Petitioner is a regular employee
On a procedural matter, petitioner Aliling
argues that WWWEC, not having appealed from the judgment of CA which declared
Aliling as a regular employee from the time he signed the employment contract,
is now precluded from questioning the appellate court’s determination as to the
nature of his employment.
Petitioner errs. The Court has, when a case is on appeal, the
authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error if
their consideration is necessary in reaching a just conclusion of the
case. We said as much in Sociedad Europea de Financiacion, SA v.
Court of Appeals,[27] “It
is axiomatic that an appeal, once accepted by this Court, throws the entire
case open to review, and that this Court has the authority to review matters
not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.”
The issue of whether or not petitioner
was, during the period material, a probationary or regular employee is of pivotal
import. Its resolution is doubtless necessary at arriving at a fair and just
disposition of the controversy.
The Labor Arbiter cryptically held in
his decision dated April 25, 2006 that:
Be that as it may, there appears no showing
that indeed the said September 20, 2004 Memorandum addressed to complainant was
received by him. Moreover, complainant’s tasked where he was assigned was a new
developed service. In this regard, it is noted:
“Due process dictates that an employee be
apprised beforehand of the conditions of his employment and of the terms of
advancement therein. Precisely, implicit in Article 281 of the Labor Code is
the requirement that reasonable standards be previously made known by the
employer to the employee at the time of his engagement (Ibid, citing Sameer
Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 132564, October 20, 1999).[28]
From our review, it appears that the labor
arbiter, and later the NLRC, considered Aliling a probationary employee despite
finding that he was not informed of the reasonable standards by which his probationary
employment was to be judged.
The CA, on the other hand, citing Cielo v. National Labor Relations Commission,[29] ruled that petitioner was a regular
employee from the outset inasmuch as he was not informed of the standards by
which his probationary employment would be measured. The CA wrote:
Petitioner was regularized from the time of
the execution of the employment contract on June 11, 2004, although respondent
company had arbitrarily shortened his tenure. As pointed out, respondent company did not make known the
reasonable standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the
time of his engagement. Hence, he was
deemed to have been hired from day one as a regular employee.[30]
(Emphasis supplied.)
WWWEC, however, excepts on the argument
that it put Aliling on notice that he would be evaluated on the 3rd
and 5th months of his probationary employment. To WWWEC, its efforts
translate to sufficient compliance with the requirement that a probationary
worker be apprised of the reasonable standards for his regularization. WWWEC invokes
the ensuing holding in Alcira v. National
Labor Relations Commission[31] to
support its case:
Conversely, an employer is deemed to
substantially comply with the rule on notification of standards if he apprises
the employee that he will be subjected to a performance evaluation on a
particular date after his hiring. We agree with the labor arbiter when he ruled
that:
In the instant case, petitioner cannot
successfully say that he was never informed by private respondent of the
standards that he must satisfy in order to be converted into regular status. This rans (sic) counter to the agreement between
the parties that after five months of service the petitioner’s performance
would be evaluated. It is only but natural that the evaluation should be
made vis-à-vis the performance standards for the job. Private respondent
Trifona Mamaradlo speaks of such standard in her affidavit referring to the
fact that petitioner did not perform well in his assigned work and his attitude
was below par compared to the company’s standard required of him. (Emphasis
supplied.)
WWWEC’s contention is untenable.
Alcira
is cast under a different factual setting. There, the labor arbiter, the NLRC, the CA, and
even finally this Court were one in their findings that the employee concerned
knew, having been duly informed during his engagement, of the standards for
becoming a regular employee. This is in stark contrast to the instant case
where the element of being informed of the regularizing standards does not
obtain. As such, Alcira cannot be
made to apply to the instant case.
To note, the June 2, 2004 letter-offer
itself states that the regularization standards or the performance norms to be used
are still to be agreed upon by Aliling
and his supervisor. WWWEC has failed to prove that an agreement as regards
thereto has been reached. Clearly then, there were actually no performance standards
to speak of. And lest it be overlooked, Aliling was assigned to GX trucking
sales, an activity entirely different to the Seafreight Sales he was originally
hired and trained for. Thus, at the time of his engagement, the standards relative
to his assignment with GX sales could not have plausibly been communicated to
him as he was under Seafreight Sales. Even for this reason alone, the
conclusion reached in Alcira is of
little relevant to the instant case.
