Philipine National Red Cross is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions

"xxx.

PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions

On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95,7 otherwise known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.8 The PNRC provides six major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services, Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.9

The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929.10 The Whereas clauses of the PNRC Charter read:

WHEREAS, there was developed at Geneva, Switzerland, on August 22, 1864, a convention by which the nations of the world were invited to join together in diminishing, so far lies within their power, the evils inherent in war;

WHEREAS, more than sixty nations of the world have ratified or adhered to the subsequent revision of said convention, namely the "Convention of Geneva of July 29 [sic], 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field" (referred to in this Charter as the Geneva Red Cross Convention);

WHEREAS, the Geneva Red Cross Convention envisages the establishment in each country of a voluntary organization to assist in caring for the wounded and sick of the armed forces and to furnish supplies for that purpose;

WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an independent nation on July 4, 1946 and proclaimed its adherence to the Geneva Red Cross Convention on February 14, 1947, and by that action indicated its desire to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating the suffering caused by war and to establish in the Philippines a voluntary organization for that purpose as contemplated by the Geneva Red Cross Convention;

WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a Charter of the American National Red Cross which must be terminated in view of the independence of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in the other countries which have ratified or adhered to the Geneva Red Cross Convention assist in promoting the health and welfare of their people in peace and in war, and through their mutual assistance and cooperation directly and through their international organizations promote better understanding and sympathy among the peoples of the world. (Emphasis supplied)

The PNRC is a member National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Movement), which is composed of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (International Federation), and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (National Societies). The Movement is united and guided by its seven Fundamental Principles:

1. HUMANITY – The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.

2. IMPARTIALITY – It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

3. NEUTRALITY – In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

4. INDEPENDENCE – The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.

5. VOLUNTARY SERVICE – It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.

6. UNITY – There can be only one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.

7. UNIVERSALITY – The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide. (Emphasis supplied)

The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard of reference for all members of the Movement. The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the duty to uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement.11

The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents as neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In the Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or controlled, and neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as government personnel or as instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend to the wounded in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.

Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent in order to conduct its activities in accordance with the Fundamental Principles. The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency that implements government policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out its mission as a National Red Cross Society.12 It is imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in relation to the State.

To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress.13 The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors, as provided under Section 11 of the PNRC Charter:

SECTION 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine National Red Cross shall be financed primarily by contributions obtained through solicitation campaigns throughout the year which shall be organized by the Board of Governors and conducted by the Chapters in their respective jurisdictions. These fund raising campaigns shall be conducted independently of other fund drives by other organizations. (Emphasis supplied)

The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter, as amended, only six of the thirty members of the PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the President of the Philippines. Thus, twenty-four members, or four-fifths (4/5), of the PNRC Board of Governors are not appointed by the President. Section 6 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, provides:

SECTION 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested in a Board of Governors composed of thirty members, six of whom shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, eighteen shall be elected by chapter delegates in biennial conventions and the remaining six shall be selected by the twenty-four members of the Board already chosen. x x x.

Thus, of the twenty-four members of the PNRC Board, eighteen are elected by the chapter delegates of the PNRC, and six are elected by the twenty-four members already chosen — a select group where the private sector members have three-fourths majority. Clearly, an overwhelming majority of four-fifths of the PNRC Board are elected or chosen by the private sector members of the PNRC.

The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC, elects the PNRC Chairman and all other officers of the PNRC. The incumbent Chairman of PNRC, respondent Senator Gordon, was elected, as all PNRC Chairmen are elected, by a private sector-controlled PNRC Board four-fifths of whom are private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official.

Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution,14 the President appoints all officials and employees in the Executive branch whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution or by law. The President also appoints those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under this Section 16, the law may also authorize the "heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards" to appoint officers lower in rank than such heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards.15 In Rufino v. Endriga,16 the Court explained appointments under Section 16 in this wise:

Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.

Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. x x x

x x x

In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the power is vested in the head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last three situations, the law may not also authorize officers other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to appoint lower-ranked officers.

x x x

The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the "heads" of the specified offices, and in no other person. The word "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their members, for several reasons.

The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.

Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,17 the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive branch. If an office is legally not under the control of the President, then such office is not part of the Executive branch. In Rufino v. Endriga,18 the Court explained the President’s power of control over all government offices as follows:

Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial branches, or must belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-judicial body or local government unit. Otherwise, such government office, entity, or agency has no legal and constitutional basis for its existence.

The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department" falls "under the Office of the President."

Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President "shall have control of all executive . . . offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office — one performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies — from the President’s power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.

The President’s power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.

In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises "control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional basis. (Emphasis supplied)

An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector individuals elected to the PNRC Board by the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Board exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC. The PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions or actions of the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the President. The President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again that the office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office, not a government office.1avvphi1

Although the State is often represented in the governing bodies of a National Society, this can be justified by the need for proper coordination with the public authorities, and the government representatives may take part in decision-making within a National Society. However, the freely-elected representatives of a National Society’s active members must remain in a large majority in a National Society’s governing bodies.19

The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon contributing ₱35, ₱100, ₱300, ₱500 or ₱1,000 for the year.20 Even foreigners, whether residents or not, can be members of the PNRC. Section 5 of the PNRC Charter, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1264,21 reads:

SEC. 5. Membership in the Philippine National Red Cross shall be open to the entire population in the Philippines regardless of citizenship. Any contribution to the Philippine National Red Cross Annual Fund Campaign shall entitle the contributor to membership for one year and said contribution shall be deductible in full for taxation purposes.

Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.

Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of Camporedondo v. NLRC,22 which ruled that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. In ruling that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation, the simple test used was whether the corporation was created by its own special charter for the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the general corporation law. Since the PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is a government corporation. However, the Camporedondo ruling failed to consider the definition of a government-owned or controlled corporation as provided under Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987:

SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. – x x x

(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.(Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be government officials holding such membership by appointment or designation by the government. Under this criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not own or control PNRC.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 175352 (2009)

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners,
vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_175352_2009.html#rnt20

Quo warranto

"xxx.

Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition

A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto. Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners allege in their petition that:

4. Respondent became the Chairman of the PNRC when he was elected as such during the First Regular Luncheon-Meeting of the Board of Governors of the PNRC held on February 23, 2006, the minutes of which is hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex "A."

5. Respondent was elected as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, during his incumbency as a Member of the House of Senate of the Congress of the Philippines, having been elected as such during the national elections last May 2004.

6. Since his election as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, which position he duly accepted, respondent has been exercising the powers and discharging the functions and duties of said office, despite the fact that he is still a senator.

7. It is the respectful submission of the petitioner[s] that by accepting the chairmanship of the Board of Governors of the PNRC, respondent has ceased to be a Member of the House of Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, x x x

x x x x

10. It is respectfully submitted that in accepting the position of Chairman of the Board of Governors of the PNRC on February 23, 2006, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the House of Senate and, therefore, has long ceased to be a Senator, pursuant to the ruling of this Honorable Court in the case of FLORES, ET AL. VS. DRILON AND GORDON, G.R. No. 104732, x x x

11. Despite the fact that he is no longer a senator, respondent continues to act as such and still performs the powers, functions and duties of a senator, contrary to the constitution, law and jurisprudence.

12. Unless restrained, therefore, respondent will continue to falsely act and represent himself as a senator or member of the House of Senate, collecting the salaries, emoluments and other compensations, benefits and privileges appertaining and due only to the legitimate senators, to the damage, great and irreparable injury of the Government and the Filipino people.5 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.

Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage.6 In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition.

Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a taxpayer’s suit, the petition would still fail on the merits.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 175352 (2009)

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners,
vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_175352_2009.html#rnt20

"Cause of action" explained

"xxx.

The rule against splitting the cause of action does not apply in a Petition for Certiorari

Petitioner maintains that the CA erred in applying the rule against splitting a cause of action. Accordingly, a Petition for Certiorari is not based on a cause of action but rather the presence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the assailed order.[49]

We agree with the petitioner.

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a "cause of action" as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. The essential elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of the defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.[50]

On the other hand, a Writ of Certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65 will issue when there is grave abuse of discretion committed by a tribunal, board or officer who in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions, has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instance of grave abuse of discretion, the court may annul or modify the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and grant such incidental reliefs as the law and justice may require.

Verily, a Petition for Certiorari cannot be based on a cause of action. First, the parties involved in such petition would be the petitioner and the tribunal, board or officer who purportedly exceeded its discretion in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In a cause of action, the parties would be the plaintiff and the defendant who violated the right of the former which he (defendant) had the obligation to respect.

Second, a Petition for Certiorari cannot arise from a violation of a right belonging to the petitioner that the tribunal, board or officer has the concomitant obligation to respect. To reiterate, a certiorari writ will only lie when the tribunal, board of officer commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the existence of a cause of action will be the basis of every ordinary civil action.[51]

Third, a Writ of Certiorari results in the annulment or modification of the proceedings. However, the violation of a right of a plaintiff or breach of obligation by the defendant would give rise to a cause of action that will provide the plaintiff with the right to file an action in court for the recovery of damages or other relief.[52]

Finally, a Petition for Certiorari, being a special civil action, may only be availed of when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Meanwhile, a cause of action is the basic requirement in an ordinary civil action.

Here, the CA held that petitioner violated the subject rule and should have joined all its objections against the August 10, 2012 Order of the RTC in one Petition for Certiorari. The CA explained:

Petitioner is guilty of splitting its cause of action in the filing of the instant Petition. Rule 2, Sections 3 and 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provide:

Section 3. One Suit For A Single Cause of Action. — A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. (3 a)

Section 4. Splitting A Single Cause of Action; Effect of. — If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. (4a)

It is undisputable that CA-G.R. 127072 is a Petition assailing the contents of the 10 August 2012 Order of the trial court on the issue of whether the plaintiffs are non-suited. The instant action on the other hand, assails the same Order, albeit this time only on the portion resolving the issue of non-applicability of the ICC and the disallowance of the Requests for Admission. Definitely, the Petitioner could have joined all its objections to the assailed Order in a single Petition for Certiorari, but rather elected to file two (2) Petitions thus taxing the energy and the docket of this Court. Thus, the instant action should also be dismissed based on this ground.[53]

The CA arrived at an erroneous conclusion.

Petitioner filed the first petition (CA-G.R. 127072) to question the November 28, 2011 and August 10, 2012 Orders upon the belief that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to declare FITI and Bacalla as not suited. On the other hand, the second petition (CA-G.R. No. 129574) now subject of the instant case, arose from the August 10, 2012 and January 14, 2013 Orders of the trial court which petitioner maintains to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion due to the application of the Interim Rules. Clearly, the said petitions did not allege the RTC to have violated petitioner's right which may be the basis for a cause of action. Instead, petitioner alleged separate occasions of grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in not declaring FITI and Batalla as not suited and in applying the Interim Rules. Both petitions will give rise to an annulment or modification of the proceedings below and will not afford the petitioner with a remedy of damages against the RTC.

