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People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154954 , February 1, 2012. [ARTEMIO VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; CONSOLIDATED WITH: G.R. No. 154954; G.R. No. 155101; G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, February 1, 2012].


“x x x.

The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.

As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, a verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.

This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial; or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.

The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused. We have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.

The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa in finding that the four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of "the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required. The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced.

On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused "were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa. It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officers findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the "multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered from the initiation rites. Considering that the CA found that the "physical punishment heaped on Lenny Villa was serious in nature, it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.

Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the Petition.

X x x.”