Considering the absolute nullification of the trial court’s Decision, the proceedings arising from the execution pending appeal based on the said Decision is likewise completely vacated.
Since the trial court’s main Decision awarding PhP28,500,000 in favor of Peña has been nullified above, the execution pending appeal attendant thereto, as a result, no longer has any leg to stand on and is thus completely vacated.
To recall, prior to the filing of Urban Bank of its notice of appeal in the main case, Peña moved on 07 June 1999 for execution pending appeal of the Decision, which had awarded him a total of PhP28,500,000 in compensation and damages. In supporting his prayer for discretionary execution, Peña cited no other reason than the pending separate civil action for collection filed against him by a creditor, who was demanding payment of a PhP3,000,000 loan.According to him, he had used the proceeds of the loan for securing the bank’s Pasay property. In opposition to the motion, Urban Bank countered that the collection case was not a sufficient reason for allowing execution pending appeal.
Favorably acting on Peña’s motion, the RTC-Bago City, through Judge Henry J. Trocino, issued a Special Order authorizing execution pending appeal on the basis of Peña’s indebtedness to his creditor-friend. In accordance with this Special Order, Atty. Josephine Mutia-Hagad, the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff, expeditiously issued a Writ of Execution on the same day. The trial court’s Special Order and Writ of Execution were the subjects of a Rule 65 Petition filed by Urban Bank with the CA.
Both the Special Order and Writ of Execution are nullified for two reasons:
(1) Since the Decision of the RTC-Bago City is completely vacated, all its issuances pursuant to the Decision, including the Special Order and the Writ of Execution are likewise vacated; and
(2) The Special Order authorizing execution pending appeal based on the collection suit filed against Atty. Peña had no basis under the Rules of Court, and the same infirmity thus afflicts the Writ of Execution issued pursuant thereto.
Since the Decision of the RTC-Bago City is vacated, all orders and writs pursuant thereto are likewise vacated.
Considering that the Special Order and Writ of Execution was a result of the trial court’s earlier award of PhP28,500,000, the nullification or complete reversal of the said award necessarily translates to the vacation as well of the processes arising therefrom, including all the proceedings for the execution pending appeal.
Considering the unconscionable award given by the trial court and the unjustified imposition of solidary liability against the eight bank officers, the Court is vacating the Decision of the RTC-Bago City Decision. The trial court erroneously made solidarily liable Urban Bank’s directors and officers without even any allegations, much less proof, of any acts of bad faith, negligence or malice in the performance of their duties. In addition, the trial court mistakenly anchored its astounding award of damages amounting PhP28,500,000 on the basis of the mere account of Atty. Peña of a telephone conversation, without even considering the surrounding circumstances and the sheer disproportion to the legal services rendered to the bank.
A void judgment never acquires finality. In contemplation of law, that void decision is deemed non-existent. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum. Hence, the validity of the execution pending appeal will ultimately hinge on the court’s findings with respect to the decision in which the execution is based.
Although discretionary execution can proceed independently while the appeal on the merits is pending, the outcome of the main case will greatly impact the execution pending appeal, especially in instances where as in this case, there is a complete reversal of the trial court’s decision. Thus, if the decision on the merits is completely nullified, then the concomitant execution pending appeal is likewise without any effect. In fact, the Rules of Court expressly provide for the possibility of reversal, complete or partial, of a final judgment which has been executed on appeal. Precisely, the execution pending appeal does not bar the continuance of the appeal on the merits, for the Rules of Court explicitly provide for restitution according to equity and justice in case the executed judgment is reversed on appeal.
Considering that the Decision of the RTC-Bago City has been completely vacated and declared null and void, it produces no effect whatsoever. Thus, the Special Order and its concomitant Writ of Execution pending appeal is likewise annulled and is also without effect. Consequently, all levies, garnishment and sales executed pending appeal are declared null and void, with the concomitant duty of restitution under the Rules of Court, as will be discussed later on.
In any case, the trial court’s grant of execution pending appeal lacks sufficient basis under the law and jurisprudence.
We rule that the pendency of a collection suit by a third party creditor which credit was obtained by the winning judgment creditor in another case, is not a sufficiently good reason to allow execution pending appeal as the Rules of Court provide. Execution pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy allowed only when there are reasons to believe that the judgment debtor will not be able to satisfy the judgment debt if the appeals process will still have to be awaited. It requires proof of circumstances such as insolvency or attempts to escape, abscond or evade a just debt.
