"5. ID.;ID.; PRESCRIPTION; THE SO-CALLED "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" DO NOT CONVINCE THIS COURT THAT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, MARTIAL LAW SHOULD BE TREATED AS FORCE MAJEURE THAT SUSPENDS THE RUNNING OF PRESCRIPTION.— If this Court does, then it would be relieving private respondents of their bounden duty to show that during martial law they were so circumstanced that it was impossible for them to commence, continue or even resist an action. And yet a fullblown hearing is not even necessary as the so-called "special circumstances" do not convince this Court that, in this particular case, martial law should be treated as force majeure that suspends the running of presciption. Likewise, petitioners have consistently pointed out that during the hearing of the motion to dismiss, private respondents failed to adduce any proof regarding their allegations on the tolling of the prescriptive period. Private respondents have not, in any of their pleadings, rebutted this."
Source -
[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. JUDGE AMIR PUNDOGAR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, 12th Judicial Region, Branch III, FERNANDO JACINTO, JACINTO STEEL, INC., and ILIGAN INTEGRATED STEEL MILLS, INC., Respondents.
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.
Link - chanrobles.com.
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68
