Donations

"Matabuena (Matabuena v. Cervantes, 148 Phil. 295 [1971]), EQUALIZED common-law relationships between a man and a woman, on the one hand, and validly married spouses on the other, in respect of the NULLITY OF DONATIONS made BETWEEN THE PARTIES. This case similarly pronounces that the PROHIBITION against a spouse TO DONATE any absolute community property or conjugal partnership property WITHOUT THE CONSENT of the other spouse EQUALLY APPLIES to COMMON-LAW RELATIONS or COHABITATIONS of a man and a woman without a valid marriage or under a void marriage."

Jurisprudence -

NICXON L. PEREZ, JR., PETITIONER, VS. AVEGAIL PEREZ-SENERPIDA, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND MR. SENERPIDA, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 233365, March 24, 2021.

Source -

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/mar2021/gr_233365_2021.html

Plea bargaining in drug cases

"xxx.

SC Provides Clarificatory Guidelines on Plea-Bargaining in Drugs Cases

July 28, 2022

The Supreme Court, during its En Banc deliberations on Tuesday, July 26, 2022, reaffirmed the primacy and exclusivity of its rule-making power under the Constitution, and guaranteed its precedence in governing over the plea bargaining process in drugs cases.

In the consolidated cases of People v. Montierro, (G.R No. 254564), Baldadera v. People (G.R. No. 254564); and Re: Letter of the Philippine Judges Association Expressing its Concern over the Ramifications of the Decisions in G.R. No. 247575 and G.R. No. 250295 (A.M. No. 21-07-16-SC), the Supreme Court En Banc underscored the stability and independence of the Court and its rule-making power in resolving the conflict between Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 27, which prohibits plea bargaining for illegal sale of dangerous drugs to the lesser offense of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia under Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and the SC’s Resolution in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC adopting the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases.

Holding that plea bargaining in the prosecution of drugs cases goes into the very matters of fundamental constitutional rights, the Court resolved to clarify the guidelines it earlier issued in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, dated April 10, 2018. Hence, while the Supreme Court takes judicial notice of the DOJ’s efforts to amend DOJ Circular No. 27 to conform with the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases, the Court nevertheless issues the following guidelinesfor the guidance of both the Bench and the Bar:

Offers for plea bargaining must be initiated in writing by way of a formal written motion filed by the accused in court.

The lesser offense which the accused proposes to plead guilty to must necessarily be included in the offense charged.

Upon receipt of the proposal for plea bargaining that is compliant with the provisions of the Court’s Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases, the judge shall order that a drug dependency assessment be administered. If the accused admits drug use, or denies it but is found positive after a drug dependency test, then he/she shall undergo treatment and rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months. Said period shall be credited to his/her penalty and the period of his/her after-care and follow-up program if the penalty is still unserved. If the accused is found negative for drug use/dependency, then he/she will be released on time served, otherwise, he/she will serve his/her sentence in jail minus the counselling period at the rehabilitation center.

As a rule, plea bargaining requires the mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to the approval of the court. Regardless of the mutual agreement of the parties, the acceptance of the offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the court.

Though the prosecution and the defense may agree to enter into a plea bargain, it does not follow that the courts will automatically approve the proposal. Judges must still exercise sound discretion in granting or denying plea bargaining, taking into account the relevant circumstances, including the character of the accused.

The court shall not allow plea bargaining if the objection to the plea bargaining is valid and supported by evidence to the effect that:

the offender is a recidivist, habitual offender, known in the community as a drug addict and a troublemaker, has undergone rehabilitation but had a relapse, or has been charged many times; or

when the evidence of guilt is strong.

Plea bargaining in drugs cases shall not be allowed when the proposed plea bargain does not conform to the Court-issued Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases.

Judges may overrule the objection of the prosecution if it is based solely on the ground that the accused’s plea bargaining proposal is inconsistent with the acceptable plea bargain under any internal rules or guidelines of the DOJ, though in accordance with the plea bargaining framework issued by the Court, if any.

If the prosecution objects to the accused’s plea bargaining proposal due tothe circumstances enumerated in item no. 5, the trial court is mandated tohear the prosecution’s objection and rule on the merits thereof. If the trialcourt finds the objection meritorious, it shall order the continuation of the criminal proceedings.

If an accused applies for probation in offenses punishable under RA No. 9165, other than for illegal drug trafficking or pushing under Section 5 in relation to Section 24 thereof, then the law on probation shall apply.

The Supreme Court Public Information Office will upload a copy of the Court’s Decision to the SC website once it receives an official copy from the Office of the Clerk Court En Banc. ###

Xzz. "


Source - https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/28879/

Venue - "Criminal action must be commenced in the place where the crime was committed, or in any place where one of the essential ingredients or elements thereof occurred (Section 15, Rule 110, Rules of Criminal Procedure)." -

Tranquil G.S. Salvador III:

"xxx.

Criminal action must be commenced in the place where the crime was committed, or in any place where one of the essential ingredients or elements thereof occurred (Section 15, Rule 110, Rules of Criminal Procedure).

This is unlike in civil cases, where it may be instituted in the place where the property is located, if it is a real action, or where the parties reside, if it is a personal action, at the option of the plaintiff (Rule 4, Civil Procedure).

For example, for homicide, the action must be commenced in the city or municipality where the victim was stabbed to death; for carnapping, it must be in the place where the motor vehicle was taken; and for the sale of illegal drugs, it will be where the buy-bust operation and arrest took place.

