I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. On October 22, 2003 respondent private MARTIN BUMANLAG filed a complaint for EJECTMENT against the petitioner CRISTINA OCAMPO FERRER with the herein public respondent Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pinas City, Branch 79, docketed as Civil Case No. 6790 (summary proceeding), the ultimate facts of which are extensively quoted below, for the record:
xxxx.
THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER
(SUMMARY PROCEDURE)
1. The defendant is a LESSEE of two (2) lots owned by the plaintiff (lessor), located within Las Pinas City, and described as follows:
a) TCT No. 111059 with an area of 282 sq. m. and located at Lot 30, Block 8, Manuel Homes, Marcos Alvarez Ave., Talon 5, Las Pinas City; and
b) TCT No. 111060 covering the adjoining lot (Lot 29) also with an area of 282 sq. m. and located at Lot 29, Block 8, Manuel Homes, Marcos Alvarez Ave., Talon 5, Las Pinas City.
2. On October 3, 1990 the plaintiff (as lessor) and the defendant (as lessee) entered into a CONTRACT OF LEASE WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE. Attached hereto as ANNEX A hereof is a copy of the said contract.
3. The plaintiff hereby adopts into this complaint the stipulations, covenants, terms and conditions of the said contract to form part of this complaint by incorporation and reference. More particularly, and for purposes of summarizing its salient provisions, the said contract contained the following major stipulations, covenants, terms and conditions, to wit:
a) The subject lots of the said contract are the lots covered by the aforementioned two (2) land titles registered in the name of the plaintiff. (See the whereas/premise clause of the contract);
b) The term of the lease was ten (10) years, commencing on July 1, 1990 and to end on July 1, 2000, renewable for another period at the pleasure of the both parties. (See Par. 1, Annex A, Contract);
c) The monthly rental was Six Thousand Pesos (P6, 000.00) for the first five (5) years from July 1, 1990 to July 1, 1995. (Par. 2, Id., ;
d) The monthly rental shall be increased to Eight Thousand Pesos (P8, 000.00) from the sixth (6th) year to the tenth (10th) year from July 1, 1995 to July 1, 2000. (Id.);
e) The rentals shall be paid without need of express demand. (Par. 3, Id.);
f) The plaintiff waived the usual three (3) months cash deposit. (Par. 4, Id.);
g) The agreed advance rentals were Fifty Eight Thousand Pesos (P58, 000.00) representing rentals for ten (10) months from July 1, 1990 to April 1, 1991. (Id.).
h) Failure of the defendant to pay at least three (3) months rentals would mean an automatic termination, rescission and cancellation of the contract, in which case the defendant should forthwith vacate the leased properties and the plaintiff may take physical possession thereof, without need of demand. (Par. 5, Id.);
i) The plaintiff allowed the defendant to use, free of charge, some 300 sq. m. of the adjacent lot (covered by TCT No. T-6893 and denominated as Lot 15) as the basketball court, school playground and garden of the school of the defendant (School of the Holy Spirit) for school year 1990-1995. (Par. 6, Id.);
j) The defendant shall comply with all applicable national and local laws and rules and regulations in building improvements or in operating her business on the leased lots. (Par. 7, Id.);
k) Local real taxes on the leased lots were for the account of the plaintiff, while local real estate taxes on the improvements on the leased lots were for the accounts of the defendant. (Par. 8, Id.);
l) The defendant was given the right to purchase, within the first five (5) years from the execution of the contract, the five (5) lots covered by the following TCTs: No. 111060 (leased lot), 111059 (leased lot), 111058, T-6893, and T-6894. The total area of all such lots was 2,260 sq. m.. In case the defendant would opt to purchase the said five (5) lots, the price per square meter shall be negotiated and shall be mutually agreeable to both parties. (Par. 9, Id.);
m) The services to be utilized by the defendant on the leased lots to operate her school and other business activities shall be for the account of the defendant. (Par. 10, Id.);
n) The defendant was prohibited to sublease or transfer her rights under the contract without the written consent of the plaintiff. (Par. 11, Id.);
o) All improvements to be built by the defendant on the leased lots shall be owned by the plaintiff upon the termination, cancellation or expiration of the contract, without any duty to reimburse the defendant. (Par. 12, Id.);
p) The contract had cancelled, rescinded, and nullified the prior CONTRACT OF LEASE WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE between the parties, executed/notarized on April 18, 1990, in respect of the two (2) lots covered by TCT Nos. T-6893 and 6894. (Par. 13, Id.);
q) The party who would breach the contract shall be liable for damages and attorney’s fees. (Par. 14, Id.).
