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Third issue: Grant of the privilege of the writ ofamparo
A. Alleged violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada
Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires the parties to establish their claims by substantial evidence,[75] or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[76] The use of this evidentiary threshold reveals the clear intent of the framers of the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing amparo situations.[77]
In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already ceased, it is necessary for the petitioner in an amparo action to prove the existence of a continuing threat.[78] Thus, this Court held in its Resolution in Razon v. Tagitis:[79]
Manalo is different from Tagitis in terms of their factual settings, as enforced disappearance was no longer a problem in that case. The enforced disappearance of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo effectively ended when they escaped from captivity and surfaced, while Tagitis is still nowhere to be found and remains missing more than two years after his reported disappearance. An Amparo situation subsisted in Manalo, however, because of the continuing threat to the brothers’ right to security; the brothers claimed that since the persons responsible for their enforced disappearance were still at large and had not been held accountable, the former were still under the threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which threat constituted a direct violation of their right to security of person.[80] (Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioners failed to meet the threshold of substantial evidence. Sifting through all the evidence and allegations presented, the crux of the case boils down to assessing the veracity and credibility of the parties’ diverging claims as to what actually transpired on 5-6 February 2008. In this regard, this Court is in agreement with the factual findings of the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally deprived of his liberty from the point when he disembarked from the aircraft up to the time he was led to the departure area of the airport,[81] as he voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of respondents:
[Lozada] was one of the first few passengers to get off the plane because he was instructed by Secretary Atienza, th[r]ough a phone call on the night of 04 February 2008, while he was still in Hong Kong, to proceed directly to the Bureau of Immigration so that few people would notice him and he could be facilitated in going out of the airport without any hassle from the people of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms. Again, [Lozada] stated that he wanted to get away from the Senate people. [Lozada] even went to the men’s room of the airport, after he was allegedly “grabbed”, where he made a call to his brother Arturo, using his Globe phone, and he was not prevented from making said call, and was simply advised by the person who met him at the tube to (sic) “sir, bilisan mo na”. When they proceeded out of the tube and while walking, [Lozada] heard from the radio track down, “wag kayo dyan, sir, nandyan yong mga taga Senado”, so they took a detour and went up to the departure area, did not go out of the normal arrival area, and proceeded towards the elevator near the Duty Free Shop and then down towards the tarmac. Since [Lozada] was avoiding the people from the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, said detour appears to explain why they did not get out at the arrival area, where [Lozada] could have passed through immigration so that his passport could be properly stamped.
This Court does not find any evidence on record that [Lozada] struggled or made an outcry for help when he was allegedly “grabbed” or “abducted” at the airport. [Lozada] even testified that nobody held him, and they were not hostile to him nor shouted at him. With noon day clarity, this Court finds that the reason why [Lozada] was fetched at the airport was to help him avoid the Senate contingent, who would arrest and detain him at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, until such time that he would appear and give his testimony, pursuant to the Order of the Senate on the NBN-ZTE Project. [Lozada] clearly knew this because at that time, it was still his decision not to testify before the Senate. He agreed with that plan.[82] (Emphases supplied.)
The foregoing statements show that Lozada personally sought the help of Sec. Atienza to avoid the Senate personnel, and thus knew that the men who met him at the airport were there to aid him in such objective. Surely, the actions of Lozada evinced knowledge and voluntariness, uncharacteristic of someone who claims to have been forcibly abducted.
However, these men’s subsequent acts of directing Lozada to board the vehicle and driving him around, without disclosing the exact purpose thereof, appear to be beyond what he had consented to and requested from Sec. Atienza. These men neither informed him of where he was being transported nor provided him complete liberty to contact his family members to assure them of his safety. These acts demonstrated that he lacked absolute control over the situation, as well as an effective capacity to challenge their instructions.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained, so much so that his right to liberty and security had been violated, the acts that manifested this restraint had already ceased and has consequently rendered the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo moot. Whether or not Lozada was deprived of his liberty from the point when he was led inside the vehicle waiting for him at the airport up to the time he was taken to La Salle Green Hills, petitioners’ assertions that Lozada and his family continue to suffer various threats from respondents remain unproven. The CA correctly found as follows:
The supposed announcement of General Razon over the radio that [Lozada] was in the custody of the PNP can neither be construed as a threat to [Lozada’s] life, liberty and security. Certainly, no person in his right mind would make that kind of media announcement if his intent was indeed to threaten somebody’s life, liberty and security.
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He claims that he is threatened by the alleged presence of armed men riding in motorcycle passing outside the De La Salle premises where he and his family are staying and by alleged threats of armed men around him at places where he went to. Again, these alleged threats were not proven by any evidence at all, as having originated from any of the respondents.