There are two reasons for the rule: first, trial courts can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within their territorial jurisdiction. Second, it is grounded on the fact that where the crime took place is where the witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available (Tranquil Salvador III, Criminal Procedure citing Union Bank v. People, G.R. No. 192565, 28 February 2012).

However, there are “transitory or continuing offenses”, which are crimes where “some acts material and essential to the crimes and requisite to their consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some in another”(Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, 17 November 2004) In such cases, the action can be instituted where any of its essential ingredients, or elements, occurred.

ADVERTISEMENT

For example, in violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the venue shall be in any of the places where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored (Rigor v. People).

In a prosecution for estafa under Article 315(3) of the Revised Penal Code, the venue shall be either in the place where the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses of the accused were made, or where the damage was consummated; as “deceit and damage are the basic elements of estafa” (Tuzon v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-27410, 28 August 1975).

In kidnapping, the venue shall be wherever the victim is deprived of liberty, as “deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another” People v. Grospe, G.R. 74053, 20 January 1988).

To determine whether the court has jurisdiction over a criminal case, the allegations in the criminal complaint or information are examined. However, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction, if in the course of the trial, evidence shows that the offense was committed elsewhere (Isip v. People, G.R. No. 170298, 26 June 2007).

While as a general rule, criminal actions can only be instituted within the territorial borders of the place where the crime was committed, there are crimes committed outside of the Philippines but can be prosecuted here.

An example is when a person outside of the Philippines, creates counterfeit Philippine coins, currency, or securities (Article 2, Revised Penal Code).
Similarly, any person who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commits, conspires, or plots to finance terrorism in the Philippines shall be tried in the country (Section 19, Republic Act 10168).

This is likewise seen in the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020, where a Filipino citizen or national outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines who conspires to commit terrorism, incites to commit terrorism, recruits people to a terrorist organization, or provides material support to terrorists shall still be tried here (Section 49, Republic Act 11479).

Any violation of the Cybercrime Prevention Act may be prosecuted in the Philippines against any Filipino national regardless of the place of commission (Section 21, Republic Act 10175).

Hence, Filipinos abroad who impute a vice, crime or defect against a natural or juridical person in the Philippines through any online or virtual platform such as YouTube, Facebook, or Twitter can be prosecuted in the Philippines. They cannot raise the defense that they are outside the jurisdiction of the Philippines.

In the case of AAA v. BBB, the Supreme Court declared that the psychological and mental anguish experienced by a woman constitutes a material element of the offense of psychological violence under Republic Act No. 9262. Hence, psychological violence committed through marital infidelity is a transitory or continuing crime.

The Supreme Court explained that even if the extramarital affair causing the mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, this does not place the offender beyond the reach of Philippine courts.

This ruling has addressed the suffering of Filipina spouses who have been victims of philandering husbands who commit infidelities outside the Philippines (G.R. No. 212448, 11 January 2018).

It must be noted that the rule that venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases does not extend to applications for search warrants, because strictly speaking there are no criminal cases yet. In Pilipinas Shell, et al. v. Romars, the court characterized a search warrant as “a special criminal process”, and concluded that “proceeding for said applications are not [being] criminal in nature … the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto” (G.R. No. 189669, 16 February 2015).

Knowing the place where the crime or any of its elements is committed is only one aspect of jurisdiction that the prosecution should know before commencing the action.

The other aspect is the penalty of the offense. If the penalty of imprisonment exceeds six years, then the case will be filed in the Regional Trial Court; however, if it does not exceed six years regardless of the fine or accessory penalties, it will be filed in the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court, subject to exceptions in law (Republic Act 7691).

Xxx."

Source:

https://manilastandard.net/opinion/columns/footnotes-by-tranquil-g-s-salvador-iii/314243922/venue-is-jurisdictional.html

Levy on execution - Manuel R. Riguera

"While leafing through Professor Antonio R. Bautista’s Remedial Law Quizzer (2004 ed.), I came across Question No. 252 (at p. 116), which reads as follows:

“The sheriff, levying a writ of execution, harvested bangus from the judgment defendant’s fishpond. Is this levy proper?”

Without dwelling too much on the question, I answered in my mind that the levy is proper. After all, what could be wrong with a sheriff harvesting bangus from a fishpond pursuant to a levy on execution?

Professor Bautista’s answer to the question however took me by surprise:

“No. Levy on execution should have been by merely filing with the proper register of deeds the notice of levy because fish in a fishpond is real property. (Civil Code, Art. 415[6]; Rule 39, Sec. 9[b] last par. in relation to Rule 57, Sec. 7)”

The above answer made me realize that although the question appears deceptively easy because of its brevity, it is actually quite difficult because the reader has to unlock the core issue to come up with a credible answer. Professor Bautista’s question is an issue-spotter. The question does not present to the reader the immediate issue in a silver platter. The reader must extract the core issue himself relying upon his knowledge of the rules that may come into play.

Nonetheless, my intuition told me that the suggested answer is susceptible to challenge. I looked at the provisions cited by Professor Bautista (I supplied the emphases).

Article 415, Civil Code

“Art. 415. The following are immovable property:

…

“(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding places of similar nature, in case their owner has placed them or preserves them with the intention to have them permanently attached to the land, and forming a permanent part of it: the animals in these places are included;”

Section 9(b), last paragraph, Rule 39 (Execution of Judgments), Rules of Court

“Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.”