In Florendo v. Paramount Insurance, Corp., the Court explained that the execution pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that execution issues as a matter of right, when a judgment has become final and executory:
As such exception, the court’s discretion in allowing it must bestrictly construed and firmly grounded on the existence of good reasons.“Good reasons,” it has been held, consist of compelling circumstances that justify immediate execution lest the judgment becomes illusory. The circumstances must be superior, outweighing the injury or damages that might result should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would make of execution pending appeal, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, a tool of oppression and inequity. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the presence or the absence of good reasons remains the yardstick in allowing the remedy of execution pending appeal, which should consist of exceptional circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer, should the appealed judgment be reversed later. Thus, the Court held that even the financial distress of the prevailing company is not sufficient reason to call for execution pending appeal:
In addressing this issue, the Court must stress that the execution of a judgment before its finality must be founded upon good reasons. The yardstick remains the presence or the absence of good reasons consisting of exceptional circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer, should the appealed judgment be reversed later. Good reason imports a superior circumstance that will outweigh injury or damage to the adverse party. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to show “paramount and compelling reasons of urgency and justice.” Petitioner cites as good reason merely the fact that “it is a small-time building contractor that could ill-afford the protracted delay in the reimbursement of the advances it made for the aforesaid increased costs of . . . construction of the [respondent's] buildings.”
Petitioner's allegedly precarious financial condition, however, is not by itself a jurisprudentially compelling circumstance warranting immediate execution. The financial distress of a juridical entity is not comparable to a case involving a natural person — such as a very old and sickly one without any means of livelihood, an heir seeking an order for support and monthly allowance for subsistence, or one who dies.
Indeed, the alleged financial distress of a corporation does not outweigh the long standing general policy of enforcing only final and executory judgments. Certainly, a juridical entity like petitioner corporation has, other than extraordinary execution, alternative remedies like loans, advances, internal cash generation and the like to address its precarious financial condition. (Emphasis supplied)
In Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, the Court denied execution pending appeal to a juridical entity which allegedly was in financial distress and was facing civil and criminal suits with respect to the collection of a sum of money. It ruled that the financial distress of the prevailing party in a final judgment which was still pending appeal may not be likened to the situation of a natural person who is ill, of advanced age or dying as to justify execution pending appeal:
It is significant to stress that private respondent Falcon is a juridical entity and not a natural person. Even assuming that it was indeed in financial distress and on the verge of facing civil or even criminal suits, the immediate execution of a judgment in its favor pending appeal cannot be justified as Falcon’s situation may not be likened to a case of a natural person who may be ill or may be of advanced age. Even the danger of extinction of the corporation will not per se justify a discretionary execution unless there are showings of other good reasons, such as for instance, impending insolvency of the adverse party or the appeal being patently dilatory. But even as to the latter reason, it was noted in Aquino vs. Santiago (161 SCRA 570 ), that it is not for the trial judge to determine the merit of a decision he rendered as this is the role of the appellate court. Hence, it is not within competence of the trial court, in resolving a motion for execution pending appeal, to rule that the appeal is patently dilatory and rely on the same as its basis for finding good reason to grant the motion. Only an appellate court can appreciate the dilatory intent of an appeal as an additional good reason in upholding an order for execution pending appeal which may have been issued by the trial court for other good reasons, or in cases where the motion for execution pending appeal is filed with the appellate court in accordance with Section 2, paragraph (a), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
What is worse, only one case was actually filed against Falcon and this is the complaint for collection filed by Solidbank. The other cases are “impending”, so it is said. Other than said Solidbank case, Falcon’s survival as a body corporate cannot be threatened by anticipated litigation. This notwithstanding, and even assuming that there was a serious threat to Falcon’s continued corporate existence, we hold that it is not tantamount nor even similar to an impending death of a natural person. The material existence of a juridical person is not on the same plane as that of human life. The survival of a juridical personality is clearly outweighed by the long standing general policy of enforcing only final and executory judgments. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the trial court supported its discretionary grant of execution based on the alleged collection suit filed against Peña by his creditor friend for PhP3,000,000:
It has been established that the plaintiff secured the loan for the purpose of using the money to comply with the mandate of defendant bank to hold and maintain possession of the parcel of land in Pasay City and to prevent intruders and former tenants from occupying the said property. The purpose of the loan was very specific and the same was made known to defendant bank through defendant Teodoro Borlongan. The loan was not secured for some other purpose. Truth to tell, the plaintiff accomplished his mission in clearing the property of tenants, intruders and squatters, long before the deadline given him by the defendant bank. The plaintiff was assured by no less than the President of defendant bank of the availability of funds for his compensation and reimbursement of his expenses. Had he been paid by defendant bank soon after he had fulfilled his obligation, he could have settled his loan obligation with his creditor.
