“xxx. The question here is who
has authority to grant good conduct time allowances, not on what basis such
allowances should be made.
In Kabigting v. Director of
Prisons, G.R. No. L-12276, Aug. 26, 1958, it was held that in habeas corpus
proceedings, the trial court has no power to grant the petitioner time
allowances for good conduct "[because] in accordance with Article 99 of
the Revised Penal Code it is the Director of the Prisons who shall grant
allowances for good conduct if such good conduct has been observed by the
prisoner concerned." In People v. Tan, 19 SCRA 433 (1967), it was emphatically held that a provincial
warden cannot grant credit for good conduct to a prisoner and order his release
because Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code vests the authority to grant
prisoners good conduct time allowances "exclusively in the Director and
[in] no one else." In that case, the prisoner was under the supervision
and control of the provincial warden, but the authority of the Director to
grant good conduct time allowances was upheld. Indeed, there is nothing in R.A.
No. 6975 [‘Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990’] which
repeals Art. 99 [‘Who grants time allowances’] of the Revised Penal Code.
X x x.
Needless to say, the writ of
habeas corpus remains available as a remedy against any abuse of the authority
granted by Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code to the Director of Prisons, but
that is altogether a different kettle of fish from the question posed in this
case. Here, the question is whether a court may rely on the certification of
the City Warden as to good conduct time allowances in ordering the release of
prisoners by writ of habeas corpus. We hold that it cannot, in view of Art. 99
of the Revised Penal Code vesting the authority to grant good conduct time
allowances solely in the Director of Prisons.
In view of the foregoing, we are
constrained to order the re-arrest of all of respondents. This can be
done without placing them in double jeopardy of being punished for the same
offense because their re-incarceration is merely a continuation of the
penalties that they had not completely served due to the invalid crediting of
good conduct time allowances in their favor. [citing People v. Tan, 19 SCRA
433 (1967)].
WHEREFORE, the appealed order is
SET ASIDE and the case is hereby REMANDED to the trial judge for further
proceedings, taking into account the certification of the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections as to the good conduct time allowances to which
respondents may be entitled, by either granting the writ of habeas corpus with
respect to some of the respondents or ordering the re-arrest of others, as the
facts may warrant.”
CITY
WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL, petitioner, vs. RAYMOND S. ESTRELLA, et. al., G.R.
No. 141211, August 31, 2001.
