Summary judgments in forfeiture cases

"Xxx.

Petitioners’ sham denials justify the application of summary judgment

As already settled in the Swiss Deposits Decision and reiterated in the discussion above as the law of the case, the lawful income of the Marcoses is only USD 304,372.43. As discussed in paragraph 9 of the Petition for Forfeiture, Annex V-21-b states that Arelma’s assets as of 19 May 1983 were worth USD 3,369,975.00.63 The entirety of the lawful income of the Marcoses represents only 9% of the entire assets of Arelma, which petitioners remain unable to explain.

In their Answer to the Petition for Forfeiture, petitioners employ the same tactic, consisting of general denials based on a purported lack of knowledge regarding the whereabouts of the Arelma assets. Paragraph 32 of the said pleading states:

Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 59 of the Petition insofar as it alleges that the Marcoses used their cronies and engaged in laundering their filthy riches for being false and conclusory of the truth being that the Marcoses did not engage in any such illegal acts and that all the properties they acquired were lawfully acquired; and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents are not privy to the alleged transactions.64

This particular denial mimics petitioners’ similar denials of the allegations in the forfeiture Petition pertaining to the Swiss accounts and is practically identical to paragraphs 7 to 37 of the Answer. The Swiss Deposits Decision has characterized these as "sham" denials:

17. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 18 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.

18. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 19 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs and that they are not privy to the activities of the BIR.

19. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 20 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.

20. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 21 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.

21. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 22 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.

22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundation and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.

23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.

24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents are not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.

25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.

26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.

Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents' defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of privity" or "(inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago" or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses' defenses were a sham and evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the issues.65 (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, petitioners give the same stock answer to the effect that the Marcoses did not engage in any illegal activities, and that all their properties were lawfully acquired. They fail to state with particularity the ultimate facts surrounding the alleged lawfulness of the mode of acquiring the funds in Arelma (which totaled USD 3,369,975.00 back in 1983), considering that the entirety of their lawful income amounted only to USD 304,372.43, or only 9% of the entire Arelma fund. Then, as now, they employ what the Court in G.R. No. 152154 characterized as a "negative pregnant," not just in denying the criminal provenance of the Arelma funds, but in the matter of ownership of the said funds. As discussed by the Court in the first Republic case, cited by the Sandiganbayan:

Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.66

Due to the insufficiency of petitioners’ denial of paragraph 59 which in effect denies only the qualifying circumstances, and by virtue of the Court’s ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision, petitioners are deemed to have admitted the factual antecedents and the establishment of Arelma. In paragraph 32 of their Answer, they only deny the first few sentences of paragraph 59, while conveniently neglecting to address subparagraphs 1 to 5 and the opening bank documents described in 5 (a) to (d) of the Petition for Forfeiture. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Petition discusses the establishment of a Panamanian company to be named either "Larema, Inc. or Arelma, Inc., or Relma, Inc.;" the appointment of several people as directors; and the opening of a direct account with Merrill Lynch. Paragraphs 3 to 5 also of the Petition for Forfeiture detail correspondences between a "J.L. Sunier" and a letter addressed to Malacañang with the salutation "Dear Excellency."

Regarding the averment of petitioners that they lack knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the above allegations in the Petition for Forfeiture, the Court’s discussion in the Swiss Deposits Decision bears reiterating:

Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged.67

Petitioners cannot escape the fact that there is manifest disparity between the amount of the Arelma funds and the lawful income of the Marcoses as shown in the ITRs filed by spouses Marcos. The Swiss Deposits Decision found that the genuineness of the said ITRs and balance sheets of the Marcos spouses have already been admitted by petitioners themselves:

Not only that. Respondents’ answer also technically admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the petition for forfeiture, as well as the veracity of the contents thereof.

The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and balance sheets on the ground of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly points out that respondents' denial was not really grounded on lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief but was based on lack of recollection. By reviewing their own records, respondent Marcoses could have easily determined the genuineness and due execution of the ITRs and the balance sheets. They also had the means and opportunity of verifying the same from the records of the BIR and the Office of the President. They did not.

When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a specific denial. An unexplained denial of information within the control of the pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective denial.68 (Footnotes omitted.)

We find that petitioners have again attempted to delay the goal of asset recovery by their evasiveness and the expedient profession of ignorance. It is well-established that a profession of ignorance about a fact that is necessarily within the pleader’s knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all. On a similar vein, there is a failure by petitioners to properly tender an issue, which as correctly ruled by the Sandiganbayan, justifies the Republic’s resort to summary judgment.

Summary judgment may be allowed where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and where the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.69 In Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan, the Court has previously discussed the importance of summary judgment in weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation in order to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial, viz:

Even if the pleadings appear, on their face, to raise issues, summary judgment may still ensue as a matter of law if the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine. The presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact determines, at bottom, the propriety of summary judgment. A "genuine issue", as differentiated from a fictitious or contrived one, is an issue of fact that requires the presentation of evidence. To the party who moves for summary judgment rests the onus of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. 70

Even if in the Answer itself there appears to be a tender of issues requiring trial, yet when the relevant affidavits, depositions, or admissions demonstrate that those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for plaintiff.71

Summary judgment, or accelerated judgment as it is sometimes known, may also call for a hearing so that both the movant and the adverse party may justify their positions. However, the hearing contemplated (with 10-day notice) is for the purpose of determining whether the issues are genuine or not, not to receive evidence of the issues set up in the pleadings. In Carcon Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 72 the Court ruled that a hearing is not de riguer. The matter may be resolved, and usually is, on the basis of affidavits, depositions, and admissions. This does not mean that the hearing is superfluous; only that the court is empowered to determine its necessity.

It is the law itself that determines when a summary judgment is proper. Under the rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact that call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial.1âwphi1 Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law. What is crucial to a determination, therefore, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then summary judgment is called for.73

Guided by the principles above indicated, we hold that under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, summary judgment is proper. The Sandiganbayan did not commit a reversible error in granting the corresponding 2004 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by respondent. The latter is well within its right to avail itself of summary judgment and obtain immediate relief, considering the insufficient denials and pleas of ignorance made by petitioners on matters that are supposedly within their knowledge.

These denials and pleas constitute admissions of material allegations under paragraph 59 of the Petition for Forfeiture – a tact they have employed repeatedly in Civil Case No. 0141. As discussed, the purpose of summary judgment is precisely to avoid long drawn litigations and useless delays.74 We also affirm the Sandiganbayan’s findings that the moving party, the Republic, is now entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 2 April 2009 of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED. All assets, properties, and funds belonging to Arelma, S.A., with an estimated aggregate amount of USD 3,369,975 as of 1983, plus all interests and all other income that accrued thereon, until the time or specific day that all money or monies are released and/or transferred to the possession of the Republic of the Philippines, are hereby forfeited in favor of Respondent Republic of the Philippines.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 189434 April 25, 2012

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 189505

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Link:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_189434_2012.html

Separate judgments under Rule 36

"Xxx.

Thus, the other properties, which were subjects of the Petition for Forfeiture, but were not included in the 2000 Motion, can still be subjects of a subsequent motion for summary judgment. To rule otherwise would run counter to this Court’s long established policy on asset recovery which, in turn, is anchored on considerations of national survival.

E.O. 14, Series of 1986,51 and Section 1(d) of Proclamation No. 352 declared the national policy after the Marcos regime. The government aimed to implement the reforms mandated by the people: protecting their basic rights, adopting a provisional constitution, and providing for an orderly transition to a government under a new constitution. The said Proclamation further states that "The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts." One of the "whereas" clauses of E.O. 14 entrusts the PCGG with the "just and expeditious recovery of such ill-gotten wealth in order that the funds, assets and other properties may be used to hasten national economic recovery." These clauses are anchored on the overriding considerations of national interest and national survival, always with due regard to the requirements of fairness and due process.

With the myriad of properties and interconnected accounts used to hide these assets that are in danger of dissipation, it would be highly unreasonable to require the government to ascertain their exact locations and recover them simultaneously, just so there would be one comprehensive judgment covering the different subject matters.

In any case, the Sandiganbayan rightly characterized their ruling on the 2004 Motion as a separate judgment, which is allowed by the Rules of Court under Section 5 of Rule 36:

Separate judgments.—When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court, at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims. In case a separate judgment is rendered, the court by order may stay its enforcement until the rendition of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as may be necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is rendered.53

Rule 35 on summary judgments, admits of a situation in which a case is not fully adjudicated on motion,54 and judgment is not rendered upon all of the reliefs sought. In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua,55 we had occasion to rule that a careful reading of its Section 4 reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final judgment," as it does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for." In this case, there was never any final or complete adjudication of Civil Case No. 0141, as the Sandiganbayan’s partial summary judgment in the Swiss Deposits Decision made no mention of the Arelma account.

