In the fairly recent case of JOHN JOSEPH LUMANLAW y BULINAO vs. Hon. EDUARDO B. PERALTA JR., in His Capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (Branch 13), Manila, G.R. No. 164953, February 13, 2006, the Philippine Supreme Court once again upheld the universal doctrine of SPEEDY TRIAL by asserting that vexatious, oppressive, unjustified and capricious delays in the arraignment violates the constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy case disposition, particularly when the accused is detained. Under such circumstances, MANDAMUS is a proper remedy for relief from prolonged detention. Thus:
X x x.
Main Issue:
Right to Speedy Trial
Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal proceedings in which the accused are formally informed of the charges against them. [33] The proper conduct of the arraignment is provided in Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. A perusal of the provision shows that arraignment is not a mere formality, but an integral part of due process. [34] Particularly, it implements the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them and their right to speedy trial.
On this point, petitioner argues that, by respondent’s failure to act expeditiously on his arraignment, his right to speedy trial was violated. He points out the fourteen postponements that resulted in his intolerable detention for almost two years. Moreover, he cites Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 (implementing Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as “The Speedy Trial Act of 1998”), which provides that arraignment shall be held within thirty days from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused.
On the other hand, respondent counters that there were no capricious and oppressive delays that would justify a dismissal of the Information. The Office of the Solicitor General points to the participation of petitioner himself in the protracted proceedings, such as his filing of a Motion for Preliminary Investigation and his counsel’s absence from one of the scheduled hearings. [35]
Speedy Trial Construed
The thirty-day period invoked by petitioner was construed in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How. [36] It was held in that case that the period was not absolute. Certain delays were allowed by law and excluded from the computation of the time within which trial must commence. The Court ruled that those exclusions should “reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept of ‘speedy trial’ is a ‘relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.’” [37] It held further that courts must strive to maintain a delicate balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial, on the one hand; and, on the other, the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals.
Indeed, judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum. They must contend with the realities of everyday life. Thus, a sensible assessment of their conduct must consider several factors, rather than a mere mathematical calculation of periods that have elapsed between stages. Jurisprudence has set forth the following guidelines:
“x x x. [T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered.” [38]
Reasonable Postponements
It should be stressed that petitioner never acquiesced to the seemingly endless postponements of the arraignment. He asserted his right to speedy trial twice, but was denied by respondent in both instances. Considering that petitioner has been under detention since December 2002, we need not belabor the prejudice, distress, and anxiety he suffered as a result of the delayed arraignment.
We concede that the bases for some of the delays were completely sound, such as the retirement of Judge Arranz [39] and the manifestation of petitioner that the latter would be filing a Motion for Preliminary Investigation. [40] Those matters were manifestly not intended to delay the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 02-208426.
The delay caused by Judge Arranz’s retirement may be deemed a normal part of the ordinary conduct of court business and was not necessarily unreasonable. The second ground was the right of the accused accorded by Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. [41] Verily, petitioner’s request for a preliminary investigation before arraignment was well-advised, in view of the rule that failure to do so would constitute a waiver of the right. [42] Thus, it has been held that though the conduct of a preliminary investigation may hold back the progress of a case, such investigation is necessary so that the defendant’s right will not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency. [43]
Unjustified Delay
This Court reviewed the other reasons for the postponements in this case, but finds them far from being reasonable. There were fourteen postponements in all. Going over the causes for the delays, we see the lack of earnest effort on the part of respondent to conduct the arraignment as soon as the court calendar would allow. Most of the postponements could have easily been avoided if he had been more keen on respecting and upholding petitioner’s constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition.
Given the length and the unreasonableness of the majority of the delays, a violation of the right of petitioner to speedy trial becomes manifest. Almost two years [44] elapsed from the filing of the Information against him until the filing of this Petition; incredibly, he has not been arraigned. An arraignment takes, at most, ten minutes of the court’s business and does not normally entail legal gymnastics. It consists simply of reading to the accused the charges leveled against them, ensuring their understanding of those charges, and obtaining their plea to the charges. A prudent and resolute judge can conduct an arraignment as soon as the accused are presented before the court.