Section 7, Rule 57 (Preliminary Attachment), Rules of Court

“SEC. 7. Attachment of real and personal property; recording thereof. – Real and personal property shall be attached by the sheriff executing the writ in the following manner:

“(a) Real property, or growing crops thereon, or any interest therein … by filing with the registry of deeds a copy of the order, together with a description of the property attached, and a notice that it is attached ….”

The core issue presented by the problem may be stated as follows: Are the bangus real or personal property? If the bangus were real property, then levy on execution should be made, as in Professor Bautista’s answer, by filing with the register of deeds the notice of levy pursuant to Section 9(b) last paragraph of Rule 39 in relation to Section 7(a), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the bangus were personal property, levy on execution is made by the sheriff by taking the bangus pursuant to Section 9(b) last paragraph of Rule 39 in relation to Section 7(b), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.

To my mind the bangus are personal property and hence, the levy on execution would be proper. This is because of a thematic concept in Property Law which I recollected from my years of teaching the subject in law school.

Doctrine of mobilization by anticipation

The doctrine of mobilization by anticipation provides that if the implementation or consummation of a contract or transaction will require the removal of the real property from the land or immovable to which it is attached, then such real property is considered as personal property for purposes of that contract or transaction. In Sibal v. Valdez, 50 Phil. 512, 520-521 (1927), it was held that for purposes of execution, growing crops are considered as personal property; thus, the judgment debtor would have no right of redemption over the seized growing crops. The reason is that the growing crops would have to be harvested in order to sell them at execution.

Obviously, the bangus would have to be taken from the fishpond to sell them at public auction. Thus, the bangus are mobilized in anticipation of the forthcoming execution sale.

My suggested answer to the question would then be as follows:

“Yes, the levy on execution on the bangus from the defendant’s fishpond is proper.

“Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the sheriff may levy on execution upon personal property by taking the same and keeping it in his custody preparatory to the execution sale. [S9(b) R39]

“Here, the bangus is considered as personal property as the same will be mobilized in anticipation of the forthcoming execution sale. Hence, the levy is proper.”

Assumption vs Presumption

A reader may answer that the levy is not proper since there was no showing that the sheriff first demanded payment from the judgment obligor before levying upon the bangus.

My criticism of this answer is that the reader is making an assumption not warranted by the question. I have emphasized to my bar exam coachees that while they can presume facts, they cannot assume them.

One cannot assume that the sheriff did not make a prior demand for payment on the judgment obligor. On the other hand, one can presume that he did because of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed (Section 3[m], Rule 131, Rules of Court)."

Source:

https://legisperit.com/2022/07/10/a-fishy-levy/

Legal ethics

"IMMORALITY AND DISBARMENT 

By: ATTY. DENNIS GORECHO
- Columnist/CDN Digital
July 12,2022 - 09:00 AM


Passing the “best bar ever” for the new 8,241 lawyers is not enough: they have to be reminded of the highest standards of morality expected from members of the legal profession.

Discussion on disbarment is an interesting part of the legal ethics sessions of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

Good moral character is a condition which precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with upon admission.

It is a continuing qualification which all lawyers must possess (People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 682), otherwise, a lawyer may either be suspended or disbarred.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the exacting standards of mental and moral fitness based on the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

The Supreme Court stressed in several cases that if the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers serve to curb misbehavior and promote excellent public service in the Judiciary.

In Advincula v. Advincula (A.C. No. 9226, June 14, 2016), lawyers are reminded to always conduct themselves in a manner as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that they are flouting the moral standards of the legal profession.

“It is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be in fact of good moral character, but must also be in deed, any lawyer guilty of gross misconduct should be suspended or disbarred even if the misconduct relates to his or her personal life for as long as the misconduct evinces his or her lack of moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community,” the Court said.

In Narag v. Narag (A.C. No. 3405, June 29, 1998), “immoral conduct” has been described as conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.

Such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

In Ceniza v. Ceniza ( A.C. No. 8335, April 10, 2019) and Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, (A.C. No. 4256, February 13, 2004 ), the lawyers were disbarred for having abandoned their respective spouses and having maintained illicit affairs with other partners.

In Guevarra v. Eala ( 529 SCRA 1.), a lawyer was disbarred for engaging in an extra­ marital affair with a married woman.

In Perez v. Catindig, ( A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015), the lawyer’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one warranted his disbarment because he displayed his deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the 1987 Constitution.

In Panagsagan vs. Panagsagan (A.C. No. 7733, October 1, 2019), the conversion of the lawyer to Islam was a feeble attempt to shield himself from the complaint, to conceal his gross immoral conduct of infidelity and to legitimize his illicit affair.

My former UP LAW professor Associate Justice Marvic Leonen said in the case of Dagala v. Quesada, Jr. (814 Phil. 103) that the negligence or utter lack of callousness of spouses who commit indiscretions as shown by their inability to ask for forgiveness, their concealment of the act from their legitimate relationships, or their lack of support for the children born out of wedlock should be aggravating and considered for the penalty to be imposed.

Proceedings for disbarment may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or upon filing of a verified complaint of any person before the Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

When the integrity or morality is challenged, it is not enough that the lawyer denies the charge, for he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence presented on the charge.

The lawyer must present proof that he still maintains the degree of integrity and morality expected of him at all times.

( Peyups is the moniker of University of the Philippines. Atty. Dennis R. Gorecho heads the seafarers’ division of the Sapalo Velez Bundang Bulilan law offices. For comments, e-mail info@sapalovelez.com, or call 0917-5025808 or 0908-8665786.)