Defendants were benefitted by the services rendered by the plaintiff. While plaintiff has complied with the undertaking, the defendants, however, failed to perform their obligation to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff stands to suffer greatly if the collection case against him is not addressed. Firstly, as shown in Exhibit “C”, plaintiff’s total obligation with Roberto Ignacio as of May 1999 is PhP24,192,000.00. This amount, if left unpaid, will continue to increase due to interest charges being imposed by the creditor to the prejudice of plaintiff. Secondly, a preliminary attachment has already been issued and this would restrict the plaintiff from freely exercising his rights over his property during the pendency of the case.
In their opposition, defendants claim that plaintiff’s indebtedness is a ruse, however, defendants failed to adduce evidence to support its claim.
The court finds that the pendency of the case for collection of money against plaintiff is a good reason for immediate execution. 
The mere fact that Atty. Peña was already subjected to a collection suit for payment of the loan proceeds he used to perform his services for Urban Bank is not an acceptable reason to order the execution pending appeal against the bank. Financial distress arising from a lone collection suit and not due to the advanced age of the party is not an urgent or compelling reason that would justify the immediate levy on the properties of Urban Bank pending appeal. That Peña would made liable in the collection suit filed by his creditor-friend would not reasonably result in rendering illusory the final judgment in the instant action for agent’s compensation.
Peña’s purported difficulty in paying the loan proceeds used to perform his services does not outweigh the injury or damages that might result should Urban Bank obtain a reversal of the judgment, as it did in this case. Urban Bank even asserts that the collection suit filed against Peña was a mere ruse to provide justification for the execution pending appeal, no matter how flimsy. As quoted above, the trial court noted Atty. Peña’s total obligation to his creditor-friend as of May 1999 was already the incredible amount of PhP24,192,000.00, even when the Complaint dated 03 April 1999 itself, which spawned the collection suit included only a prayer for payment of PhP3,500,000 with attorney’s fees of PhP100,000. It seems absurd that Atty. Peña would agree to obtaining a loan from his own friend, when the Promissory Notes provided for a penalty of 5% interest per month or 60% per annum for delay in the payment. It sounds more like a creative justification of the immediate execution of the PhP28.5 Million judgment notwithstanding the appeal.
In fact, the Court of Appeals noted Atty. Peña’s admission of sufficient properties to answer for any liability arising from the collection suit arising from his creditor-friend. In initially denying the execution pending appeal, the appellate court held that:
On the other hand, private respondent’s claim that the only way he could pay his indebtedness to Roberto Ignacio is through the money that he expects to receive from petitioners in payment of his services is belied by his testimony at the hearing conducted by the trial court on the motion for execution pending appeal wherein petitioners were able to secure an admission from him that he has some assets which could be attached by Roberto Ignacio and that he would probably have other assets left even after the attachment.
Hence, to rule that a pending collection suit against Atty. Peña, which has not been shown to result in his insolvency, would be to encourage judgment creditors to indirectly and indiscriminately instigate collection suits or cite pending actions, related or not, as a “good reason” to routinely avail of the remedy of discretionary execution. As an exception to the general rule on execution after final and executory judgment, the reasons offered by Atty. Peña to justify execution pending appeal must be strictly construed.
Neither will the Court accept the trial court’s unfounded assumption that Urban Bank’s appeal was merely dilatory, as in fact, the PhP28,500,000 award given by the trial court was overturned by the appellate court and eventually by this Court.
Moreover, at the time the Special Order of Judge Henry Trociño of the RTC-Bago City came out in 1999, Urban Bank had assets worth more than PhP11 Billion and had a net worth of more than PhP2 Billion. There was no reason then to believe that Urban Bank could not satisfy a judgment of PhP28,500,000, a sum that was only 1% of its net worth, and 1/5 of 1% of its total assets of PhP11,933,383,630. Urban Bank was even given a Solvency, Liquidity and Management Rating of 82.89 over 100 by no less than the BSP and reportedly had liquid assets amounting to PhP2,036,878. In fact, no allegation of impending insolvency or attempt to abscond was ever raised by Atty. Peña and yet, the trial court granted execution pending appeal.
Since the original order granting execution pending appeal was completely void for containing no justifiable reason, it follows that any affirmance of the same by the Court of Appeals is likewise void.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55667, finding a new reason for granting execution pending appeal,i.e., the receivership of Urban Bank, is likewise erroneous, notwithstanding this Court’s ruling in Lee v. Trocino. In accordance with the subsequent Resolution of the Court in abovementioned case of Lee v. Trocino, we directly resolve the issue of the insufficiency of the reasons that led to the grant of execution pending appeal.