[Lozada] also considers the installation of the surveillance camera at the De La Salle and at St. Scholastica as indirect threat to his right to life, liberty and security. He claims that these are spy cameras. However, save for [Lozada’s] self-serving claim, he simply failed to prove that they were installed or ordered installed by the respondentsfor the purpose of threatening his right to life, liberty and security.
[Lozada] further maintains that there is an alleged trend, i.e., wherever he goes, there is a bomb threat. There were bomb threats in the places where he went to like in [the Polytechnic University of the Philippines], Dagupan, Cebu and Bohol. However, [Lozada] himself testified that he did not try to ascertain where the bomb threats emanated. Plainly, there is no evidence on record that the bomb threats were made by the respondents or done upon their instigation.
Moreover, [Lozada] views the pronouncement of the Secretary of Justice that he was put on the watch list of the Bureau of Immigration as a threat to his life, liberty and security. This alleged threat is again unsupported by evidence, as in fact, [Lozada] testified that he did not ascertain from the Bureau of Immigration whether his name was actually in the official watch list of the Bureau. At any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not one of the respondents in the amparo petition, and there is no showing in the record that it was the respondents who ordered the same for the purpose of threatening him.
[Lozada] harps on the filing of alleged frivolous cases against him and his familyas threat to his life, liberty and security. xxx However, [Lozada] himself testified that he does not know whether the respondents or any of the respondents ordered the filing of these cases against him. In any event, said purported cases are to be determined based on their own merits and are clearly beyond the realm of the instant amparopetition filed against the respondents.[83] (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, petitioners insist that while they were able to sufficiently establish their case by the required evidentiary standard, respondents failed to discharge their burden to prove their defenses by substantial evidence and to show that respondents exercised extraordinary diligence as required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.[84] This Court has squarely passed upon this contention in Yano v. Sanchez,[85] to wit:
The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence.
Thus, in amparo actions, petitioners must establish their claims by substantial evidence, and they cannot merely rely on the supposed failure of respondents to prove either their defenses or their exercise of extraordinary diligence. In this case, the totality of the evidence presented by petitioners fails to meet the requisite evidentiary threshold, and the privilege of the writ of amparo has already been rendered moot and academic by the cessation of the restraint to Lozada’s liberty.
B. Propriety of the privilege of the writ ofamparo and its interim reliefs
As previously discussed, there is no basis to grant Lozada the privilege of the writ ofamparo, considering that the illegal restraint alleged in this case had already ceased and there is no imminent or continuing restriction on his liberty. In Castillo v. Cruz,[86] this Court held as follows:
Although respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified. (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, it appears that Lozada had already filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ) a Complaint charging respondents with kidnapping and attempted murder, docketed as I.S. No. 2008-467.[87] In this regard, this Court’s ruling in Rubrico v. Arroyo[88] is worth considering:
First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary detention rooted in the same acts and incidents leading to the filing of the subjectamparo petition has been instituted with the OMB, docketed as OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of a prima facie case against the five (5) impleaded individuals suspected to be actually involved in the detention of Lourdes have been set in motion. It must be pointed out, though, that the filing of the OMB complaint came before the effectivity of the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007.
Second, Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action have, in the meanwhile, been commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action where the AmparoRule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule. Under the terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at the outset. But as things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by force of that section is no longer technically feasible in light of the interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the Court has, pursuant to Sec. 6 of the Rule, already issued ex parte the writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has dismissed the petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as respondents only those believed to be the actual abductors of Lourdes, while the instant petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked to investigate the kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts and/or omissions subject of the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so linked as to call for the consolidation of both proceedings to obviate the mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.
Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ ofamparo as an inexpensive and effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly address the situation obtaining under the premises. Towards this end, two things are at once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that body in its own investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases is to be fully effective. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, if the Complaint filed before the DOJ had already progressed into a criminal case, then the latter action can more adequately dispose of the allegations made by petitioners. After all, one of the ultimate objectives of the writ of amparo as a curative remedy is to facilitate the subsequent punishment of perpetrators.[89] On the other hand, if there is no actual criminal case lodged before the courts, then the denial of the Petition is without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate administrative, civil or criminal case, if applicable, against those individuals whom Lozada deems to have unduly restrained his liberty.
Finally, with respect to the interim reliefs sought by petitioners, this Court, in Yano v. Sanchez,[90] declined to grant the prayer for the issuance of a TPO, as well as Inspection and Production Orders, upon a finding that the implicated public officials were not accountable for the disappearance subject of that case. Analogously, it would be incongruous to grant herein petitioners’ prayer for a TPO and Inspection and Production Orders and at the same time rule that there no longer exists any imminent or continuing threat to Lozada’s right to life, liberty and security. Thus, there is no basis on which a prayer for the issuance of these interim reliefs can be anchored.
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