4. The defendant has reneged on her contractual duty to pay the agreed rentals stipulated in the foregoing contract. As of March 1, 2003 the rental arrears of the defendant amounted to Seven Hundred Forty Four Thousand Seven Hundred Two Pesos (P744, 702.00). Plaintiff has written the defendant a final DEMAND LETTER dated March 11, 2003, through his current counsel Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr. (Laserna Cueva Mercader Law Offices), demanding payment of her rental arrears and to vacate the leased lots/properties, a copy of which is attached as ANNEX B hereof, which demand letter the defendant had rejected x x x x x.
5. On March 12, 2003 the plaintiff filed a barangay complaint (Talon 5, Las Pinas City) for purposes of final conciliation/mediation, and to reiterate the aforementioned final demand letter of the plaintiff referred to in the preceding paragraphs, a copy of which barangay complaint is attached as ANNEX C hereof.
6. In view of the failure of the parties to arrive at a compromise at the barangay level, the Barangay Talon 5 issued a Certificate To File Action, on April 29, 2003, a copy of which is attached as ANNEX D hereof.
7. The contract expired on July 1, 2000 (Par. 1, Annex A, Contract of Lease, supra). To date the defendant adamantly continues to control and possess the leased lots and continues to exploit and benefit from the economic value of such lots against the will of the plaintiff, to the grave detriment of the plaintiff, despite all the repeated previous demands and protestations of the plaintiff --- in violation of all the basic norms of justice, fairness and good faith.
8. The plaintiff, as a community leader being a Councilman of Barangay Talon 5 of this City, had been very patient with the defendant for a long period of time. In May 1998 his former counsel had sent a demand letter to the defendant on account of the latter’s rental arrears as of such month. (See ANNEX E hereof). In May 1999 the plaintiff himself sent another demand letter to the defendant on account of the latter’s rental arrears as of such month. (See ANNEX F hereof).
9. Before filing this ejectment suit with this Court, the current counsel for the plaintiff (Laserna Cueva Mercader Law Offices) had sent a final NOTICE TO LITIGATE, dated October 13, 2003, to the defendant by way of a last/final demand/notice/reminder to the defendant and to give the defendant a last/final chance to settle her obligation, restore the physical possession of the leased lots to the plaintiff, and avoid a tedious and costly suit. (See ANNEX G hereof).
10. The plaintiff was constrained to hire a counsel to defend and protect his rights and interests in the face of the contractual breach, unlawful detainer and deprivation of the physical possession of the leased lots committed by the defendant. The plaintiff has agreed to pay his counsel a discounted acceptance fee of P20,000.00, discounted appearance fee of P2,000.00 per court hearing, and a final premium fee of 25 percent of the recoverable damages in this suit. (See ANNEX H hereof).
11. This ejectment suit is covered by the RULES OF SUMMARY PROCEDURE and RULE 70. xxxx.” (END OF QUOTE)
2. The aforementioned ejectment complaint filed by the respondent prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that, immediately upon filing of this suit, the plaintiff’s motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, integrated in this complaint, be forthwith set for the required motion hearing and that, after such motion hearing/s, the proper writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued with dispatch by the Court, upon posting by the plaintiff of the required injunction bond at such amount as the Court may fix at its discretion.
FURTHERMORE, it is respectfully prayed that, after trial, JUDGMENT be rendered ordering the defendant:
1. To pay her rental arrears to the plaintiff, with legal interest, which arrears as of March 2003 are computed below, to wit:
1995 P56,702.00
1996 96,000.00
1997 96,000.00
January 1, 1998 to
June 30, 1998 48,000.00
June 30, 1998 to
May 30, 1999 88,000.00
June 1, 1999 to
March 2003 360,000.00
Total……………………. P744,702.00
2. To VACATE the subject lots/properties and to RESTORE the physical/material possession thereof to and in favor of the plaintiffs; and
3. To pay the plaintiff attorney’s fees as follows: acceptance fee of P20,000.00, appearance fees of P2,000.00 per court hearing, and a final premium fee of 25 percent of the recoverable damages in this suit; and litigation expenses of at least P50,000.00; plus costs of suit.
