"The evolution of the duty of trial
courts in instances where the accused
pleaded guilty to a capital offense
Accused-appellant was charged with murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, making said crime a capital offense.37
It must be noted that murder remains a capital offense despite the proscription against the imposition of death as a punishment.38 In People v. Albert,39 the Court ruled that "in case death was found to be the imposable penalty, the same would only have to be reduced to reclusion perpetua in view of the prohibition against the imposition of the capital punishment, but the nature of the offense of murder as a capital crime, and for that matter, of all crimes properly characterized as capital offenses under the Revised Penal Code, was never tempered to that of a non-capital offense."40
Thus, when accused-appellant pleaded guilty during his arraignment, he pleaded to a capital offense. Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules is relevant, viz.:
SECTION 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and [shall] require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
Interestingly, the rule encapsulated in Sec. 3, Rule 116 was not the rule prior to the advent of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The evolution of the rule reveals a dichotomy which the Court now addresses. The development of the rule, as well as jurisprudence, dictates a just resolution of the case.
Even prior to the adoption of the 1940 Rules of Court, jurisprudence has had to grapple with instances where an accused pleaded guilty to a capital offense. In such instances, the Court maintained a policy of restraint in rendering judgment on the sole basis of such plea.
As early as 1903, in U.S. v. Patala,41 the Court cautioned against the acceptance of pleas of guilty and opined that the trial judge should freely exercise his discretion in allowing pleas of guilty to be withdrawn if the accused does not fully realize the probable effects of his admission:
The pleas of "guilty" and "not guilty" as accepted in American law were unknown to the Spanish law. Under the Spanish law there was what was called "judicial confession," whereby the accused admitted the commission of the act alleged in the complaint, but by so doing the defendant did not attempt to characterize the act as criminal, as is the case with a defendant who pleads "guilty" under American law. It also appears that there are no words in the Tagalog or Visayan dialects which can express exactly the idea conveyed by the English word "guilty." In a case of homicide, for instance, when the question is put to the defendant in either of these two dialects as to whether he is guilty or not guilty, he is asked whether he killed the deceased or not. If he answers that he did kill the deceased, he merely admits that he committed the material act which caused the death of the deceased. He does not, however, understand it to be an admission on his part that he has no defense and must be punished. The case at bar serves to illustrate this fact. Under these circumstances, we are of opinion that the trial judge should freely exercise his discretion in allowing the plea of "guilty" to be withdrawn; indeed, he must, on his own motion, order that it be withdrawn if, in his opinion, the accused does not fully realize the probable effect of his admission.42
Again, in the 1917 case of U.S. v. Jamad (Jamad),43 this Court noted that "[notwithstanding the plea of 'guilty,' several witnesses were examined, under the well-settled practice in this jurisdiction which contemplates the taking of additional evidence in cases wherein pleas of 'guilty' are entered to complaints or information charging grave crimes, and more especially crimes for which the prescribed penalty is death."44 Hence, the following guidelines were adopted:
We may say then, in response to the request for a ruling on this subject by the Attorney-General:
(1) The essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime or crimes charged in the complaint or information.
(2) Such a plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself supplied the necessary proof.
(3) There is nothing in the law in this jurisdiction which forbids the introduction of evidence as to the guilt of the accused, and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime, after the entry of a plea of "guilty."
(4) Having in mind the danger of the entry of improvident pleas of "guilty" in criminal cases, the prudent and advisable course, especially in cases wherein grave crimes are charged, is to take additional evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime.
(5) The better practice would indicate that, when practicable, such additional evidence should be sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction independently of the plea of guilty, or at least to leave no room for reasonable doubt in the mind of either the trial or the appellate court as to the possibility of a misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the precise nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty.
(6) Notwithstanding what has been said, it lies in the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge whether he will take evidence or not in any case wherein he is satisfied that a plea of "guilty" has been entered by the accused, with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his act.
(7) But in the event that no evidence is taken, this court, if called upon to review the proceedings had in the court below, may reverse and send back for a new trial, if, on the whole record, a reasonable doubt arises as to whether the accused did in fact enter the plea of "guilty" with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of the act.45
From the foregoing, it is evident that this jurisdiction places a premium on ensuring that an accused pleading guilty to a grave crime understands his plea and the possible consequences thereof. Further, this Court expressly recognized the wisdom in receiving evidence in such cases despite the fact that Sec. 3146 of General Order No. 5847 contemplated the reception of evidence only in cases where a plea of not guilty has been entered.
