"Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does declare hearsay as generally inadmissible testimonial evidence:
Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception x x x
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it.23 A person who introduces a hearsay statement is not obliged to enter into any particular stipulation, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that he/she entrenches himself/herself in the simple assertion that he/she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. For this reason, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.24
The hearsay rule, however, does not apply to independently relevant statements. People v. Umapas25 is instructive on the matter:
[W]hile the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. This is the doctrine of independently relevant statements x x x26 (Emphasis supplied)
Del Rosario's testimony can and will be admitted as evidence only for the purpose of proving that such statements regarding Arriola's lack of authority to sell the subject property were, in fact, made and uttered by Candelaria. This is circumstantially relevant to the instant case and within the competence of Del Rosario to confirm. Also, her perception on the conversation in question was adequately tested when she took the witness stand and was cross-examined by Arriola's counsel in open court. Hence, Del Rosario's account as to the fact of her conversation with Candelaria and the latter's stand against Arriola's authority to sell, irrespective of its veracity, is considered as an independently relevant statement that may properly be received as evidence against Arriola.
Nonetheless, the truth of such declarations by Candelaria, as heard by Del Rosario, is easily disce1nible from the evidence on record. Assessed with other established circumstances, Arriola's fraud is evident. As defined in People v. Balasa:27"
G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020
LUIS T. ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_199975_2020.html