In fact, by fixing a period of only thirty days from the filing of the information to the conduct of an arraignment, RA 8493 recognizes that this fundamental right should and can be done with minimal delay. For this reason alone, we are astonished that the court a quo could not complete such a simple but fundamental stage in the proceedings. The protracted delay became all the more oppressive and vexatious when viewed from the perspective that the liberty of the accused was being curtailed for the entire duration.
Postponement Due to
Absence of Counsel
It will be recalled that the arraignment set for August 6, 2003, was postponed by the trial court due to the absence of the counsel of petitioner. [45] The latter sought to proceed with the arraignment by requesting the assistance of the public defender as counsel de oficio, but the request was denied on the flimsy ground that the accused already had a counsel de parte. We find no legal basis for the trial court’s action.
The appointment of a counsel de oficio in the absence of the defendant’s counsel de parte is not prohibited, [46] not even by the Constitution, [47] especially when the accused themselves request that appointment. In fact, the court has a mandatory duty to appoint a counsel de oficio when the accused have no counsel of choice at the time of their arraignment. [48] People v. Serzo [49] held thus:
“x x x [A]n accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be represented either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be represented by counsel is immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the state's and the offended party's equally important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the accused's option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.” [50]
Like other personal rights, the right to a counsel de parte is waivable, so long as 1) the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law; and 2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently made. [51]
Applying these principles, it would have been more prudent for respondent judge to have appointed a counsel de oficio for purposes of arraignment only. This course of action became more compelling in the instant case when petitioner himself requested the appointment. [52] To be sure, he would not have been prejudiced by that action, provided there was a proper observance of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 8 of this rule, before proceeding with the arraignment, the court is mandated to give the appointed counsel de oficio reasonable time to consult with the accused as to the latter’s plea. [53]
Clearly, respondent judge’s postponement of the arraignment on August 6, 2003, had no substantial basis. Thus, the postponement, initially caused by the absence of petitioner’s counsel, became unreasonable and ultimately attributable to respondent’s inflexibility as regards contingencies.
Responsibility of Judges
in Minimizing Delay
The foremost cause for the lengthy delay in this case was the repeated failure of the jail wardens to bring the accused to court. No less than four court settings, [54] spanning seven months, were postponed on this ground alone. To be sure, this recurring circumstance was caused, in different instances, by the failure of the court personnel to issue the produce order on time and by the dereliction of the jail wardens. Remarkably, although respondent judge was justified in deferring the arraignment until the accused was presented, [55] the problem could have been easily averted by efficient court management.
In his role as administrator, respondent should have supervised his clerk of court to ensure a timely service of the produce order on the wardens of the Manila City Jail. Judges must keep a watchful eye on the level of performance and conduct of the court personnel under their immediate supervision, who are primarily employed to aid in the administration of justice. Judges who set the pace for greater efficiency, diligence and dedication, could prompt their personnel to be more diligent and efficient in the performance of official duties. For certain, leniency in the administrative supervision of court personnel must be avoided. [56]
We stress the need to remind judges to exhibit more diligence and efficiency in the performance of their judicial duties to avoid loss of faith and confidence in the administration of justice. Rule 3.09 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires them to “organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business x x x.” Additionally, Section 5(d) of Rule 135 confers upon every court the power to control the conduct of its ministerial officers and of all other persons who in any manner are connected with a case before it.
Respondent did not exercise his prerogatives in administering speedy justice. Instead, he was content with issuing reminders [57] that miserably failed to resolve the problem expeditiously. We can only conclude from the distinct circumstances of the case that he failed to assert actively his authority to expedite the proceedings.
Instead of being proactive and steering the course of the proceedings with deliberate dispatch, respondent tended to be passive and reactive by allowing the pace of the proceedings to be dictated by the listlessness of the parties, his staff, and the jail wardens. Judges should be more deliberate in their actions and, within the bounds of law, make full use of their authority to expedite proceedings while continuing to respect the rights of parties to ventilate their respective causes fully.
Indeed, judges are required to dispose of the court’s business expeditiously, in accordance with Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which we quote:
“A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required period.”
This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to act promptly on their cases. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. [58]
In the light of the numerous and unreasonable delays in the arraignment of petitioner, the sought for dismissal of the Information filed against him is in order.
