"The Court's Ruling
The Court grants the Petition and acquits Calingasan of the crime charged.
In all criminal cases, the Court has always adhered to the fundamental policy that when the guilt of the accused is not proven with moral certainty, the constitutional presumption of innocence must be upheld, and the exoneration of the accused must be granted as a matter of right.29 Thus, to warrant a finding of guilt for the crime charged, the prosecution must establish, beyond reasonable doubt, each and every element of the crime charged in the information or for any other crime necessarily included therein.30
In the case at bar, upon careful review of the case records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden.
Calingasan cannot be held liable for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262.
Calingasan was charged and convicted by the courts a quo for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, which provides:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children.
Based on the Information filed against him, Calingasan is accused of willfully denying private complainant and their child of the financial support legally due them, which allegedly caused them mental and emotional anguish, public ridicule and humiliation.31
In the very recent case of Acharon v. People32 (Acharon), the Court en banc clarified that the failure or inability to provide financial support per se is not a criminal act punishable under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262. What Section 5(i) penalizes is the act of inflicting psychological violence against women and children by willfully or consciously denying them the financial support legally due to them. The Court ratiocinated as follows:
The Court stresses that Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 uses the phrase "denial of financial support" in defining the criminal act. The word "denial" is defined as "refusal to satisfy a request or desire" or "the act of not allowing someone to do or have something." The foregoing definitions connote willfulness, or an active exertion of effort so that one would not be able to have or do something. This may be contrasted with the word "failure," defined as "the fact of not doing something [which one] should have done," which in turn connotes passivity. From the plain meaning of the words used, the act punished by Section 5(i) is, therefore, dolo in nature — there must be a concurrence between intent, freedom, and intelligence, in order to consummate the crime.
x x x x
It is not enough, therefore, for the woman to experience mental or emotional anguish, or for her partner to deny financial support that is legally due her. In order for criminal liability to arise under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, insofar as it deals with "denial of financial support," there must, therefore, be evidence on record that the accused willfully or consciously withheld financial support legally due the woman for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon her. x x x
"It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and children." In prosecutions under Section 5(i), therefore, "[p]sychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator" with denial of financial support as the weapon of choice. In other words, to be punishable by Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, it must ultimately be proven that the accused had the intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the woman, thereby inflicting psychological violence upon her, with the willful denial of financial support being the means selected by the accused to accomplish said purpose.
This means that the mere failure or one's inability to provide financial support is not sufficient to rise to the level of criminality under Section 5(i), even if mental or emotional anguish is experienced by the woman. In other words, even if the woman were to suffer mental or emotional anguish due to the lack of financial support, but the accused merely failed or was unable to so provide support, then criminal liability would not arise. A contrary interpretation to the foregoing would result in absurd, if not outright unconstitutional, consequences.33 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court in Acharon enumerated the elements that need to be proven to hold an accused liable for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, viz.:
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
(3) The offender willfully refuses to give or consciously denies the woman and/or her child or children financial support that is legally due her and/or her child or children; and
(4) The offender denied the woman and/or her child or children the financial support for the purpose of causing the woman and/or her child or children mental or emotional anguish.34
Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the Court holds that, contrary to the findings of the courts a quo, the prosecution failed to prove the third and fourth elements thereof.
Apart from establishing the relationship of the parties and that Calingasan left home sometime in 1998, not a single evidence was offered by the prosecution to establish that Calingasan deliberately or willfully refused to provide private complainant and their child the financial support legally due them. Also, no proof was adduced showing that Calingasan's supposed failure or refusal to provide financial support caused private complainant and their child mental and emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation.
On the contrary, records of the case evidently showed that Calingasan, for a time, provided private complainant and their child financial support and that his subsequent failure to do so was due to circumstances beyond his control. Calingasan testified under oath and presented documentary evidence showing that he was arrested in Canada and incarcerated for almost six (6) years.35 When he was released from prison, Calingasan tried to look for a permanent job but was not able to find one. He had since then relied upon the support and help of his siblings.36
These pieces of evidence, unrebutted by the prosecution, belie the accusations that (1) Calingasan deliberately denied private complainant and BBB financial support and (2) the denial of financial support was intended to cause private complainant and BBB mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation. Therefore, Calingasan cannot be convicted for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262.
Neither is Calingasan guilty of violating Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262.
Similar to Section 5(i), Section 5(e) also involves the denial of financial support legally due the woman and her child, viz.:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
x x x x
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or her child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
x x x x
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support[.]
In the cases of Melgar v. People37 (Melgar) and Reyes v. People38 (Reyes), the Court, applying the variance doctrine, had previously ruled that an accused may be convicted of violating Section 5(e), instead of Section 5(i), as long as the denial or deprivation of financial support by the accused has been established by the prosecution; because the former specifically penalizes the deprivation of financial support by itself, even in the absence of psychological violence.39
However, in Acharon, the Court en banc abandoned its ruling in Melgar and Reyes. The Court clarified that Section 5(e) and Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 penalize two distinct crimes. Section 5(i) punishes the willful infliction of psychological violence upon the woman and her child by denying them the financial support that is legally due them. Section 5(e), on the other hand, penalizes the deprivation of financial support "for the purpose of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct."40 Thus, while both provisions indeed involve the denial or deprivation of financial support, each of these provisions punishes entirely different acts. As such, the variance doctrine does not apply to convict an accused for the other crime.
Further, the Court reiterated that mere failure or inability to provide financial support is insufficient to warrant a finding of guilt for violation of either provision. There must be both an allegation and proof of the existence of the requisite specific intent penalized under each of these provisions: for Section 5(i), that the denial of financial support was for the purpose of inflicting psychological violence upon the woman and her child; while for Section 5(e), that the deprivation of financial support was for the purpose of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's actions or decisions.
Therefore, for Calingasan to be held liable for violating Section 5(e), it must be alleged and proved that he deprived private complainant and their child the financial support legally due them, for the purpose of controlling their actions and decisions, which clearly are all wanting in this case. Again, to recall, what the evidence of the prosecution simply proved in this case is that Calingasan failed to provide financial support, and nothing more. This is also insufficient to warrant a guilty verdict for violation of Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated December 15, 2017 and Resolution dated May 10, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 39417 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Cesar M. Calingasan is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED."
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 239313. February 15, 2022 ]
CESAR M. CALINGASAN,* PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2022/feb2022/gr_239313_2022.html
