"x x x.
The three principles of public bidding are: (1) the offer to the public; (2) an opportunity for competition; and (3) a basis for the exact comparison of bids.[41] By its very nature, public bidding aims to protect public interest by giving the public the best possible advantages through open competition.[42]Competition requires not only bidding upon a common standard, a common basis, upon the same thing, the same subject matter, and the same undertaking, but also that it be legitimate, fair and honest and not designed to injure or defraud the government.[43] The essence of competition in public bidding is that the bidders are placed on equal footing which means that all qualified bidders have an equal chance of winning the auction through their bids.[44] Another self-evident purpose of public bidding is to avoid or preclude suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the execution of public contracts.[45]
A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending certain provisions of the contract bidded upon. However, such changes must not constitute substantial or material amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the contract and would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same terms.[46] The determination of whether or not a modification or amendment of a contract bidded out constitutes a substantial amendment rests on whether the contract, when taken as a whole, would contain substantially different terms and conditions that would have the effect of altering the technical and/or financial proposals previously submitted by the other bidders. The modifications in the contract executed between the government and the winning bidder must be such as to render the executed contract to be an entirely different contract from the one bidded upon.[47]
Public bidding aims to secure for the government the lowest possible price under the most favorable terms and conditions, to curtail favoritism in the award of government contracts and avoid suspicion of anomalies, and it places all bidders in equal footing. Any government action which permits any substantial variance between the conditions under which the bids are invited and the contract executed after the award thereof is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which warrants proper judicial action.[48] If this flawed process would be allowed, public bidding will cease to be competitive, and worse, government would not be favored with the best bid. Bidders will no longer bid on the basis of the prescribed terms and conditions in the bid documents but will formulate their bid in anticipation of the execution of a future contract containing new and better terms and conditions that were not previously available at the time of the bidding. Such a public bidding will not inure to the public good.[49]
In Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) v. Pozzolanic Philippines Incorporated,[50] the Court nullified the right of first refusal granted to respondent therein in the Batangas Contract for being contrary to public policy. The Court explained that the same violated the requirement of competitive public bidding in the government contract, because the grant of the right of first refusal did not only substantially amend the terms of the contract bidded upon so that resultantly the other bidders thereto were deprived of the terms and opportunities granted to respondent therein after it won the public auction, but also altered the bid terms by effectively barring any and all true bidding in the future.[51]
Also in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., (PIATCO),[52] this Court declared as null and void, for being contrary to public policy, the Concession Agreement entered into by the government with PIATCO, because it contained provisions that substantially departed from the Draft Concession Agreement included in the bid documents. The Court considered the subject contracts a mockery of the bidding process, because they were substantially amended after their award to the successful bidder on terms more beneficial to PIATCO and prejudicial to public interest.[53]
The same conclusions cannot be applied in the present case.
One. Smartmatic-TIM was not granted additional right that was not previously available to the other bidders. Admittedly, the AES contract was awarded to Smartmatic-TIM after compliance with all the requirements of a competitive public bidding. The RFP, Bid Bulletins and the AES contract identified the contract as one of lease with option to purchase. The AES contract is primarily a contract of lease of goods[54] listed in the contract and purchase of services[55] also stated in the contract. Section 4.3 thereof gives the Comelec the OTP the goods agreed upon. The same provision states the conditions in exercising the option, including the additional amount that the Comelec is required to pay should it exercise such right. It is, therefore, undisputed that this grant of option is recognized by both parties and is already a part of the principal contract of lease. Having been included in the RFP and the bid bulletins, this right given to the Comelec to exercise the option was known to all the bidders and was considered in preparing their bids. The bidders were apprised that aside from the lease of goods and purchase of services, their proposals should include an OTP the subject goods. Although the AES contract was amended after the award of the contract to Smartmatic-TIM, the amendment only pertains to the period within which the Comelec could exercise the option because of its failure to exercise the same prior to the deadline originally agreed upon by the parties. Unlike in PSALM, wherein the winning bidder was given the right of first refusal which substantially amended the terms of the contract bidded upon, thereby depriving the other bidders of the terms and opportunities granted to winning bidder after it won the public auction; and in Agan, Jr., wherein the Concession Agreement entered into by the government with PIATCO contained provisions that substantially departed from the draft Concession Agreement included in the bid documents; the option contract in this case was already a part of the original contract and not given only after Smartmatic-TIM emerged as winner. The OTP was actually a requirement by the Comelec when the contract of lease was bidded upon. To be sure, the Extension Agreement does not contain a provision favorable to Smartmatic-TIM not previously made available to the other bidders.
