Moral turpitude

"xxx.

Moral turpitude has been defined aseverything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; anact of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,30 contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.31 Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that the Court has to determine as to what crime involves moral turpitude.32 Salvador was convicted of falsification of public document. The MTCC found that she made an untruthful statement in a narration of facts and perverted the truth with a wrongful intent.33 While Salvador invoked good faith as a defense, the MTCC was not convinced, stating that good faith could not be made to depend solely on the self-serving statement of the accused. It must be supportedby other independent evidence.34 To the MTCC, Salvador miserably failed to clearly show the presence of good faith. More specifically, the trial court stated:

She alleged that she honestlybelieved she was employed with VWI because Alfonso Tuzon is the operations manager of VWI. Second, she was responsible in the preparation of the payroll sheets of VWI.

However, the following circumstances negate the existence of good faith:

1. Accused was not included in the list of employees of VWI as shown in Exhibits "G", "G-1", "G-2", "G-3", and "G-4," "J" and its sub-markings and "K" and its sub-markings;

2. Accused was not in the payroll of VWI as shown in Exhibit "L";

3. Accused received her salary from Rodolfo Quiambao and not from VWI;

4. Rodolfo Quiambao, who is not a VWI employee, issued directives to the accused;

5. Accused never went to the VWI office at Magapit, Lallo, Cagayan;

6. Accused never had any VWI identification card;

7. Accused had no contract of employment with VWI; and finally,

8. Rodolfo Quiambao worked personally with Alfonso Tuzon and not with VWI.

These circumstances were known to the accused. Despite knowledge of these facts, accused stated in her PDS that she was employed with VWI, thus, she perverted the truth. Said act constitutes malice on her part negating her claim of good faith.35 [Emphasis supplied] Granting arguendothat Salvador had no criminal intent to injure a third person, the same is immaterial as such intent is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. It is jurisprudentially settled that in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers or private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents,the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faithand the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. In falsification of public documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.36

Salvador did not appeal from the said judgment and, instead, filed an application for probation which was granted.1âwphi1 It has been held that an application for probation is an admission of guilt.37 Logically then, when Salvador applied for probation, she admitted the making of an untruthful statement in her PDS. In Lumancas v. Intas,38 the Court held that "the accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet being a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the government, the making of an untruthful statement therein was, therefore, intimately connected with such employment."39 The filing of a PDS is required in connection with the promotion to a higher position and contenders for promotion have the legal obligation to disclose the truth. Otherwise, enhancing their qualifications by means of false statements will prejudice other qualified aspirants to the same position.40

As early as 1961, in the case of De Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces,41 the Court disbarred a lawyer on the ground of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, after having found that the said lawyer was convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents. Similarly, in In Re - Attorney Jose Avanceña,42 the said lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law due to a conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude after being convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents. Lastly, in RE: SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin,43 the Court reiterated that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.44

Following the Court's disposition in the aforecited cases, the CSC and the CA therefore erred in reaching a conclusion to the contrary, especially that Salvador's conviction for such crime already attained finality. Both tribunals were of the view that Salvador merely committed a mere error of judgment and, thus, no moral turpitude was involved. Their position was based on the finding previously made by the CSC-RO II in the first administrative complaint. That could not a valid basis because, as earlier pointed out, the second case was separate and distinct from the first one.

Although the CSC itself recognized that it was for the Court to determine what crime involved moral turpitude, it ruled that Salvador's commission of the crime of falsification of public document did not involve moral turpitude. Both the CSC and the CA strayed away from the settled jurisprudence on the matter. It will beabsurd to insist that Salvador committed a mere error of judgment when the very basis of the second administrative charge against her was a final judgment of conviction where the trial court found otherwise.

Considering that the principal act punished in the crime of falsification of public document is the violation of the public faithand the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, the elements of the administrative offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude clearly exist in this case. The Court does not have to look beyond what is simply apparent from the surrounding circumstances.

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CECILIA PAGADUAN, Petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and REMA MARTIN SALVADOR, Respondents. G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014.