Read more: https://cebudailynews.inquirer.net/452579/immorality-and-disbarment#ixzz7YoDC1aAO

Follow us: @inquirerdotnet on Twitter | inquirerdotnet on Facebook. "

REPUBLIC ACT No. 10707 - AN ACT AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 968, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “PROBATION LAW OF 1976”, AS AMENDED

REPUBLIC ACT No. 10707

AN ACT AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 968, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “PROBATION LAW OF 1976”, AS AMENDED

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant for a probationable penalty and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best. No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction: Provided, That when a judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed to apply for probation based on the modified decision before such decision becomes final. The application for probation based on the modified decision shall be filed in the trial court where the judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty was rendered, or in the trial court where such case has since been re-raffled. In a case involving several defendants where some have taken further appeal, the other defendants may apply for probation by submitting a written application and attaching thereto a certified true copy of the judgment of conviction.

“The trial court shall, upon receipt of the application filed, suspend the execution of the sentence imposed in the judgment.

“This notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the benefit of probation should he seek a review of the modified decision which already imposes a probationable penalty.

“Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.1âwphi1

“An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.”

SECTION 2. Section 9 of the same Decree, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those:

“a. sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years;

“b. convicted of any crime against the national security;

“c. who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of more than six (6) months and one (1) day and/or a fine of more than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00);

“d. who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and

“e. who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.”

SECTION 3. Section 16 of the same Decree, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 16. Termination of Probation. — After the period of probation and upon consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is deemed terminated.

“The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to totally extinguish his criminal liability as to the offense for which probation was granted.

“The probationer and the probation officer shall each be furnished with a copy of such order.”

SECTION 4. Section 24 of the Same Decree is hereby amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 24. Miscellaneous Powers of Regional, Provincial and City Probation Officers. — Regional, Provincial or City Probation Officers shall have the authority within their territorial jurisdiction to administer oaths and acknowledgments and to take depositions in connection with their duties and functions under this Decree. They shall also have, with respect to probationers under their care, the powers of a police officer. They shall be considered as persons in authority.”

SECTION 5. Section 27 of the same Decree is hereby amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 27. Field Assistants, Subordinate Personnel. – Regional, Provincial or City Probation Officers shall be assisted by such field assistants and subordinate personnel as may be necessary to enable them to carry out their duties effectively.”

SECTION 6. Section 28 of the same Decree is hereby amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 28. Volunteer Probation Assistants (VPAs). — To assist the Chief Probation and Parole Officers in the supervised treatment program of the probationers, the Probation Administrator may appoint citizens of good repute and probity, who have the willingness, aptitude, and capability to act as VPAs.

“VPAs shall not receive any regular compensation except for reasonable transportation and meal allowances, as may be determined by the Probation Administrator, for services rendered as VPAs.

“They shall hold office for a two (2)-year term which may be renewed or recalled anytime for a just cause. Their functions, qualifications, continuance in office and maximum case loads shall be further prescribed under the implementing rules and regulations of this Act.

“There shall be a reasonable number of VPAs in every regional, provincial, and city probation office. In order to strengthen the functional relationship of VPAs and the Probation Administrator, the latter shall encourage and support the former to organize themselves in the national, regional, provincial, and city levels for effective utilization, coordination, and sustainability of the volunteer program.”

SECTION 7. Separability Clause. — If any provision of this Act is declared invalid, the provisions hereof not affected by such declaration shall remain in full force and effect.

SECTION 8. Repealing Clause. — All laws, executive orders, or administrative orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended, repealed or modified accordingly.

SECTION 9. Appropriations Clause. — The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be included in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law.

SECTION 10. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — Within sixty (60) days from the approval of this Act, the Department of Justice shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.

SECTION 11. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,


(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

Speaker of the House

of Representatives


(Sgd.) FRANKLIN M. DRILON

President of the Senate

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2280 and House Bill No. 4147 was finally passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on September 15, 2015 and September 14, 2015, respectively.


(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP

Secretary General

House of Representatives


(Sgd.) OSCAR B. YABES

Secretary of the Senate


Approved: NOV 26 2015


(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO, III

President of the Philippines in

Rally permits, maximum tolerance, and freedom parks

"x x x.

Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do not act on applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application duly filed on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by the law.

In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that "in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny."26

For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.

In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance. The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

X x x."


G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169848 April 25, 2006

Jess Del Prado, Wilson Fortaleza, Leody de Guzman, Pedro Pinlac, Carmelita Morante, Rasti Delizo, Paul Bangay, Marie Jo Ocampo, Lilia dela Cruz, Cristeta Ramos, Adelaida Ramos, Mary Grace Gonzales, Michael Torres, Rendo Sabusap, Precious Balute, Roxanne Magboo, Ernie Bautista, Joseph de Jesus, Margarita Escober, Djoannalyn Janier, Magdalena Sellote, Manny Quiazon, Ericson Dizon, Nenita Cruzat, Leonardo De los Reyes, Pedrito Fadrigon, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his official capacity as The Executive Secretary and in his personal capacity, ANGELO REYES, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, ARTURO LOMIBAO, in his official capacity as the Chief, Philippine National Police, VIDAL QUEROL, in his official capacity as the Chief, National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO), PEDRO BULAONG, in his official capacity as the Chief, Manila Police District (MPD) AND ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS GARCIA, and AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION AND INSTRUCTIONS, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169881 April 25, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented by its Chairperson ELMER C. LABOG and Secretary General JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National President, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, GILDA SUMILANG, FRANCISCO LASTRELLA, and ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP DIRECTOR GENRAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, HONORABLE MAYOR LITO ATIENZA, and PNP MPD CHIEF SUPT. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169838_2006.html

Police power and freedom of speech

"x x x.

