MARCIANO ALCARAZ vs.
JUDGE FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 87, QUEZON CITY,
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2272
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2559-RTJ)
February 16, 2011
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
x x x.
Our Ruling
We disagree with the finding and recommendation of the OCA.
At first glance, it would seem that the respondent was guilty of undue delay, if not, absolute neglect in resolving Emelita’s motion for execution pending appeal. The respondent had not taken any action on the said motion and, in fact, came to consider Emelita’s plea for an execution pending appeal only after the latter had filed an Urgent Motion. From the filing of the motion for execution pending appeal, a period of more than five (5) months had to pass before the respondent finally directed a writ of execution to be issued. Under these circumstances, it was understandable why the complainant cried out against the inaction.
A deeper look at the records of the case, however, reveals that no administrative fault may be attributed on the part of the respondent.
An inspection of Emelita’s motion for execution pending appeal discloses a defective notice of hearing. Thus:[35]
NOTICE OF HEARING
The BRANCH CLERK OF COURT
RTC QUEZON CITY
BRANCH 87
Greetings:
Kindly submit the foregoing MOTION for the consideration and approval of the Honorable Court immediately upon receipt hereof, or at any time convenient to the Honorable Court.
Paranaque City for Quezon City
November 12, 2005
Atty. Nelson B. Bayot (Sgd.)
(Emphasis supplied).
The Rules of Court require every written motion, except those that the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of an adverse party, to be set for hearing by its proponent.[36] When a motion ought to be heard, the same rules prescribe that it must be served to the adverse party with a notice of hearing.[37]
The substance of a notice of hearing is, in turn, laid out in Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The provision states:[38]
Section 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all the parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bench, it is clear that the notice of hearing in Emelita’s motion for execution pending appeal did not comply with the foregoing standards.
First. Rather than being addressed to the adverse party, the notice of hearing in Emelita’s motion was directed to the Branch Clerk of Court. Such gaffe actually contradicts a basic purpose of the notice requirement—i.e., to inform an adverse party of the date and time of the proposed hearing.
Second. The notice of hearing did not specify a date and time of hearing. In fact, there was nothing in the notice that even suggests that the proponent intended to set a hearing with the trial court in the first place. As may be observed, the notice is merely an instruction for the clerk of court to submit the motion “for the consideration and approval” of the trial court “immediately upon receipt” or “at any time convenient” with the said court. The notice of hearing in Emelita’s motion does not, in reality, give any kind of notice.
Jurisprudence had been categorical in treating a litigious motion without a valid notice of hearing as a mere scrap of paper.[39] In the classic formulation of Manakil v. Revilla,[40] such a motion was condemned as:
x x x [n]othing but a piece of paper filed with the court. It presented no question which the court could decide. The court had no right to consider it, nor had the clerk any right to receive it without a compliance with Rule 10 [now Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15]. It was not, in fact, a motion. It did not comply with the rules of the court. It did not become a motion until x x x the petitioners herein fixed a time for hearing of said alleged motion. (Emphasis supplied).
An important aspect of the above judicial pronouncement is the absence of any duty on the part of the court to take action on a motion wanting a valid notice of hearing. After all, the Rules of Court places upon the movant, and not with the court, the obligations both to secure a particular date and time for the hearing of his motion[41] and to give a proper notice thereof on the other party.[42] It is precisely the failure of the movant to comply with these obligations, which reduces an otherwise actionable motion to a “mere scrap of paper” not deserving of any judicial acknowledgment.
Accordingly, a judge may not be held administratively accountable for not acting upon a “mere scrap of paper.” To impose upon judges a positive duty to recognize and resolve motions with defective notices of hearing would encourage litigants to an unbridled disregard of a simple but necessary rule of a fair judicial proceeding. In Hon. Cledera v. Hon. Sarmiento,[43] this Court aptly observed:
The rules commanding the movant to serve of the adverse party a written notice of the motion (Section 2, Rule 37) and that the notice of hearing "shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion" (Section 5, Rule 15), do not provide for any qualifications, much less exceptions. To deviate from the peremptory principle x x x would be one step in the emasculation of the revised rules and would be subversive of the stability of the rules and jurisprudence thereon — all to the consternation of the Bench and Bar and other interested persons as well as the general public who would thereby be subjected to such an irritating uncertainty as to when to render obedience to the rules and when their requirements may be ignored. We had to draw a line somewhere and WE did when we promulgated on January 1, 1964 the Revised Rules of Court, wherein WE delineated in a language matchless in simplicity and clarity the essential requirements for a valid notice of hearing on any motion, to eliminate all possibilities of equivocation or misunderstanding.[44] (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, We find the respondent free from any administrative liability in not taking action on Emelita’s motion for execution pending appeal. The motion itself is not entitled to judicial cognizance—the reason for which is imputable to the fault of the movant herself and not to an apparent breach of the respondent of her duties as a member of the bench. Notably, the respondent did act on the matter of the execution of the MeTC judgment pending appeal when the issue was properly scheduled for hearing in the 8 February 2006 Urgent Motion.
x x x.
