Because of its importance to the Bar, I wish to reiterate the doctrines pronounced by the Philippine Supreme Court in the case of ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR. vs. ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ, A.C. No. 8243 , July 24, 2009, which involved the ethical issues of conflict of interest, deceit and dishonesty on the part of a lawyer and wherein the Court DISBARRED the respondent Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez for such offenses, thus:
1. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:
Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste and, more importantly, upon necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s case, including its weak and strong points. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given to him to take advantage of his client; for if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double ─ dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. It is for these reasons that we have described the attorney-client relationship as one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.
2. Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of “friendly accommodations,” precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC.
3. Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no written contract for the engagement of her services was ever forged between her and complainant. This argument all the more reveals respondent’s patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and of basic ethical standards expected from an advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said:
The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. (Emphasis supplied.)
4. Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have done was either to advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.
5. In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, 453 Phil. 108 (2003), we explained the concept of conflict of interest, thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
6. Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainant’s hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, respondent impressed upon complainant that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel. Respondent herself admitted to complainant that without the latter’s help, she would not have been able to earn as much and that, as a token of her appreciation, she was willing to share some of her earnings with complainant. Clearly, respondent’s act is shocking, as it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, but also toyed with decency and good taste.
7. Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client had ever complained of respondent’s unethical behavior. This remark indubitably displays respondent’s gross ignorance of disciplinary procedure in the Bar. As a member of the Bar, she is expected to know that proceedings for disciplinary actions against any lawyer may be initiated and prosecuted by the IBP Board of Governors, motu proprio or upon referral by this Court or by the Board of Officers of an IBP Chapter even if no private individual files any administrative complaint.
8. Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar her on the grounds of deceit, malpractice and other gross misconduct, aside from violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, has been rendered moot and academic by voluntary termination of her IBP membership, allegedly after she had been placed under the Department of Justice’s Witness Protection Program. Convenient as it may be for respondent to sever her membership in the integrated bar, this Court cannot allow her to do so without resolving first this administrative case against her.
The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is necessary in order to determine the degree of her culpability and liability to complainant. The case may not be dismissed or rendered moot and academic by respondent’s act of voluntarily terminating her membership in the Bar regardless of the reason for doing so. This is because membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. The conduct of a lawyer may make him or her civilly, if not criminally, liable to his client or to third parties, and such liability may be conveniently avoided if this Court were to allow voluntary termination of membership. Hence, to terminate one’s membership in the Bar voluntarily, it is imperative that the lawyer first prove that the voluntary withdrawal of membership is not a ploy to further prejudice the public or to evade liability. No such proof exists in the present case.
