In the midst of the vindictive and discriminatory partisan politics prevailing in the Philippines, which, in most cases, has rendered the Philippine justice system helpless, the Philippine Supreme Court, in the recent case of THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS, MUNICIPALITY OF BAYOMBONG PROVINCE OF NUEVA VISCAYA vs. PUNONG BARANGAY SEVERINO MARTINEZ, G.R. No. 170626, March 3, 2008, reiterated its past rulings stating (a) that the Office of the President and the local Sangguniang (local legislative councils at the Barangay, municipal/city and provincial levels) were without any power to remove elected officials, since the power was exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code; (b) that Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 was invalid and unconstitutional; and (c) that “where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction and where the question or questions involved are essentially judicial” an aggrieved party may have direct recourse to the courts, as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
On 5 November 2004, respondent Barangay Chairman Severino Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitioner Sangguniang Barangay (municipal legislative council) through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials pursuant to Section 61 of Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, alleging the respondent’s:
1. Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the income of their solid waste management project since 2001 particularly the sale of fertilizer derived from composting.
2. Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer the sale of recyclable materials taken from garbage collection.
3. Using the garbage truck for other purposes like hauling sand and gravel for private persons without monetary benefit to the barangay because no income from this source appears in the year end report even if payments were collected x x x.
4. Using/spending barangay funds for repair, gasoline, lubricants, wheels and other spare parts of the garbage truck instead of using the money or income of said truck from the garbage fees collected as income from its Sold Waste Management Project. x x x.
5. Unliquidated traveling expenses for Seminar/Lakbay-Aral in 2003 because although a cash advance was made by the respondent for the said purpose, he, however, did not attend said seminar because on the dates when he was supposed to be on seminar they saw him in the barangay. x x x.
6. That several attempts to discuss said problem during sessions were all in vain because respondent declined to discuss it and would adjourn the session. x x x.
Pending the administrative proceedings,
On 28 July 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed upon
On 26 August 2005,
On 20 October 2005, the trial court issued an Order declaring the Decision of the Sangguniang Bayan and the Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao void. It maintained that the proper courts, and not the petitioner, are empowered to remove an elective local official from office, in accordance with Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, the Order of the Sangguniang Bayan removing
Although Martinez’s term as Punong Barangay expired upon the holding of the 29 October 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections and, thus, rendering this petition moot and academic, the Court nevertheless settled the legal question because it was capable of repetition yet evading review.
The pivotal issue was whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove
According to the Court, the pertinent legal provisions and cases decided by this Court firmly establish that the Sangguniang Bayan is not empowered to do so.
Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials from office when it provides that “an elective local official may be removed from office xxx by order of the proper court.”
The Court reiterated its previous ruling In the case of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., where the Court en banc categorically ruled that “the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code”.
It further “invalidated Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, which provided that “an elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other”.
The Court nullified the aforequoted rule since the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its authority when it granted to the “disciplining authority” the power to remove elective officials, a power which the law itself granted only to the proper courts.
The Court likewise reiterated its ruling in the case of Pablico v. Villapando, where it declared that “the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts”; that “Article 125 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the ‘disciplining authority’ to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991”; that “the law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage”; that the “their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority”; that “where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove”.
The Court opined that “the rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the disciplining authority”; and that “vesting the local legislative body with the power to decide whether or not a local chief executive may be removed from office, and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority”; that “such an arrangement clearly demotes the courts to nothing more than an implementing arm of the Sangguniang Panglunsod, or Sangguniang Bayan”, which “would be an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of powers” because it would “place the courts under the orders of the legislative bodies of local governments”; that in such a case, “the courts would be stripped of their power of review, and their discretion in imposing the extreme penalty of removal from office (would be) left to be exercised by political factions which stand to benefit from the removal from office of the local elective official concerned, the very evil which Congress sought to avoid when it enacted Section 60 of the Local Government Code”.
According to the Court, “Congress clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done only after a trial before the appropriate court, where court rules of procedure and evidence can ensure impartiality and fairness and protect against political maneuverings” and that “elevating the removal of an elective local official from office from an administrative case to a court case may be justified by the fact that such removal not only punishes the official concerned but also, in effect, deprives the electorate of the services of the official for whom they voted”.
The Court clarified that Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure for the filing of an administrative case against an erring elective barangay official before the Sangguniang Panglunsod or Sangguniang Bayan. However, the Sangguniang Panglunsod or Sangguniang Bayan “cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code”. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office, “the case should be filed with the regional trial court”. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case “even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is appropriate”. On the other hand, “the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panglunsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is suspension” and that “if it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court”.
The Court cited Paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government”.
In rejecting the theory of the petitioner that the respondent should have first sought recourse from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Court stated that although the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review and that non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint, nonetheless, the said doctrine “is not inflexible” because it is subject to the following exceptions: 1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; 2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; 3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; 4) where the amount involved is relatively small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; 5) where the question raised is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; 6) where judicial intervention is urgent; 7) where its application may cause great and irreparable damage; 8) where the controverted acts violate due process; 9) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; 10) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 11) when strong public interest is involved; and 13) in quo warranto proceedings.
In fine, although as a general rule, no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been exhausted, the rule is not applicable “where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction and where the question or questions involved are essentially judicial”.
In this case, the Sangguniang Bayan acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated 28 July 2005 removing
In addition, citing its ruling in the case of Castro v. Gloria, the Court held that “where the case involves only legal questions, the litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such judicial relief can be sought”. Issues of law “cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer” and an appeal to the administrative officer would only be “an exercise in futility”. A legal question is properly addressed to a regular court of justice rather than to an administrative body, the Court said.
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
LCM Law, Las
http://attylaserna.blogpsot.com