The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power," which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.18

Reyes v. Bagatsing19 further expounded on the right and its limits, as follows:

1. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent." Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.

2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: "It must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution." What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal or printed, being in a context of violence. It must always be remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. It means more than just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United States v. Apurado: "It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers." It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to one’s destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.

There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939 vintage, of Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: "Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied." The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v. Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. Reference was made to such plaza "being a promenade for public use," which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally starting from a public park that is the Luneta.

4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the gates of the US embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this Court categorically declared: "Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. chap. 145, section 2, providing that no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town or from licensing committee,’ was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that ‘a statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, * * *. "Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored: "Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection."

x x x

6. x x x The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: "The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects." There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then, only the guilty parties should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place – is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."

x x x

8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, -- even more so than on the other departments – rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of judgment." Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. x x x.

X x x."

G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169848 April 25, 2006

Jess Del Prado, Wilson Fortaleza, Leody de Guzman, Pedro Pinlac, Carmelita Morante, Rasti Delizo, Paul Bangay, Marie Jo Ocampo, Lilia dela Cruz, Cristeta Ramos, Adelaida Ramos, Mary Grace Gonzales, Michael Torres, Rendo Sabusap, Precious Balute, Roxanne Magboo, Ernie Bautista, Joseph de Jesus, Margarita Escober, Djoannalyn Janier, Magdalena Sellote, Manny Quiazon, Ericson Dizon, Nenita Cruzat, Leonardo De los Reyes, Pedrito Fadrigon, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his official capacity as The Executive Secretary and in his personal capacity, ANGELO REYES, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, ARTURO LOMIBAO, in his official capacity as the Chief, Philippine National Police, VIDAL QUEROL, in his official capacity as the Chief, National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO), PEDRO BULAONG, in his official capacity as the Chief, Manila Police District (MPD) AND ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS GARCIA, and AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION AND INSTRUCTIONS, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169881 April 25, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented by its Chairperson ELMER C. LABOG and Secretary General JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National President, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, GILDA SUMILANG, FRANCISCO LASTRELLA, and ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP DIRECTOR GENRAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, HONORABLE MAYOR LITO ATIENZA, and PNP MPD CHIEF SUPT. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169838_2006.html

Free speech

"x x x.

Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v. CA,15 the Court, as early as the onset of this century, in U.S. v. Apurado,16 already upheld the right to assembly and petition, as follows:

There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the people’s exercise of these rights. As early as the onset of this century, this Court in U.S. vs. Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly and petition and even went as far as to acknowledge:

"It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater, the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising."

Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso,17 the Court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks.

X x x."




G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169848 April 25, 2006

Jess Del Prado, Wilson Fortaleza, Leody de Guzman, Pedro Pinlac, Carmelita Morante, Rasti Delizo, Paul Bangay, Marie Jo Ocampo, Lilia dela Cruz, Cristeta Ramos, Adelaida Ramos, Mary Grace Gonzales, Michael Torres, Rendo Sabusap, Precious Balute, Roxanne Magboo, Ernie Bautista, Joseph de Jesus, Margarita Escober, Djoannalyn Janier, Magdalena Sellote, Manny Quiazon, Ericson Dizon, Nenita Cruzat, Leonardo De los Reyes, Pedrito Fadrigon, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his official capacity as The Executive Secretary and in his personal capacity, ANGELO REYES, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, ARTURO LOMIBAO, in his official capacity as the Chief, Philippine National Police, VIDAL QUEROL, in his official capacity as the Chief, National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO), PEDRO BULAONG, in his official capacity as the Chief, Manila Police District (MPD) AND ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS GARCIA, and AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION AND INSTRUCTIONS, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169881 April 25, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented by its Chairperson ELMER C. LABOG and Secretary General JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National President, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, GILDA SUMILANG, FRANCISCO LASTRELLA, and ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP DIRECTOR GENRAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, HONORABLE MAYOR LITO ATIENZA, and PNP MPD CHIEF SUPT. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169838_2006.html

PUBLIC ASSEMBLY ACT OF 1985

Batas Pambansa Blg. 880

An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The People Of Their Right Peaceably To Assemble And Petition The Government [And] For Other Purposes

Section 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. – The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law.

Sec. 3. Definition of terms. – For purposes of this Act:

(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.

The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances; Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.

The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.

(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access.

(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.

(d) "Modification of a permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes.

Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required. – A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.

Sec. 5. Application requirements. – All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:

(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.

(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of the applicant under Section 8 hereof.

(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.

(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.

Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application. –

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory.

(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

Sec. 7. Use of Public throroughfare. – Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.

Sec. 8. Responsibility of applicant. – It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following:

(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;|avvphi|.net

(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly;

(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held peacefully;

(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit; and

(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly.

Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. – Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.

Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. – It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:

(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;

(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;

(c) Tear gas, smoke grenadesater cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.

Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. – No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:

(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;

(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;

(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;

(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;

(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a ground for dispersal.

Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. – When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.

Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. – The following shall constitute violations of the Act:

(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;

(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf;

(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;

(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;

(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public assembly;

(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;

(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:

1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;

2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;

3. the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;

4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;

5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.

Sec. 14. Penalties. – Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding section shall be punished as follows:

(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months;

(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;

(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;

(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days.