In cases where the two or more defendants are made subsidiarily or solidarily liable by the final judgment of the trial court, discretionary execution can be allowed if all the defendants have been found to be insolvent. Considering that only Urban Bank, and not the other eight individual defendants, was later on considered by the Court of Appeals to have been “in danger of insolvency,” is not sufficient reason to allow execution pending appeal, since the liability for the award to Peña was made (albeit, mistakenly) solidarily liable together with the bank officers.
In Flexo Manufacturing Corp. v. Columbus Food, Inc., and Pacific Meat Company, Inc., both Columbus Food, Inc., (Columbus Food) and Pacific Meat Company, Inc., (Pacific Meat) were found by the trial court therein to be solidarily liable to Flexo Manufacturing, Inc., (Flexo Manufacturing) for the principal obligation of PhP2,957,270.00. The lower court also granted execution pending appeal on the basis of the insolvency of Columbus Food, even if Pacific Meat was not found to be insolvent. Affirming the reversal ordered by the Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that since there was another party who was solidarily liable to pay for the judgment debt, aside from the insolvent Columbus Food, there was no good reason to allow the execution pending appeal:
Regarding the state of insolvency of Columbus, the case ofPhilippine National Bank v. Puno, held:
“While this Court in several cases has held that insolvency of the judgment debtor or imminent danger thereof is a good reason for discretionary execution, otherwise to await a final and executory judgment may not only diminish but may nullify all chances for recovery on execution from said judgment debtor, We are constrained to rule otherwise in this particular case. In the aforecited cases, there was either only one defeated party or judgment debtor who was, however, insolvent or there were several such parties but all were insolvent, hence the aforesaid rationale for discretionary execution was present. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that, assuming MMIC is insolvent, its co-defendant PNB is not. It cannot, therefore, be plausibly assumed that the judgment might become illusory; if MMIC cannot satisfy the judgment, PNB will answer for it. It will be observed that, under the dispositive portion of the judgment hereinbefore quoted, the liability of PNB is either subsidiary or solidary.
Thus, when there are two or more defendants and one is not insolvent, the insolvency of a co-defendant is not a good reason to justify execution pending appeal if their liability under the judgment is either subsidiary or solidary. In this case, Pacific was adjudged to be solidarily liable with Columbus. Therefore, the latter is not the only party that may be answerable to Flexo. Its insolvency does not amount to a good reason to grant execution pending appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the trial court in this case found Urban Bank and all eight individual bank officers solidarily liable to Atty. Peña for the payment of the PhP28,500,000 award. Hence, had the judgment been upheld on appeal, Atty. Peña could have demanded payment from any of the nine defendants. Thus, it was a mistake for the Court of Appeals to have affirmed execution pending appeal based solely on the receivership of Urban Bank, when there were eight other individual defendants, who were solidarily liable but were not shown to have been insolvent. Since Urban Bank’s co-defendants were not found to have been insolvent, there was no good reason for the Court of Appeals to immediately order execution pending appeal, since Atty. Peña’s award could have been satisfied by the eight other defendants, especially when the de Leon Group filed its supersedeas bond.
It seems incongruous for Atty. Peña to be accorded the benefit of erroneously impleading several bank directors, who had no direct hand in the transaction, but at the same time, concentrating solely on Urban Bank’s inability to pay to justify execution pending appeal, regardless of the financial capacity of its other co-defendants. Worse, he capitalized on the insolvency and/or receivership of Urban Bank to levy or garnish properties of the eight other individual defendants, who were never shown to have been incapable of paying the judgment debt in the first place. The disposition on the execution pending appeal may have been different had Atty. Peña filed suit against Urban Bank alone minus the bank officers and the same bank was found solely liable for the award and later on declared under receivership.