Section 4 of Rule 35 pertains to a situation in which separate judgments were necessary because some facts existed without controversy, while others were controverted. However, there is nothing in this provision or in the Rules that prohibits a subsequent separate judgment after a partial summary judgment on an entirely different subject matter had earlier been rendered. There is no legal basis for petitioners’ contention that a judgment over the Swiss accounts bars a motion for summary judgment over the Arelma account.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 189434 April 25, 2012

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 189505

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Link:

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_189434_2012.html

Law of the case

"Xxx.

In any case, petitioners may no longer question the findings of the Sandiganbayan affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision, as these issues have long become the "law of the case" in the original Petition for Forfeiture. As held in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic:42

Law of the case … is a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, … so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

Otherwise put, the principle means that questions of law that have been previously raised and disposed of in the proceedings shall be controlling in succeeding instances where the same legal question is raised, provided that the facts on which the legal issue was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

In the case at bar, the same legal issues are being raised by petitioners. In fact, petitioner Marcos Jr. admits outright that what he seeks is a reversal of the issues identical to those already decided by the Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision.43 He may not resuscitate, via another petition for review, the same issues long laid to rest and established as the law of the case.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 189434 April 25, 2012

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 189505

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Link:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_189434_2012.html

Principle of immutability of judgments

"Xxx.

Petitioner Marcos, Jr. argues that there are genuine issues of fact as borne by the Pre-trial Order, Supplemental Pre-trial Order, and the Pre-trial Briefs of the parties. He laments that the Republic was unable to meet the necessary averments under the forfeiture law, which requires a comparison between the approximate amount of property acquired during the incumbency of Ferdinand Marcos, and the total amount of governmental salaries and other earnings.32 While the Petition contained an analysis of Ferdinand Marcos’s income from 1965 to 1986 (during his incumbency), there was purportedly no mention of the latter’s income from 1940 to 1965 when he was a practicing lawyer, congressman and senator; other earnings until the year 1985; and real properties that were auctioned off to satisfy the estate tax assessed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.33

Petitioner Marcos, Jr. implores us herein to revisit and reverse our earlier ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision and argues that the pronouncements in that case are contrary to law and its basic tenets. The Court in that case allegedly applied a lenient standard for the Republic, but a strict one for the Marcoses. He finds fault in the ruling therein which was grounded on public policy and the ultimate goal of the forfeiture law, arguing that public policy is better served if the Court gave more importance to the substantive rights of the Marcoses.

In accordance with the principle of immutability of judgments, petitioners can no longer use the present forum to assail the ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision, which has become final and executory. Aside from the fact that the method employed by petitioner is improper and redundant, we also find no cogent reason to revisit the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141, which this Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision found to be thorough and convincing. In the first place, using a Rule 45 Petition to question a judgment that has already become final is improper, especially when it seeks reconsideration of factual issues, such as the earnings of the late President from 1940 to 1965 and the existence of real properties that petitioners claim were auctioned off to pay the taxes. Secondly, petitioners never raised the existence of these earnings and real properties at the outset and never mentioned these alleged other incomes by way of defense in their Answer. In their Answer, and even in their subsequent pleadings, they merely made general denials of the allegations without stating facts admissible in evidence at the hearing. As will be discussed later, both the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court found that the Marcoses’ unsupported denials of matters patently and necessarily within their knowledge were inexcusable, and that a trial would have served no purpose at all.34

R.A. 1379 provides that whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and to his other lawful income, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.35 The elements that must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are the following: (1) the offender is a public officer or employee; (2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his incumbency; and (3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property.

Thus, in determining whether the presumption of ill-gotten wealth should be applied, the relevant period is incumbency, or the period in which the public officer served in that position. The amount of the public officer’s salary and lawful income is compared against any property or amount acquired for that same period. In the Swiss Deposits Decision, the Court ruled that petitioner Republic was able to establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses "were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials."36

For a petition to flourish under the forfeiture law, it must contain the following:

(a) The name and address of the respondent.

(b) The public officer or employment he holds and such other public offices or employment which he has previously held.

(c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his incumbency in his past and present offices and employments.

(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been identified by the Solicitor General.

(e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings and incomes from legitimately acquired property, and

(f) Such other information as may enable the court to determine whether or not the respondent has unlawfully acquired property during his incumbency.37 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners claim that the Republic failed to comply with subparagraphs c, d, and e above, because the latter allegedly never took into account the years when Ferdinand Marcos served as a war veteran with back pay, a practicing lawyer, a trader and investor, a congressman and senator. We find this claim to be a haphazard rehash of what has already been conclusively determined by the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision. The alleged "receivables from prior years" were without basis, because Marcos never had a known law office nor any known clients, and neither did he file any withholding tax certificate that would prove the existence of a supposedly profitable law practice before he became President. As discussed in the Swiss Deposits Decision:

The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case for forfeiture:

x x x x x x x x x

4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for several decades continuously and without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by direct action of the people of EDSA on February 22-25, 1986.

5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former First Lady who ruled with FM (Ferdinand Marcos) during the 14-year martial law regime, occupied the position of Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 up to the peaceful revolution in February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa during the early years of martial law from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor in concurrent capacity as Minister of Human Settlements.1âwphi1

x x x x x x x x x

11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official Report of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former President Marcos as President from 1966 to 1976 was ₱ 60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, ₱ 100,000 a year; while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was ₱ 75,000 a year.38

The Sandiganbayan found that neither the late Ferdinand Marcos nor petitioner Imelda Marcos filed any Statement of Assets and Liabilities, as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Coupled with the fact that the Answer consisted of general denials and a standard plea of "lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations" – what the Court characterized as "foxy replies" and mere pretense – fairness dictates that what must be considered as lawful income should only be the accumulated salaries of the spouses and what are shown in the public documents they submitted, such as their Income Tax Return (ITR) and their Balance Sheets. The amounts representing the combined salaries of the spouses were admitted by petitioner Imelda Marcos in paragraph 10 of her Answer, and reflected in the Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo:

Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President
1966-1976 at ₱ 60,000/year ₱ 660,000
1977-1984 at ₱ 100,000/year 800,000
1985 at ₱ 110,000/year 110,000
₱ 1,570,00


Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister
June 1976-1985 at ₱ 75,000/year ₱ 718,000


In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couple's combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount of ₱ 30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to ₱ 2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43.39

The date contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheets filed by the Marcoses are summarized in Schedules A to D submitted as evidence by the Republic. Schedule A showed that from 1965 to 1984, the Marcoses reported Php 16,408,442.00 or USD 2,414,484.91 in total income, comprised of:
Income Source Amount Percentage
Official Salaries - ₱ 2,627,581.00 - 16.01%
Legal Practice - 11,109,836.00 - 67.71%
Farm Income - 149,700.00 - .91%
Others - 2,521,325.00 - 15.37%
Total ₱ 16,408,442.00 - 100.00%


The amount reported by the Marcos couple as their combined salaries more or less coincided with the Official Report submitted by the Minister of Budget. Yet what appeared anomalous was the Php 11,109,836 representing "Legal Practice," which accounted for 67% or more than three-fourths of their reported income. Out of this anomalous amount, Php 10,649,836, or 96% thereof, represented "receivables from prior years" during the period 1967 to 1984. The Court cited the Solicitor General’s findings:

In the guise of reporting income using the cash method under Section 38 of the National Internal Revenue Code, FM made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal practice before he became a President (FM being barred by law from practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and that, incredibly, he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after. The only problem is that in his Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately preceding his ascendancy to the presidency he did not show any Receivables from client at all, much less the ₱ 10.65-M that he decided to later recognize as income. There are no documents showing any withholding tax certificates. Likewise, there is nothing on record that will show any known Marcos client as he has no known law office. As previously stated, his net worth was a mere ₱ 120,000.00 in December, 1965. The joint income tax returns of FM and Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons of their kleptocracy.40

In addition, the former President also reported a total of Php 2,521,325 which he referred to as "Miscellaneous Items" and "Various Corporations" under "Other Income" for 1972-1976. Spouses Marcos did not declare any income from any deposits that may be subject to a 5% withholding tax, nor did they file any capital gains tax returns from 1960 to 1965. The Bureau of Internal Revenue attested that there are no records pertaining to the tax transactions of the spouses in Baguio City, Manila, Quezon City, and Tacloban.