Moreover, a Writ of Certiorari may only be availed when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For this reason, We cannot fault the petitioner for filing the second petition because the trial court only ruled on the applicability of the Interim Rules in the August 10, 2012 Order. It is settled rule that a Motion for Reconsideration is mandatory before the filing of a Petition for Certiorari.[54] Hence, petitioner properly moved for a reconsideration of that portion in the August 10, 2012 Order pertaining to the application of the Interim Rules before directly resorting to a Petition for Certiorari. Accordingly, the CA erred in applying the rule against splitting the cause of action in the assailed rulings.

A final note.

The inaccurate application by the CA of the rule against splitting a cause of action will not negatively impact the efficacy of its July 27, 2015 Decision and March 4, 2016 Resolution. To recall, We affirmed the CA in denying the petitioner's application for a Writ of Certiorari because the Interim Rules apply in the proceedings below. The misapplication of the rule on splitting the cause of action was merely an innocuous mistake on the part of the CA and will not disaffirm our resolve to deny the present petition due to lack of merit.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 223404, July 15, 2020

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, VS. MARCIANO S. BACALLA, JR., EDUARDO M. ABACAN, ERLINDA U. LIM, FELICITO A. MADAMBA, AND PEPITO M. DELGADO, RESPONDENTS.

"Intra-corporate controversy" explained

"xxx.

The Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies under R.A. No. 8799 applies to the proceedings in the RTC.

The Court notes that the petitioner does not challenge the jurisdiction of the RTC in hearing the complaint filed by the respondents. The controversy lies in whether the trial court correctly applied the Interim Rules on Intra-Corporate Controversies in its proceedings below.

The Interim Rules traces its roots from Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 which transferred all cases under Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate RTC. Under Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A, the following cases were transferred to the RTC:


a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholder, partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission;

b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity;

c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations. (emphasis supplied)

In compliance, the Court approved the Interim Rules on March 13, 2001 and took effect on April 1, 2001.[36] Section 1(a), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules restates the cases enumerated under Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A with the addition of derivative suits[37] and inspection of corporate books.[38]

In the assailed Decision, the CA observed that based on the impleaded parties, allegations, and the reliefs prayed for, the complaint concerned the recovery of assets of the dissolved TGICI. It concluded that because of the fraudulent dissipation of TGICI assets caused by the officers, the matter had become an intra-corporate dispute under Sec. 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A.[39]

Indeed, the respondents initiated their action under the Interim Rules as shown on the face of the complaint which reads: "For: Devices or Schemes Amounting to Fraud and Misrepresentation Detrimental to the Interest of the Public Under PD No. 902-A and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under R.A. 8799 with Declaration of Nullity of Contracts and Specific Performance with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction."[40] But since courts cannot rely on the caption of the complaint alone, and if the complainant wishes to invoke the court's special commercial jurisdiction, the complaint must show on its face what the claimed fraudulent corporate acts[41] are which require the application of the Interim Rules. We expounded on this requirement in Guy v. Guy[42] as follows:

x x x. In Reyes, we pronounced that "in cases governed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies a bill of particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is essential, therefore, for the complaint to show on its face what are claimed to be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant wishes to invoke the court's special commercial jurisdiction." This is because fraud in intra-corporate controversies must be based on "devices and schemes employed by, or any act of, the board of directors, business associates, officers or partners, amounting to fraud or misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, or members of any corporation, partnership, or association," as stated under Rule 1, Section 1(a) (1) of the Interim Rules. The act of fraud or misrepresentation complained of becomes a criterion in determining whether the complaint on its face has merits, or within the jurisdiction of special commercial court, or merely a nuisance suit. (emphasis supplied)

We perused the subject complaint and were convinced that it contained specific allegations of corporate layering, improper matched orders and other manipulative devices or schemes resorted to by the corporate officers in defrauding the stockholders and investors of TGICI.[43] Evidently, these averments meet the standard of specificity required by Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A and Section 1(a)(1), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules.

However, the petitioner remained unconvinced that the Interim Rules applies. It argued that the complaint does not involve an intra-corporate controversy as it failed to satisfy the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test. It ventured that since Cielo Azul has a separate and distinct personality, there can be no relationship between the corporation and the respondents as TGICI receiver and investors.

The contention is erroneous.

In determining whether a case is an intracorporate controversy, We resort to a combined application of the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test.[44]

Under the relationship test, the existence of any of the following relations makes the conflict intra-corporate: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. For as long as any of these intra-corporate relationships exists between the parties, the controversy would be characterized as intra-corporate.[45]

Meanwhile, in the nature of controversy test, the controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties' correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation.[46]

The subject complaint specifically alleged that the corporate officers resorted to corporate layering by transferring funds accumulated through investments by the public to TGICI subsidiaries. Such allegation plainly established the relationship between the petitioner as the issuer of shares funneled to Cielo Azul, and herein respondents as court-appointed receiver and investors. Based on this relationship, respondents sought the lower court to pierce the corporate veil and declare Cielo Azul, JAMCOR Holdings, TMG Holdings, Jesus Tibayan and Gelacio as having one personality. Accordingly, We concur with the CA that petitioner cannot take refuge from the defense of being a third party. The CA fittingly explained:

It is also undisputed that there is a right of action vested upon the Receiver of the said holding corporation as well as the investors thereof over the wholly owned subsidiary. The latter is sued in due regard to the allegations on the singular identity of the holding corporation and the wholly owned subsidiary in this case. This right of action by interested parties in the holding corporation over the subsidiary transcends the individual juridical personalities of the said corporations as ruled by the Supreme Court in Gokongwei vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, wherein the right of the stockholder of the parent corporation to inspect the books of the wholly owned subsidiary was upheld. x x x

x x x x

Accordingly, the fact that Prudential Bank (now Petitioner Bank) and the vendees who seem to be third parties do not necessarily convert this action into an ordinary civil action where only the Rules of Court applies. There are sufficient allegations of anomalies in the sale of all the corporate assets (the 630,225 shares of stocks) of the subsidiaries to the vendees with the latter's knowledge and participation and also with the knowledge of Prudential Bank. Thus, the impleading of the vendees and Prudential Bank aside from the subsidiaries and the officers of the corporation is only consequential because of Prudential Bank's and the vendees' participation in violating the investors' rights. What matters is that there is a violation of the Corporation Code and defraudation of those interested therein, i.e., the investing public.

In Spouses Abejo vs. Dela Cruz, the Supreme Court clarified that when it affects the interests of the corporation, i.e., the enforcement of rights and obligations under the Corporation Code affecting the internal or intracorporate affairs of the said Corporation, the same is an Intracorporate dispute. xxx

x x x x

Indeed, in Rivilla vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Supreme Court citing Abejo, recognized the dispute as Intracorporate as when schemes were resorted to by officers of corporations to defraud investors. x x x[47] (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

As a mere conduit in the alleged fraudulent investment scheme by TGICI, Tibayan and Elacio, Cielo Azul, with TMG Holdings and JAMCOR Holdings, cannot prevent the court-appointed receiver of TGICI from accessing its corporate books and records to recover the assets which have been purportedly dissipated through illegal stock trading. Verily, the nature of the dispute raised by the respondents in their complaint is intrinsically connected with the regulation of TGICI and its subsidiaries.

Considering that the present matter involves an intra-corporate dispute, the CA did not err in affirming the denial by the RTC of the petitioner's belated filing of Requests for Admissions based on Section 1, Rule 3[48] of the Interim Rules.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 223404, July 15, 2020 

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, VS. MARCIANO S. BACALLA, JR., EDUARDO M. ABACAN, ERLINDA U. LIM, FELICITO A. MADAMBA, AND PEPITO M. DELGADO, RESPONDENTS.

Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court ample inherent and administrative powers to effectively control the conduct of its proceedings.

"xxx.

Policies Adopted for Conduct of Court Hearing

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao arbitrarily recognized only one public prosecutor and one private prosecutor for all the offended parties but allowed each of the counsels representing the individual respondents to be heard during the proceedings before it. She also unjustifiably prohibited the prosecution’s use of tape recorders.

But Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court ample inherent and administrative powers to effectively control the conduct of its proceedings. Thus:

Sec. 5. Inherent powers of court. — Every court shall have power:

x x x x

(b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person or persons empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;

x x x x

(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto;

x x x x

(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice;

x x x x

There is nothing arbitrary about Judge Yadao’s policy of allowing only one public prosecutor and one private prosecutor to address the court during the hearing for determination of probable cause but permitting counsels representing the individual accused to do so. A criminal action is prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.26 The burden of establishing probable cause against all the accused is upon him, not upon the private prosecutors whose interests lie solely in their clients’ damages claim. Besides, the public and the private prosecutors take a common position on the issue of probable cause. On the other hand, each of the accused is entitled to adopt defenses that are personal to him.

As for the prohibition against the prosecution’s private recording of the proceedings, courts usually disallows such recordings because they create an unnecessary distraction and if allowed, could prompt every lawyer, party, witness, or reporter having some interest in the proceeding to insist on being given the same privilege. Since the prosecution makes no claim that the official recording of the proceedings by the court’s stenographer has been insufficient, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in Judge Yadao’s policy against such extraneous recordings.

Xxx."


G.R. Nos. 162144-54
November 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORRE- YADAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, HON. MA. NATIVIDAD M. DIZON, in her capacity as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, PANFILO M. LACSON, JEWEL F. CANSON, ROMEO M. ACOP, FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, CEZAR O. MANCAO II, ZOROBABEL S. LAURELES, GLENN G. DUMLAO, ALMARIO A. HILARIO, JOSE ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, GIL C. MENESES, ROLANDO ANDUYAN, JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, RICARDO G. DANDAN, CEASAR TANNAGAN, VICENTE P. ARNADO, ROBERTO T. LANGCAUON, ANGELITO N. CAISIP, ANTONIO FRIAS, CICERO S. BACOLOD, WILLY NUAS, JUANITO B. MANAOIS, VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, CECILIO T. MORITO, REYNALDO C. LAS PINAS, WILFREDO G CUARTERO, ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, OSMUNDO B. CARINO, NORBERTO LASAGA, LEONARDO GLORIA, ALEJANDRO G LIWANAG, ELMER FERRER and ROMY CRUZ, Respondents.

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.

"xxx.

