EN BANC
[G.R. No. 103567. December 4, 1995.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO SALLE, JR. Y GERCILLA @ "KA NOMOT," RICKY MENGOTE Y CUNTADO @ "KA RICKY/KA LIZA/KA JUN," and TEN JOHN DOES, Accused. FRANCISCO SALLE, JR., Y GERCILLA and RICKY MENGOTE Y CUNTADO, Accused-Appellants.
"x x x.
The reason the Constitutional Commission adopted the "conviction by final judgment" requirement, reviving in effect the original provision of the 1973 Constitution on the pardoning power, was, as expounded by Commissioner Napoleon Rama, to prevent the President from exercising executive power in derogation of the judicial power. 15
Indeed, an appeal brings the entire case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the appellate court. A becoming regard for the doctrine of separation of powers demands that such exclusive authority of the appellate court be fully respected and kept unimpaired. For truly, had not the present Constitution adopted the "conviction by final judgment" limitation, the President could, at any time, and even without the knowledge of the court, extend executive clemency to anyone whom he, in good faith or otherwise, believes to merit presidential mercy. It cannot be denied that under the Jones Law and the 1981 amendment to the 1973 Constitution on the pardoning power which did not require conviction, the President had unimpeded power to grant pardon even before the criminal case could be heard. And under the 1935 Constitution which required "conviction" only, the power could be exercised at any time after conviction and regardless of the pendency of the appeal. In either case, there could be the risk not only of a failure of justice but also of a frustration of the system of administration of justice in view of the derogation of the jurisdiction of the trial or appellate court. Where the President is not so prevented by the Constitution, not even Congress can impose any restriction to prevent a presidential folly. 16 Hence, nothing but a change in the constitutional provision consisting in the imposition of "conviction by final judgment" requirement can change the rule. The new Constitution did it.
Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal, i.e., the appealed conviction must first be brought to finality.
Accordingly, while this Court, in its resolution of 21 March 1991 in People v. Pedro Sepada, 17 dismissed the appeal for having become moot and academic in view of the parole granted to the appellant, it explicitly declared the necessity of a final judgment before parole or pardon could be extended. Thus:
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the COURT RESOLVED to DISMISS the appeal for having become moot and academic. To avoid any possible conflict with the judicial determination of pending appeals, the Court further DIRECTED the Board of Pardons and Parole to adopt a system which enables it to ascertain whether a sentence has become final and executory and has, in fact, been executed before acting on any application for parole or pardon. The Court Administrator shall coordinate with the Department of Justice on how this may be best achieved. (Emphasis supplied).
Recently, in its resolution of 31 January 1995 in People v. Hinlo, 18 this Court categorically declared to be "in clear violation of the law" the "practice of processing applications for pardon or parole despite pending appeals." This Court resolved therein as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, in order to put a stop to the practice of processing applications for pardon and parole despite pending appeals which is in clear violation of the law, the Court Resolved to:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) REQUIRE Atty. Conrado H. Edig, counsel de parte of accused Bernardo Hinlo, Catalino Capin, Martin Hinlo and Cecerio Ongco, who were given pardon, to secure and file the withdrawal of the appeals of said accused within days from receipt of this Resolution;
(2) CALL the attention of the Presidential Committee to observe the proper procedure as required by law before granting bail, pardon or parole in cases before it; and
(3) REMIND the Board of Pardons and Parole about the Court’s directive in People v. Sepada case. (Emphasis supplied).
The above pronouncements of this Court in Sepada and in Hinlo may still be unheeded, either through deliberate disregard thereof or by reason of an erroneous application of the obiter dictum in Monsanto or of the ruling in Crisola. Hence, the need for decisive action on the matter.
And now on the instant case. Considering that appellant Ricky Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal up to this date the conditional pardon extended to him should not have been enforced. Nonetheless, since he stands on the same footing as the accused-appellants in the Hinlo case, he may be freed from the full force, impact, and effect of the rule herein pronounced subject to the condition set forth below. This rule shall fully bind pardons extended after 31 January 1995 during the pendency of the grantee’s appeal.