FURTHERMORE, it is prayed that this suit be tried under the Rules of Summary Procedure, being an ejectment case (unlawful detainer);.
FINALLY, the plaintiff prays for such and other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises. Xxxx.” (END OF QUOTE).
4. Petitioner FERRER herself, pro se, filed her extensive (unverified) ANSWER dated November 27, 2003 which was personally prepared and signed by her, denying the allegations in the complaint and raising various irrelevant and immaterial issues. Her VERIFICATION was filed much later (dated 2 December 203). On December 22, 2003 her counsel, Atty. Job MADAYAG, entered his appearance and belatedly moved to admit a COUNTERCLAIM.
5. The PRE-TRIAL of the case was set on March 12, 2004. The parties filed their PRE-TRIAL BRIEFS. BUMANLAG executed a special power of attorney in favor of his counsel. On March12, 2004 the Court issued an ORDER terminating the pre-trial and requiring the parties to submit their respective POSITION PAPERS and other supporting documents. On April 13, 2004 BUMANLAG filed an extensive Position Paper with its supporting documents and affidavits (by the Spouses BUMANLAG), as required in the Order and by the Rules of Summary Procedure. FERRER likewise filed her position paper. The only supporting documents attached thereto were her old 1992 and 1993 letters to BUMANLAG which expressed her interest to buy from BUMANLAG the subject lots. The said transaction did not materialize.
6. On May 18, 2004 the public respondent MTC of Las Pinas City issued a DECISION recognizing the merits of the complaint of BUMANLAG. Its FINDINGS are hereunder extensively quoted, for the record:
xxxx.
FINDINGS OF THE COURT
The Court is convinced that the plaintiff has sufficiently and preponderantly proven his cause of action against the defendant in ejecting the latter from the premises subject of this case.
Annexes to the complaint, original and certified true copies submitted to the Court clearly show that the plaintiff is the registered owner of the land subject of this case and this fact was never controverted by the defendant.
The defendant raised the defense that she does not owe any amount to the plaintiff and that this cause of action was merely meant to harass her.
By virtue of the contract of lease entered into by the parties, defendant is obliged to pay monthly rentals to the plaintiff which, from the averment of both parties, it can be inferred that the same had been complied with faithfully until 1994 only. Defendant failed to refute plaintiff’s claim of her failure to pay rentals from 1995 until the filing of this case except for a mere allegation that the rental payment was waived orally for a period of 2 years by the plaintiff’s wife sometime in 1996. Hence, defendant is a deforciant even as early as 1995 or, granting that her claim of waiver is true, as early as 1998. Failure of payment of rental is a valid ground in ejectment case,
It has repeatedly been held that in ejectment cases, the sole question for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property in question and neither a claim of juridical ownership can outrightly deprive the Court from taking due cognizance of the case.
The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between same parties respecting title to the land or building, nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving possession.
Plaintiff as the registered owner of the subject property have the right to possess, enjoy and dispose of the same as provided in Articles 428 and 429 of the Civil Code, which expressly provides, thus:
“Art. 428 – The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without the other limitations than those established by law.
The owner has also the right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.”
“Art. 429 – The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may reasonable necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.”
In this case at bar, the possession by the defendant of the subject premises was initially legal, the same was based on a contract of lease. However, with the expiration of the ten-year period, without the same having been extended, and failure of the defendant to comply with here obligation to pay the monthly rentals, possession of the defendant of the subject property became illegal. Hence, plaintiff has a valid cause of action.
The Court will not longer discuss on the option to buy issue as this had not materialized, aside from the fact that the Court believes that the same should be pursued in a separate cause of action. Xxxx.” (END FO QUOTE).
7. The dispositive part of the aforesaid Decision reads thus:
xxxx.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, commanding the latter and all persons claiming rights under here the following:
1. To peacefully vacate the subject premises by surrendering possession thereof the plaintiff;
2. To pay plaintiff the sum of Php8,000.00 a month representing defendant’s rent on the use and occupation of the property from date of default until actual vacation.
3. To pay the sum of Php20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees;
4. To pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. Xxx.” (END OF QUOTE).
8. On June 3, 2004 FERRER, thru counsel, received a copy of the decision. On June 8, 2004 her counsel, by mail, filed a notice of appeal, without the corresponding payment of the appeal fee (either in the forma of a certified check or postal money order serve on the Court via registered mail). In the notice of appeal, FERRER asked the Court to fix the amount of the supersedeas bond.
