"x x x.
Article 21 of E.O. 226 defines a tax credit as follows:
ARTICLE 21. “Tax credit” shall mean any of the credits against taxes and/or duties equal to those actually paid or would have been paid to evidence which a tax credit certificate shall be issued by the Secretary of Finance or his representative, or the Board, if so delegated by the Secretary of Finance. The tax credit certificates including those issued by the Board pursuant to laws repealed by this Code but without in any way diminishing the scope of negotiability under their laws of issue are transferable under such conditions as may be determined by the Board after consultation with the Department of Finance. The tax credit certificate shall be used to pay taxes, duties, charges and fees due to the National Government; Provided, That the tax credits issued under this Code shall not form part of the gross income of the grantee/transferee for income tax purposes under Section 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code and are therefore not taxable: Provided, further, That such tax credits shall be valid only for a period of ten (10) years from date of issuance.
Under Article 39 (j) of the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, tax credits are granted to entities registered with the Bureau of Investment (BOI) and are given for taxes and duties paid on raw materials used for the manufacture of their export products.
A TCC is defined under Section 1 of Revenue Regulation (RR) No. 5-2000, issued by the BIR on 15 August 2000, as follows:
B. Tax Credit Certificate — means a certification, duly issued to the taxpayer named therein, by the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative, reduced in a BIR Accountable Form in accordance with the prescribed formalities, acknowledging that the grantee-taxpayer named therein is legally entitled a tax credit, the money value of which may be used in payment or in satisfaction of any of his internal revenue tax liability (except those excluded), or may be converted as a cash refund, or may otherwise be disposed of in the manner and in accordance with the limitations, if any, as may be prescribed by the provisions of these Regulations.
RR 5-2000 prescribes the regulations governing the manner of issuance of TCCs and the conditions for their use, revalidation and transfer. Under the said regulation, a TCC may be used by the grantee or its assignee in the payment of its direct internal revenue tax liability. It may be transferred in favor of an assignee subject to the following conditions: 1) the TCC transfer must be with prior approval of the Commissioner or the duly authorized representative; 2) the transfer of a TCC should be limited to one transfer only; and 3) the transferee shall strictly use the TCC for the payment of the assignee’s direct internal revenue tax liability and shall not be convertible to cash. A TCC is valid only for 10 years subject to the following rules: (1) it must be utilized within five (5) years from the date of issue; and (2) it must be revalidated thereafter or be otherwise considered invalid.
The processing of a TCC is entrusted to a specialized agency called the “One-Stop-Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center” (“Center”), created on 07 February 1992 under Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 226. Its purpose is to expedite the processing and approval of tax credits and duty drawbacks. The Center is composed of a representative from the DOF as its chairperson; and the members thereof are representatives of the Bureau of Investment (BOI), Bureau of Customs (BOC) and Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), who are tasked to process the TCC and approve its application as payment of an assignee’s tax liability.
A TCC may be assigned through a Deed of Assignment, which the assignee submits to the Center for its approval. Upon approval of the deed, the Center will issue a DOF Tax Debit Memo (DOF-TDM), which will be utilized by the assignee to pay the latter’s tax liabilities for a specified period. Upon surrender of the TCC and the DOF-TDM, the corresponding Authority to Accept Payment of Excise Taxes (ATAPET) will be issued by the BIR Collection Program Division and will be submitted to the issuing office of the BIR for acceptance by the Assistant Commissioner of Collection Service. This act of the BIR signifies its acceptance of the TCC as payment of the assignee’s excise taxes.
Thus, it is apparent that a TCC undergoes a stringent process of verification by various specialized government agencies before it is accepted as payment of an assignee’s tax liability.
In the case at bar, the CIR disputes the ruling of the CTA En Banc, which found Petron to have had no participation in the fraudulent procurement and transfer of the TCCs. Petitioner believes that there was substantial evidence to support its allegation of a fraudulent transfer of the TCCs to Petron. The CIR further contends that respondent was not a qualified transferee of the TCCs, because the latter did not supply petroleum products to the companies that were the assignors of the subject TCCs.
The CIR bases its contentions on the DOF’s post-audit findings stating that, for the periods covering 1995 to 1998, Petron did not deliver fuel and other petroleum products to the companies (the transferor companies) that had assigned the subject TCCs to respondent. Petitioner further alleges that the findings indicate that the transferor companies could not have had such a high volume of export sales declared to the Center and made the basis for the issuance of the TCCs assigned to Petron. Thus, the CIR impugns the CTA En Banc ruling that respondent was a transferee in good faith and for value of the subject TCCs.
Not finding merit in the CIR’s contention, we affirm the ruling of the CTA En Banc finding that Petron is a transferee in good faith and for value of the subject TCCs.
From the records, we observe that the CIR had no allegation that there was a deviation from the process for the approval of the TCCs, which Petron used as payment to settle its excise tax liabilities for the years 1995 to 1998.