In addition, a judgment creditor of a bank, which has been ordered by the BSP to be subject of receivership, has to fall in line like every other creditor of the bank and file its claim under the proper procedures for banks that have been taken over by the PDIC. Under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7653, otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act, which prevailed at that time, once a bank is under receivership, the receiver shall immediately gather and take charge of all the assets and liabilities of the bank and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors and all of the bank’s assets shall be considered as under custodial legis and exempt from any order of garnishment, levy, attachment or execution. In the Minute Resolution of the Monetary Board of the BSP, Urban Bank was not only prevented from doing business in the Philippines but its asset and affairs were placed under receivership as provided for under the same law. In fact, even Peña himself assured the PDIC, as receiver of Urban Bank, that he would not schedule or undertake execution sales of the bank’s assets for as long as the bank remains in receivership. Until the approval of the rehabilitation or the initiation of the liquidation proceedings, all creditors of the bank under receivership shall stand on equal footing with respect to demanding satisfaction of their debts, and cannot be extended preferred status by an execution pending appeal with respect to the bank’s assets:
… [t]o execute the judgment would unduly deplete the assets of respondent bank to the obvious prejudice of other creditors. After the Monetary Board has declared that a bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations, the Board becomes the trustee of its assets for the equal benefit of all the depositors and creditors. After its insolvency, one creditor cannot obtain an advantage or preference over another by an attachment, execution or otherwise. Until there is an approved rehabilitation or the initiation of the liquidation proceedings, creditors of the bank stand on equal footing with respect to demanding satisfaction of their debts, and cannot be afforded special treatment by an execution pending appeal with respect to the bank’s assets. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, assuming that the CA was correct in finding a reason to justify the execution pending appeal because of the supervening event of Urban Bank’s closure, the assumption by the EIB of the liabilities of Urban Bank meant that any execution pending appeal can be granted only if EIB itself is shown to be unable to satisfy Peña’s judgment award of PhP28,500,000. That is not at all the case. In just one particular sale on execution herein, EIB offered to answer in cash for a substantial part of Peña’s claims, as evidenced by EIB’s capacity and willingness to redeem the executed properties (condominium units sold to intervenor Unimega) by tendering manager’s checks for more than PhP22 Million which is already 77.57% of Peña’s total award from the trial court. The fact that EIB’s offer to take over Urban Bank means it was able to satisfy the BSP’s concern that all legitimate liabilities of Urban Bank be duly discharged.
As an exception to the general rule that only final judgments may be executed, the grant of execution pending appeal must perforce be based on “good reasons.” These reasons must consist of compelling or superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages suffered, should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment or final order. The circumstances that would reasonably justify superior urgency, demanding interim execution of Peña’s claims for compensation and/or damages, have already been settled by the financial capacity of the eight other co-defendants, the approval of the supersedeas bonds, the subsequent takeover by EIB, and the successor bank’s stable financial condition, which can answer for the judgment debt. Thus, Peña’s interest as a judgment creditor is already well-protected.
While there is a general rule that a final and executory judgment in the main case will render moot and academic a petition questioning the exercise of the trial court’s discretion in allowing execution pending appeal, we find it necessary to rule categorically on this question because of the magnitude of the aberrations that attended the execution pending appeal in the Decision of the RTC-Bago City.
Irregularities in the Levy and Sale on Execution Pending Appeal
Assuming that the Special Order granting execution pending appeal were valid, issues have been raised on alleged irregularities that mar the levy and sale on execution of the properties of Urban Bank and its officers and directors. Many of the facts have not been sufficiently litigated before the trial and appellate courts for us to fully rule on the issue, nevertheless, from what is on record, the following are the observations of this Court:
First, contrary to the general rules on execution, no opportunity was given to Urban Bank or the other co-defendants to pay the judgment debt in cash or certified check. Before proceeding on the levying and garnishing personal and real properties, demand must be made by the sheriff against the judgment debtors, Urban Bank and the eight other individual bank officers, for the immediate payment of the award subject of the execution pending appeal. It has not been shown whether Urban Bank and its officers and directors were afforded such an opportunity. Instead of garnishing personal properties of the bank, the sheriff inexplicably proceeded to levy substantial real properties of the bank and its officers at the onset.
Second, assuming that Urban Bank and its officers did not possess sufficient cash or funds to pay for the judgment debt pending appeal, they should have been given the option to choose which of their properties to be garnished and/or levied. In this case, Urban Bank exercised its option by presenting to the sheriff various parcels of land, whose values amount to more than PhP76,882,925 and were sufficient to satisfy the judgment debt.Among those presented by the bank, only the property located in Tagaytay was levied upon by the sheriff. No sufficient reason was raised why the bank’s chosen properties were rejected or inadequate for purposes of securing the judgment debt pending appeal. Worse, the Sheriff proceeded with garnishing and levying on as many properties of Urban Bank and its officers, in disregard of their right to choose under the rules.
Third, the public auction sales conducted in the execution pending appeal sold more properties of Urban Bank and the directors than what was sufficient to satisfy the debt. Indeed, the conservative value of the properties levied herein by the sheriff amounting to more than PhP181,919,190, consisting of prime condominium units in the heart of the Makati Business district, a lot in Tagaytay City, shares in exclusive clubs, and shares of stock, among others, was more than sufficient to answer for the PhP28,500,000judgment debt six times over. Rather than stop when the properties sold had approximated the monetary award, the execution sale pending appeal continued and unduly benefitted Atty. Peña, who, as judgment creditor and, at times, the winning bidder, purchased most of the properties sold.