Based on the facts established in
this case in light of extant jurisprudence, the CA’s holding as to the kind of
employment petitioner enjoyed is correct. So was the NLRC ruling, affirmatory
of that of the labor arbiter. In the final analysis, one common thread runs
through the holding of the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the CA, i.e., petitioner
Aliling, albeit hired from management’s standpoint as a probationary employee,
was deemed a regular employee by force of the following self-explanatory
provisions:
Article 281 of the Labor Code
ART. 281. Probationary
employment. - Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from
the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an
apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an
employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a
just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the
employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is
allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular
employee. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule VIII-A of the
Labor Code
Sec. 6. Probationary
employment. – There is probationary employment where the employee, upon his
engagement, is made to undergo a trial period where the employee determines his
fitness to qualify for regular employment, based on reasonable standards made
known to him at the time of engagement.
Probationary employment shall be governed by
the following rules:
x x x x
(d)
In all cases of probationary
employment, the employer shall make
known to the employee the standards
under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his
engagement. Where no standards are made
known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee. (Emphasis supplied.)
To repeat, the labor arbiter, NLRC
and the CA are agreed, on the basis of documentary evidence adduced, that respondent
WWWEC did not inform petitioner Aliling of the reasonable standards by which
his probation would be measured against at the time of his engagement. The
Court is loathed to interfere with this factual determination. As We have held:
Settled
is the rule that the findings of the Labor Arbiter, when affirmed by the NLRC
and the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court, unless patently
erroneous. It is not the
function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
already considered in the proceedings below. The jurisdiction of this Court in
a petition for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing only errors of law,
not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not
supported by evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts.[32]
The more recent Peñafrancia Tours and Travel Transport, Inc., v. Sarmiento[33] has
reaffirmed the above ruling, to wit:
Finally, the CA affirmed the ruling of the
NLRC and adopted as its own the latter's factual findings. Long-established is
the doctrine that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies x x x are accorded
respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. When passed upon
and upheld by the CA, they are binding and conclusive upon this Court and will
not normally be disturbed. Though
this doctrine is not without exceptions, the Court finds that none are
applicable to the present case.
WWWEC also cannot validly argue that
“the factual findings being assailed are
not supported by evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts.” Its very own letter-offer of employment argues
against its above posture. Excerpts of the letter-offer:
Additionally, upon the effectivity of your
probation, you and your immediate
superior are required to jointly define your objectives compared with the job
requirements of the position. Based on the pre-agreed objectives, your
performance shall be reviewed on the 3rd month to assess your competence and
work attitude. The 5th month Performance Appraisal shall be the basis in
elevating or confirming your employment status from Probationary to Regular.
Failure to meet the job requirements during
the probation stage means that your services may be terminated without prior
notice and without recourse to separation pay. (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents further allege that San Mateo’s email dated
July 16, 2004 shows that the standards for his regularization were made known
to petitioner Aliling at the time of his engagement. To recall, in that email
message, San Mateo
reminded Aliling of the sales quota he ought to meet as a condition for his
continued employment, i.e., that the GX trucks should already be 80% full by
August 5, 2004. Contrary to respondents’ contention, San Mateo’s email cannot support their allegation
on Aliling being informed of the standards for his continued employment, such
as the sales quota, at the time of his
engagement. As it were, the email message was sent to Aliling more than a
month after he signed his employment contract with WWWEC. The aforequoted
Section 6 of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule VIII-A of the Code
specifically requires the employer to inform the probationary employee of such
reasonable standards at the time of his
engagement, not at any time later; else, the latter shall be considered a
regular employee. Thus, pursuant to the explicit provision of Article 281 of
the Labor Code, Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule VIII-A
of the Labor Code and settled jurisprudence, petitioner Aliling is deemed a
regular employee as of June 11, 2004, the date of his employment contract.
x x x."
See:
ARMANDO ALILING,
Petitioner,
-
versus -
JOSE B. FELICIANO, MANUEL BERSAMIN,
JJ.
F. SAN MATEO III, JOSEPH R.
LARIOSA, and WIDE WIDE Promulgated:
WORLD EXPRESS CORPORATION,
Respondents.
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G.R. No. 185829
Present:
VELASCO,
JR., J., Chairperson
PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE,
JJ.
Promulgated:
April
25, 2012
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