In A.M. OCA-IPI No. 06-2429-RTJ, September 4, 2006, entitled “ATTY. REX G. RICO v. JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 275, LAS PIÑAS CITY”, the Philippine Supreme Court dismissed an administrative matter against Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for lack of merit and for being judicial in nature, holding in the process:
1. that “the filing of an administrative complaint against a judge is not the appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available”;
2. that, “as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty and corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action”;
3. that the Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge “clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial”; and
4. that “as against the bare allegations of misconduct with no cogent proof thereon, and the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, the latter shall prevail”.
I am citing this case because the above pronouncements of the Supreme Court have a strong bearing on the fate and effective operation of the Justice System, especially in the light of the unfair propensity of some lawyers and litigants to file administrative cases against trial judges whose orders do not suit their legal theories and desires.
Atty. Rex G. Rico charged Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, RTC, Br. 275, Las Piñas City with Gross Ignorance of the Law; Incompetence; Manifest Bias and Partiality relative to Criminal Case No. 02-0710 entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Conrado Jocson, et al." for Kidnapping for Ransom.
Complainant alleged that on 09 December 2003, private complainant, through counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing scheduled on 10 December 2003, because the witness, Jan Arad Fernandez, the kidnap victim himself, had to take his final examination in his school, AMA Computer College in Makati City. This fact was made known to the private prosecutor (complainant) by Jan Arad's mother, Daisy Fernandez, on 09 December 2003, hence, the former immediately filed a motion for postponement on that same day, or a day before the scheduled hearing (December 10, 2003). The respondent denied the motion in his Order dated 10 December 2003. The respondent Judge ordered the direct testimony of Jan Arad Fernandez, the kidnap victim, stricken-off the record.
On 10 February 2004, the prosecution filed its Motion for Reconsideration over the respondent's Order dated 10 December 2003, attaching therein the original copy of the Certification dated 02 February 2004, issued by Ms. Ma. Dolores Grutas, professor who gave the final examination to Jan Arad Fernandez, attested by Dr. Dante Silva, Dean, College of Business Administration and Accountancy, AMA Computer College. The said Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the respondent Judge in his Order dated 30 March 2004.
The latter order stated that pursuant to Resolution No. 02-001 by the Las Piñas RTC Judges and conformably with the Covenant signed by the Representatives of the Criminal Justice System in Las Piñas City on February 18, 2004 and there being no injunction received from the Supreme Court enjoining the implementation of the Covenant or the Resolution despite receipt of the copies thereof, the above-captioned case/s is/are hereby declared covered by the project "EXPRESS COURT: A 180-DAY JUSTICE SYSTEM" designed to dispose, to wit: (1) ordinary cases within 180 days from their filing; (2) extraordinary cases 360 days from their filing; (3) exceptional cases within 720 days.
Complainant argued that respondent Judge arrogated unto himself the authority to promulgate rules of procedure exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court. Based on the above-cited order, the prosecution, in conformity with the public prosecutor filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) directed against the assailed irregular and oppressive Orders of the respondent Judge dated 10 December 2003 and 30 March 2004. Thus, on 19 May 2004, the prosecution also moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the trial court in view of the said petition, but to no avail. On 25 May 2004, the prosecution once again filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the proceedings in the case handled by the respondent Judge, but the Court of Appeals in its Order dated 19 July 2004, denied the same.
However, on 08 August 2005, private prosecutor received copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals granting the prosecution's Petition for Certiorari, finding that respondent Judge acted abusively, oppressively and with grave abuse of discretion, thus, setting aside his Orders dated 10 December 2003 and 30 March 2004.
Complainant said that respondent Judge's acts of issuing the said assailed orders should not be countenanced as it amounted to deprivation of the prosecution's right to adduce evidence. The alleged Resolution No. 02-001 by the Las Piñas RTC Judges and the supposed covenant signed by the Representative of the Criminal Justice System in Las Piñas City on 18 February 2004, stated in respondent's Order dated 30 March 2004, cannot arrogate or bestow unto said bodies, with more reason to respondent Judge of the authority to promulgate rules of procedure. It should be emphasized that said authority is vested exclusively by the Constitution only to the Supreme Court and no other court. Therefore, the act of the respondent Judge in denying the said Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing as well as the denial of the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration are clear indications of the latter's blatant disregard of the Rules of Court which must be acted upon accordingly in order to set a precedent against abusive and whimsical magistrate like the respondent.
