In the case of MARIETTA DUQUE vs. JUDGE CRISOSTOMO L. GARRIDO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City, A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2027, February 27, 2009, the respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido was found GUILTY of GROSS INEFFICIENCY for delay in the disposition of a case and for which he was FINED Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). He was likewise found GUILTY of violation of Presidential Decree No. 26 for which he was ADMONISHED. He was STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of the decision be attached to his personal record.
In a verified letter-complaint dated February 7, 2006 complainant Marietta Duque charged respondent, Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Tacloban City, Leyte, with gross violation of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a decision beyond ninety (90) days in Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 entitled People v Reynaldo Caones y Royo Sr., et al.
In a Report dated September 6, 2006, the OCA found respondent judge administratively liable for rendering a decision beyond the 90-day period in violation of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Additionally, respondent was found to have violated the franking privilege under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 26.
The Supreme Court agreed with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the office of a judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of official duties.
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case within the reglementary period of 90 days, to wit:
(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. (Emphasis ours)
Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as follows:
Rule 3.05 — A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
Indeed, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period within which to decide cases is mandatory. The Court has consistently emphasized strict observance of this rule in order to minimize the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case, for, not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.
As readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the Memorandum for the Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 2005 . Thus, the case was deemed submitted for decision on that date. Accordingly, the decision should have been rendered not later than November 8, 2005. However, respondent issued it only on December 12, 2005 which was more than four months after the case had been submitted for decision.
Respondent Judge Garrido clearly violated both the Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct when he failed to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within the 90-day period to decide cases prescribed for the lower courts.
Whenever a judge cannot decide a case promptly, all he has to do is to ask the Court for a reasonable extension of time to resolve it. In this case, granting that it was for a justifiable reason to render a decision or resolve a matter beyond the reglementary period, the respondent could have sought additional time by simply filing a request for extension. Respondent, however, did not avail of such relief.
Respondent did not proffer any tenable justification for the delay in rendering the decision. He insisted that it was proper and procedural to first resolve the parties' memoranda before the case may be considered submitted for decision. He, thus, would want the Court to consider his Order dated September 13, 2005 resolving the memoranda of the parties and declaring the case submitted for resolution as the starting point of the 90-day period for deciding the case and not on August 10, 2005, the date when the last pleading was filed.
Administrative Circular No. 28 issued by this Court on July 3, 1989 regarding the submission of memoranda for purposes of deciding cases, clearly provides:
x x x The ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run from submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or upon the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. (Emphasis ours)
A judge cannot even justify his delay in deciding a case on the excuse that he was still awaiting the parties' memoranda. In Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court held:
x x x judges should decide cases even if the parties failed to submit memoranda within the given periods. Non-submission of memoranda is not a justification for failure to decide cases. The filing of memoranda is not a part of the trial nor is the memorandum itself an essential, much less indispensable pleading before a case may be submitted for decision. As it is merely intended to aid the court in the rendition of the decision in accordance with law and evidence - which even in its absence the court can do on the basis of the judge’s personal notes and the records of the case - non-submission thereof has invariably been considered a waiver of the privilege. (Emphasis ours)
Failure of a judge, such as respondent herein, to decide a case within the prescribed period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting a disciplinary sanction.
Under Section 9(1) , Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, of the Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is categorized as a less serious charge. Under Section 11(B) of the same Rule, the penalty for such charge is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
For failure of respondent judge in this case to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within the prescribed period and taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance that it was his first offense, we impose on him a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
The Court agreed with the findings of the OCA that respondent must also be penalized for violation of P.D. No. 26 because he filed his Rejoinder to this administrative case taking advantage of the franking privilege. Although such privilege is extended to judges, the same refers only to official communications and papers directly connected with the conduct of judicial proceedings which shall be transmitted in the mail free of charge. The respondent, in mailing his Rejoinder, made it appear that the same is an official court process as the envelope used bears his station and the words “FREE FROM POSTAGE”.