The Balance Sheet attached to the couple’s ITR for 1965 indicates an ending net worth of Php 120,000, which covered the year immediately preceding their ascendancy to the presidency. As previously mentioned, the combined salaries of the spouses for the period 1966 to 1986, or in the two decades that they stayed in power, totaled only USD 304,372.43. In stark contrast, as shown by Schedule D, computations establish the total net worth of the spouses for the years 1965 until 1984 in the total amount of USD 957,487.75, assuming that the income from legal practice is real and valid.41 The combined salaries make up only 31.79% of the spouses’ total net worth from 1965 to 1984. This means petitioners are unable to account for or explain more than two-thirds of the total net worth of the Marcos spouses from 1965 to 1984.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 189434 April 25, 2012

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 189505

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Link:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_189434_2012.html

As FORFEITURE suits under R.A. 1379 are CIVIL in nature, it follows that Rule 35 of the Rules of Court on SUMMARY JUDGMENT may be applied to the present case.

"Xxx.

As early as Almeda v. Judge Perez,28 we have already delineated the difference between criminal and civil forfeiture and classified the proceedings under R.A. 1379 as belonging to the latter, viz:

"Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in nature, and may be in rem or in personam. If they are under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, they are criminal in nature, although they may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged the proceeding is of a civil nature; and under statutes which specifically so provide, where the act or omission for which the forfeiture is imposed is not also a misdemeanor, such forfeiture may be sued for and recovered in a civil action."

In the first place a proceeding under the Act (Rep. Act No. 1379) does not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the state. (Sec. 6) In the second place the procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a civil action. Thus there is a petition (Sec. 3), then an answer (Sec. 4), and lastly, a hearing. The preliminary investigation which is required prior to the filing of the petition, in accordance with Sec. 2 of the Act, is provided expressly to be one similar to a preliminary investigation in a criminal case. If the investigation is only similar to that in a criminal case, but the other steps in the proceedings are those for civil proceedings, it stands to reason that the proceeding is not criminal. xxx. (citations omitted)

Forfeiture cases impose neither a personal criminal liability, nor the civil liability that arises from the commission of a crime (ex delicto). The liability is based solely on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties.29 Executive Order No. 14 (E.O. No. 14), Defining the Jurisdiction Over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand Marcos, authorizes the filing of forfeiture suits that will proceed independently of any criminal proceedings. Section 3 of E.O. 14 empowered the PCGG to file independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions.30

Thus, petitioners cannot equate the present case with a criminal case and assail the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan on the bare claim that they were deprived of a "full-blown trial." In affirming the Sandiganbayan and denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration in the Swiss Deposits Decision, the Court held:

Section 5 of RA 1379 provides:

The court shall set a date for a hearing which may be open to the public, and during which the respondent shall be given ample opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the court, how he has acquired the property in question.

And pursuant to Section 6 of the said law, if the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State.

x x x x x x x x x

A careful analysis of Section 5 of RA 1379 readily discloses that the word "hearing" does not always require the formal introduction of evidence in a trial, only that the parties are given the occasion to participate and explain how they acquired the property in question. If they are unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that they lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State. There is no provision in the law that a full blown trial ought to be conducted before the court declares the forfeiture of the subject property. Thus, even if the forfeiture proceedings do not reach trial, the court is not precluded from determining the nature of the acquisition of the property in question even in a summary proceeding.31

As forfeiture suits under R.A. 1379 are civil in nature, it follows that Rule 35 of the Rules of Court on Summary Judgment may be applied to the present case. This is consistent with our ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision upholding the summary judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan over the Swiss deposits, which are subject of the same Petition for Forfeiture as the Arelma assets.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 189434 April 25, 2012

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


G.R. No. 189505

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Link:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_189434_2012.html

Marcos ill-gotten wealth: Arelma and Swiss bank accounts

MARCOS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH: The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the Decision, dated 2 April 2009, of the Sandiganbayan which FORFEITED in favor of the REPUBLIC all assets, properties, and funds belonging to ARELMA, S.A., with an estimated aggregate amount of USD 3,369,975 as of 1983, plus all INTERESTS AND ALL OTHER INCOME. The case discussed below also gave a background on the RELATED ILL-GOTTEN SWISS BANK ACCOUNTS of the Marcoses, totaling USD 356 MILLION.

2012 SUPREME COURT DECISION

THE decision of the Supreme Court, dated April 25, 2012, in the consolidated cases entitled "FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government, Respondent" and "IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner,

vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent", docketed as G.R. No. 189434 and G.R. No. 189505, written by former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, referred to the underlying Sandiganbayan case docketed as CIVIL CASE NO. 0141 where the Sandiganbayan declared all assets and properties of ARELMA , S.A., an entity created by the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, FORFEITED in favor of the government.

The Supreme Court DENIED the foregoing petitions. It AFFIRMED the appealed Decision, dated 2 April 2009, of the Sandiganbayan which FORFEITED in favor of the Republic all assets, properties, and funds belonging to ARELMA, S.A., with an estimated aggregate amount of USD 3,369,975 as of 1983, plus all INTERESTS AND ALL OTHER INCOME that accrued thereon.

BACKGROUNDER

On 17 December 1991, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a Petition for Forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the forfeiture law, Republic Act No. 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14. The petition was docketed as CIVIL CASE NO. 0141.

The Republic, through the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought the declaration of SWISS BANK ACCOUNTS totaling USD 356 MILLION (now USD 658 MILLION), and two TREASURY NOTES worth USD 25 MILLION and USD 5 million, as ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH.

The Republic also sought the FORFEITURE of the ASSETS OF DUMMY CORPORATIONS and entities established by nominees of Marcos and his wife, Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, as well as real and personal properties MANIFESTLY OUT OF PROPORTION to the spouses’ lawful income. This claim was based on evidence collated by the PCGG with the assistance of the UNITED STATES JUSTICE DEPARTMENT and the SWISS FEDERAL POLICE DEPARTMENT .

The Petition for Forfeiture described among others, a corporate entity by the name "ARELMA , Inc.," which maintained an account and portfolio in MERRILL LYNCH, NEW YORK , and which was purportedly organized for the same purpose of HIDING ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH .

Before the case was set for pretrial before the Sandiganbayan , the MARCOS CHILDREN and PCGG CHAIRPERSON Magtanggol Gunigundo SIGNED SEVERAL COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS (a General Agreement and Supplemental Agreements) all dated 28 December 1993 for a GLOBAL SETTLEMENT of the Marcos assets. One of the "whereas" clauses in the General Agreement specified that the Republic "obtained a JUDGMENT from the SWISS FEDERAL TRIBUNAL on DECEMBER 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (USD 356 MILLION ) belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met xxx." This Decision was in turn based on the finding of ZURICH DISTRICT ATTORNEY Peter Cosandey that the DEPOSITS IN THE NAME OF THE FOUNDATIONS WERE OF ILLEGAL PROVENANCE.

IMELDA Marcos filed a manifestation before the Sandiganbayan claiming she was NOT A PARTY to the Motion for Approval of the Compromise Agreements, and that she OWNED 90% OF THE FUNDS while the remaining 10% belonged to the MARCOS ESTATE.

In a 19 September 2000 Decision, the Sandiganbayan INITIALLY GRANTED the 2000 Motion, declaring that the SWISS DEPOSITS held in escrow at the PNB were ill-gotten wealth, and, thus, FORFEITED in favor of the State.

In a Resolution dated 31 January 2002, the Sandiganbayan REVERSED its earlier ruling and denied the 2000 Motion.

Thereafter, alleging GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION on the part of the Sandiganbayan in rendering its 31 January 2002 Resolution, the Republic filed a Petition for CERTIORARI with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 152154, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (for brevity, the "SWISS DEPOSITS DECISION").

Resolving the abovementioned petition of the Republic, the SUPREME Court, in G.R. No. 152154, SET ASIDE the assailed 31 January 2002 Sandiganbayan Resolution and REINSTATED the 19 September 2000 Decision of the Sandiganbayan, including the declaration that the SWISS DEPOSITS WERE ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH.

Thereafter, on 16 July 2004, the Republic filed before the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (2004 Motion) to declare "the funds, properties, shares in and interests of ARELMA, wherever they may be located, as ill-gotten assets and forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 1379.

