"Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two (2) things: 1. The fact of the crime, i.e. the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged; and (2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The Court finds the prosecution unable to prove both aspects, thus, it is left with no option but to acquit on reasonable doubt.
R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation against persons, or by using force upon things.[20] By the amendment in Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659, Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act now reads:
SEC. 14. Penally for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act: (1) the penalty of life imprisonment was changed to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." This third amendment clarifies the law's intent to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." Consequently, where the elements of carnapping are not proved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would cease to be applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be punishable under the Revised Penal Code.[21]
In the instant case, the Court finds the charge of carnapping unsubstantiated for failure of the prosecution to prove all its elements. For one, the trial court's decision itself makes no mention of any direct evidence indicating the guilt of accused-appellant. Indeed, the CA confirmed the lack of such direct evidence.[22] Both lower courts solely based accused-appellant's conviction of the special complex crime on one circumstantial evidence and that is, the fact of his possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle.
The Court notes that the prosecution's evidence only consists of the fact of the victim's disappearance, the discovery of his death and the details surrounding accused-appellant's arrest on rumors that the vehicle he possessed had been carnapped. Theres is absolutely no evidence supporting the prosecution's theory that the victim's vehicle had been carnapped, much less that the accused-appellant is the author of the same.
Certainly, it is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted, but for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, following are the guidelines: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is as such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[23] Decided cases expound that the circumstantial evidence presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rationale except that of guilt.[24]
In the case at bar, notably there is only one circumstantial evidence. And this sole circumstantial evidence of possession of the vehicle does not lead to an inference exclusively consistent with guilt. Fundamentally, prosecution did not offer any iota of evidence detailing the seizure of the vehicle, much less with accused-appellant's participation. In fact, there is even a variance concerning how accused-appellant was discovered to be in possession of the vehicle. The prosecution's uncorroborated evidence says accused-appellant was apprehended while driving the vehicle at a checkpoint, although the vehicle did not bear any license plates, while the latter testified he was arrested at home. Xxx.
Xxx.
Considering the dearth of evidence, the subject vehicle is at best classified as "missing" since the non-return of the victim and his vehicle on 12 November 2002. Why the check-point had begun before then, as early 3 November 2002, as stated by the prosecution witness raises doubts about the prosecution's version of the case. Perhaps, the check-point had been set up for another vehicle which had gone missing earlier. In any event, accused-appellant's crime, if at all, was being in possession of a missing vehicle whose owner had been found dead. There is perhaps guilt in the acquisition of the vehicle priced so suspiciously below standard. But how this alone should lead to a conviction for the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide/murder, affirmed by the appellate court is downright disturbing.
The application of disputable presumption found in Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act, in this case the alleged carnapping and the homicide/murder of its owner, is limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto.[26] In the instant case, accused-appellant set-up a defense of denial of the charges and adhered to his unrebutted version of the story that the vehicle had been sold to him by the brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista. Though the explanation is not seamless, once the explanation is made for the possession, the presumption arising from the unexplained possession may not anymore be invoked and the burden shifts once more to the prosecution to produce evidence that would render the defense of the accused improbable. And this burden, the prosecution was unable to discharge. Xxx.
Evidently, the disputable presumption cannot prevail over accused-appellant's explanation for his possession of the missing vehicle. The possession having been explained, the legal presumption is disputed and thus, cannot find application in the instant case. To hold otherwise would be a miscarriage of justice as criminal convictions necessarily require proof of guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and in the absence of such proof, should not be solely based on legal disputable presumptions.
The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of the victim may not be treated as an incident of carnapping. Nonetheless, even under the provisions of homicide and murder under the Revised Penal Code, the Court finds the guilt of accused-appellant was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
There were no eyewitnesses to the killing of the victim, Mario Magdato. Again, both courts relied only on the circumstantial evidence of accused-appellant's possession of the missing vehicle for the latter's conviction. Shirley, the widow, testified that her husband and their vehicle went missing on 12 November 2002. Dr. Concepcion gave testimony on the cause of death of Mario Magdato and the injuries he had sustained. Most glaringly, no connection had been established between the victim's gunshot wound which caused his death and the firearm found in the person of accused-appellant. Only SPO2 Figueroa's testimony gave light on how allegedly accused-appellant was found to have been in possession of the missing vehicle of the victim. But even if this uncorroborated testimony was true, it does not link accused-appellant to the carnapping, much less, the murder or homicide of the victim. And it does not preclude the probability of accused-appellant's story that he had merely bought the vehicle from the Bautista brothers who have themselves since gone missing.
The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfil the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional, presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.[30]
The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of accused-appellant beyond the point of moral certainty. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, however, is a burden particular to the prosecution and does not apply to exculpatory facts as may be raised by the defense; the accused is not required to establish matters in mitigation or defense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is he required to establish the truth of such matters by a preponderance of the evidence, or even to a reasonable probability.[31]
It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. What is required of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with moral certainty. Upon the prosecution's failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the thought that it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life.[32] The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[33]
In the final analysis, the circumstances narrated by the prosecution engender doubt rather than moral certainty on the guilt of accused-appellant."
G.R. No. 207662. April 13, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS, ALEX BAUTISTA, AND RICKY BAUTISTA ACCUSED.
FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61917