In his comment, respondent Judge vehemently denied the allegations of the complaint. Anent the allegation that he acted with abuse and oppression relative to the Order dated 10 December 2003, denying the prosecution's Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing, respondent Judge explained that he did not oppress the prosecution's right to adduce evidence. The Order he issued may have been too harsh yet, the same does not outrightly mean oppression or despotism.
Respondent Judge narrated that the hearing of 10 December 2003 was pre-set in accord with continuous trial. The said date was for the cross-examination of the prosecution's witness Jan Arad Fernandez after his direct examination, which is in addition to his testimony given during the application for bail proceedings. The motion to cancel was filed on 09 December 2003. Records show that no affidavit was attached to the motion except the private prosecutor's assertion that witness Fernandez could not appear on 10 December 2003 as it allegedly coincided with a school examination. Respondent contended that the fact that complainant himself did not appear on 10 December 2003 lead him to assume that his motion to cancel hearing will be granted is to respondent's opinion merely an absurd assumption and which will not sit well in any court. In the first place, said motion is a litigious one and will require comment or opposition on the adverse party. Respondent argued, the defense lawyers vigorously objected to the cancellation of the hearing by contending that the absence of an affidavit violated the Rules of Court as well as the violation of the three-day notice rule. Not amiss to mention is the fact that the defense was then invoking the right to speedy trial. Thus, had the private prosecutor appeared, the scheduled date would not have been wasted; trial could have continued by presenting another witness.
Respondent Judge further argued that a judge could not take judicial notice of either illness or a school examination, hence, the rule requires affidavits and other supporting papers. Although he believed that his order may have been too harsh, yet the same cannot in any way be considered oppressive or despotic. On this aspect, respondent pointed out that contrary to complainant's view, he is of the belief that his actuation is in accordance with the strict mandate of the requirements under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. In fine, what the complainant really dislikes is the strictness he manifested when the latter violated the rules.
Anent the expunction of testimony of the prosecution's witness, respondent countered it is but the necessary consequence thereof considering that there was an incomplete testimony and no cross-examination was conducted on the part of the prosecution's witness. Likewise, respondent Judge believed that that is a valid consequence of the Order, thus, the prosecution must rest its case, after its failure or unwillingness to adduce additional evidence. The absence of other witnesses and further evidence has paved the way for him to sustain the defense invocation for speedy trial.
Upon evaluation, the Office of the Court of Administrator (OCA) stated that, after a careful perusal of the records of the case, it was of the considered view that the complainant was clearly assailing the alleged errors committed by the respondent Judge in the latter's exercise of judicial discretion.
Time and again, the Supreme Court in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1581, Re: Peter Sesbreño vs. Judge Gloria B. Aglugub, February 28, 2005 enunciated that: "In sum, for liability to attach for gross ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision, or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous but most importantly, it must be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty or some other like motive."
Respondent Judge's actuations were hardly indicative of bad faith or any motive of the same nature which characterizes the offense of gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, bias and partiality. The respondent Judge's denial of the Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing dated 10 December 2003 resulting in the expunction of the prosecution witness' testimony was by its nature neither despotic nor oppressive in the absence of a clear and convincing proof to the contrary, the OCA stated.
The OCA added that there was negligence on the part of the movant (herein complainant) when he filed the motion to postpone a day before the scheduled hearing. He did not even bother to appear on the scheduled date of hearing, which made the respondent Judge rule to deny the same. Indeed, complainant had the belief that his Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing would be granted, but to his dismay, the respondent Judge did otherwise which prompted him to file this administrative complaint.
Settled in this case is the fact that the respondent Judge strictly applied the provisions of the Rules of Court pertaining to three-day notice requirement in filing motions and other similarly applicable rules under the premises. Such being the case, respondent merely exercised his judicial discretion on the basis of the respective contentions of the parties in the criminal proceedings vis-à-vis the factual antecedents in the said proceedings which became the subject matter of this administrative complaint. In the same vein, absence of any evidence to prove that the respondent Judge acted in a malevolent manner relative to the issuance of the assailed Orders will make him administratively liable, the OCA stated.
Moreover, it should be noted that although the Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari filed by the prosecution, no evidence of bad faith was established against the respondent Judge in relation to the issuance of the assailed Orders. Therefore, the administrative complaint filed by the complainant is not an appropriate remedy in order to vindicate their alleged damaged and prejudice. The OCA reiterated the settled ruling that: administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the issuance of the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. Complainant could not be allowed to indirectly secure from this Court a ruling thereon in violation of the principle on hierarchy of courts. (A.M. No. RTJ-05-1905, Re: Charito L. Planas vs. Judge Ernesto A. Reyes, etc., February 23, 2005).
Thus, the OCA recommended that the administrative complaint be DISMISSED for lack of merit and for being judicial in nature.
