Sps Webb vs Sec of Justice : 139120 : July 31, 2003 : J. Carpio Morales : Third Division
[G.R. No. 139120. July 31, 2003]
SPS. FREDDIE & ELIZABETH WEBB, et. al. vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, et. al..
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
x x x.
At the time petitioners’ petition for certiorari was filed before the appellate court and even up to the rendition of its assailed Resolution on February 8, 1999, the rule in force was above-quoted Rule 65, Sec. 4. The petition at bar would then fail. The rule, however, was amended during the pendency of the present case before this Court by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC (Further Amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which took effect on September 1, 2000. The 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari is now reckoned from date of receipt of the notice of denial of a motion for reconsideration or new trial if one was filed.[14]
The next “logical step” to take then would be for this Court to direct the appellate court to resolve the petition for certiorari on the merits. Such step, however, would unduly prolong its disposition, hence, this Court shall now resolve the same.[15]
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors, hence, has power of review over their resolutions. He may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.[16]
The power of review of the Secretary of Justice is also recognized under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court:
Sec. 4. Resolution of Investigating Prosecutor and its review. — x x x x If upon petition by a proper party under such Rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties x x x x
Once a complaint or information is filed in court, however, as in the present case, any disposition of the case — be it dismissal of the case, or conviction or acquittal of the accused — rests on the sound discretion of the court. For although the prosecutor retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court[17] which is “the final arbiter on whether or not to proceed with the case.”
As a general rule, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Our duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are, however, exceptions[18] to this rule, none of which are obtaining in the case now before us x x x x Since the Information has already been filed, the final arbiter on whether or not to proceed with the case is the Regional Trial Court as earlier discussed.[19] (Underscoring supplied)
In the present case, there is no showing that the public prosecutor has filed a motion to withdraw the informations before the trial court. The trial judge has thus not been afforded the chance to pass upon any such motion to determine whether probable cause indeed does or does not lie against the accused-non-members of the PDI Board.
With respect to the affirmance by the Secretary of Justice of the exclusion of the respondent-members of the PDI Board of Directors in the information for libel: The records on hand do not show that petitioners have come up with prima facie evidence that respondent-members of the Board actually caused or participated in the publication, or were “in some way directly responsible for the writing, editing or publishing” of the alleged libelous articles.[20] It is on this score that this Court finds that the affirmance by the Secretary of Justice of the dismissal of the complaint against the respondent-members of the PDI Board was not attended with grave abuse of discretion.
x x x.
