"xxx.
Chairman Brillantes is not
liable for indirect contempt.
Finally, the Court does not agree with the petitioners' claim that former COMELEC Chairman Brillantes acted in a way that would make him liable for indirect contempt.
The petitioners allege that the respondents' refusal to abide by the Court's Resolution dated May 8, 2013 constitutes indirect contempt, as afore-outlined. Said Resolution stated, to wit:
After hearing the issues and arguments raised, the Court Resolved, in open court, to require the parties to SUBMIT simultaneously their respective MEMORANDA within twenty (20) days from date or until May 28, 2013.
The Chief Justice, in open court, DIRECTED the Chairperson of the COMELEC to include in his memorandum report of his COMPLIANCE with the undertakings he had made before this Court, including a report on how the COMELEC had proceeded to obtain and secure the source code of all the computerized voting machines used in the elections, how it was able to call the parties to make the same available for their review and how the review was conducted, as well as the discussions it had made with the parties.
Thereafter, with or without the parties' respective memoranda, the case shall be deemed SUBMITTED for resolution.66
Put simply, the order of the Court was for Chairman Brillantes to include in his memorandum the various undertakings he made in open court. Clearly, the only set undertakings promised by Chairman Brillantes were the following: first, to allow review after an interested party applies and complies with all the requirements for review under the resolution, as queried by former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, and as confirmed during the oral arguments; second, categorically stating that he and the COMELEC would amend the resolutions to allow interested parties more time to comply with the documentary requirements, while mentioning that this would need to be implemented after the elections; and third, that the respondents would accommodate the petitioners' request to review the source code. All of which shall be reported in the memorandum.
The petitioners' accusations on the charge of indirect contempt fail to persuade. Under the law, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; and
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.67
The Court's review of the records reveals that the respondents did not renege on these undertakings. As to the first undertaking, while the Court questioned and ultimately found that the guidelines promulgated by the respondents went against the law in allowing the source code review, for purposes of the charge of indirect contempt, the Court finds that the respondents discharged their duty in making the same available for review. This is evidenced by the fact that other parties complied with the requirements and were able to review the source code, a fact that the petitioners do not contest.
As to the second undertaking, the respondents promulgated Resolution No. 9657, its purpose solely to grant interested parties time to comply with the documentary requirements, to wit:
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, [R.A.] No. 9369, and other election laws, the [COMELEC] has RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that the request for the conduct of source code review, together with the credentials of the reviewer, shall not be filed not later than 01 April 2013, during regular office hours, at the Office of the Clerk of the Commission, [COMELEC], 8F Palacio del Gobernador Condominium, Intramuros, Manila, free from filing fee.68
As to the third, the Court agrees with the respondents that Chairman Brillantes' manifestations in open court, as well as its letter dated May 23, 2013, all sufficiently show that he made the effort to comply with the directive. It was the petitioners who failed to follow up on the respondents' initiative and invitation. While the petitioners indeed wrote a letter, this was done on the day itself of the review. It is not surprising, thus, that the respondents were unable to respond to the letter sent by the petitioners requesting for the immediate appraisal of the source code and the details appurtenant to the review. After all, the letter is dated May 9, 2013, the same day the review was scheduled, at 9:00 a.m., something the petitioners acknowledge. Both events occurred at around the same time on the same day, and it is impossible for the respondents to have replied to the same. It is ironic that the petitioners conveniently allege the lack of time to comply with the requirements of COMELEC, yet expect the respondents to reply the very same morning to a letter sent.
As for the SMS message allegedly sent by Senator Gordon asking for the time and venue of the source code review, there is nothing in the records that confirms the same. If the SMS message indeed existed, it was incumbent on the petitioners to produce it. This they failed to do, and as such, the Court cannot put any stock into this allegation.
In deciding that Chairman Brillantes is not liable for indirect contempt, the Court focuses solely on the undertakings that were directly promised to the Court, not those which the petitioner feels were promised. The Court does not subscribe to the arguments of the petitioners as articulated in their petition and reply, as to the propriety69 of the source code being reviewed only after four days which is allegedly a lack of time. Likewise, the petitioners' speculations that there was no subsequent source code review or even was a source code to review for both the 2010 and the 2013 elections,70 lose its sheen when one considers that other interested parties were able to review the code without a single complaint.
The Court reminds the petitioners that contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity.71 It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties-litigant or their witnesses during litigation.
In the case at bar, none of the above circumstances are present. This Court also notes that indirect contempt proceedings partake of the nature of a criminal prosecution; hence, strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions also apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt; the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.72 Moreover, in contempt proceedings, if the answer to the contempt charge is satisfactory, the contempt proceedings end.73 The Court finds that the respondents were able to properly show their compliance with their undertakings, both in their contemporaneous and subsequent actions, as well as in their responsive pleadings to the charge of the petitioners. As a result, the Court is satisfied that the respondents did not commit any acts which would signify possible disobedience and disrespect to the Court, and thus, Chairman Brillantes is not liable for indirect contempt.
Xxxx."
BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., AND RICHARD J. GORDON, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SIMILARLY SITUATED, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. G.R. No. 206719, April 10, 2019.
