Perjury: probable cause, elements.

"xxx.

Petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her complaint for perjury for lack of probable cause. The contention is untenable. Probable cause, as used in preliminary investigations, is defined as the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted."21 The elements of perjury under Article 18322 of the Revised Penal Code are:

(a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and, (d) that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.23 (Emphasis supplied)

Public respondent correctly ruled that the first and third elements are absent here in that private respondents’ statements in their counter-affidavits in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 were not material to that case nor do they constitute willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.

On the Element of Materiality

In prosecutions for perjury, a matter is material if it is the "main fact which was the subject of the inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact xxx."24 To hold private respondents liable, there must be evidence that their assailed statements in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 were the subject of inquiry in that case. Petitioner has presented no such evidence. The records are hardly helpful, as petitioner did not furnish the Court a copy of her complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387.

What is before the Court is a portion of respondent Pascua’s counter-affidavit in that case as quoted by public respondent in his 4 April 2000 Resolution. Admittedly, some inference is possible from this quoted material, namely, that the basis of petitioner’s complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is that respondent Pascua prevented her from taking part in the 16 July 1998 meeting. However, it would be improper for the Court to rely on such inference because the element of materiality must be established by evidence and not left to inference.25

At any rate, petitioner’s complaint for perjury will still not prosper because respondent Pascua’s statement — that OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is significantly the same as petitioner’s and Yabut’s administrative complaint against respondent Pascua before the DECS — is immaterial to the inferred issue.

On the Element of Deliberate Assertion of Falsehood

The third element of perjury requires that the accused willfully and deliberately assert a falsehood. Good faith or lack of malice is a valid defense.26 Here, the Court finds that respondent Pascua’s statement in his counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that he called the 16 July 1998 meeting does not constitute a deliberate assertion of falsehood. While it was Yabut and some unidentified ACNTS personnel who requested a dialogue with respondent Pascua, it was respondent Pascua’s consent to their request which led to the holding of the meeting. Thus, respondent Pascua’s statement in question is not false much less malicious. It is a good faith interpretation of events leading to the holding of the meeting.

Regarding respondent Pascua’s allegation in his counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that petitioner’s complaint was a mere "rehash and duplication with a slight deviation of fact" of the DECS administrative case petitioner and Yabut filed against respondent Pascua, petitioner has not shown why this is false. Petitioner again did not furnish the Court a copy of her and Yabut’s complaint with the DECS.

Respondent Turla’s statement in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that respondent Pascua called the 16 July 1998 meeting was a mere reiteration of what respondent Pascua told him. Consequently, it was correct for public respondent to hold that since respondent Turla merely repeated what he heard from respondent Pascua, he could not be held liable for making a false and malicious statement.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 144692
January 31, 2005

CELSA P. ACUÑA, petitioner,
vs.
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, PEDRO PASCUA and RONNIE TURLA, (Angeles City National Trade School), respondents.