The Sandiganbayan FORFEITED the funds of ARELMA, INC., presently under management and/or in an account at the MERRILL LYNCH ASSET MANAGEMENT, NEW YORK, U.S.A., in the estimated aggregate amount of US$3,369,975.00 as of 1983, plus all INTERESTS and all other INCOME that accrued THEREON.

On 22 October 2009, Ferdinand "BONGBONG" Marcos, Jr. filed with the Supreme Court the instant Rule 45 Petition, questioning the said Sandiganbayan Decision.

One week later, IMELDA Marcos filed a separate Rule 45 Petition on essentially identical grounds, which was later CONSOLIDATED with the first Petition.

The two petitions questioned the aforementioned Sandiganbayan decision which FORFEITED the funds of ARELMA, INC. in favor of the Republic.

As earlier stated, the Supreme Court DENIED the consolidated petitions of Bongbong and Imelda Marcos.

FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS ARE CIVIL IN NATURE

The crux of the present case devolved solely upon the RECOVERY OF ASSETS presumptively characterized by the law as ill-gotten, and owned by the State; hence, it is AN ACTION IN REM .

Forfeiture proceedings are ACTIONS IN REM and THEREFORE CIVIL IN NATURE. Proceedings under R.A. 1379 do NOT terminate in the imposition of a PENALTY but merely in the FORFEITURE of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the State.

FORFEITURE CASES impose neither a personal criminal liability, nor the civil liability that arises from the commission of a crime (ex delicto). The liability is based solely on a statute that safeguards the RIGHT OF THE STATE TO RECOVER UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED PROPERTIES. Executive Order No. 14 (E.O. No. 14), Defining the Jurisdiction Over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand Marcos, authorizes the filing of FORFEITURE SUITS that will PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS . Section 3 of E.O. 14 empowered the PCGG to file INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS SEPARATE FROM THE CRIMINAL ACTIONS .

FULL-BLOWN TRIAL NOT REQUIRED IN FORFEITURE CASES SO LONG AS THE PARTIES ARE GIVEN THE OCCASION TO PARTICIPATE AND EXPLAIN HOW THEY ACQUIRED THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION.

A careful analysis of Section 5 of RA 1379 readily discloses that the word "hearing" does not always require the formal introduction of evidence in a trial, only that the parties are given the occasion to participate and explain how they acquired the property in question. If they are unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that they lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State. There is no provision in the law that a full blown trial ought to be conducted before the court declares the forfeiture of the subject property. Thus, even if the forfeiture proceedings do not reach trial, the court is not precluded from determining the nature of the acquisition of the property in question even in a summary proceeding.

As forfeiture suits under R.A. 1379 are CIVIL in nature, it follows that RULE 35 of the Rules of Court on SUMMARY JUDGMENT may be applied to the present case. This is consistent with the earlier ruling of the Supreme Court in the SWISS DEPOSITS DECISION upholding the summary judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan over the Swiss deposits, which are subject of the same Petition for Forfeiture as the ARELMA assets.

IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT

FURTHER, the Supreme Court held that, In accordance with the PRINCIPLE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENTS, PETITIONERS Bongbong and Imelda Marcos could no longer use the present forum to assail the ruling in the SWISS DEPOSITS DECISION, which had become FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

Aside from the fact that the method employed by petitioners was improper and redundant, the Supreme Court also ruled that it found no cogent reason to REVISIT THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN IN CIVIL CASE NO. 0141, which this Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision found to be THOROUGH AND CONVINCING.

In the first place, using a Rule 45 Petition to question a judgment that has already become FINAL is improper, especially when it seeks RECONSIDERATION OF FACTUAL ISSUES, such as the EARNINGS of the late President from 1940 TO 1965 and the existence of real properties that petitioners claimed were auctioned off to pay the taxes. Secondly, petitioners NEVER RAISED the existence of these earnings and real properties AT THE OUTSET and NEVER MENTIONED these alleged other incomes by way of defense in their ANSWER. In their Answer, and even in their subsequent pleadings, they merely made GENERAL DENIALS of the allegations without stating facts admissible in evidence at the hearing. Both the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court found that the Marcoses’ UNSUPPORTED DENIALS of matters patently and necessarily within their knowledge were INEXCUSABLE , and that a TRIAL WOULD HAVE SERVED NO PURPOSE AT ALL.

The Supreme Court held that R.A. 1379 provided that whenever any PUBLIC OFFICER or employee had acquired during his incumbency an amount of property MANIFESTLY OUT OF PROPORTION TO HIS SALARY as such public officer and to his other lawful income, said property shall be PRESUMED PRIMA FACIE to have been UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED.

THE MARCOS SPOUSES NEVER FILED ANY STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH

The Sandiganbayan found that NEITHER the late Ferdinand Marcos nor petitioner Imelda Marcos filed any STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES , as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Coupled with the fact that the Answer consisted of GENERAL DENIALS and a standard plea of "lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations" – what the Court characterized as "foxy replies" and mere pretense – fairness dictates that what must be considered as LAWFUL INCOME should only be the accumulated salaries of the spouses and what are shown in the public documents they submitted, such as their INCOME TAX RETURN (ITR) and their BALANCE SHEETS.

TE LAWFUL INCOME OF THE MARCOS SPOUSES AMOUNTED TO MERELY $304,372.43.30

The amounts representing the combined salaries of the spouses were admitted by petitioner Imelda Marcos in paragraph 10 of her Answer, and reflected in the Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo:

Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President

1966-1976 at ₱ 60,000/year ₱ 660,000
1977-1984 at ₱ 100,000/year 800,000
1985 at ₱ 110,000/year 110,000
₱ 1,570,000

Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister

June 1976-1985 at ₱ 75,000/year ₱ 718,000

In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 were the Marcos couple's combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount of ₱30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to ₱ 2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43.30.

PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION: THE ASSETS AND PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY THE MARCOSES WERE MANIFESTLY AND PATENTLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO THEIR AGGREGATE SALARIES AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS

The Supreme Court reiterated that the Republic was able to establish the PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were MANIFESTLY AND PATENTLY DISPROPORTIONATE to their aggregate salaries as public officials. The Republic presented further evidence that they had bigger deposits beyond their lawful incomes, foremost of which were the SWISS ACCOUNTS deposited in the names of FIVE FOUNDATIONS spirited away by the couple to different countries. Petitioners Bongbong and Imelda Marcos thus FAILED TO OVERTURN THIS PRESUMPTION when they merely presented VAGUE DENIALS and pleaded "lack of sufficient knowledge" in their Answer.

LAW OF THE CASE

PETITIONERS Bongbong and Imelda Marcos may no longer question the findings of the Sandiganbayan, affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision, as these issues have long become the "LAW OF THE CASE" in the original Petition for Forfeiture.

LAW OF THE CASE is a term applied to an established rule that when an APPELLATE COURT passes on a question and REMANDS the case to the LOWER COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS , the question there SETTLED becomes the LAW OF THE CASE upon SUBSEQUENT APPEAL. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the CONTROLLING legal rule or decision between the SAME PARTIES in the SAME CASE continues to be the law of the case, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

The principle means that QUESTIONS OF LAW that have been PREVIOUSLY RAISED AND DISPOSED OF in the proceedings shall be CONTROLLING IN SUCCEEDING INSTANCES where the SAME legal question is raised, PROVIDED that the facts on which the legal issue was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

NATIONAL POLICY TO RECOVER ILL-GOTTEN PROPERTIES AMASSED BY THE LEADERS AND SUPPORTERS OF THE MARCOS REGIME

E.O. 14, Series of 1986, and Section 1(d) of Proclamation No. 352 declared the national policy after the ouster of the the Marcos regime in 1986. The government aimed to implement the REFORMS mandated by the people: protecting their BASIC RIGHTS, adopting a PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION , and providing for an ORDERLY TRANSITION to a government under a NEW CONSTITUTION . The said Proclamation further states that "The President shall give PRIORITY to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to RECOVER ILL-GOTTEN PROPERTIES amassed by the leaders and supporters of the PREVIOUS REGIME and protect the interest of the people through orders of SEQUESTRATION or FREEZING OF ASSETS OR ACCOUNTS ." One of the "whereas" clauses of E.O. 14 entrusts the PCGG with the "just and expeditious RECOVERY OF SUCH ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH in order that the funds, assets and other properties may be used to hasten NATIONAL ECONOMIC RECOVERY." These clauses are anchored on the overriding considerations of NATIONAL INTEREST and NATIONAL SURVIVAL, always with due regard to the requirements of FAIRNESS and DUE PROCESS .