The Supreme Court agreed with the recommendation.
By:
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
LCM LAW, Las Pinas City, Philippines
1. that “the filing of an administrative complaint against a judge is not the appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available”;
2. that, “as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty and corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action”;
3. that the Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge “clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial”; and
4. that “as against the bare allegations of misconduct with no cogent proof thereon, and the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, the latter shall prevail”.
I am citing this case because the above pronouncements of the Supreme Court have a strong bearing on the fate and effective operation of the Justice System, especially in the light of the unfair propensity of some lawyers and litigants to file administrative cases against trial judges whose orders do not suit their legal theories and desires.
Atty. Rex G. Rico charged Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, RTC, Br. 275, Las Piñas City with Gross Ignorance of the Law; Incompetence; Manifest Bias and Partiality relative to Criminal Case No. 02-0710 entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Conrado Jocson, et al." for Kidnapping for Ransom.
Complainant alleged that on 09 December 2003, private complainant, through counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing scheduled on 10 December 2003, because the witness, Jan Arad Fernandez, the kidnap victim himself, had to take his final examination in his school, AMA Computer College in Makati City. This fact was made known to the private prosecutor (complainant) by Jan Arad's mother, Daisy Fernandez, on 09 December 2003, hence, the former immediately filed a motion for postponement on that same day, or a day before the scheduled hearing (December 10, 2003). The respondent denied the motion in his Order dated 10 December 2003. The respondent Judge ordered the direct testimony of Jan Arad Fernandez, the kidnap victim, stricken-off the record.
On 10 February 2004, the prosecution filed its Motion for Reconsideration over the respondent's Order dated 10 December 2003, attaching therein the original copy of the Certification dated 02 February 2004, issued by Ms. Ma. Dolores Grutas, professor who gave the final examination to Jan Arad Fernandez, attested by Dr. Dante Silva, Dean, College of Business Administration and Accountancy, AMA Computer College. The said Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the respondent Judge in his Order dated 30 March 2004.
The latter order stated that pursuant to Resolution No. 02-001 by the Las Piñas RTC Judges and conformably with the Covenant signed by the Representatives of the Criminal Justice System in Las Piñas City on February 18, 2004 and there being no injunction received from the Supreme Court enjoining the implementation of the Covenant or the Resolution despite receipt of the copies thereof, the above-captioned case/s is/are hereby declared covered by the project "EXPRESS COURT: A 180-DAY JUSTICE SYSTEM" designed to dispose, to wit: (1) ordinary cases within 180 days from their filing; (2) extraordinary cases 360 days from their filing; (3) exceptional cases within 720 days.
Complainant argued that respondent Judge arrogated unto himself the authority to promulgate rules of procedure exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court. Based on the above-cited order, the prosecution, in conformity with the public prosecutor filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) directed against the assailed irregular and oppressive Orders of the respondent Judge dated 10 December 2003 and 30 March 2004. Thus, on 19 May 2004, the prosecution also moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the trial court in view of the said petition, but to no avail. On 25 May 2004, the prosecution once again filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the proceedings in the case handled by the respondent Judge, but the Court of Appeals in its Order dated 19 July 2004, denied the same.
However, on 08 August 2005, private prosecutor received copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals granting the prosecution's Petition for Certiorari, finding that respondent Judge acted abusively, oppressively and with grave abuse of discretion, thus, setting aside his Orders dated 10 December 2003 and 30 March 2004.
Complainant said that respondent Judge's acts of issuing the said assailed orders should not be countenanced as it amounted to deprivation of the prosecution's right to adduce evidence. The alleged Resolution No. 02-001 by the Las Piñas RTC Judges and the supposed covenant signed by the Representative of the Criminal Justice System in Las Piñas City on 18 February 2004, stated in respondent's Order dated 30 March 2004, cannot arrogate or bestow unto said bodies, with more reason to respondent Judge of the authority to promulgate rules of procedure. It should be emphasized that said authority is vested exclusively by the Constitution only to the Supreme Court and no other court. Therefore, the act of the respondent Judge in denying the said Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing as well as the denial of the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration are clear indications of the latter's blatant disregard of the Rules of Court which must be acted upon accordingly in order to set a precedent against abusive and whimsical magistrate like the respondent.
In his comment, respondent Judge vehemently denied the allegations of the complaint. Anent the allegation that he acted with abuse and oppression relative to the Order dated 10 December 2003, denying the prosecution's Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing, respondent Judge explained that he did not oppress the prosecution's right to adduce evidence. The Order he issued may have been too harsh yet, the same does not outrightly mean oppression or despotism.