Fourth, it was supremely disconcerting how Urban Bank, through its successor EIB, was unduly deprived of the opportunity to redeem the properties, even after presenting manager’s checks equal to the purchase price of the condominium units sold at the execution sale. No reason was offered by the trial court or the sheriff for rejecting the redemption price tendered by EIB in order to recover the properties executed and sold in public auction pending appeal.
Finally, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that there was already a sufficient supersedeas bond given to answer for whatever monetary award will be given in the end. To recall, the De Leon Group had already tendered a supersedeas bond of PhP40,000,000 in the Court of Appeals to prevent execution pending appeal over their properties. In fact, even Urban Bank tendered a separate supersedeas bond of equal amount with this Court, for a total of PhP80,000,000 to secure any judgment to be awarded to Atty. Peña. That execution sales over the properties of judgment debtors proceeded despite the three-fold value of securities compared to the amount of the award indicates bad faith, if not malice, with respect to the conduct of the execution pending appeal.
Inasmuch as the RTC Decision has already been vacated and an independent finding has been made by this Court of the complete nullity of the order granting execution pending appeal, it follows that all acts pursuant to such order and its writ are also void. It does not follow however, that the Court’s Decision in Co v. Sillador, is nullified, inasmuch as an equally-important legal doctrine – the immutability of Supreme Court final decisions – is also to be considered. In any case, the factual circumstances and the ruling on that case were limited to the actions of Sheriff Allan Sillador with respect to properties levied under the same Special Order and Writ of Execution, which were subject of third party claims made by the spouses ofTeodoro Borlongan, Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel, Jr. It does not encompass other specific events and acts committed in the course of the execution pending appeal that may warrant administrative or disciplinary actions. Having said that, this Court leaves it to the parties to explore avenues for redress in such a situation.
The observation on the irregularities above-enumerated are made for the purpose of correcting the injustice that has been committed herein, by allowing the Court to pursue the question of who was responsible for such gross violation of the rules on execution, and for the Court to find measures to improve the safeguards against abuse of court processes. It is for this reason that the Office of the Court Administrator will be given a special task by the Court on this matter. Judge Henry Trocino of RTC-Bago City, who issued the Special Order and had supervisory authority over the proceedings of the execution pending appeal, would have been included under such administrative investigation by the Office of the Court Administrator, were it not for his retirement from the judicial service.
The Court’s Suspension Order of Execution Pending Appeal
Acting on Atty. Peña’s Omnibus Motion dated 09 December 2002 and Unimega’s Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 December 2002 with respect to the Court’s Order dated 13 November 2002 that clarified the earlier stay order against the execution pending appeal, the Court hereby denies both motions. The Court is fully correct in suspending the period for the running of the redemption period of the properties of Urban Bank and its officers and directors that were levied and subject of execution sale to satisfy the judgment debt in favor of Atty. Peña, the Court having conclusively determined that the supersedeas bond filed was sufficient and considering the subsequent finding that the said execution pending appeal lacks any sufficient ground for the grant thereof.
As to the theory of Atty. Peña that the actuations of Justice Carpio, the then ponente of this case, in drafting the questioned Order should positively impact his motion for reconsideration of the same, the Court finds this argument utterly devoid of merit.
In the first place, that questioned Order was not the decision of only a single member of the Court, Justice Carpio, but of the entire division to which he belonged, then composed of retired Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Justices Jose Vitug, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and Adolfo Azcuna. This Order was affirmed by the same Division as its duly-promulgated order. In relation to this, the affirmation by the Division of this Order demonstrates that there is no truth to Atty. Peña’s claim that Justice Carpio fabricated the Order.
In the second place, Atty. Peña’s claim of undue interest against Justice Carpio specifically with respect to the latter having the instant case transferred to his new Division, is based on ignorance of the system of assignment of cases in the Supreme Court. When a reorganization of the Court takes place in the form of a change in the composition of Divisions, due to the retirement or loss of a member, the Justices do not thereby lose their case assignments but bring the latter with them to their new Divisions.The cases are then transferred to the Justices’ new Divisions, by way of the corresponding request from each justice. Each justice is in fact, required to make this request, otherwise the rollo of the cases of which he is Member-in-Charge will be retained by a Division in which he is no longer a member. Indeed, Atty. Peña’s imagination has gotten the better of him.