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN CIVIL CASES FOR THE FORFEITURE OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH CASES ALLOWED

The petitioners Bong and Imelda Marcos had again attempted to DELAY THE GOAL OF ASSET RECOVERY by their EVASIVENESS and the EXPEDIENT PROFESSION OF IGNORANCE.

A profession of ignorance about a fact that is necessarily WITHIN THE PLEADER’S KNOWLEDGE OR MEANS OF KNOWING is as ineffective as NO DENIAL AT ALL.

On a similar vein, there was a failure by PETITIONERS Bongbong and Imelda Marcos to properly TENDER AN ISSUE , which, as correctly ruled by the Sandiganbayan, JUSTIFIED the Republic’s resort to SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT may be ALLOWED where there is NO GENUINE ISSUE as to ANY MATERIAL FACT and where the moving party is ENTITLED to a judgment as a MATTER OF LAW.

Summary JUDGMENT is important in weeding out SHAM CLAIMS OR DEFENSES at an early stage of the litigation in order to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.

Even if the pleadings appear, on their face, to raise issues, summary judgment may still ensue as a matter of law if the AFFIDAVITS , DEPOSITIONS and ADMISSIONS show that such issues are NOT GENUINE. The presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact determines, at bottom, the propriety of summary judgment.

A "GENUINE ISSUE", as differentiated from a fictitious or contrived one, is an issue of fact that REQUIRES THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE.

Even if in the Answer itself there appears to be a tender of issues requiring trial, yet when the relevant AFFIDAVITS, DEPOSITIONS , or ADMISSIONS demonstrate that those issues are NOT GENUINE BUT SHAM OR FICTITIOUS , the Court is justified in DISPENSING WITH THE TRIAL and RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT for plaintiff.

Summary judgment, or ACCELERATED JUDGMENT as it is sometimes known, may also call for a hearing so that both the movant and the adverse party may justify their positions. However, the hearing contemplated (with 10-day notice) is for the purpose of determining WHETHER THE ISSUES ARE GENUINE OR NOT , not to receive evidence of the issues set up in the pleadings. A hearing is not de riguer. The matter may be resolved, and usually is, on the basis of AFFIDAVITS , DEPOSITIONS , and ADMISSIONS . This does not mean that the hearing is superfluous; only that the court is empowered to determine its necessity.

The Supreme Court held that, guided by the principles above indicated, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER . The SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT COMMIT A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING THE 2004 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed by the Republic.

The Republic was well within its right to avail itself of summary judgment and obtain immediate relief, considering the INSUFFICIENT DENIALS AND PLEAS OF IGNORANCE made by petitioners on matters that were supposedly WITHIN THEIR KNOWLEDGE.

These denials and pleas constituted ADMISSIONS of material allegations under paragraph 59 of the Petition for Forfeiture – a tactic the petitioners Bongbong and Imelda Marcos had employed repeatedly in Civil Case No. 0141.

As discussed, the purpose of summary judgment is precisely TO AVOID LONG DRAWN LITIGATIONS AND USELESS DELAYS. The Supreme Court also affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s findings that the moving party, the Republic, was ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

SOURCE :

R. No. 189434 April 25, 2012

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 189505

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

LINK :

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_189434_2012.html

Under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-owners of the Marcos properties upon the death of the President. The property rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted to another through the decedent's death. In this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their right to transfer or dispose of the properties that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the partition or the distribution of the estate.

"Xxx.

 
The Marcos siblings are compulsory heirs.

To reiterate, in its third Amended Complaint, petitioner prays that the Marcos respondents be made to (1) pay for the value of the alleged ill-gotten wealth with interest from the date of acquisition; (2) render a complete accounting and inventory of all funds and other pieces of property legally or beneficially held and/or controlled by them, as well as their legal and beneficial interest therein; (3) pay actual damages estimated at P200 billion and additional actual damages to reimburse expenses for the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth estimated at P250 million or in such amount as may be proven during trial; (4) pay moral damages amounting to P50 billion; (5) pay temperate and nominal damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses in an amount to be proven during the trial; (6) pay exemplary damages in the amount of P1 billion; and (7) pay treble judicial costs.[39]

It must be stressed that we are faced with exceptional circumstances, given the nature and the extent of the properties involved in the case pending with the Sandiganbayan. It bears emphasis that the Complaint is one for the reversion, the reconveyance, the restitution and the accounting of alleged ill-gotten wealth and the payment of damages. Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the court is charged with the task of (1) determining the properties in the Marcos estate that constitute the alleged ill-gotten wealth; (2) tracing where these properties are; (3) issuing the appropriate orders for the accounting, the recovery, and the payment of these properties; and, finally, (4) determining if the award of damages is proper.

Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the death of Ferdinand E. Marcos, it is imperative therefore that the estate be duly represented. The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to a litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself protected, as he continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.[40] On that note, we take judicial notice of the probate proceedings regarding the will of Ferdinand E. Marcos. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos II,[41] we upheld the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of letters testamentary in solidum to Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.

Unless the executors of the Marcos estate or the heirs are ready to waive in favor of the state their right to defend or protect the estate or those properties found to be ill-gotten in their possession, control or ownership, then they may not be dropped as defendants in the civil case pending before the Sandiganbayan.

Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as those parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. They are those parties who possess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Parties are indispensable if their interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with that of the other parties.[42]

In order to reach a final determination of the matters concerning the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos - that is, the accounting and the recovery of ill-gotten wealth - the present case must be maintained against Imelda Marcos and herein respondent Ferdinand "Bongbong" R. Marcos, Jr., as executors of the Marcos estate pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision, actions may be commenced to recover from the estate, real or personal property, or an interest therein, or to enforce a lien thereon; and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executors.

We also hold that the action must likewise be maintained against Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Irene Marcos-Araneta on the basis of the non-exhaustive list attached as Annex "A" to the Third Amended Complaint, which states that the listed properties therein were owned by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and their immediate family.[43] It is only during the trial of Civil Case No. 0002 before the Sandiganbayan that there could be a determination of whether these properties are indeed ill-gotten or were legitimately acquired by respondents and their predecessors. Thus, while it was not proven that respondents conspired in accumulating ill-gotten wealth, they may be in possession, ownership or control of such ill-gotten properties or the proceeds thereof as heirs of the Marcos couple. Thus, their lack of participation in any illegal act does not remove the character of the property as ill-gotten and, therefore, as rightfully belonging to the State.

Secondly, under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-owners of the Marcos properties upon the death of the President. The property rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted to another through the decedent's death.[44] In this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their right to transfer or dispose of the properties that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the partition or the distribution of the estate. In Jakosalem v. Rafols,[45] we said:


Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted." And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs "becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the coowners of the estate while it remains undivided." (3 Manresa, 357; Alcala vs. Alcala, 35 Phil. 679.) And according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of the community. Hence, in the case of Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528, where some of the heirs, without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court, speaking thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate. (Emphasis supplied)

Xxx."


SECOND DIVISION
[ G. R. No. 171701, February 08, 2012 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PETITIONER, VS. MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R. MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, AND PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO, RESPONDENTS.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/21716

Petitioner failed to observe the best evidence rule.

"Xxx.

Petitioner failed to observe the
best evidence rule.

It is petitioner's burden to prove the allegations in its Complaint. For relief to be granted, the operative act on how and in what manner the Marcos siblings participated in and/or benefitted from the acts of the Marcos couple must be clearly shown through a preponderance of evidence. Should petitioner fail to discharge this burden, the Court is constrained and is left with no choice but to uphold the Demurrer to Evidence filed by respondents.

First, petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents themselves. It is imperative, therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove petitioner's allegations.

Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must be the original document itself. The origin of the best evidence rule can be found and traced to as early as the 18th century in Omychund v. Barker,[34] wherein the Court of Chancery said:


The judges and sages of the law have laid it down that there is but one general rule of evidence, the best that the nature of the case will admit.

The rule is, that if the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses.

The first ground judges have gone upon in departing from strict rules, is an absolute strict necessity. Secondly, a presumed necessity. In the case of writings, subscribed by witnesses, if all are dead, the proof of one of their hands is sufficient to establish the deed: where an original is lost, a copy may be admitted; if no copy, then a proof by witnesses who have heard the deed, and yet it is a thing the law abhors to admit the memory of man for evidence.


Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the originals were not presented, or any compelling ground why the court should admit these documents as secondary evidence absent the testimony of the witnesses who had executed them.