The Jamad guidelines became the standard for trial courts when confronted with similar circumstances. It must be noted, however, that the reception of evidence in cases where the accused pleads guilty remained discretionary on the part of the trial court. In fact, convictions solely on the basis of a plea of guilty were upheld by this Court.
In U.S. v. Burlado,48 this Court affirmed therein accused's conviction for the crime of qualified theft on the strength of his plea of guilty. The Court explained that "[a] plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant himself having supplied the necessary proof by his plea of guilty. (United States v. Dineros, 18 Phil. 566 (1911); United States v. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305 (1917).) The defendant having admitted his guilt of the facts charged in the complaint, the only question left for decision is the penalty"49
The 1940 Rules of Court, the earliest progenitor of the 2000 Revised Rules, extended the same level of protection. Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the 1940 Rules of Court reads:
SECTION 5. Plea of Guilty — Determination of Punishment. — Where the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or information, if the court accepts the plea and has discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it may hear witnesses to determine what punishment shall be imposed.50
The 1964 version of the Rules of Court reproduced this section verbatim.51 Thus, when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court may hear witnesses for purposes of determining the punishment to be imposed; the guilt of the accused was a forgone conclusion. The rule seemed to institutionalize Jamad as shown by the discretionary nature of the hearing.
Accordingly, in People v. Ng Pek,52 this Court stated that "[t]he record shows that when the case was called for the arraignment of the accused on November 3, 1947, the accused waived his right to be assisted by counsel and then and there entered the plea of guilty. That plea necessarily foreclosed the right of the accused to defend himself and left the court with no other alternative than to impose the penalty prescribed by law."53
In the same breath, the Court, in People v. Santa Rosa,54 upheld the conviction of therein accused for illegal possession of a firearm due to his plea of guilty. It stated that "[t]he general rule is that 'a plea of guilty when formally entered on arraignment is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant himself having supplied the necessary proof by his plea of guilty."55
Finally, in People v. Acosta,56 which involved the imposition of the supreme penalty of death for the crime of robbery with homicide, this Court upheld the conviction and penalty imposed and stated that:
"x x x the essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the information; that when formally entered, such a plea is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself supplied the necessary proof; and that while it may be prudent and advisable in some cases, especially where grave crimes are charged, to take additional evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime nevertheless it lies in the sound discretion of the court whether to take evidence or not in any case where it is satisfied that the plea of guilty has been entered by the accused with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his act. (citations omitted)"57
Clearly, to this point, the reception of evidence when an accused pleads guilty depended on the sound discretion of the trial court.
However, the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules) introduced a paradigm shift to the formerly discretionary role of trial courts when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The 1985 version of the rule,58 as amended, reads:
SECTION 3. Plea of Guilty to Capital Offense; Reception of Evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. (5a, R-118)
The 2000 Revised Rules retained the salient points of the 1985 amendment. Hence, at present, the three (3)-fold duty of the trial court in instances where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense is as follows: (1) conduct a searching inquiry, (2) require the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt and precise degree of culpability, and (3) allow the accused to present evidence on his behalf.
The present rules formalized the requirement of the conduct of a searching inquiry as to the accused's voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. Further, it made mandatory the reception of evidence in cases where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. Most importantly, the present rules require that the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. Evidently, starting with the 1985 Rules, the accused may no longer be convicted for a capital offense on the sole basis of his plea of guilty.
The Court acknowledged the paradigm shift in People v. Lagarto,59 thus:
Section 5, Rule 118 of the old Rules of Court provides that "Where the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or information, if the trial court accepts the plea and has discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it may hear witnesses to determine what punishments shall be imposed." The trial court in a criminal case may sentence a defendant who pleads guilty to the offense charged in the information, without the necessity of taking testimony. (US v. Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541). Yet, it is advisable for the trial court to call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the defendant. (People vs. Comendador, supra) The present Revised Rules of Court, however, decrees that where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, it is now mandatory for the court to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and his precise degree of culpability, with the accused being likewise entitled to present evidence to prove, inter alia, mitigating circumstances (See People vs. Camay, 152 SCRA 401; Section 3, Rule 116 of Rules of Court).60 (emphasis supplied)
It is equally important to note that the 1985 Rules retained the directive that the reception of evidence in cases where the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense is discretionary on the part of the trial court.
This is encapsulated in Sec. 4, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules.61 The 2000 Revised Rules adopted Sec. 4, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules verbatim.
Considering the mandatory nature of Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules, this Court, in People v. Gambao (Gambao),62 restated the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense as follows:
(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and
(3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.63
Gambao also explained the rationale for these duties, thus:
Courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence of his plea. Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.64 (emphasis supplied). "
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html