Dismissal of the Criminal Cases

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she set the motions for determination of probable cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest, and allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The prosecution stresses that under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court Judge Yadao’s duty was to determine probable cause for the purpose of issuing the arrest warrants solely on the basis of the investigating prosecutor’s resolution as well as the informations and their supporting documents. And, if she had some doubts as to the existence of probable cause, the rules required her to order the investigating prosecutor to present additional evidence to support the finding of probable cause within five days from notice.

Rather than take limited action, said the prosecution, Judge Yadao dug up and adopted the Ombudsman’s findings when the latter conducted its preliminary investigation of the crime of robbery in 1996. Judge Yadao gave weight to the affidavits submitted in that earlier preliminary investigation when such documents are proper for presentation during the trial of the cases. The prosecution added that the affidavits of P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos and SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes reasonably explained the prior inconsistent affidavits they submitted before the Ombudsman.

The general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when determining probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.13

But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in their new affidavits the inconsistent statements that they earlier submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable cause based on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent statements and related documents that the witnesses themselves brought up and were part of the records. Besides, she received no new evidence from the respondents.14

The public prosecutor submitted the following affidavits and documents along with the criminal informations to enable Judge Yadao to determine the presence of probable cause against the respondents:

1. P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu’s affidavit of March 24, 200115 in which he said that on May 17, 1995 respondent Canson, NCR Command Head, ordered him to form two teams that would go after suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members who were seen at the Superville Subdivision in Parañaque City. Yu headed the assault team while Marlon Sapla headed the perimeter defense. After the police team apprehended eight men inside the safe house, it turned them over to their investigating unit. The following day, Yu just learned that the men and three others were killed in a shoot-out with the police in Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.

2. P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos’ affidavit of March 24, 200116 in which he said that he was part of the perimeter defense during the Superville operation. After the assault team apprehended eight male suspects, it brought them to Camp Crame in two vans. Ramos then went to the office of respondent Zubia, TMC Head, where he saw respondents Lacson, Acop, Laureles, Villacorte and other police officers.

According to Ramos, Zubia said that the eight suspects were to be brought to Commonwealth Avenue and killed in a supposed shoot-out and that this action had been cleared with higher authorities, to which remark Lacson nodded as a sign of approval. Before Ramos left the meeting, Lacson supposedly told him, "baka may mabuhay pa diyan." Ramos then boarded an L-300 van with his men and four male suspects. In the early morning of May 18, 1995, they executed the plan and gunned down the suspects. A few minutes later, P/S Insp. Glenn G. Dumlao and his men arrived and claimed responsibility for the incident.

3. SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes’ affidavit of April 24, 200117 in which he corroborated Ramos’ statements. Medes said that he belonged to the same team that arrested the eight male suspects. He drove the L-300 van in going to Commonwealth Avenue where the suspects were killed.

4. Mario C. Enad’s affidavit of August 8, 199518 in which he claimed having served as TMC civilian agent. At around noon of May 17, 1995, he went to Superville Subdivision together with respondents Dumlao, Tannagan, and Nuas. Dumlao told Enad to stay in the car and observe what went on in the house under surveillance. Later that night, other police officers arrived and apprehended the men in the house. Enad went in and saw six men lying on the floor while the others were handcuffed. Enad and his companions left Sucat in the early morning of May 18, 1995. He fell asleep along the way but was awaken by gunshots. He saw Dumlao and other police officers fire their guns at the L-300 van containing the apprehended suspects.

5. SPO2 Noel P. Seno’s affidavit of May 31, 200119 in which he corroborated what Ramos said. Seno claimed that he was part of the advance party in Superville Subdivision and was also in Commonwealth Avenue when the suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were killed.

6. The PNP ABRITG After Operations Report of May 31, 199520 which narrated the events that took place on May 17 and 18, 1995. This report was submitted by Lacson, Zubia, Acop and Canson.

7. The PNP Medico-Legal Reports21 which stated that the suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang tested negative for gunpowder nitrates.

The Court agrees with Judge Yadao that the above affidavits and reports, taken together with the other documents of record, fail to establish probable cause against the respondents.

First. Evidently, the case against respondents rests on the testimony of Ramos, corroborated by those of Medes, Enad, and Seno, who supposedly heard the commanders of the various units plan the killing of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members somewhere in Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City and actually execute such plan. Yu’s testimony is limited to the capture of the gang members and goes no further. He did not see them killed.

Second. Respecting the testimonies of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, the prosecution’s own evidence—the PNP ABRITG’s After Operations Report of May 31, 1995—shows that these men took no part in the operations against the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members. The report included a comprehensive list of police personnel from Task Force Habagat (Lacson), Traffic Management Command (Zubia), Criminal Investigation Command (Acop), and National Capital Region Command (Canson) who were involved. The names of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno were not on that list. Notably, only Yu’s name, among the new set of witnesses, was on that list. Since an after-battle report usually serves as basis for commendations and promotions, any omitted name would hardly have gone unchallenged.

Third. Ramos, whose story appeared to be the most significant evidence against the respondents, submitted in the course of the preliminary investigation that the Office of the Ombudsman conducted in a related robbery charge against the police officers involved a counter-affidavit. He claimed in that counter-affidavit that he was neither in Superville Subdivision nor Commonwealth Avenue during the Kuratong Baleleng operations since he was in Bulacan on May 17, 1995 and at his home on May 18.22 Notably, Medes claimed in a joint counter-affidavit that he was on duty at the TMC headquarters at Camp Crame on May 17 and 18.23

Fourth. The Office of the Ombudsman, looking at the whole picture and giving credence to Ramos and Medes’ statements, dismissed the robbery case. More, it excluded Ramos from the group of officers that it charged with the murder of the suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. Under the circumstances, the Court cannot be less skeptical than Judge Yadao was in doubting the sudden reversal after six years of testimony of these witnesses.