9. On June 14, 2004 BUMANLAG filed a MOTION FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL (Sec. 2, Rule 39). Inter alia, it alleged thus:
“xxxx.
1. Section 2, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure allows discretionary execution pending appeal upon “good reasons”.
The Honorable Court still “has jurisdiction over the case” and it is still “in possession” of the record of the case.
The said provision gives the Court the power to issue a writ of execution pending appeal “even before the expiration of the period to appeal”;
(See: Justice Jose Y. Feria, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Phil. Legal Studies Series No. 5, 1997 ed., pp. 115, et. seq., citing Belgado v. IAC, 147 SCRA 258; Abe Industries Inc. v. IAC, 162 SCRA 48; Sonida Industries v. Wagan, 179 SCRA 763; Sec., 9, Rule 41; Universal Far East Corp. v. CA, 131 SCRA 642; Phil. British Assurance Co. v. IAC, 150 SCRA 520).
2. The contract of lease subject matter of this case had long expired on July 1, 2000 -- or four (4) years ago yet.
Since that time and up to the present time, the defendant has been in possession of and enjoying the economic value of the subject leased lots (by way of an elementary school), resulting in a grave detriment to the economic rights and interests and the family income and sustenance of the plaintiff and his family -- despite the fact that the defendant has reneged on her obligations since 1998.
The defendant has again accepted new and old students to her school located on the leased lots despite the pendency of the case and the promulgation of the decision against her.
It is just and fair to allow the execution of the decision pending appeal.
3. The plaintiff is willing, able and ready to post a counter-bond, if required by the Court, to insure the issuance of the herein requested writ of execution pending appeal;
xxxx.” (END OF QUOTE)
10. FERRER opposed the motion. In her opposition dated June 25, 2004, she cited old/inapplicable cases justifying nonpayment of appeal fees. She also filed a manifestation dated June 28, 2004 admitting, inter alia, her and her counsel’s ERROR, MISTAKE AND NEGLIGENCE for their failure to pay the appeal fee on time.
To the said pleadings, BUMANLAG filed a REPLY on July 7, 2004 asserting thus:
“xxxx.
1. With all due respect to the distinguished counsel for the defendant, the provisions and cases cited by him in the defendant’s manifestation, dated June 28, 2004, e.g., Sec. 20 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines dated Jan. 11, 1983, Fontaner v. Bonsubre, 145 SCRA 663, Nawasa v. Sec. of DPWH, 16 SCRA 536, Del Rosario v. NLRC, 136 SCRA 669, are no longer current and have been superseded by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. The pending issues are: (a) Should the appeal be dismissed for failure of the defendant to pay the appeal docket fee?; and (b) Should the plaintiff’s motion for execution pending appeal be granted?
3. ON THE ISSUE OF THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE.
There is no argument that the defendant had failed to pay the appeal docket fee within 15 days form the time of receipt of the decision of this Court. Such fact was admitted by the defendant and her counsel during the hearing on June 25, 2004. The manifestation of the defendant, dated June 28, 2004, expressly admitted that she had belatedly paid the appeal docket fee only on June 25, 2004.
Sec. 1, Par. C, of Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that failure to pay the appeal docket fee as provided in Sec. 4 of Rule 41 of the said Rules is a ground to dismiss the appeal. (Justice Jose Y. Feria, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, 1997 ed., pp. 192-193).
Sec. 4 of Rule 41 provides that within 15 days from receipt of the decision the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court a quo the “full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees”. The appellate court docket fee and other lawful fees are now required to be paid within 15 days from receipt of the decision of the court a quo. Failure to pay the said fees is a ground for dismissal of the appeal. (Feria, id., pp. 155-156).
More specifically, Sec. 5 of Rule 40 (Appeals from MTC to RTC) provides that within the said 15-day period from time of receipt of the decision the appellant “shall pay” to the clerk of the court a quo “the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees”.
Further, Sec. 9 of Rule 41 governs all appeals from MTC to RTC (Sec. 4, Rule 40).
4. ON THE ISSUE OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.
As earlier stated, Sec. 9 of Rule 41 governs all appeals from MTC to RTC (Sec. 4, Rule 40).
Sec. 9 of Rule 41 provides, inter alia, provides that “prior to the transmittal of the original record…the court may…order execution pending appeal in accordance with Sec. 2 of Rule 39…”. This is the situation in the instant case.