In particular, it may not insist that the photocopies of the documents fall under Sec. 7 of Rule 130, which states:


Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. ? When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved be a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.


Secs. 19 and 20 of Rule 132 provide:


SECTION 19. Classes of documents. ? For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:


(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

SECTION 20. Proof of private document. -- Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:


(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.


The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations does not make them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule.

Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these public and private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of the Commission's investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. However, given the purposes for which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses." Witnesses can testify only to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own perception.[35] Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the documents themselves.

Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the affiant's statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.[36]

As to the copy of the TSN of the proceedings before the PCGG, while it may be considered as a public document since it was taken in the course of the PCGG's exercise of its mandate, it was not attested to by the legal custodian to be a correct copy of the original. This omission falls short of the requirement of Rule 132, Secs. 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court.[37]

In summary, we adopt the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:


Further, again contrary to the theory of the plaintiff, the presentation of the originals of the aforesaid exhibits is not validly excepted under Rule 130, Section 3 (a), (b), and (d) of the Rules of Court. Under paragraph (d), when `the original document is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,' presentation of the original thereof is excepted. However, as earlier observed, all except one of the exhibits introduced by the plaintiff were not necessarily public documents. The transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the proceedings purportedly before the PCGG, the plaintiff's exhibit "Q", may be a public document, but what was presented by the plaintiff was a mere photocopy of the purported TSN. The Rules provide that when the original document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Exhibit "Q" was not a certified copy and it was not even signed by the stenographer who supposedly took down the proceedings.

The rest of the above-mentioned exhibits cannot likewise be excepted under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 3. Section 5 of the same Rule provides that `when the original documents has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.' Thus, in order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be proof by satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of the original; (2) loss, destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3) reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original. None of these requirements were complied with by the plaintiff. Similar to exhibit `Q', exhibits `P', `R', `S', and `T' were all photocopies. `P', `R', and `T' were affidavits of persons who did not testify before the Court. Exhibit `S' is a letter which is clearly a private document. Not only does it not fall within the exceptions of Section 3, it is also a mere photocopy. As We previously emphasized, even if originals of these affidavits were presented, they would still be considered hearsay evidence if the affiants do not testify and identify them.[38]


Thus, absent any convincing evidence to hold otherwise, it follows that petitioner failed to prove that the Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta III collaborated with former President Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and participated in the first couple's alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar as the specific allegations herein were concerned.

Xxx."


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PETITIONER, VS. MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R. MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, AND PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO, RESPONDENTS. GR. No. 171701, February 08, 2012. 

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/21716

Complaint for REVERSION, RECONVEYANCE , RESTITUTION , ACCOUNTING and DAMAGES against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his ESTATE upon his death; IMELDA R. Marcos; and herein respondents IMEE Marcos-Manotoc, IRENE Marcos-Araneta, BONGBONG Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III. The case involved P200 BILLION of the Marcoses' alleged accumulated ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH

SUMMARY: On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic and assisted by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for REVERSION, RECONVEYANCE , RESTITUTION , ACCOUNTING and DAMAGES against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his ESTATE upon his death; IMELDA R. Marcos; and herein respondents IMEE Marcos-Manotoc, IRENE Marcos-Araneta, BONGBONG Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III. The case involved P200 BILLION of the Marcoses' alleged accumulated ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH. -

SUPREME COURT DECISION:

The 2012 decision of the Supreme Court, written by former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, in the case entitled REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PETITIONER, VS. MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, et. al., docketed as GR No. 171701 and dated February 08, 2012, involved P200 billion of the Marcoses' alleged accumulated ill-gotten wealth. It also included the alleged use of the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9 for the Marcos family's personal benefit; the alleged use of De Soleil Apparel for dollar salting; and the alleged illegal acquisition and operation of the bus company Pantranco North Express, Inc. (Pantranco).

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, the first executive act of then President Corazon C. Aquino was to create the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, the PCGG was charged with the task of assisting the President in the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.

On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic and assisted by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for REVERSION, RECONVEYANCE , RESTITUTION , ACCOUNTING and DAMAGES against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his ESTATE upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.

The Complaint, inter alia, alleged that the

"defendants Imelda (IMEE) R. Marcos-Manotoc, Tomas Manotoc, Irene R. Manotoc (sic) Araneta, Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., actively collaborated, with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos among others, in confiscating and/or unlawfully appropriating funds and other property, and in concealing the same as described above."

The complaint further alleged that "each of the said Defendants, either by taking undue advantage of their relationship with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, or by reason of the above-described active collaboration, unlawfully acquired or received property, shares of stocks in corporations, illegal payments such as commissions, bribes or kickbacks, and other forms of improper privileges, income, revenues and benefits."

Thus, Republic set forth the following CAUSES OF ACTION in its Complaint:

1. First Cause of Action: BREACH OF PUBLIC TRUST - A public office is a public trust. By committing all the acts described above, Defendants repeatedly breached public trust and the law, making them liable solidarily to Plaintiff. The funds and other property acquired by Defendants following, or as a result of, their breach of public trust, some of which are mentioned or described above, estimated to amount to ?200 billion are deemed to have been acquired for the benefit of Plaintiff and are, therefore, impressed with constructive trust in favor of Plaintiff and the Filipino people. Consequently, Defendants are solidarily liable to restore or reconvey to Plaintiff all such funds and property thus impressed with constructive trust for the benefit of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.

2. Second Cause of Action: ABUSE OF RIGHT AND POWER -

(a) Defendants, in perpetrating the unlawful acts described above, committed abuse of right and power which caused untold misery, sufferings and damages to Plaintiff. Defendants violated, among others Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;

(b) As a result of the foregoing acts, Defendants acquired the title to the beneficial interest in funds and other property and concealed such title, funds and interest through the use of relatives, business associates, nominees, agents, or dummies. Defendants are, therefore, solidarily liable to Plaintiff to return and reconvey all such funds and other property unlawfully acquired by them estimated at TWO HUNDRED BILLION PESOS, or alternatively, to pay Plaintiff, solidarily, by way of indemnity, the damage caused to Plaintiff equivalent to the amount of such funds or the value of other property not returned or restored to Plaintiff, plus interest thereon from the date of unlawful acquisition until full payment thereof.

3. Third Cause of Action: UNJUST ENRICHMENT -

Defendants illegally accumulated funds and other property whose estimated value is P200 billion in violation of the laws of the Philippines and in breach of their official functions and fiduciary obligations. Defendants, therefore, have unjustly enriched themselves to the grave and irreparable damage and prejudice of Plaintiff. Defendants have an obligation at law, independently of breach of trust and abuse of right and power, and as an alternative, to solidarily return to Plaintiff such funds and other property with which Defendants, in gross evident bad faith, have unjustly enriched themselves or, in default thereof, restore to Plaintiff the amount of such funds and the value of the other property including those which may have been wasted, and/or lost estimated at P200 billion with interest thereon from the date of unlawful acquisition until full payment thereof.

4. Fourth Cause of Action: ACCOUNTING -

The Commission, acting pursuant to the provisions of the applicable law, believe that Defendants, acting singly or collectively, in unlawful concert with one another, and with the active collaboration of third persons, subject of separate suits, acquired funds, assets and property during the incumbency of Defendant public officers, manifestly out of proportion to their salaries, to their other lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property. Consequently, they are required to show to the satisfaction of this Honorable Court that they have lawfully acquired all such funds, assets and property which are in excess of their legal net income, and for this Honorable Court to decree that the Defendants are under obligation to account to Plaintiff with respect to all legal or beneficial interests in funds, properties and assets of whatever kind and wherever located in excess of the lawful earnings or lawful income from legitimately acquired property.

5. Fifth Cause of Action - LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES -

(a) By reason of the unlawful acts set forth above, Plaintiff and the Filipino people have suffered actual damages in an amount representing the pecuniary loss sustained by the latter as a result of the Defendants' unlawful acts, the approximate value and interest of which, from the time of their wrongful acquisition, are estimated at P200 billion plus expenses which Plaintiff has been compelled to incur and shall continue to incur in its effort to recover Defendants' ill-gotten wealth all over the world, which expenses are reasonably estimated at P250 million. Defendants are, therefore, jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for actual damages in an amount reasonably estimated at P200 Billion Pesos and to reimburse expenses for recovery of Defendants' ill-gotten wealth estimated to cost P250 million or in such amount as are proven during the TRIAL.