Respondent Judge narrated that the hearing of 10 December 2003 was pre-set in accord with continuous trial. The said date was for the cross-examination of the prosecution's witness Jan Arad Fernandez after his direct examination, which is in addition to his testimony given during the application for bail proceedings. The motion to cancel was filed on 09 December 2003. Records show that no affidavit was attached to the motion except the private prosecutor's assertion that witness Fernandez could not appear on 10 December 2003 as it allegedly coincided with a school examination. Respondent contended that the fact that complainant himself did not appear on 10 December 2003 lead him to assume that his motion to cancel hearing will be granted is to respondent's opinion merely an absurd assumption and which will not sit well in any court. In the first place, said motion is a litigious one and will require comment or opposition on the adverse party. Respondent argued, the defense lawyers vigorously objected to the cancellation of the hearing by contending that the absence of an affidavit violated the Rules of Court as well as the violation of the three-day notice rule. Not amiss to mention is the fact that the defense was then invoking the right to speedy trial. Thus, had the private prosecutor appeared, the scheduled date would not have been wasted; trial could have continued by presenting another witness.
Respondent Judge further argued that a judge could not take judicial notice of either illness or a school examination, hence, the rule requires affidavits and other supporting papers. Although he believed that his order may have been too harsh, yet the same cannot in any way be considered oppressive or despotic. On this aspect, respondent pointed out that contrary to complainant's view, he is of the belief that his actuation is in accordance with the strict mandate of the requirements under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. In fine, what the complainant really dislikes is the strictness he manifested when the latter violated the rules.
Anent the expunction of testimony of the prosecution's witness, respondent countered it is but the necessary consequence thereof considering that there was an incomplete testimony and no cross-examination was conducted on the part of the prosecution's witness. Likewise, respondent Judge believed that that is a valid consequence of the Order, thus, the prosecution must rest its case, after its failure or unwillingness to adduce additional evidence. The absence of other witnesses and further evidence has paved the way for him to sustain the defense invocation for speedy trial.
Upon evaluation, the Office of the Court of Administrator (OCA) stated that, after a careful perusal of the records of the case, it was of the considered view that the complainant was clearly assailing the alleged errors committed by the respondent Judge in the latter's exercise of judicial discretion.
Time and again, the Supreme Court in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1581, Re: Peter Sesbreño vs. Judge Gloria B. Aglugub, February 28, 2005 enunciated that: "In sum, for liability to attach for gross ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision, or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous but most importantly, it must be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty or some other like motive."
Respondent Judge's actuations were hardly indicative of bad faith or any motive of the same nature which characterizes the offense of gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, bias and partiality. The respondent Judge's denial of the Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing dated 10 December 2003 resulting in the expunction of the prosecution witness' testimony was by its nature neither despotic nor oppressive in the absence of a clear and convincing proof to the contrary, the OCA stated.
The OCA added that there was negligence on the part of the movant (herein complainant) when he filed the motion to postpone a day before the scheduled hearing. He did not even bother to appear on the scheduled date of hearing, which made the respondent Judge rule to deny the same. Indeed, complainant had the belief that his Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing would be granted, but to his dismay, the respondent Judge did otherwise which prompted him to file this administrative complaint.
Settled in this case is the fact that the respondent Judge strictly applied the provisions of the Rules of Court pertaining to three-day notice requirement in filing motions and other similarly applicable rules under the premises. Such being the case, respondent merely exercised his judicial discretion on the basis of the respective contentions of the parties in the criminal proceedings vis-à-vis the factual antecedents in the said proceedings which became the subject matter of this administrative complaint. In the same vein, absence of any evidence to prove that the respondent Judge acted in a malevolent manner relative to the issuance of the assailed Orders will make him administratively liable, the OCA stated.
Moreover, it should be noted that although the Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari filed by the prosecution, no evidence of bad faith was established against the respondent Judge in relation to the issuance of the assailed Orders. Therefore, the administrative complaint filed by the complainant is not an appropriate remedy in order to vindicate their alleged damaged and prejudice. The OCA reiterated the settled ruling that: administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the issuance of the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. Complainant could not be allowed to indirectly secure from this Court a ruling thereon in violation of the principle on hierarchy of courts. (A.M. No. RTJ-05-1905, Re: Charito L. Planas vs. Judge Ernesto A. Reyes, etc., February 23, 2005).
Thus, the OCA recommended that the administrative complaint be DISMISSED for lack of merit and for being judicial in nature.
The Supreme Court agreed with the recommendation.
By:
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
LCM LAW, Las Pinas City, Philippines