Sec. 9 of Rule 41 speaks of “discretionary execution pending appeal”. For “good reasons”, the court a quo, upon motion, may grant the same.
The good reasons being posed by the plaintiff are the following: (a) the appeal of the defendant is clearly dilatory; (b) the subject lease contract had long expired in year 2000; (c) the defendant has been enjoying the exploiting the full economic value of the subject property since year 2000; (d) the plaintiff has been deprived since year 2000 of the economic value of the subject property; and (e) the plaintiff is able, prepared and willing to post a counter-supersedeas bond, if so required by the Court.
The defendant has no valid and strong defenses to overturn the well-reasoned decision of this Court, and her appeal is flimsy and dilatory. The constitutional provision on “education” raised by the defendant in her opposition to the motion for execution pending appeal is irrelevant and immaterial to the case and may not be used by her to shield her contractual breaches and her tortuous, exploitative, and dilatory acts.
The Court has issued an order, dated June 25, 2004, setting the supersedeas bond at P856,702.00 (1995 to May 2005 arrears).
We hope it does not signal an approval of the defendant’s notice of appeal, which is defective for failure to pay the docket fee within 15 days from the time of receipt of the decision of the Court or the denial of the meritorious motion of the plaintiff for execution pending appeal.
The said order can be the basis of the counter-supersedeas bond that the plaintiff proposes to post to insure the approval of his motion for execution pending appeal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the plaintiff’s motion for execution pending appeal be granted and that the notice of appeal filed by the defendant be denied. Xxxxx.” (END OF QUOTE).
11. Meanwhile, on June 25, 2004 the Court issued an ORDER commanding FERRER to file a supersedeas bond of P 856, 702.00 within 10 days from receipt of the order.
FERRER, without notifying BUMANLAG, filed an ex parte motion to reduce the bond to P 616, 000.00.
On July 16, 2004 the Court DENIED the motion to reduce the bond. It corrected the amount of the bond to P 848, 702.00 and gave FERRER another 10 days to post the bond counted from date of receipt of the new order.
12. On August 13, 2004 FERRER filed an urgent ex parte manifestation asking for an extension of 15 days (up to August 31, 2004) to file her supersedeas bond (P 848, 702. 00).
She reneged on her duty to file the bond.
13. On September 14, 2004 the Court issued an ORDER commanding the issuance of a WRIT OF EXECUTION, the main parts of which read thus:
xxxx.
For resolution is a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal and opposition thereto.
Record disclosed that defendant failed to pay the appeal docket fee within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Decision of this Court. The Decision was received by the defendant on June 3, 2004 and the appeal docket fee was paid only on June 25, 2004.
Defendant failed to file a sufficient supersedeas bond to stay immediate execution of judgment as provided under Section 19, Rules of Court.
Judgment in ejectment case are immediately executory and to stay the same, the following requisite have to be complied with as held in the case of Pedro vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA, 145 (1994):
a. Perfecting an appeal
b. Filing a supersedeas bond
c. Making a periodic deposit of reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property pending of the appeal
Record shows that there was no supersedeas bond that was put up by the defendant, therefore, the appeal was not perfected and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the City Court was not lost. Hence, the authority to resolve the motion for execution devolves upon it.
Let a writ of execution be issued against defendant Cristina Ocampo-Ferrer.
Let a copy of this Order be furnished the parties and their respective counsel.
SO ORDERED. Xxxx.” (END OF QUOTE).
14. On October 5, 2004 FERRER filed a Rule 65 petition for CERTIORARI against MTC 79 and BUMANLAG before the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City.
The petition was premised on the SOLE allegation that the case did not pass thru the Barangay-level conciliation.
II. ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT APPEAL IS DILATORY, FLIMSY AND UNMERITORIOUS.
III. DISCUSSION
15. The petition is patently UNMERITORIOUS, DILATORY (to delay the execution of the ejectment decision of the public respondent MTC of Las Pinas City), FLIMSY, and BASELESS.