Sec. 15. Freedom parks. – Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit.

In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act.

Sec. 16. Constitutionality. – Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby.

Sec. 17. Repealing clause. – All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

Sec. 18. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, October 22, 1985.

G.R. No. 169838             April 25, 2006

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169848             April 25, 2006

Jess Del Prado, Wilson Fortaleza, Leody de Guzman, Pedro Pinlac, Carmelita Morante, Rasti Delizo, Paul Bangay, Marie Jo Ocampo, Lilia dela Cruz, Cristeta Ramos, Adelaida Ramos, Mary Grace Gonzales, Michael Torres, Rendo Sabusap, Precious Balute, Roxanne Magboo, Ernie Bautista, Joseph de Jesus, Margarita Escober, Djoannalyn Janier, Magdalena Sellote, Manny Quiazon, Ericson Dizon, Nenita Cruzat, Leonardo De los Reyes, Pedrito Fadrigon, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his official capacity as The Executive Secretary and in his personal capacity, ANGELO REYES, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, ARTURO LOMIBAO, in his official capacity as the Chief, Philippine National Police, VIDAL QUEROL, in his official capacity as the Chief, National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO), PEDRO BULAONG, in his official capacity as the Chief, Manila Police District (MPD) AND ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS GARCIA, and AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION AND INSTRUCTIONS, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169881             April 25, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented by its Chairperson ELMER C. LABOG and Secretary General JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National President, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, GILDA SUMILANG, FRANCISCO LASTRELLA, and ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP DIRECTOR GENRAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, HONORABLE MAYOR LITO ATIENZA, and PNP MPD CHIEF SUPT. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169838_2006.html

Legal easement of right of way

"x x x.

The conferment of the legal easement of right of way is governed by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code:

ART. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.

Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.

In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance.

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.

ART. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

In summary, an entitlement to the easement of right of way requires that the following requisites must be met.

The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);

There is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);

The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and

The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).15

All the above requisites are present in this case.

As regards the first requisite, there is no dispute that the respondent's property was surrounded by other immovables owned by different individuals, including Spouses Williams. The isolation was further shown in the Sketch Plan16 prepared by Honorato R. Bisnar, the geodetic engineer deputized by the parties. Moreover, contrary to Spouses Williams' claim that there was a barangay road closest to the dominant estate, the RTC, during the ocular inspection, observed that "there was no existing barangay road xxx."17

The second requisite of payment of indemnity was also complied with by the respondent when he wrote Spouses Williams on January 27, 2004, formally asking them to provide him with a right of way, for which he was in willing to pay a reasonable value or to swap a portion of his property.18

Anent the third requisite, the isolation of the dominant estate was not due to the respondent's own acts. The property he purchased was already surrounded by other immovables leaving him no adequate ingress or egress to a public highway. Spouses Williams refused to grant a right of way and averred that the isolation of the dominant estate was attributable to the respondent's own acts. They pointed out that when the respondent purchased the dominant estate, he knew that Sierra was in negotiation with them for the sale of the dominant estate, thus, he was in bad faith. Nonetheless, it cannot be used to defeat the respondent's claim for a right of way. Sierra had every right to sell his property to anybody. Further, when the respondent bought the dominant estate there could have been no existing contract of sale yet considering that Spouses Williams and Sierra were still in negotiation. Hence, consent, one of the essential requisites for a valid contract, was lacking.

As to the fourth requisite, the Court finds that the right of way sought by the respondent is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and it is the shortest distance to the national highway. This is evident in the Sketch Plan19 showing that the requested right of way was alongside the perimeter of Spouses Williams' property. Moreover, during the ocular inspection, the RTC observed that the right of way, which the respondent was seeking was alongside a precipice.20 Spouses Williams insisted that they intended to build structures on the portion claimed by the respondent, but at a safe distance from the precipice, not immediately beside it. In addition, the 705.20 sq. m long pathway would only affect a small portion of the 12,200 sq. m. property of Spouses Williams, and for which the respondent expressed willingness to pay.

Even assuming that the right of way being claimed by the respondent is not the shortest distance from the dominant estate to the public highway, it is well-settled that "[t]he criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation, xxx In other words, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. If having these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest."21 As previously discussed, the right of way claimed by the respondent is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

X x x."

G.R. No. 207146, March 15, 2017

SPOUSES LARRY AND ROSARITA WILLIAMS, Petitioners, v. RAINERO A. ZERDA, Respondent.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2017marchdecisions.php?id=228

The economy under Duterte

"10 things about the economy that the Duterte administration should admit

April 4, 2022

by IBON Foundation


X x x.

All this will seek to distract from how social and economic development have been set back by the Duterte administration even before the pandemic, with the last two years of poor COVID-19 response just making things even worse. Despite recent hyped economic growth:

The Philippines has the third worst performing economy during the pandemic in Southeast Asia. The Philippine economy, measured by real gross domestic product (GDP), is still 4.5% smaller than before the pandemic in 2019 behind only Thailand (4.6% smaller) and Myanmar (15.8% smaller).[1] Other countries contracted by less or – like Vietnam, Lao PDR and Singapore – were even able to grow.

