Wednesday, January 14, 2009

Extortion

In the case of FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA vs. ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, A.C. No. 7298 [Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565], June 25, 2007, the Supreme Court found the respondent lawyer liable for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and was meted out the penalty of reprimand with the stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

Let me digest the case below for legal research purposes of the visitors of this blog.

In this administrative complaint, the respondent lawyer is charged with violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand letter the contents of which threatened complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.

The salient parts of the demand letter are as follows:

“BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of millions under established precedence of cases and laws. In addition to other multiple charges like:

1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the government.
2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents
4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.

These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts as settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).”


Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law,” reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. In particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a “lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.” Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer’s client.

In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail.

Blackmail is “the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints,…obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice.” In common parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.

In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr., we held that “[a]n accusation for blackmail and extortion is a very serious one which, if properly substantiated, would entail not only respondent’s disbarment from the practice of law, but also a possible criminal prosecution.” While the respondent in Boyboy was exonerated for lack of evidence, the same may not be said of respondent in the present case for he admits to writing the offensive letter.

In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the same as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting that “a lawyer is under obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses punishable by the State.” He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of disputes.

Respondent’s assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that respondent’s threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his client’s demands. It was not respondent’s intention to point out complainant’s violations of the law as he so gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to “keep silent” about the said violations if payment of the claim is made on the date indicated.

Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client’s claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his client’s claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged communication rule under which a private communication executed in the performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged nature of the letter was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his client.

However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold that disbarment is too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote the same out of his overzealousness to protect his client’s interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.