The CIR quotes the CTA Second Division and urges us to affirm the latter’s Decision, which found Petron to have participated in the fraudulent issuance and transfer of the TCCs. However, any merit in the position of petitioner on this issue is negated by the Joint Stipulation it entered into with Petron in the proceedings before the said Division. As correctly noted by the CTA En Banc, herein parties jointly stipulated before the Second Division in CTA Case No. 6423 as follows:
13. That petitioner (Petron) did not participate in the procurement and issuance of the TCCs, which TCCs were transferred to Petron and later utilized by Petron in payment of its excise taxes.
This stipulation of fact by the CIR amounts to an admission and, having been made by the parties in a stipulation of facts at pretrial, is treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof. The Court cannot lightly set it aside, especially when the opposing party relies upon it and accordingly dispenses with further proof of the fact already admitted. The exception provided in Rule 129, Section 4 is that an admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through a palpable mistake, or that no such admission was made. In this case, however, exception to the rule does not exist.
We agree with the pronouncement of the CTA En Banc that Petron has not been shown or proven to have participated in the alleged fraudulent acts involved in the transfer and utilization of the subject TCCs. Petron had the right to rely on the joint stipulation that absolved it from any participation in the alleged fraud pertaining to the issuance and procurement of the subject TCCs. The joint stipulation made by the parties consequently obviated the opportunity of the CIR to present evidence on this matter, as no proof is required for an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings. Thus, the CIR cannot now be allowed to change its stand and renege on that admission.
Moreover, a close examination of the arguments proffered by the CIR in their Petition calls for a reevaluation of the sufficiency of evidence in the case. The CIR seeks to persuade this Court to believe that there is substantial evidence to prove that Petron committed a misrepresentation, because the petroleum products were delivered not to the transferor but to other companies. Thus, the TCCs assigned by the transferor companies to Petron were fraudulent. Clearly, a recalibration of the sufficiency of evidence presented by the CIR is needed for a different conclusion to be reached.
The fundamental rule is that the scope of our judicial review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is confined only to errors of law and does not extend to questions of fact. It is basic that where it is the sufficiency of evidence that is being questioned, there is a question of fact. Evidently, the CIR does not point out any specific provision of law that was wrongly interpreted by the CTA En Banc in the latter’s assailed Decision. Petitioner anchors it contention on the alleged existence of the sufficiency of evidence it had proffered to prove that Petron was involved in the perpetration of fraud in the transfer and utilization of the subject TCCs, an allegation that the CTA En Banc failed to consider. We have consistently held that it is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. Such an exception does not obtain in the circumstances of this case.
The CIR claims that Petron was not an innocent transferee for value, because the TCCs assigned to respondent were void. Petitioner based its allegations on the post-audit report of the DOF, which declared that the subject TCCs were obtained through fraud and, thus, had no monetary value. The CIR adds that the TCCs were subject to a post-audit by the Center to complete the payment of the excise tax liability to which they were applied. Petitioner further contends that the Liability Clause of the TCCs makes the transferee or assignee solidarily liable with the original grantee for any fraudulent act pertinent to their procurement and transfer. The CIR assails the contrary ruling of the CTA En Banc, which confined the solidary liability only to the original grantee of the TCCs. Thus, petitioner believes that the correct interpretation of the Liability Clause in the TCCs makes Petron and the transferor companies or the original grantee solidarily liable for any fraudulent act or violation of the pertinent laws relating to the transfers of the TCCs. 
We are not persuaded by the CIR’s position on this matter.
The Liability Clause of the TCCs reads:
Both the TRANSFEROR and the TRANSFEREE shall be jointly and severally liable for any fraudulent act or violation of the pertinent laws, rules and regulations relating to the transfer of this TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE.
The scope of this solidary liability, as stated in the TCCs, was clarified by this Court in Shell, as follows:
The above clause to our mind clearly provides only for the solidary liability relative to the transfer of the TCCs from the original grantee to a transferee. There is nothing in the above clause that provides for the liability of the transferee in the event that the validity of the TCC issued to the original grantee by the Center is impugned or where the TCC is declared to have been fraudulently procured by the said original grantee. Thus, the solidary liability, if any, applies only to the sale of the TCC to the transferee by the original grantee. Any fraud or breach of law or rule relating to the issuance of the TCC by the Center to the transferor or the original grantee is the latter's responsibility and liability. The transferee in good faith and for value may not be unjustly prejudiced by the fraud committed by the claimant or transferor in the procurement or issuance of the TCC from the Center. It is not only unjust but well-nigh violative of the constitutional right not to be deprived of one's property without due process of law. Thus, a re-assessment of tax liabilities previously paid through TCCs by a transferee in good faith and for value is utterly confiscatory, more so when surcharges and interests are likewise assessed.