The Philippines has the highest unemployment rate (7.4% in Q4 2021) compared to Indonesia (6.5% in Q3 2021), Malaysia (4.3% in Q4 2021), Vietnam (3.6% in Q4 2021), Thailand (2.3% in Q3 2021), and Singapore (2% in Q4 2021).[2]

The Philippines has the highest inflation rate (3.9% in 2021) compared to Malaysia (2.5%), Singapore (2.3%), Indonesia (1.6%), Thailand (-0.1%) and Vietnam (-5.1%).[3]

The Philippines has the biggest trade deficit (11% of GDP in 2021) compared to Thailand (0.7% surplus), Vietnam (1.4% surplus), Indonesia (3% surplus), Singapore (12.8% surplus), and Malaysia (16.3% surplus).[4]

The Philippines has the biggest fiscal deficit (8.6% of GDP in 2021) compared to Malaysia (6.1%), Thailand (around 6.1% as of the first three quarters of 2021), Indonesia (4.6% in 2021), Singapore (1.5% surplus), and Vietnam (2.0% surplus).[5]

Even before the pandemic, job generation was the worst of the last six (6) administrations in the past 36 years – average annual net employment creation of only 313,338 over the period 2016-2019 was already the worst in the post-Marcos era.[6] This only got worse upon the pandemic and especially after the administration’s protracted lockdowns.

Between January 2020 and January 2022, unemployment grew more than employment –employment increased by only 1.1% (or by 475,000 to 43 million) while unemployment increased by 22.3% (or by 534,000 to 2.9 million).[7]

This is set to be the only administration under which real wages declined in the last six (6) administrations and 36 years – the real wage in the National Capital Region (NCR) has fallen by 8.2% since the start of the Duterte administration, as of February 2022.[8]

The Duterte administration did not prioritize COVID-19 response. Only Php616 billion was spent on COVID-19 response in 2020 and 2021 versus Php1.9 trillion for Build, Build, Build infrastructure and Php2.3 trillion for debt servicing (interest and principal).[9]

The economy is at its weakest in 70 years – manufacturing has fallen to its smallest share of GDP (18.6% in 2020 and 19.2% in 2021) in 70 years and agriculture to its smallest (9.2% in 2019 and 9.6% in 2021) in history.[10]

[1] IBON estimates from data collected from World Bank and national statistical agencies.

[2] From data collated by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (https://www.bsp.gov.ph/Statistics/Economic%20Indicators%20of%20Selected%20Countries/tab48_sas.aspx)

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] IBON computations from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) Labor Force Survey data (various years).

[7] Ibid.

[8] IBON estimates from National Wages and Productivity Commission wage data and BSP inflation data.

[9] COVID-19 response, infrastructure spending and debt servicing data from Department of Budget and Management.

[10] National income data from PSA.

X x x. "

Read: 

 https://www.ibon.org/10-things-about-the-economy-that-the-duterte-administration-should-admit/

Sovereignty vs. Sovereign Rights

"Sovereignty Vs. Sovereign Rights: De-escalating Tensions in the South China Sea

24 June 2022

PRATNASHREE BASU

https://www.orfonline.org/research/de-escalating-tensions-in-the-south-china-sea/?amp



X x x.


Decoupling Sovereignty and Sovereign Rights

The disputes discussed in the previous sections are multidimensional. However, the critical distinction is between a state's absolute ‘sovereignty’ and its ‘sovereign rights’. Sovereignty, as applied to states, comprises “rights and power over a territory, responsibility and accountability over a population, general and specific authorities, and recognition by other sovereign states”; sovereign rights, meanwhile, as utilised by UNCLOS, “pertains to the entitlements or privileges of a state to a defined area of a sea called the exclusive economic zone” and thus “represents the limited rights of a state over its exclusive economic zone.”[19] Every state's right to exclude external actors from its area of jurisdiction, as conceptualised in the principle of Westphalian[c] sovereignty, assumes great significance in the context of the SCS.[20] This principle, if applied to the SCS dispute, raises questions on the validity of concepts such as ‘innocent passage’ and ‘cooperative maritime boundary settlement’ as envisioned in international law on marine administration. The conflict is mostly due to differences in the understanding of historical and modern sovereignty. It is not surprising, therefore, that administering a mutually acceptable framework of sovereign rights in the maritime zone is highly complex and challenging.

There is a rethinking of the idea of sovereignty, from an absolutist notion of complete non-interference in a state’s domestic affairs to ensuring the state discharges its responsibility to protect the rights of its citizens, especially human rights. This has provided space for limited interventions by the international community on legitimate grounds. It has made sovereignty partly conditional on a state's performance in fulfilling its obligations.[21] The question is whether this reassessment of sovereignty can be extended to a state's obligation in the maritime domain under international maritime law. The UN’s Declaration on Principles of International Law creates a responsibility for states to duly acknowledge equal sovereignty of all and the sovereign rights inherent therein. Suppose it is established that China is leveraging its economic and political heft to violate the sovereignty of coastal states of the region. Can this be a legitimate ground for intervention by external players such as the US and its allies, international and regional bodies such as the UN and ASEAN, or even multi-nation associations such as the QUAD (the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue of Australia, India, Japan, and the US) and the AUKUS (a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the US)?

Sovereignty is often inflated by attaching a sense of divinity to its character. However, in its application, sovereignty is not absolute.[22] In international politics, there are continuous negotiations over the extent to which a ‘sovereign’ nation needs to restrain itself while exercising its sovereign rights in exchange for its association with international, regional, or supranational entities. Similarly, the signatories of UNCLOS are subject to specific restrictions in the exercise of sovereignty in their maritime jurisdictions. Articles 207 to 212 of the UNCLOS provide that states must adopt regulatory policies to prevent, reduce, and control marine pollution. Article 17 says states enjoy the right of ‘innocent passage’ through the territorial sea of other states. This provision is the most critical distinction between sovereignty over territorial land and territorial sea. This is also perhaps why it is vehemently opposed by countries such as China.