Of course, Yu may have taken part in the subject operation but, as he narrated, his role was limited to cornering and arresting the suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members at their safe house in Superville Subdivision. After his team turned the suspects over to an investigating unit, he no longer knew what happened to them.

Fifth. True, the PNP Medico-Legal Reports showed that the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members tested negative for gunpowder nitrates. But this finding cannot have any legal significance for the purpose of the preliminary investigation of the murder cases against the respondents absent sufficient proof that they probably took part in gunning those gang members down.

The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel of prosecutors to present additional evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.24

But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The court’s first option under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause." That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.

It is only "in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause" that the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice. But that is not the case here. Discounting the affidavits of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, nothing is left in the record that presents some doubtful probability that respondents committed the crime charged. PNP Director Leandro Mendoza sought the revival of the cases in 2001, six years after it happened. It would have been ridiculous to entertain the belief that the police could produce new witnesses in the five days required of the prosecution by the rules.

In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple murder, they should be insulated from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.25

Xxx. "


G.R. Nos. 162144-54
November 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORRE- YADAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, HON. MA. NATIVIDAD M. DIZON, in her capacity as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, PANFILO M. LACSON, JEWEL F. CANSON, ROMEO M. ACOP, FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, CEZAR O. MANCAO II, ZOROBABEL S. LAURELES, GLENN G. DUMLAO, ALMARIO A. HILARIO, JOSE ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, GIL C. MENESES, ROLANDO ANDUYAN, JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, RICARDO G. DANDAN, CEASAR TANNAGAN, VICENTE P. ARNADO, ROBERTO T. LANGCAUON, ANGELITO N. CAISIP, ANTONIO FRIAS, CICERO S. BACOLOD, WILLY NUAS, JUANITO B. MANAOIS, VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, CECILIO T. MORITO, REYNALDO C. LAS PINAS, WILFREDO G CUARTERO, ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, OSMUNDO B. CARINO, NORBERTO LASAGA, LEONARDO GLORIA, ALEJANDRO G LIWANAG, ELMER FERRER and ROMY CRUZ, Respondents.

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court and Rule 3.12, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct provide for the compulsory disqualification of a judge while the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 provides for his voluntary inhibition.

"xxx.

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to inhibit herself from hearing the cases against the respondents.

The rules governing the disqualification of judges are found, first, in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

and in Rule 3.12, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states:

Rule 3.12. – A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include among others, proceedings where:

(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

x x x x

(e) the judge knows the judge’s spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. In every instance, the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 and Rule 3.12, Canon 3 provide for the compulsory disqualification of a judge while the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 provides for his voluntary inhibition.

The matter of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge since he is in a better position to determine whether a given situation would unfairly affect his attitude towards the parties or their cases. The mere imputation of bias, partiality, and prejudgment is not enough ground, absent clear and convincing evidence that can overcome the presumption that the judge will perform his duties according to law without fear or favor. The Court will not disqualify a judge based on speculations and surmises or the adverse nature of the judge’s rulings towards those who seek to inhibit him.12

Here, the prosecution contends that Judge Yadao should have inhibited herself for improperly submitting to a public interview on the day following her dismissal of the criminal cases against the respondents. But the Court finds nothing basically reprehensible in such interview. Judge Yadao’s dismissal of the multiple murder cases aroused natural public interest and stirred the media into frenzy for correct information. Judge Yadao simply accommodated, not sought, the requests for such an interview to clarify the basis of her order. There is no allegation that she gave out false information. To be sure, the prosecution never once accused her of making public disclosures regarding the merits of those cases prior to her order dismissing such cases.

The prosecution also assails as constituting bias Judge Yadao’s statement that a very close relative stood to be promoted if she was to issue a warrant of arrest against the respondents. But this statement merely shows that she cannot be dissuaded by some relative who is close to her. How can this constitute bias? Besides, there is no evidence that the close relative she referred to was her spouse or child which would be a mandatory ground for disqualification.

Further, the prosecution claims that Judge Yadao prejudged its motion for reconsideration when she said in her comment to the administrative complaint against her that such motion was merely the prosecution’s stubborn insistence on the existence of probable cause against the respondents. The comment could of course not be regarded as a prejudgment of the issue since she had precisely already issued an order holding that the complainant’s evidence failed to establish probable cause against the respondents. And there is nothing wrong about characterizing a motion for reconsideration as a "stubborn" position taken by the party who filed it. Judge Yadao did not characterize the motion as wholly unjustified at the time she filed her comment.

Xxx."



G.R. Nos. 162144-54

November 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORRE- YADAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, HON. MA. NATIVIDAD M. DIZON, in her capacity as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, PANFILO M. LACSON, JEWEL F. CANSON, ROMEO M. ACOP, FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, CEZAR O. MANCAO II, ZOROBABEL S. LAURELES, GLENN G. DUMLAO, ALMARIO A. HILARIO, JOSE ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, GIL C. MENESES, ROLANDO ANDUYAN, JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, RICARDO G. DANDAN, CEASAR TANNAGAN, VICENTE P. ARNADO, ROBERTO T. LANGCAUON, ANGELITO N. CAISIP, ANTONIO FRIAS, CICERO S. BACOLOD, WILLY NUAS, JUANITO B. MANAOIS, VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, CECILIO T. MORITO, REYNALDO C. LAS PINAS, WILFREDO G CUARTERO, ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, OSMUNDO B. CARINO, NORBERTO LASAGA, LEONARDO GLORIA, ALEJANDRO G LIWANAG, ELMER FERRER and ROMY CRUZ, Respondents.