Two. The amendment of the AES contract is not substantial. The approved budget for the contract was P11,223,618,400.00[56] charged against the supplemental appropriations for election modernization. Bids were, therefore, accepted provided that they did not exceed said amount. After the competitive public bidding, Smartmatic-TIM emerged as winner and the AES contract was thereafter executed. As repeatedly stated above, the AES contract is a contract of lease with OTP giving the Comelec the right to purchase the goods agreed upon if it decides to do so. The AES contract not only indicated the contract price for the lease of goods and purchase of services which is P7,191,484,739.48, but also stated the additional amount that the Comelec has to pay if it decides to exercise the option which is P2,130,635,048.15. Except for the period within which the Comelec could exercise the OTP, the terms and conditions for such exercise are maintained and respected. Admittedly, the additional amount the Comelec needed to pay was maintained (less the amount already paid when it purchased 920 units of PCOS machines with corresponding CCS for the special elections in certain areas in the provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Bulacan) subject to the warranties originally agreed upon in the AES contract. The contract amount not only included that for the contract of lease but also for the OTP. Hence, the competitive public bidding conducted for the AES contract was sufficient. A new public bidding would be a superfluity.
The Solicitor General himself clarified during the oral arguments that the purchase price of the remaining PCOS machines stated in the assailed Deed of Sale was the price stated in Article 4.3 of the AES contract. Therefore, the said amount was already part of the original amount bidded upon in 2009 for the AES contract which negates the need for another competitive bidding.[57]
Third. More importantly, the amendment of the AES contract is more advantageous to the Comelec and the public.
The nature of an option contract was thoroughly explained in Eulogio v. Apeles,[58] to wit:
An option is a contract by which the owner of the property agrees with another person that the latter shall have the right to buy the former's property at a fixed price within a certain time. It is a condition offered or contract by which the owner stipulates with another that the latter shall have the right to buy the property at a fixed price within a certain time, or under, or in compliance with certain terms and conditions; or which gives to the owner of the property the right to sell or demand a sale. An option is not of itself a purchase, but merely secures the privilege to buy. It is not a sale of property but a sale of the right to purchase. It is simply a contract by which the owner of the property agrees with another person that he shall have the right to buy his property at a fixed price within a certain time. He does not sell his land; he does not then agree to sell it; but he does sell something, i.e., the right or privilege to buy at the election or option of the other party. Its distinguishing characteristic is that it imposes no binding obligation on the person holding the option, aside from the consideration for the offer.[59]
Also in Carceller v. Court of Appeals,[60] the Court described an option in this wise:
An option is a preparatory contract in which one party grants to the other, for a fixed period and under specified conditions, the power to decide, whether or not to enter into a principal contract. It binds the party who has given the option, not to enter into the principal contract with any other person during the period designated and, within that period, to enter into such contract with the one to whom the option was granted, if the latter should decide to use the option. It is a separate agreement distinct from the contract which the parties may enter into upon the consummation of the option.[61]
In Adelfa Properties, Inc. v. CA,[62] the Court described an option as:
An option, as used in the law on sales, is a continuing offer or contract by which the owner stipulates with another that the latter shall have the right to buy the property at a fixed price within a certain time, or under, or in compliance with, certain terms and conditions, or which gives to the owner of the property the right to sell or demand a sale. It is sometimes called an “unaccepted offer.” x x x[63]
From the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, an option is only a preparatory contract and a continuing offer to enter into a principal contract. Under the set-up, the owner of the property, which is Smartmatic-TIM, gives the optionee, which is the Comelec, the right to accept the former’s offer to purchase the goods listed in the contract for a specified amount, and within a specified period. Thus, the Comelec is given the right to decide whether or not it wants to purchase the subject goods. It is, therefore, uncertain whether or not the principal contract would be entered into. The owner of the property would then have to wait for the optionee to make a decision. A longer option period would mean that more time would be given to the optionee to consider circumstances affecting its decision whether to purchase the goods or not. On the part of Smartmatic-TIM, it would have to wait for a longer period to determine whether the subject goods will be sold to the Comelec or not, instead of freely selling or leasing them to other persons or governments possibly at a higher price. This is especially true in this case as the terms and conditions for the exercise of the option including the purchase price, had been included in the AES contract previously bidded upon. The parties are bound to observe the limitations embodied therein, otherwise, a new public bidding would be needed.
We agree with respondents that the exercise of the option is more advantageous to the Comelec, because the P7,191,484,739.48 rentals paid for the lease of goods and purchase of services under the AES contract was considered part of the purchase price. For the Comelec to own the subject goods, it was required to pay only P2,130,635,048.15. If the Comelec did not exercise the option, the rentals already paid would just be one of the government expenses for the past election and would be of no use to future elections. Assuming that the exercise of the option is nullified, the Comelec would again conduct another public bidding for the AES for the 2013 elections with its available budget of P7 billion. Considering that the said amount is the available fund for the whole election process, the amount for the purchase or lease of new AES will definitely be less than P7 billion. Moreover, it is possible that Smartmatic-TIM would again participate in the public bidding and could win at a possibly higher price. The Comelec might end up acquiring the same PCOS machines but now at a higher price.
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