Thirdly, his insinuation (which he denies) that Justice Carpio may have been bribed because the latter has a new Mercedes Benz is highly offensive and has no place where his points should have been confined to legal reasons and arguments.
Incidentally, Atty. Peña has voiced the fear in the Letter of Complaint filed in the Court’s Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, which he brought against the ponente of this Decision, that she will suppress material information regarding the issuance of the Order suspending the redemption period because of her close relationship to Justice Carpio. Contrary to this fear, this Decision is frontally disposing of this claim by stating that there is no basis to believe that the questioned Order was anything than the joint decision of the five members of the then First Division, and that his arguments in his motion to reconsider does not persuade this Court to vary in any form the questioned order. Moreover, our disposition of this case renders moot his motion to reconsider the order.
It must be emphasized that the prolonged resolution of the procedural issue in the Petitions in G. R. Nos. 145817 and 145822 on the execution pending appeal is due in no small part to the delays arising from Peña’s peculiar penchant for filing successive motions for inhibition and re-raffle. The Court cannot sanction Peña’s repeated requests for voluntary inhibition of members of the Court based on the sole ground of his own self-serving allegations of lack of faith and trust, and would like to reiterate, at this point, the policy of the Court not to tolerate acts of litigants who, for just about any conceivable reason, seek to disqualify a judge (or justice) for their own purpose, under a plea of bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment.The Court cannot allow the unnecessary and successive requests for inhibition, lest it opens the floodgates to forum-shopping where litigants look for a judge more friendly and sympathetic to their cause than previous ones.
The Court is still confronted with the supervening acts related to the execution pending appeal and the reversal of the award of damages, which affect the rights of the parties as well as of the intervenors to the case, specifically, intervenor Unimega. In completely resolving the differing claims and performing its educational function, the Court shall briefly encapsulate and restate the operational rules governing execution pending appeal when there has been a reversal of the trial court’s Decision on the award of damages in order to guide the parties as well as the bench and bar in general. The necessity of making these detailed instructions is prompted by the most natural question an ordinary person with a sense of justice will ask after reading the facts: How can an obligation to pay for the services of a lawyer so that 23 unwanted tenants leave a corporation's property lead to the loss or the impairment of use of more than PhP181 Million worth of properties of that corporation and of its officers and directors? Obviously, this Court must undertake corrective actions swiftly.
The rule is that, where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled – on appeal or otherwise – the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances. The Rules of Court precisely provides for restitution according to equity, in case the executed judgment is reversed on appeal. “In an execution pending appeal, funds are advanced by the losing party to the prevailing party with the implied obligation of the latter to repay the former, in case the appellate court cancels or reduces the monetary award.”
In disposing of the main case subject of these Petitions, the Court totally reversed the staggering amount of damages given by the trial court, and limited on a quantum meruit basis the agent’s compensation to PhP4,500,000 only. However, properties of Urban Bank and individual petitioners have been garnished and levied upon in the amount of supposedly more than PhP85,399,350.
Applying the foregoing rules, petitioner-respondent bank is entitled to complete and full restitution of its levied properties, subject to the payment of the PhP4,500,000. Meanwhile, petitioners bank officers, all of whom have not been found individually or solidarily liable, are entitled to full restitution of all their properties levied upon and garnished, since they have been exonerated from corporate liability with respect to the bank’s agency relationship with Peña.
Considering the monetary award to Peña and the levy on and execution of some of its properties pending appeal, Urban Bank, now EIB, may satisfy the judgment in the main case and at the same time fully recover all the properties executed owing to the complete reversal of the trial court’s awarded damages. It must immediately and fully pay the judgment debt before the entire lot of levied properties, subject of the execution pending appeal, is restored to it.
Due to the complete reversal of the trial court’s award for damages, which was the basis of the Special Order and Writ of Execution allowing execution pending appeal, intervenor Unimega and other bidders who participated in the public auction sales are liable to completely restore to petitioner-respondent bank all of the properties sold and purchased therein. Although execution pending appeal is sanctioned under the rules and jurisprudence, when the executed decision is reversed, the premature execution is considered to have lost its legal bases. The situation necessarily requires equitable restitution to the party prejudiced thereby. As a matter of principle, courts are authorized at any time to order the return of property erroneously ordered to be delivered to one party, if the order is found to have been issued without jurisdiction.
