See - G.R. No. 221815 (lawphil.net)
GLYNNA
FORONDA-CRYSTAL, Petitioner vs. ANIANA LAWAS SON, Respondent. G.R. No. 221815, November
29, 2017.
“x x x.
On the Issue
of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction
is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a
case.16 In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to
dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction
over the subject matter.17 It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent
or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the
court that it exists.18
What is
relevant in this case, therefore, is the delineation provided for by law which
separates the jurisdictions of the second level courts—the Regional Trial
Courts—and the first level courts—the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC),
Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC), and
Municipal Trial Courts in the Cities (MTCC).
This can be
easily ascertained through a reading of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.19
According to
this law, in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction where the assessed value of the property exceeds ₱20,000.00 or, for civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such value exceeds ₱50,000.00.20 For those below the
foregoing threshold amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the MeTC, MTC,
MCTC, or MTCC.21
For a full
discourse on the resolution of the present petition, emphasis must be given on
the assessed values22 —not the fair market values—of the real properties
concerned.
According to
the case of Heirs of Concha, Sr. v. Spouses Lumocso,23 the law is emphatic that
in determining which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of
the realty involved that should be computed. Heirs of Concha, Sr. averred this
definitive ruling by tracing the history of the The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, as amended. It said:
The original
text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of
R.A. 296, as amended, gave the RTCs x x x exclusive original jurisdiction. x x
x Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction
whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary
estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property
under Section 19(2).
The
distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment
introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994 which expanded the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the first level courts. x x x. Thus, under the present law,
original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves
"title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein"
under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level
courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark.
This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the
RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice."24
(Emphasis, underscoring and formatting supplied, citations omitted)
Time and
again, this Court has continuously upheld Heirs of Concha, Sr.'s ruling on this
provision of law.25 In fact, in Malana, et al. v. Tappa, et al.26 the Court
said that "the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the
word 'shall' and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of
real property where the assessed value does not exceed ₱20,000.00."27
To determine
the assessed value, which would in turn determine the court with appropriate
jurisdiction, an examination of the allegations in the complaint is necessary.
It is a hornbook doctrine that the court should only look into the facts
alleged in the complaint to determine whether a suit is within its
jurisdiction.28 According to the case of Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Cruz, et
al.,29 only these facts can be the basis of the court's competence to take
cognizance of a case, and that one cannot advert to anything not set forth in
the complaint, such as evidence adduced at the trial, to determine the nature
of the action thereby initiated.30
It is not a
surprise, therefore, that a failure to allege the assessed value of a real
property in the complaint would result to a dismissal of the case. This is
because absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the
property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. Indeed, the courts cannot
take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land.31 This is the
same ratio put forth by the Court in the case of Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Cruz,
et al.,32 where the case was dismissed partly on the basis of the following:
The
complaint did not contain any such allegation on the assessed value of the
property. There is no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC had
jurisdiction over the action of petitioners. Indeed, absent any allegation in
the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined
whether it is the RTC or the MTC which has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the petitioners' action.33 (Citations omitted)
In
Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,34 the Court had no qualms in dismissing the
case for failing to allege the assessed value of the subject property. Similar
to Spouses Cruz,35 Quinagoran36 held that: "Considering that the
respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value of the
subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to dismiss.
Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void, and the CA erred in
affirming the RTC."
This is not
to say, however, that there is no room for a liberal interpretation of this
rule. In Tumpag v. Tumpag,37 the Court, through Justice Brion, provided for an
instance when an exception to the strict application could be allowed. It said:
Generally,
the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine
whether a suit is within its jurisdiction. There may be instances, however,
when a rigid application of this rule may result in defeating substantial
justice or in prejudice to a party's substantial right.38
In that
case, there was also no allegation of the assessed value of the property.
However, the Court pointed out that the facts contained in the Declaration of
Real Property, which was attached to the complaint, could have facially
resolved the question on jurisdiction and would have rendered the lengthy
litigation on that very point unnecessary.39 In essence, the Court said that
the failure to allege the real property's assessed value in the complaint would
not be fatal if, in the documents annexed to the complaint, an allegation of
the assessed value could be found.
A reading of
the quoted cases would reveal a pattern which would invariably guide both the
bench and the bar in similar situations. Based on the foregoing, the rule on
determining the assessed value of a real property, insofar as the
identification of the jurisdiction of the first and second level courts is
concerned, would be two-tiered:
First, the
general rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the
real property as alleged in the complaint; and
Second, the
rule would be liberally applied if the assessed value of the property, while
not alleged in the complaint, could still be identified through a facial
examination of the documents already attached to the complaint.
Indeed, it
is by adopting this two-tiered rule that the Court could dispense with a catena
of cases specifically dealing with issues concerning jurisdiction over real
properties.
In upholding
these afore-quoted rule, however, the Court is not unmindful of the cases of
Barangay Piapi v. Talip40 and Trayvilla v. Sejas41 where the market value of
the property, instead of the assessed value thereof, was used by the Court as
basis for determining jurisdiction.
In Barangay
Piapi,42 the complaint did not allege the assessed value of the subject
property. What it alleged was the market value thereof. The Court held that, in
the absence of an allegation of assessed value in the complaint, the Court
shall consider the alleged market value to determine jurisdiction.