16. Annexes “D” and “I” of the petition themselves show that the Barangay Talon 5 lawfully issued a CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION and that per the PATAWAG (summons), which also served as the MINUTES of the conciliation meetings/hearings, the appropriate conciliation meetings/hearings were held and that FERRER was duly notified thereof. She absented herself in some. If not most, of the meetings/hearings, thus, WAIVING her right to attend the same or to be heard. FERRER had never raised the issue of lack of barangay-level conciliation or the alleged illegality of the barangay PATAWAG or the alleged lack of meetings/hearings or the alleged spuriousness of the CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION in any of her past pleadings filed with MTC 79, i.e., ANSWER, POSITION PAPER, PRE-TRIAL BRIEF, or MOTIONS. She did not file a MOTION TO DISMISS before MTC 79. She went ahead and proceeded with the entire course of the trial of the case at the MTC 79 level. When she lost the case, she filed a notice of appeal without paying the appeal fee. Then, she asked MTC 79 to reduce the supersedeas bond and promised to pay the same before August 3,1 2004. She reneged on her promise. She violated the mandatory appeal rules for ejectment cases (Rule 70). Then, she came to this Court (RTC 255) on CERTIORARI (after failing to exercise her right to ordinary appeal under Rule 40 in relation to Rule 44) to annul the entire MTC 79 proceedings. This is the apex of unfairness, malice, injustice, dilatory tactic and gross ignorance of the law. Her counsel, a former RTC Judge of Makati and a former FEU Professor of Law, who has abetted this unjust, illegal, dilatory and malicious litigation tactic has violated his noble and sacred LAYWER’S OATH, the provisions of Rule 138, and the ethical mandates of the 1988 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILITY. This Court should not favorably sanction such an unlawful and unethical act of FERRER and her counsel.
17. Jurisprudence is replete with decisions denouncing the tactics of the petitioner. A special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, as in this case, his petition be dismissed outright. (Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corp. v. CA, GR 110701, 12 March 2002). Rule 65 is clear: When there is an available remedy, e.g. appeal, motion for reconsideration, CERTIORARI cannot be availed of as a substitute.
18. In this regard, in the very recent case of TRANS INT’L. vs. C.A., et al., G.R. NO. 128421. Resolution, January 12, 2004, the Supreme Court held, thus:
“xxxx.
The crux of the respondents’ motion for reconsideration is their view that the rules on appeal should not be construed in such a manner as to enforce a rigid application, disregarding the circumstances which led to the belated filing of the notice of appeal. We have already passed upon this argument.
In addition, there is no showing of any extraordinary circumstance which would justify a deviation from the rule on timely filing of appeals. Anyone seeking exemption from the application of this rule has the burden of proving that exceptional and meritorious grounds warranting such action exist. In this case, private respondents failed to discharge this burden. The only explanation offered for the delay in filing the notice of appeal was the alleged failure of their receiving clerk to follow their instruction to deliver to their counsel any order related to this case. They admitted that the clerk forgot to immediately deliver the copy of the order.
We reiterate that forgetfulness is not an accident, mistake or excusable negligence which constitutes sufficient justification for the one-day delay in filing the notice of appeal. Such an excuse is unacceptable.
Furthermore, the special civil action of certiorari filed by respondents in the Court of Appeals cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal. We have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari is not allowed when a party fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and neither alternative nor successive. We have always emphasized that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period provided by the rules is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect it renders the decision of the trial court final and executory. This rule is founded on the principle that the right to appeal is not a part of due process but a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. We find no cogent reason to depart from this rule.
Respondents cannot invoke the doctrine that technicalities must yield to the broader interests of substantial justice. While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal.
When the trial court dismissed respondents’ notice of appeal for having been filed out of time, it merely applied the rules according to its plain terms. As long as the trial court acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by it in the exercise thereof amounts to nothing more than a mere error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only on appeal.
The denial of this motion will serve as a bitter lesson for them but unfortunately, it was their negligence which allowed the trial court’s decision to become final and executory.
xxxx.”
19. Further, in the analogous case of Panganiban vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., GR 131471, Jan. 22, 2003, 395 SCRA 624, the Supreme Court held thus:
“The mere fact that the action for declaratory relief was filed earlier than the unlawful detainer does not necessarily mean that the first case will be given preference. The earlier case can be dismissed in favor of the later case if the later case is the more appropriate forum for the ventilation of the issues between the parties. An action for unlawful detainer is filed by a person from whom possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld by another after the expiration or termination of the latter’s right to hold possession under a contract, express or implied. Clearly the interpretation of a provision in the SLDA as to when it would expire is the key issue that would determine Carmen’s right to possess the gasoline service station. When the primary issue to be resolved is physical possession, the issue should be threshed out in the ejectment suit, and not in any other case, such as an action for declaratory relief, to avoid multiplicity of suits.