The petition filed by the REPUBLIC before the Supreme Court raised the same issues it had earlier raised in its Motion for Reconsideration filed before the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED BY RESPONDENTS MA. IMELDA (IMEE) R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND (BONGBONG) R. MARCOS, JR., CONSIDERING THAT MORE THAN PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE ON RECORD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THEIR CONNIVANCE WITH FORMER PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND OTHER MARCOS DUMMIES AND ABUSED THEIR POWER AND INFLUENCE IN UNLAWFULLY AMASSING FUNDS FROM THE NATIONAL TREASURY.

PETITION PROVED, BY MORE THAN PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE, THAT RESPONDENT-SPOUSES GREGORIO ARANETA III AND IRENE MARCOS ARANETA CONNIVED WITH FORMER PRESIDENT MARCOS IN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRING BUSINESS INTERESTS WHICH ARE GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT, AND IN A MANNER PROHIBITED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND ANTI-GRAFT STATUTES.

RESPONDENTS IMEE, BONGBONG, AND IRENE MARCOS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF FORMER PRESIDENT MARCOS AND ARE EQUALLY OBLIGED TO RENDER AN ACCOUNTING AND RETURN THE ALLEGED ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH OF THE MARCOSES.

THERE EXISTS CONCRETE EVIDENCE PROVING THAT RESPONDENTS YEUNG CHUN KAM, YEUNG CHUN FAN, AND YEUNG CHUN HO ACTED AS DUMMIES FOR THE MARCOSES, AND USED THE CORPORATION, GLORIOUS SUN, AS A CONDUIT IN AMASSING THE ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH. ACCORDINGLY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.

THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED BY INTERVENOR PEA-PTGWO WITH RESPECT TO THE PANTRANCO ASSETS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED SINCE AMPLE EVIDENCE PROVES THAT THE SAID ASSETS INDUBITABLY FORM PART OF THE MARCOS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH, AS BUTTRESSED BY THE FACT THAT NO JUDICIAL DETERMINATION HAS BEEN MADE AS TO WHOM THESE ASSETS RIGHTFULLY BELONG.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN'S RULING WHICH REJECTED PEITITONER'S DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING "INADMISSIBLE" DIRECTLY CONTRADICTS ITS EARLIER RULING ADMITTING ALL SAID DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND WAS RENDERED IN A MANNER THAT DEPRIVED PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that there was "SOME MERIT in petitioner's contention."

The Supreme Court held that closely analyzing petitioner's Complaint and the present Petition for Review, it is clear that the Marcos siblings were being sued in TWO CAPACITIES : first, as CO-CONSPIRATORS in the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth; and second, as the COMPULSORY HEIRS of their father, Ferdinand E. Marcos.

The petitioner accused the Marcos siblings of having collaborated with, participated in, and/or benefitted from their parents' alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth. In particular, as far as Imee Marcos-Manotoc was concerned, she was accused of dollar salting by using Glorious Sun to import denim fabrics from one supplier at prices much higher than those paid by other users of similar materials. It was also alleged that the Marcoses personally benefitted from the sequestered media networks IBC-13, BBC-2, and RPN-9, in which Imee Marcos had a substantial interest.

Irene Marcos-Araneta, on the other hand, was accused of having conspired with her husband, respondent Gregorio Araneta III, in his being President Marcos' conduit to Pantranco, thereby paving the way for the President's ownership of the company in violation of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 2 of the 1973 Constitution.

On the basis of the fact that thr Mar is siblings were COMPULSORY HEIRS of the decedent Ferdinand Marcos Sr., the Republic prayed that they be made to (1) pay for the VALUE OF THE ALLEGED ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH WITH INTEREST from the date of acquisition; (2) render a complete ACCOUNTING and INVENTORY of all funds and other pieces of property legally or beneficially held and/or controlled by them, as well as their legal and beneficial interest therein; (3) pay ACTUAL DAMAGES estimated at P200 BILLION and additional actual damages to REIMBURSE EXPENSES for the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth estimated at P250 million or in such amount as may be proven during trial; (4) pay MORAL DAMAGES amounting to P50 BILLION ; (5) pay TEMPERATE and NOMINAL DAMAGES, as well as ATTORNEY'S FEES and LITIGATION EXPENSES in an amount to be proven during the trial; (6) pay EXEMPLARY DAMAGES in the amount of P1 BILLION ; and (7) pay treble JUDICIAL COSTS.

The Supreme Court held that the Complaint was one for the REVERSION , the RECONVEYANCE , the RESTITUTION and the ACCOUNTING of alleged ill-gotten wealth and the payment of DAMAGES.

Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the court was charged with the tasks of (1) DETERMINING the properties in the Marcos estate that constitute the alleged ill-gotten wealth; (2) TRACING where these properties are; (3) ISSUING the appropriate orders for the accounting, the recovery, and the payment of these properties; and, finally, (4) DETERMINING if the award of damages is proper.

Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan SURVIVED THE DEATH of Ferdinand E. Marcos, it was imperative therefore that the ESTATE BE DULY REPRESENTED. The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to DUE PROCESS of every party to a litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself protected, as he continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF HIS ESTATE.

On that note, the Supreme Court took judicial notice of the PROBATE PROCEEDINGS regarding the WILL of Ferdinand E. Marcos. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, the Supreme Court upheld the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of LETTERS TESTAMENTARY in solidum to Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos AS EXECUTORS of the LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.

UNLESS the EXECUTORS of the Marcos estate or the heirs are ready to WAIVE in favor of the state their RIGHT to defend or protect the estate or those properties found to be ill-gotten in their possession, control or ownership, then they may NOT be dropped as defendants in the civil case pending before the Sandiganbayan.

Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines INDISPENSABLE PARTIES as those parties-in-interest without whom there can be no FINAL DETERMINATION of an action. They are those parties who possess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Parties are indispensable if their interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with that of the other parties.

The Supreme Court held that in order to reach a FINAL DETERMINATION of the matters concerning the ESTATE of Ferdinand E. Marcos - that is, the ACCOUNTING and the RECOVERY of ill-gotten wealth - the present case must be MAINTAINED AGAINST IMELDA MARCOS AND FERDINAND "BONGBONG " R. MARCOS, JR. , as EXECUTORS of the Marcos estate, pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.

According to this provision, actions may be commenced to recover from the estate, real or personal property, or an interest therein, or to enforce a lien thereon; and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced AGAINST THE EXECUTORS .

The Supreme Court also hold that the action must likewise be MAINTAINED against IMEE Marcos-Manotoc and IRENE Marcos-Araneta on the basis of the non-exhaustive list attached as Annex "A" to the Third Amended Complaint, which states that the listed properties therein were owned by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos AND THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY. It is only during the trial of Civil Case No. 0002 before the Sandiganbayan that there could be a determination of whether these properties are indeed ill-gotten or were legitimately acquired by respondents and their predecessors.

Thus, the Supreme Court held that while it was not yet proven at that time that the Marcos siblings-respondents conspired in accumulating ill-gotten wealth, THEY MAY BE IN POSSESSION , OWNERSHIP OR CONTROL OF SUCH ILL-GOTTEN PROPERTIES OR THE PROCEEDS THEREOF AS HEIRS OF THE MARCOS COUPLE. Thus, their lack of participation in any illegal act does NOT remove the character of the property as ill-gotten and, therefore, as rightfully belonging to the State.

Further, the Supreme Court held that under the RULES OF SUCCESSION, the HEIRS INSTANTANEOUSLY BECAME CO-OWNERS OF THE MARCOS PROPERTIES UPON THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT. The property rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are TRANSMITTED to another through the DECEDENT'S DEATH. In this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their RIGHT TO TRANSFER OR DISPOSE of the properties that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the partition or the distribution of the estate.

Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner's prayer in its Third Amended Complaint DIRECTLY REFERRED to herein respondents, to wit:

1. AS TO THE FIRST SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION - To RETURN and RECONVEY to Plaintiff all funds and other property acquired by Defendants during their incumbency as public officers, which funds and other property are MANIFESTLY OUT OF PROPORTION to their salaries, other lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property which Defendants have failed to establish as having been, in fact, lawfully acquired by them, alternatively, to SOLIDARITY PAY Plaintiff the VALUE thereof with INTEREST thereon from the date of acquisition until full payment.

2. AS TO THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - to individually render to this Honorable Court a complete ACCOUNTING and INVENTORY , subject to evaluation of Court-appointed assessors, of all funds and other property legally or beneficially held and/or controlled by them, as well as their legal and beneficial interest in such funds and other property. (Emphasis supplied)

IN SUM , the Supreme Court MAINTAINED the MARCOS SIBLINGS as RESPONDENTS, because (1) the action pending before the Sandiganbayan was one that SURVIVED DEATH, and, therefore, the rights to the estate must be duly protected; (2) they allegedly CONTROLLED , POSSESSED or OWNED ill-gotten wealth, though their direct involvement in accumulating or acquiring such wealth may not have been proven as of that time.