Notably,
this case referred to Section 7(b), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which deals
with Legal Fees, to justify its reliance on the market value. It said:
The Rule
requires that "the assessed value of the property, or if there is none,
the estimated value thereof, shall be alleged by the claimant." It bears
reiterating that what determines jurisdiction is the allegations in the
complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Petitioners' complaint is for
reconveyance of a parcel of land. Considering that their action involves the
title to or interest in real property, they should have alleged therein its
assessed value. However, they only specified the market value or estimated
value, which is ₱15,000.00. Pursuant to the provision of Section 33 (3) quoted
earlier, it is the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del
Sur, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.43 (Italics in the
original, and emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
However, the
rule alluded to above, while originally containing the sentence: "In a
real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the
estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis
in computing the fees," has already been deleted through an amendment by
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. As it currently stands, Section 7 of Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court reads:
Section 7
Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.—
a) For
filing an action or a permissive OR COMPULSORY counter-claim, CROSS-CLAIM, or
money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing a
third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention, if
the total sum claimed, INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS, PENALTIES, SURCHARGES, DAMAGES
OF WHATEVER KIND, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS and/or in
cases involving property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in
litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE
STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT, is: x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Two things
must be said of this: first, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court concerns the amount
of the prescribed filing and docket fees, the payment of which bestows upon the
courts the jurisdiction to entertain the pleadings to be filed;44 and second,
the latest iteration of the same provision already deleted the phrase
"estimated value thereof," such that the determination of the amount
of prescribed filing and docket fees are now based on the following: (a) the
fair market value of the real property in litigation stated in the current tax
declaration or current zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; or
(b) the stated value of the real or personal property in litigation as alleged
by the claimant.
A reading of
the discourse on this would indicate that the jurisdiction referred to above
does not deal with the delineation of the jurisdictions of the first and second
level courts, but with the acquisition of jurisdiction by the courts through
the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees.
This is the
same tenor of the Court's decision in Trayvilla. In that case, where no
assessed value was likewise alleged in the complaint, the Court determined jurisdiction
by considering the actual amount by which the property was purchased and as
written in the Amended Complaint. The Court stated that:
However, the
CA failed to consider that in determining jurisdiction, it could rely on the
declaration made in the Amended Complaint that the property is valued at ₱6,000,00. The handwritten document
sued upon and the pleadings indicate that the property was purchased by
petitioners for the price of ₱6,000.00. For purposes of filing the civil case against
respondents, this amount should be the stated value of the property in the
absence of a current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the BIR.45 (Emphasis
supplied)
But then
again, like the discussion on Barangay Piapi above, Trayvilla was one which
dealt with the payment of the required filing and docket fees. The crux of the
case was the acquisition of jurisdiction by payment of docket fees, and not the
delineation of the jurisdiction of the first and second level courts. In fact,
Trayvilla interchangeably used the terms "assessed value" and
"market value" in a manner that does not even recognize a difference.
Like
Barangay Piapi, therefore, Spouses Trayvilla must not be read in the context of
jurisdiction of first and second level courts as contemplated in the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended,46 where the assessed values of the
properties are required. These cases must perforce be read in the context of
the determination of the actual amount of prescribed filing and docket fees
provided for in Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Having laid
out the essential rules in determining the jurisdiction of the first and second
level courts for civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, the Court now shifts focus to the specific
circumstances that surround the current case.
In here, the
respondent failed to allege in her complaint the assessed value of the subject
property. Rather, what she included therein was an allegation of its market
value amounting to ₱200,000.00.47 In the course of the trial, the petitioner
asserted that the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax
declaration was merely ₱1,030.00, and therefore the RTC lacked jurisdiction.
The question
thus posed before this Court was whether or not the RTC should have dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction, and in the affirmative, whether or not the
RTC decision should be rendered void for being issued without jurisdiction.
As discussed
above, settled is the requirement that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended, required the allegation of the real property's assessed value
in the complaint. That the complaint in the present case did not aver the
assessed value of the property is a violation of the law, and generally would
be dismissed because the court which would exercise jurisdiction over the case
could not be identified.
However, a
liberal interpretation of this law, as opined by the Court in Tumpag,48 would
necessitate an examination of the documents annexed to the complaint. In this
instance, the complaint referred to Tax Declaration No. 16408A, attached
therein as Annex "B," which naturally would contain the assessed
value of the property. A perusal thereof would reveal that the property was
valued at ₱2,826.00.
On this
basis, it is clear that it is the MTC, and not the RTC, that has jurisdiction
over the case. The RTC should have upheld its Order dated November 8, 2006
which dismissed the same. Consequently, the decision that it rendered is null
and void.
In the case
of Maslag v. Monzon,49 the Court had occasion to rule that an order issued by a
court declaring that it has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case when under the law it has none cannot likewise be
given effect. It amounts to usurpation of jurisdiction which cannot be
countenanced. Since the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended,
already apportioned the jurisdiction of the MTC and the RTC in cases involving
title to property, neither the courts nor the petitioner could alter or
disregard the same.
In yet
another case, Diona v. Balangue,50 the Court ruled that void judgment for want
of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor
the creator of any obligation. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution
that is null and void. As said by the Court in Cañero v. University of the
Philippines:51
A void
judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may
be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect
is sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for
any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is
not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek
to enforce. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the
situation is the same as it would be if there was no judgment.52
Thus,
considering the foregoing, it would be proper for the Court to immediately
dismiss this case without prejudice to the parties' filing of a new one before
the MTC that has jurisdiction over the subject property. Consequently, the
other issues raised by the petitioner need not be discussed further.
X x x.”