As a purchaser of properties under an execution sale, with an appeal on the main case still pending, intervenor Unimega knew or was bound to know that its title to the properties, purchased in the premature public auction sale, was contingent on the outcome of the appeal and could possibly be reversed. Until the judgment on the main case on which the execution pending appeal hinges is rendered final and executory in favor of the prevailing judgment creditor, it is incumbent on the purchasers in the execution sale to preserve the levied properties. They shall be personally liable for their failure to do so, especially if the judgment is reversed, as in this case. In fact, if specific restitution becomes impracticable – such as when the properties pass on to innocent third parties – the losing party in the execution even becomes liable for the full value of the property at the time of its seizure, with interest. The Court has ruled:
When a judgment is executed pending appeal and subsequently overturned in the appellate court, the party who moved for immediate execution should, upon return of the case to the lower court, be required to make specific restitution of such property of the prevailing party as he or any person acting in his behalf may have acquired at the execution sale. If specific restitution becomes impracticable, the losing party in the execution becomes liable for the full value of the property at the time of its seizure, with interest.
While the trial court may have acted judiciously under the premises, its action resulted in grave injustice to the private respondents. It cannot be gainsaid that it is incumbent upon the plaintiffs in execution (Arandas) to return whatever they got by means of the judgment prior to its reversal. And if perchance some of the properties might have passed on to innocent third parties as happened in the case at bar, the Arandas are duty bound nonetheless to return the corresponding value of said properties as mandated by the Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the rights of intervenor Unimega to the 10 condominium units bought during the public auction sale under the Special Order are rendered nugatory by the reversal of the award of unconscionable damages by the trial court. It cannot claim to be an innocent third-party purchaser of the levied condominium units, since the execution sale was precisely made pending appeal. It cannot simply assume that whatever inaction or delay was incurred in the process of the appeal of the main Decision would
automatically render the remedy dilatory in character. Whatever rights were acquired by intervenor Unimega from the execution sale under the trial court’s Special Orders are conditional on the final outcome of the appeal in the main case. Unlike in auction sales arising from final and executory judgments, both the judgment creditor and the third parties who participate in auction sales pending appeal are deemed to knowingly assume and voluntarily accept the risks of a possible reversal of the decision in the main case by the appellate court.
Therefore, intervenor Unimega is required to restore the condominium units to Urban Bank. Although the intervenor has caused the annotation of the sale and levied on the titles to those units, the titles have remained under the name of the bank, owing to the supersedeas bond it had filed and the Court’s own orders that timely suspended the transfer of the titles and further execution pending appeal.
The obligation to restore the properties to petitioner-respondent bank is, however, without prejudice to the concurrent right of intervenor Unimega to the return of the PhP10,000,000 the latter paid for the condominium units, which Peña received as judgment creditor in satisfaction of the trial court’s earlier Decision. Consequently, intervenor’s earlier request for the issuance of a writ of possession over those units no longer has any leg to stand on. Not being entitled to a writ of possession under the present circumstances, Unimega’s ex parte petition is consequently denied.
Upon the reversal of the main Decision, the levied properties itself, subject of execution pending appeal must be returned to the judgment debtor, if those properties are still in the possession of the judgment creditor, plus compensation to the former for the deprivation and the use thereof. The obligation to return the property itself is likewise imposed on a third-party purchaser, like intervenor Unimega, in cases wherein it directly participated in the public auction sale, and the title to the executed property has not yet been transferred. The third-party purchaser shall, however, be entitled to reimbursement from the judgment creditor, with interest.
Considering the foregoing points, the Court adopts with modification the rules of restitution expounded by retired Justice Florenz D. Regalado in his seminal work on civil procedure, which the appellate court itself cited earlier. In cases in which restitution of the prematurely executed property is no longer possible, compensation shall be made in favor of the judgment debtor in the following manner:
a. If the purchaser at the public auction is the judgment creditor, he must pay the full value of the property at the time of its seizure, with interest.
b. If the purchaser at the public auction is a third party, andtitle to the property has already been validly and timely transferred to the name of that party, the judgment creditor must pay the amount realized from the sheriff’s sale of that property, with interest.
c. If the judgment award is reduced on appeal, the judgment creditor must return to the judgment debtor only the excess received over and above that to which the former is entitled under the final judgment, with interest.
In summary, Urban Bank is entitled to complete restoration and return of the properties levied on execution considering the absolute reversal of the award of damages, upon the payment of the judgment debt herein amounting to PhP4,500,000, with interest as indicated in the dispositive portion. With respect to individual petitioners, they are entitled to the absolute restitution of their executed properties, except when restitution has become impossible, in which case Peña shall be liable for the full value of the property at the time of its seizure, with interest. Whether Urban Bank and the bank officers and directors are entitled to any claim for damages against Peña and his indemnity bond is best ventilated before the trial court, as prescribed under the procedural rules on execution pending appeal.
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