Source :

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PETITIONER, VS. MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, et. al., GR No. 171701, February 08, 2012.

Link :

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/21716

THE ILL-GOTTEN MALACAÑANG JEWELRY COLLECTION OF THE MARCOSES

SUMMARY: Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is MANIFESTLY OUT OF PROPORTION TO HIS SALARY as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be PRESUMED PRIMA FACIE TO HAVE BEEN UNLAWFULLY Acquired. 

THE ILL-GOTTEN MALACAÑANG JEWELRY COLLECTION OF THE MARCOSES:

The 2017 resolution of the Supreme Court written by former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno in the consolidated cases entitled "ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Xxx. IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS and IRENE MARCOS ARANETA, Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent", docketed as G.R. No. 213027 and promulgated on January 18, 2017, referred to the pieces of JEWELRY, known as the MALACAÑANG COLLECTION, which were were labeled as ILL-GOTTEN and were consequently FORFEITED in favor of the Republic.

The underlying SANDIGANBAYAN case was Civil Case No. 0141, a FORFEITURE CASE entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Ferdinand E. Marcos, (represented by his Estate/Heirs) and Imelda R. Marcos", which was filed by the Republic through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), pursuant to Republic Act No. (R.A.) 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,8 2,9 1410 and 14-A.

The Sandiganbayan case sought the RECOVERY of the assets and properties pertaining to the Marcoses, who acquired them directly or indirectly through, or as a result of, the IMPROPER OR ILLEGAL USE OF FUNDS OR PROPERTIES OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

Some of the properties were already ADJUDGED AS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH and consequently FORFEITED in favor of the government.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan (the Swiss deposits case), the Court en banc in 2003 decreed that the deposits in various Swiss banks, were ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH AND FORFEITED in favor of the State.

Likewise, in Marcos v. Republic (the Arelma case), the Court's Second Division in 2012 declared that the funds, properties, and interests of Arelma were also ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH AND FORFEITED in favor of the State.

Actually, the pieces of jewelry were categorized into THREE COLLECTIONS.

The FIRST was the so-called HAWAII COLLECTION seized by the United States Customs Service and turned over to the Philippine Government. A ruling was made by the United States (U.S.) Hawaii District Court on December 18, 1992 that the Republic of the Philippines was entitled to the possession and control of the said collection.

The SECOND was the ROUMELIOTES COLLECTION, referred to as "MIA Jewelry", which was seized from Roumeliotes at the Manila International Airport on March 1, 1986. Although not covered by the forfeiture proceeding, respondents earlier sought their inclusion in then pending negotiations for settlement.

The THIRD was the MALACAÑANG COLLECTION, which was seized from Malacañang after February 25, 1986 and transferred to the Central Bank on March 1, 1986. This collection was the object of the aforementioned 2017 resolution of the Supreme Court.

Based on the 1991 valuation of auction house Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc., the Roumeliotes, Malacañang and Hawaii collections were worth between US$5,3 l 3,575 (low estimate) to US$7,112,879 (high estimate).

Invoking the declaration of the Supreme Court in the Swiss deposits case, the Republic stated that the lawful income of the Marcoses amounting to USD 304,372.43 was GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE to the value of the pieces of jewelry in 1991.

The Sandiganbayan issued a PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT dated 13 January 2014 ruling that (1) the MALACAÑANG COLLECTION was part and subject of the forfeiture petition; (2) the Motion for Summary Judgment was proper; and (3) the FORFEITURE of the Malacañang Collection was justified pursuant to R.A. 1379.

The ISSUES for the Supreme Court's resolution in the aforementioned consolidated cases were as follows: (1) whether the Sandiganbayan has JURISDICTION over the properties; (2) whether the MALACAÑANG COLLECTION can be the subject of the FORFEITURE CASE; (3) whether FORFEITURE is justified under R.A. 1379; (4) whether the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was not inconsistent with the Request for Admission; and (5) whether the Sandiganbayan correctly declared that the forfeiture was not a deprivation of petitioners' right to DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

In disposing of the aforementioned consolidated cases, the Supreme Court held that it FOUND NO REVERSIBLE ERROR in the ruling of the Sandiganbayan.

The Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan CORRECTLY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION over the case. The properties were INCLUDED in the 1991 Petition.

According to the Supreme Court, the Sandiganbayan correctly noted the ANNEXES, which were mentioned in and made an INTEGRAL PART of the 1991 Petition, itemizing and enumerating the pieces of jewelry with their estimated values. It ultimately found that the 1991 Petition had categorically alleged that the MALACAÑANG COLLECTION was INCLUDED in the assets, monies and properties sought to be recovered.

The Supreme Court further ruled that the Sandiganbayan CORRECTLY HELD that the FORFEITURE WAS JUSTIFIED and that the Malacañang Collection was subject to forfeiture. The LEGITIMATE INCOME of the Marcoses had been pegged at USD 304,372.43.

The Supreme Court reiterated its earlier rulings in Republic v. Sandiganbayan and in Marcos v. Republic that "whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is MANIFESTLY OUT OF PROPORTION TO HIS SALARY as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be PRESUMED PRIMA FACIE TO HAVE BEEN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED."

Petitioners FAILED to satisfactorily show that the properties were lawfully acquired; hence, the PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION that they were UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED prevails.

Section 2 of R.A. 1379 provides that "[w]henever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is MANIFESTLY OUT OF PROPORTION to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be PRESUMED PRIMA FACIE to have been UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED."

In this regard, the Sandiganbayan had taken JUDICIAL NOTICE of the LEGITIMATE INCOME of the Marcoses during their incumbency as public officers for the period 1966-1986 which was pegged at USD 304,372.43.

The Supreme Court furthermore held that the invocation by petitioners of lack of observance of DUE PROCESS at this stage of the proceedings was rather belated, especially when it was never invoked before the Sandiganbayan.

Needless to say, the VARIOUS PLEADINGS petitioners had filed in this case and in other cases involving the Marcos properties were COUNTLESS OCCASIONS when they could have proven that the Malacañang Collection had indeed been lawfully acquired as claimed.

The allegation of the petitioners that they were DENIED DUE PROCESS by not being given any opportunity to prove their lawful acquisition of the Malacañang Collection could not be given credence for being UTTERLY BASELESS.

IN FINE, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the assailed PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT dated 13 January 2014 and Resolution dated 11 June 2014 rendered by the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141.

Source :

ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS and IRENE MARCOS ARANETA, Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 213027, January 18, 2017.

https://www.facebook.com/100002290961177/posts/4636535173099469/

Sovereign immunity

"Xxx.

Finally, we take note of the Decision rendered by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court on 26 June 2012. In Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the foreign court agreed with the dismissal of the turnover proceeding against the Arelma assets initiated by alleged victims of human rights abuses during the Marcos regime. It reasoned that the Republic was a necessary party, but could not be subject to joinder in light of its assertion of sovereign immunity:

(The Republic's) national interests would be severely prejudiced by a turnover proceeding because it has asserted a claim of ownership regarding the Arelma assets that rests on several bases: the Philippine forfeiture law that predated the tenure of President Marcos; evidence demonstrating that Marcos looted public coffers to amass a personal fortune worth billions of dollars; findings by the Philippine Supreme Court and Swiss Federal Supreme Court that Marcos stole related assets from the Republic; and, perhaps most critically, the recent determination by the Philippine Supreme Court that Marcos pilfered the money that was deposited in the Arelma brokerage account. Consequently, allowing the federal court judgment against the estate of Marcos to be executed on property that may rightfully belong to the citizens of the Philippines could irreparably undermine the Republic's claim to the Arelma assets.

x x x x

The Republic's declaration of sovereign immunity in this case is entitled to recognition because it has a significant interest in allowing its courts to adjudicate the dispute over property that may have been stolen from its public treasury and transferred to New York through no fault of the Republic. The high courts of the United States, the Philippines and Switzerland have clearly explained in decisions related to this case that wresting control over these matters from the Philippine judicial system would disrupt international comity and reciprocal diplomatic self-interests.11

Xxx."

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government, Respondent. G.R. No. 189434 March 12, 2014. Accompanying case: IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 189505, March 12, 2014. (Resolution).

Source:

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/mar2014/gr_189434_2014.html.