Tuesday, February 5, 2013

Of Padre Damaso and other things | Inquirer Opinion

see -  Of Padre Damaso and other things | Inquirer Opinion


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The Celdran Case. Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code punishes “anyone who, in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.”
There are two elements in the offense: (1) That the act or acts complained of are performed in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony; and (2) that the act or acts must be notoriously offensive to the feelings of believers.
When you strip the provision of its religious element, what you have is something similar to the offenses of violation of domicile (Article 128) or interruption of a meeting (Article 131). Both of these two offenses can also result in offended feelings, but feelings are not factored into these offenses. However, 128 and 131 can be violated only by public officers.
What has attracted attention to Article 133 is the religious element in the offense. Essentially, what is punished in Article 133 is speech, whether oral or symbolic, which offends the feelings of others because of its religious content or surrounding circumstance.
Hence, an important question that must be asked is whether Article 133 violates freedom of expression and free exercise or nonestablishment of religion, especially since the crime is listed among crimes against the fundamental law. Freedom of speech is violated when speech is restrained or punished even if the speech does not present a clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the state has the right to prevent.  Free exercise of religion is violated when a person is prevented from or punished for externalizing his religious belief or is forced to do something contrary to his religious belief. Nonestablishment of religion is violated when the state shows preference for one religion over others or prefers religion to no religion.
Carlos Celdran is being ordered punished for offending the feelings of others by speaking, orally or symbolically, against religious values dearly held by others. In other words, he is being punished for religious speech. I thought that this kind of offense already disappeared after the events of 1902.
What about his disturbance of a religious gathering? If Celdran were a public officer, which he is not, you might hold him under Article 131 as a  disturber of a peaceful meeting, an offense that is religion-free. Perhaps it is enough that Celdran is already apologetic.
Incidentally, the penal codes of, at least, California and New York, have provisions similar to our Article 133. But not everything American is worth imitating!
Finally, Article 133 also raises an intriguing question: When a priest or bishop castigates or consigns to the netherworld those who oppose the Reproductive Health Law in a sermon before a captive audience of churchgoers, should he be penalized by the State or canonically censured for offending religious feelings? After all, defenders of the RH Law also have feelings! What is good for the gander should also be good for the goose.
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