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of Investigation.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the President, the Department of Justice, the Board of Pardons and Parole and the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon.
x x x."
"x x x.
The reason the Constitutional Commission adopted the "conviction by final judgment" requirement, reviving in effect the original provision of the 1973 Constitution on the pardoning power, was, as expounded by Commissioner Napoleon Rama, to prevent the President from exercising executive power in derogation of the judicial power. 15
Indeed, an appeal brings the entire case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the appellate court. A becoming regard for the doctrine of separation of powers demands that such exclusive authority of the appellate court be fully respected and kept unimpaired. For truly, had not the present Constitution adopted the "conviction by final judgment" limitation, the President could, at any time, and even without the knowledge of the court, extend executive clemency to anyone whom he, in good faith or otherwise, believes to merit presidential mercy. It cannot be denied that under the Jones Law and the 1981 amendment to the 1973 Constitution on the pardoning power which did not require conviction, the President had unimpeded power to grant pardon even before the criminal case could be heard. And under the 1935 Constitution which required "conviction" only, the power could be exercised at any time after conviction and regardless of the pendency of the appeal. In either case, there could be the risk not only of a failure of justice but also of a frustration of the system of administration of justice in view of the derogation of the jurisdiction of the trial or appellate court. Where the President is not so prevented by the Constitution, not even Congress can impose any restriction to prevent a presidential folly. 16 Hence, nothing but a change in the constitutional provision consisting in the imposition of "conviction by final judgment" requirement can change the rule. The new Constitution did it.
Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal, i.e., the appealed conviction must first be brought to finality.
Accordingly, while this Court, in its resolution of 21 March 1991 in People v. Pedro Sepada, 17 dismissed the appeal for having become moot and academic in view of the parole granted to the appellant, it explicitly declared the necessity of a final judgment before parole or pardon could be extended. Thus:
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the COURT RESOLVED to DISMISS the appeal for having become moot and academic. To avoid any possible conflict with the judicial determination of pending appeals, the Court further DIRECTED the Board of Pardons and Parole to adopt a system which enables it to ascertain whether a sentence has become final and executory and has, in fact, been executed before acting on any application for parole or pardon. The Court Administrator shall coordinate with the Department of Justice on how this may be best achieved. (Emphasis supplied).
Recently, in its resolution of 31 January 1995 in People v. Hinlo, 18 this Court categorically declared to be "in clear violation of the law" the "practice of processing applications for pardon or parole despite pending appeals." This Court resolved therein as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, in order to put a stop to the practice of processing applications for pardon and parole despite pending appeals which is in clear violation of the law, the Court Resolved to:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) REQUIRE Atty. Conrado H. Edig, counsel de parte of accused Bernardo Hinlo, Catalino Capin, Martin Hinlo and Cecerio Ongco, who were given pardon, to secure and file the withdrawal of the appeals of said accused within days from receipt of this Resolution;
(2) CALL the attention of the Presidential Committee to observe the proper procedure as required by law before granting bail, pardon or parole in cases before it; and
(3) REMIND the Board of Pardons and Parole about the Court’s directive in People v. Sepada case. (Emphasis supplied).
The above pronouncements of this Court in Sepada and in Hinlo may still be unheeded, either through deliberate disregard thereof or by reason of an erroneous application of the obiter dictum in Monsanto or of the ruling in Crisola. Hence, the need for decisive action on the matter.
And now on the instant case. Considering that appellant Ricky Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal up to this date the conditional pardon extended to him should not have been enforced. Nonetheless, since he stands on the same footing as the accused-appellants in the Hinlo case, he may be freed from the full force, impact, and effect of the rule herein pronounced subject to the condition set forth below. This rule shall fully bind pardons extended after 31 January 1995 during the pendency of the grantee’s appeal.
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of Investigation.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the President, the Department of Justice, the Board of Pardons and Parole and the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon.
x x x."
