The case of EDUARDO VARELA vs. MA. DAISY REVALEZ, et. al., G.R. No. 171705, July 29, 2010, involved the illegal termination of the services of local employees and the liabilities of the local mayor in his personal capacity arising therefrom. This is instructive in the fields of torts and damages and administrative law. Inter alia, it held: “Varela was sued in his personal capacity, not in his official capacity. In the complaint, the employees stated that, ‘due to the illegal acts of the Defendant, Plaintiffs suffered mental torture and anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation and social humiliation.’ The State can never be the author of illegal acts.”
In its 20 June 2001 Decision, the RTC declared Resolution No. 98-112 void and ordered Varela to pay the government employees P10,000 each for moral damages, P200,000 attorney’s fees, P20,000 litigation expenses, and court appearance fees at P3,000 per hearing. The RTC found that Varela acted in bad faith. The Court held:
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There is no question that the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cadiz City is the legislative arm of the local government unit and as such it possesses the power to enact the questioned resolution. Plaintiffs however challenge the manner Res. 98-112 was enacted, and the “indecent haste” that accompanied its passage. The proposal emanated from the office of defendant mayor and in a short time after its submission the measure was passed. The requisite deliberations, if at all there was one, could hardly be considered adequate and could best be described as perfunctory. The minutes of the SP say it all. The deliberations reflected a lackluster effort and a wimpish attempt by the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to justify the grant to the mayor of legislative authority to carry out the reorganization. There absolutely was no public hearing. The proposal coming as it did from the mayor, was a fait accompli, a done deal in a manner of speaking. x x x
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Careful examination of the evidence submitted by the defendant, however, would reveal a systematic effort to purge the city government of personnel who opposed the mayor politically, or disagreed with him in his policies. Furthermore, perusal of the minutes of the deliberations of the Sangguniang Panlungsod reveals that the City of Cadiz was not in dire financial straits necessitating radical measures like mass lay-off of personnel. x x x
x x x The City of Cadiz as of 1998, was not in financial extremis. It had the money, the resources to fund the salaries of personnel. x x x [Varela] even ignored the concern of a city councilor who said that at that time (1998) the City already lacked the required personnel, and so why abolish certain positions? The defendant mayor simply gave the assurance that they can create any position when the need arises and the city has the money. This statement betrayed the real intentions of the defendant insofar as the reorganization is concerned.
x x x The Mayor did not even explain what basic services would be affected. As a matter of fact, the office hardest hit and greatly affected by the mass layoff was the health services department where 50 or so of the 101 personnel complement were laid off. Does it mean that the delivery of health services is the least of the priorities of Cadiz City? Or does it mean that health service from the point of view of the defendant city mayor is not a basic service? The truth of the matter is that the health workers of Cadiz filed a case against the mayor for his refusal to implement provisions of the Magna Carta for Health Workers. Talk of vindictiveness. The poor health workers laid off were on the receiving end of the ire of the defendant mayor. There seemed to be no rhyme or reason to the reorganization scheme.
x x x x
Was the reorganization of the Cadiz City government under Res. 98-112, done in good faith? The testimony of Ramon Borromeo, which is uncontradicted, will show the true intent of the reorganization, and whether or not it was done in good faith x x x.
From the afore-quoted testimony it is clear that the abolition of the office of Mr. Borromeo in the guise of reorganization was not done in good faith. The abolition was done for “political reasons,” (Arao vs. Luspo, L-23982, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 722). As stated in Urgello, if the abolition merely resulted in placing another person or appointee with a different designation or name but substantially the same duties, then it will be considered a device to unseat the incumbent. Clearly the reorganization is not genuine and it is nothing but a ruse to defeat the constitutionally protected right of security of tenure.
x x x x
Since all the offices of the personnel of Cadiz City were declared vacant, and notices of initial termination sent on November 10, 1998, the placement Committee barely had twenty (20) days to submit a final report to defendant mayor. With 741 personnel to be reevaluated and screened, plus other new applicants, the committee did not have enough time to do their work as envisioned. The Committee had to screen and evaluate all applications to about 649 positions included in the new plantilla. Notwithstanding time constraints, the Committee did not meet until November 17, barely two (2) weeks from their deadline. Subsequently they met three (3) times. On their first meeting, the report states, the placement Committee merely agreed to ask the defendant mayor to turn over to the Committee all the application letters. Nothing by way of screening or evaluation was done that day. On the second meeting November 18, the applications were “lumped” in bundles or files, and segregated by department. Then they suggested to borrow the qualification standards from the Human Resource Management Office. Due to time constraints, it was suggested that the screening should start immediately, and they agreed to meet November 19, 1998. As of the second meeting the screening and evaluation had barely began. On November 19, 1998 the committee met with Mr. Zamora suggesting that qualification standards be used mainly eligibility performance rating, education and attainment, experience and awards and training received. Mr. Napud suggested that the department heads be interviewed. As of November 19, the committee had not started its deliberations and screening, but lo and behold Mr. Zamora came up with a complete list in time for the last meeting. On November 29, 1998, Mr. Zamora presented to the members of the committee the list of employees selected by the Placement Committee. Then the list was submitted to the mayor. These were reflected in Minutes of the meeting of the Placement Committee.
X x x.
In its 17 August 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC’s 20 June 2001 Decision. The Court of Appeals held that Varela was personally liable for the payment of moral damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and court appearance fees. It reduced the amounts of litigation expenses from P200,000 to P100,000 and from P20,000 to P10,000, respectively, and deleted the award of court appearance fees. The Court of Appeals held that:
X x x.
OUR jurisprudence is replete with cases involving the issue of whether or not a public officer may be held liable for damages in the performance of their [sic] duties, to quote:
“A public official is by law not immune from damages in his personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.”
“Settled is the principle that a public official may be liable in his personal capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.”
In addition, Book I, Chapter 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides, to quote:
“Section 38. Liability of Superior Officers. — (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. x x x”
In the case at bar, the court a quo found that bad faith attended the performance of the official acts of the original defendant, Eduardo G. Varela. x x x
WE find no reason to disturb the finding of bad faith by the court a quo considering that the same was amply supported by evidence.
The mayor raised as issue that, “THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THE PETITIONER PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF DAMAGES, ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES AS THE PETITIONER WAS SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL, AND NOT IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY.”
The Supreme Court found the petition of the mayor to be unmeritorious. Its doctrinal pronouncements are as follows:
X x x.
Varela was sued in his personal capacity, not in his official capacity. In the complaint, the employees stated that, “due to the illegal acts of the Defendant, Plaintiffs suffered mental torture and anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation and social humiliation.” The State can never be the author of illegal acts.
The complaint merely identified Varela as the mayor of Cadiz City. It did not categorically state that Varela was being sued in his official capacity. The identification and mention of Varela as the mayor of Cadiz City did not automatically transform the action into one against Varela in his official capacity. The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of the cause of action.
In Pascual v. Beltran, the Court held that:
[I]n the case at bar, petitioner is actually sued in his personal capacity inasmuch as his principal, the State, can never be the author of any wrongful act. The Complaint filed by the private respondent with the RTC merely identified petitioner as Director of the Telecommunications Office, but did not categorically state that he was being sued in his official capacity. The mere mention in the Complaint of the petitioner’s position as Regional Director of the Telecommunications Office does not transform the action into one against petitioner in his official capacity. What is determinative of the nature of the cause of action are the allegations in the complaint. It is settled that the nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filling [sic] the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (Emphasis supplied)
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