Article 56 of the Convention confers sovereign rights on states for the exploitation, exploration, conservation, and management of living and non-living resources in the waters of their EEZs and continental shelves. Article 73 also enables states to take necessary punitive measures to ensure compliance with the Convention's provisions. In the M/V Virginia G case, a dispute over Guinea-Bissau’s arrest of a Panama coastal tanker in 2009, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea addressed the restrictions on the exercise of sovereign rights by coastal states. It declared that in the exercise of such rights, the state must respect the rights of other coastal states, considering the UNCLOS's relevant provisions.[23]

The restrictions on sovereign rights are institutionalised in the rules and regulations of various international treaties. These rules are constantly evolving according to the socio-political context. Changes in restrictions on sovereign rights give such rights a dynamic character, while sovereignty is a far more concrete concept. Sovereign rights are the parts, and sovereignty is the whole of an interactive system of the jurisdictional power of the states. The whole, however, cannot be reduced to the sum of the mechanical properties of the parts. The transfer or delegation of certain sovereign rights to an external entity does not dilute the state's sovereign integrity.[24]

There is another distinction between sovereignty and sovereign rights that pertains specifically to maritime jurisprudence. Maritime boundaries only separate sovereign rights that are functional and limited in character. Possession of sovereign rights over a marine space does not imply sovereignty over it; albeit sovereign rights are contingent on sovereignty over the ‘baseline’.[d] In land administration, delimitation of territory also implies demarcation of exclusive rights. However, in the maritime domain, two or more states may have equal and valid entitlements to a given territory, and reasonable sacrifices are required by both for a mutually acceptable resolution to the boundary question.[25]

China’s refusal to acknowledge these crucial distinctions is one of the primary reasons for the tensions in the SCS. Any assertion of sovereign rights by other coastal states is perceived as a challenge to its sovereign integrity. The SCS’s resources—existing and potential—and its own significance in global maritime trade may also have prompted China to conveniently ignore these distinctions.

To be sure, however, the distinction between sovereignty and sovereign rights is only part of the problem. Another aspect is that of China claiming sovereignty over almost all the major island groups in the region. The other littoral states consider these claims untenable as per international norms.

The first reference to ‘sovereign rights’ in international maritime law was made in the 1970s, around the same time that the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea was held (which eventually led to the signing of the UNCLOS in 1982). The term has come to govern the rights of coastal states over resources in their continental shelves and EEZs, as well as their energy resources, since the 1990s. However, sovereignty is not automatically conferred because a state possesses sovereign rights over resources in its EEZ. The sovereign rights (a limited set of rights and powers) of a coastal state do not correspond to the right to exercise sovereignty (i.e., supreme political authority) over the area.

Thus there is divergence between international maritime law and China’s view of its authority.[26] Beijing regards the SCS as its adjacent and relevant waters.[27] But these terms are not spelt out in international law. China’s maritime understanding is consequently an extension of its ‘historical rights’ over the SCS. From China’s perspective, its activities in these waters—whether the construction of artificial islands or the passing of its new coast guard law—are entirely justified. They are, however, in contravention of international maritime law as laid out by the UNCLOS.

X x x."

Revised Domestic Adoption Guidelines

From the Supreme Court...

"xxx. 

June 21, 2022

Following the enactment of RA 11642, or the DOMESTIC ADMINISTRATIVE ADOPTION AND ALTERNATIVE CHILD CARE ACT, the Supreme Court has issued GUIDELINES on the IMPLICATIONS of the law on the RULE ON ADOPTION. 

In an En Banc Resolution, the Court adopted the recommendations of the Committee on Family Courts and Juvenile Concerns, led by then Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, as follows:

Upon effectivity of RA 11642, COURTS MAY NO LONGER RECEIVE OR ACCEPT PETITIONS FOR DOMESTIC ADOPTION. 

JURISDICTION over domestic adoption cases shall now be with the NEWLY CREATED NATIONAL AUTHORITY FOR CHILD CARE (NACC), a QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY attached to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

XXX. 

Petitioners have the OPTION to immediately WITHDRAW judicial petitions for domestic adoption PENDING IN COURT, REGARDLESS OF THE STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. Otherwise, the courts shall continue to hear and decide such petitions.

The courts shall give petitioners time to manifest their intent to withdraw. If petitioners fail to notify the court within the set period, they are considered to have WAIVED THE OPTION TO WITHDRAW THEIR PETITIONS. 

Petitioners, and their respective counsels, who avail of the benefits of RA 11642 without first withdrawing their pending petitions before the courts shall be sanctioned under the Rules of Court.

Domestic adoption provisions in the RULE ON ADOPTION are NOW RENDERED INEFFECTIVE except for pending domestic cases before the courts not withdrawn by petitioners.

Rescission of adoption under Section 47 of RA 11642 covers judicial adoptions.

INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION petitions pending before the courts pursuant to Part B of the Rule on Adoption shall be DISMISSED. 

All courts are required to submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a list and status report of all pending adoption cases, including archived cases.

RA 11642 TOOK EFFECT on JANUARY 28, 2022 with the goal of making domestic adoption proceedings simpler and less costly. The law also seeks to streamline alternative child care services.

FULL TEXT of A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC dated April 19, 2022 at:https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/28076/

Xxx. "

Link: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/28079/