Jurisdiction of Family Courts

"xxx.

2. Jurisdiction of Family Courts

The prosecution points out that, although this Court’s October 7, 2003 Resolution directed a re-raffle of the cases to a heinous crimes court, the prosecution in the meantime amended the informations to reflect the fact that two of the murder victims were minors. For this reason, the Executive Judge should have raffled the cases to a family court pursuant to Section 5 of R.A. 8369.

The Court is not impervious to the provisions of Section 5 of R.A. 8369, that vests in family courts jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 7610, which in turn covers murder cases where the victim is a minor. Thus:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the respondent may have incurred. (Emphasis supplied)

Undoubtedly, in vesting in family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving minors, the law but seeks to protect their welfare and best interests. For this reason, when the need for such protection is not compromised, the Court is able to relax the rule. In several cases,11 for instance, the Court has held that the CA enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts in hearing petitions for habeas corpus involving minors.

Here, the two minor victims, for whose interests the people wanted the murder cases moved to a family court, are dead. As respondents aptly point out, there is no living minor in the murder cases that require the special attention and protection of a family court. In fact, no minor would appear as party in those cases during trial since the minor victims are represented by their parents who had become the real private offended parties.

Xxx. "



G.R. Nos. 162144-54
November 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORRE- YADAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, HON. MA. NATIVIDAD M. DIZON, in her capacity as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, PANFILO M. LACSON, JEWEL F. CANSON, ROMEO M. ACOP, FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, CEZAR O. MANCAO II, ZOROBABEL S. LAURELES, GLENN G. DUMLAO, ALMARIO A. HILARIO, JOSE ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, GIL C. MENESES, ROLANDO ANDUYAN, JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, RICARDO G. DANDAN, CEASAR TANNAGAN, VICENTE P. ARNADO, ROBERTO T. LANGCAUON, ANGELITO N. CAISIP, ANTONIO FRIAS, CICERO S. BACOLOD, WILLY NUAS, JUANITO B. MANAOIS, VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, CECILIO T. MORITO, REYNALDO C. LAS PINAS, WILFREDO G CUARTERO, ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, OSMUNDO B. CARINO, NORBERTO LASAGA, LEONARDO GLORIA, ALEJANDRO G LIWANAG, ELMER FERRER and ROMY CRUZ, Respondents.

Waiver of principle of judicial hierarchy of courts.

"xxx.

Before addressing the above issues, the Court notes respondents’ contention that the prosecution’s resort to special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is improper. Since the trial court dismissed the criminal actions against respondents, the prosecution’s remedy was to appeal to the CA from that order of dismissal.

Ordinarily, the proper remedy from an order dismissing an action is an appeal.8 Here, the prosecution in fact filed a notice of appeal from such an order issued in the subject cases. But it reconsidered its action and withdrew that notice, believing that appeal was not an effective, speedy, and adequate remedy.9 In other words, the prosecution’s move was not a case of forgotten remedy but a conscious resort to another based on a belief that respondent Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion in issuing her various orders and that certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper and all-encompassing remedy for the prosecution. The Court is not prepared to say that the remedy is altogether implausible as to throw out the petition outright.

Still, the Court notes that the prosecution skipped the CA and filed its action directly with this Court, ignoring the principle of judicial hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, the CA, and the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, such concurrence does not give the People the unrestricted freedom of choice of forum.10 In any case, the immense public interest in these cases, the considerable length of time that has passed since the crime took place, and the numerous times these cases have come before this Court probably warrant a waiver of such procedural lapse.

Xxx. "


G.R. Nos. 162144-54
November 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORRE- YADAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, HON. MA. NATIVIDAD M. DIZON, in her capacity as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, PANFILO M. LACSON, JEWEL F. CANSON, ROMEO M. ACOP, FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, CEZAR O. MANCAO II, ZOROBABEL S. LAURELES, GLENN G. DUMLAO, ALMARIO A. HILARIO, JOSE ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, GIL C. MENESES, ROLANDO ANDUYAN, JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, RICARDO G. DANDAN, CEASAR TANNAGAN, VICENTE P. ARNADO, ROBERTO T. LANGCAUON, ANGELITO N. CAISIP, ANTONIO FRIAS, CICERO S. BACOLOD, WILLY NUAS, JUANITO B. MANAOIS, VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, CECILIO T. MORITO, REYNALDO C. LAS PINAS, WILFREDO G CUARTERO, ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, OSMUNDO B. CARINO, NORBERTO LASAGA, LEONARDO GLORIA, ALEJANDRO G LIWANAG, ELMER FERRER and ROMY CRUZ, Respondents.

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character.

"xxx.

Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law41 for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.

Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,42 an ex post facto law is one —

(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or

(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or

(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.

(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony that the law required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to convict the defendant.43

(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.44

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;

(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a amnesty.45


Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations;47 or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment.48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.49 Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

Xxx. "


G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.

"xxx.

Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law33 because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.34

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:

(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;

(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and

(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class,35

all of which are present in this case.

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences.36 In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations,37 it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).

In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya38 for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.

On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.40

Xxx. "


G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

Sandiganbayan jurisdiction

"xxx.

The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.

The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in Article XI, Section 4:

Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 148621 created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123,23 P.D. No. 1860,24 P.D. No. 1861,25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249.27 Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:

Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher.

(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employee, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

Sec. 7. Transitory provision — This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)

The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:

Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the pricipal accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.

x x x x x x x x x

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.

Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent28 or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases,29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery),30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases),31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee32 holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender — that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

Presumption of constitutionality of laws

"xxx.

The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.

Xxx. "


G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

Provisional dismissal of criminal case

"xxx.


The issue is whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. This rule which took effect on December 1, 2000 provides:

"SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal.- A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived."

Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect. However, this Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due to the lack of sufficient factual bases. Thus, there is need of proof of the following facts, viz: (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period.

There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was respondent Lacson himself who moved to dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then Judge Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument that their dismissal bears his express consent.

The records of the case, however, do not reveal with equal clarity and conclusiveness whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir. It appears from the resolution of then Judge Agnir that the relatives of the victims who desisted did not appear during the hearing to affirm their affidavits. Their affidavits of desistance were only presented by Atty. Godwin Valdez who testified that he assisted the private complainants in preparing their affidavits and he signed them as a witness. It also appears that only seven (7) persons submitted their affidavits of desistance, namely:

a. Myrna Abalora, mother of the victims Sherwin Abalora and Rey Abalora

b. Carmelita Elcamel, wife of Wilbur Elcamel;

c. Leonora Amora, mother of victim Joel Amora;

d. Nenita Alap-ap, wife of victim Carlito Alap-ap;

e. Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero;

f. Margarita Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas; and

g. Rolando Siplon.

From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3)38 other victims, namely: Meleubren Soronda, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Alex Neri. The same records do not show whether they were notified of the hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure, it is not fair to expect the element of notice to be litigated before then Judge Agnir for Section 8, Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that time.

The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction filed by respondent Lacson in the RTC of Manila, presided by Judge Pasamba, to enjoin the prosecutors from reinvestigating the said cases against him. The only question raised in said petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the right of respondent Lacson against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants.

Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the eleven (11) informations for murder against respondent Lacson and company were revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the case for respondent Lacson immediately filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against him.

This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals where respondent Lacson raised for the first time the argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against him. But even then, the appellate court did not require the parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether notices were given to the offended parties before Judge Agnir ordered the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson and company. To be sure, there is a statement in the Decision of the appellate court to the effect that "records show that the prosecution and the private offended parties were notified of the hearing x x x."39 It is doubtful whether this finding is supported by the records of the case. It appears to be contrary to Judge Agnir's finding that only seven (7) of the complainants submitted affidavits of desistance.

Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The reckoning date of the 2-year bar has to be first determined - - - whether it is from the date of the Order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were received by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity of the new rule.

If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The new rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar.

In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to rule whether or not the re-filing of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be enjoined. Fundamental fairness requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule depends. They involve disputed facts and arguable questions of law. The reception of evidence on these various issues cannot be done in this Court but before the trial court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the case at bar is remanded to the RTC - Quezon City, Branch 81 so that the State prosecutors and the respondent Lacson can adduce evidence and be heard on whether the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with on the basis of the evidence of which the trial court should make a ruling on whether the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 should be dismissed or not. Pending the ruling, the trial court is restrained from issuing any warrant of arrest against the respondent Lacson. Melo and Carpio, JJ., take no part.

SO ORDERED.

Xxx."



G.R. No. 149453 May 28, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,

vs.

PANFILO M. LACSON

Duterte, panay ang banat mo sa COA nang wala sa lugar. Gusto mong itago sa bayan ang COA audit reports na naglalantad sa kasamaan ng gobyerno mo. Kung umasta ka para kang hari ng Pilipinas. Basahin mo ang Konstitusyon!

Article II, Declaration of State Policies,

1987 Constitution:


Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION in nation-building.


Section 27. The State shall maintain HONESTY AND INTEGRITY in the public service and take positive and effective measures against GRAFT AND CORRUPTION.


Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a POLICY OF FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE of all its transactions involving public interest.


Article III, Bill of Rights, 1987 Constitution :


Section 7. The RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION on matters of public concern shall be recognized. ACCESS TO OFFICIAL RECORDS, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.


Article IX (A), Constitutional Commissions,

1987 Constitution:


Section 1. The CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS, which shall be INDEPENDENT, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT.



Article IX (D), Commission on Audit,

1987 Constitution:


Section 1.


There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, Certified Public Accountants with not less than ten years of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same profession.


The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.


Section 2.


The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty TO EXAMINE, AUDIT, AND SETTLE all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post- audit basis:


constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution;


autonomous state colleges and universities;


other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and


such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.


The Commission shall have EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY, subject to the limitations in this Article, TO DEFINE THE SCOPE OF ITS AUDIT AND EXAMINATION, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.


Section 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiaries in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.


Section 4. The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within the time fixed by law, an annual report covering the financial condition and operation of the Government, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and non-governmental entities subject to its audit, and recommend measures necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It shall submit such other reports as may be required by law.




Article XI, Accountability of Public Officers,

1987 Constitution:




Section 1. PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.