A transferee in good faith and for value of a TCC who has relied on the Center's representation of the genuineness and validity of the TCC transferred to it may not be legally required to pay again the tax covered by the TCC which has been belatedly declared null and void, that is, after the TCCs have been fully utilized through settlement of internal revenue tax liabilities. Conversely, when the transferee is party to the fraud as when it did not obtain the TCC for value or was a party to or has knowledge of its fraudulent issuance, said transferee is liable for the taxes and for the fraud committed as provided for by law. (Emphasis supplied.)
We also find that the post-audit report, on which the CIR based its allegations, does not have the effect of a suspensive condition that would determine the validity of the TCCs.
We held in Petron v. CIR (Petron), which is on all fours with the instant case, that TCCs are valid and effective from their issuance and are not subject to a post-audit as a suspensive condition for their validity. Our ruling in Petron finds guidance from our earlier ruling in Shell, which categorically states that a TCC is valid and effective upon its issuance and is not subject to a post-audit. The implication on the instant case of the said earlier ruling is that Petron has the right to rely on the validity and effectivity of the TCCs that were assigned to it. In finally determining their effectivity in the settlement of respondent’s excise tax liabilities, the validity of those TCCs should not depend on the results of the DOF’s post-audit findings. We held thus in Petron:
As correctly pointed out by Petron, however, the issue about the immediate validity of TCCs and the use thereof in payment of tax liabilities and duties are not matters of first impression for this Court. Taking into consideration the definition and nature of tax credits and TCCs, this Court's Second Division definitively ruled in the aforesaid Pilipinas Shell case that the post audit is not a suspensive condition for the validity of TCCs, thus:
Art. 1181 tells us that the condition is suspensive when the acquisition of rights or demandability of the obligation must await the occurrence of the condition. However, Art. 1181 does not apply to the present case since the parties did NOT agree to a suspensive condition. Rather, specific laws, rules, and regulations govern the subject TCCs, not the general provisions of the Civil Code. Among the applicable laws that cover the TCCs are EO 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code, Letter of Instructions No. 1355, EO 765, RP-US Military Agreement, Sec. 106 (c) of the Tariff and Customs Code, Sec. 106 of the NIRC, BIR Revenue Regulations (RRs), and others. Nowhere in the aforementioned laws does the post-audit become necessary for the validity or effectivity of the TCCs. Nowhere in the aforementioned laws is it provided that a TCC is issued subject to a suspensive condition.
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. . . (T)he TCCs are immediately valid and effective after their issuance. As aptly pointed out in the dissent of Justice Lovell Bautista in CTA EB No. 64, this is clear from the Guidelines and instructions found at the back of each TCC, which provide:
1. This Tax Credit Certificate (TCC) shall entitle the grantee to apply the tax credit against taxes and duties until the amount is fully utilized, in accordance with the pertinent tax and customs laws, rules and regulations.
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4. To acknowledge application of payment, the One-Stop-Shop Tax Credit Center shall issue the corresponding Tax Debit Memo (TDM) to the grantee.
The authorized Revenue Officer/Customs Collector to which payment/utilization was made shall accomplish the Application of Tax Credit at the back of the certificate and affix his signature on the column provided."
The foregoing guidelines cannot be clearer on the validity and effectivity of the TCC to pay or settle tax liabilities of the grantee or transferee, as they do not make the effectivity and validity of the TCC dependent on the outcome of a post-audit. In fact, if we are to sustain the appellate tax court, it would be absurd to make the effectivity of the payment of a TCC dependent on a post-audit since there is no contemplation of the situation wherein there is no post-audit. Does the payment made become effective if no post-audit is conducted? Or does the so-called suspensive condition still apply as no law, rule, or regulation specifies a period when a post-audit should or could be conducted with a prescriptive period? Clearly, a tax payment through a TCC cannot be both effective when made and dependent on a future event for its effectivity. Our system of laws and procedures abhors ambiguity.
Moreover, if the TCCs are considered to be subject to post-audit as a suspensive condition, the very purpose of the TCC would be defeated as there would be no guarantee that the TCC would be honored by the government as payment for taxes. No investor would take the risk of utilizing TCCs if these were subject to a post-audit that may invalidate them, without prescribed grounds or limits as to the exercise of said post-audit.
The inescapable conclusion is that the TCCs are not subject to post-audit as a suspensive condition, and are thus valid and effective from their issuance.
In addition, Shell and Petron recognized an exception that holds the transferee/assignee liable if proven to have been a party to the fraud or to have had knowledge of the fraudulent issuance of the subject TCCs. As earlier mentioned, the parties entered into a joint stipulation of facts stating that Petron did not participate in the procurement or issuance of those TCCs. Thus, we affirm the CTA En Banc’s ruling that respondent was an innocent transferee for value thereof.
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