But the more compelling reason is that the MTC had already resolved the unlawful detainer case in favor of Shell even before the RTC dismissed the action for declaratory relief. It would have been an exercise in futility for the RTC to continue proceedings in the action for declaratory relief when the MTC had already ruled that the term of the SLDA was for only five years or until July 31, 1995. The proper forum for Carmen to clarify the provision of the SLDA on the expiration of the term of the contract is in her appeal of the decision of the MTC in the unlawful detainer case. It appears that it is Carmen who wants to avoid the adverse ruling in the unlawful detainer case by insisting that the action for declaratory relief be given preference even after the ejectment suit was already decided. Panganiban vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, G.R. 131471, January 22, 2003. 395 SCRA 624)”.
20. The petitioner raised in her petition the alleged nullity of the barangay conciliation proceedings held before Barangay Talon 5.
This claim is baseless and maliciously fabricated to DELAY the execution of the judgment of the lower court, as the records of the said proceedings and the corroborating testimonies of the hearing officer Mr. Ernesto Sanchez had shown.
21. In this regard, it is noteworthy to quote extensively the recent case of Zamora, et. al. vs. Heirs of Carmen Izquierdo, ET. AL., GR 146195, November 18, 2004, thus:
xxxx. Forthwith, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the controversy was not referred to the barangay for conciliation. First, they alleged that the barangay Certification to File Action “is fatally defective” because it pertains to another dispute, i.e., the refusal by respondents’ attorney-in-fact to give her written consent to petitioners’ request for installation of water facilities in the premises. And, second, when the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the Punong Barangay (as Lupon Chairman), did not constitute the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo before whom mediation or arbitration proceedings should have been conducted, in violation of Section 410(b), Chapter 7 (Katarungang Pambarangay), Title One, Book III of Republic Act No. 7160 (otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991) xxxx.
The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (the Katarungang Pambarangay Law), now included under R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991), is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To attain this objective, Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a precondition to filing a complaint in court xxxx.
In the case at bar, the Punong Barangay, as Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, conducted conciliation proceedings to resolve the dispute between the parties herein. Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the complaint does not only allege, as a cause of action, the refusal of respondents’ attorney-in-fact to give her consent to the installation of water facilities in the premises, but also petitioners’ violation of the terms of the lease, specifically their use of a portion therein for their photocopying business and their failure to pay the increased rental. As correctly found by the RTC:
“The records show that confrontations before the barangay chairman were held on January 26, 1997, February 9, 1997, February 23, 1997, February 28, 1997, July 27, 1997, August 3, 1997, August 10, 1997, August 17, 1997 and August 24, 1997 wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed but also the terms of the lease and the proposed execution of a written contract relative thereto. It appears, however, that no settlement was reached despite a total of nine meetings at the barangay level.
It is of no moment that the complaint was initially made by defendant-appellant Avelina Zamora because herein plaintiff-appellee was given by the Sangguniang Barangay the authority to bring her grievance to the
Court for resolution. While it is true that the Sertifikasyon dated September 14, 1997 is entitled ‘Ukol Sa Hindi Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot Sa Pagpapakabit Ng Tubig’, this title must not prevail over the actual issues discussed in the proceedings.
Hence, to require another confrontation at the barangay level as a sine qua non for the filing of the instant case would not serve any useful purpose anymore since no new issues would be raised therein and the parties have proven so many times in the past that they cannot get to settle their differences amicably.”
We cannot sustain petitioners’ contention that the Lupon conciliation alone, without the proceeding before the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo, contravenes the law on Katarungang Pambarangay. Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160, quoted earlier, clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either before the Lupon Chairman (as what happened in the present case), or the Pangkat.
Moreover, in Diu vs. Court of Appeals, we held that “notwithstanding the mandate in Section 410(b) of R.A. No. 7160 that the Barangay Chairman shall constitute a Pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts,” the same “Section 410(b) should be construed together with Section 412(a) of the same law (quoted earlier), as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case.” Here, while the Pangkat was not constituted, however, the parties met nine (9) times at the Office of the Barangay Chairman for conciliation wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed but also petitioners’ violation of the lease contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial compliance with the law which does not require strict adherence thereto.”
21. In fine, the appeal is flimsy, baseless and dilatory. It must be dismissed for obvious lack of merit.
LET THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT MTC OF LAS PINAS CITY BE NOW FULLY EXECUTED, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.
