I. Summary of the News Article
On December 21, 2025, the bicameral conference committee for the 2026 Philippine national budget restored unprogrammed appropriations to ₱243.4 billion—an amount even higher than the House’s original proposal. These are “standby” funds that are not part of the base ₱6.793 trillion budget, and are drawn only when there are excess revenues or additional foreign loans. Debate persists within and outside Congress over these funds: proponents describe them as efficient tools for unforeseen expenditures or strategic programs, while critics liken them to pork-barrel mechanisms and question their constitutionality.
II. Legal Argument: Unprogrammed Funds Are Unconstitutional
A. Constitutional Text and Structure
The 1987 Constitution’s budget provisions are explicit in delineating the powers of the Executive and the Legislature over appropriations. Article VI, Section 25(1) states:
> “No law shall be passed authorizing increase of the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget.”
This provision reflects a clear separation of powers and fiscal discipline: the President’s National Expenditure Program (NEP) sets a ceiling, and Congress must either accept or reduce appropriations—not enlarge them. Unprogrammed funds, by design, allow for future appropriations beyond what the President originally proposed, which potentially violates this constitutional ceiling.
Further, Article VI, Section 25(5) bars any transfer of appropriations by law, vesting that discretion only in the President in narrowly defined circumstances. Unprogrammed funds offer a mechanism whereby unspecified expenses may effectively be reallocated without clear itemization or legislative specificity, thus undermining legislative power of the purse.
B. Supreme Court Commentary and Jurisprudential Tendencies
In the 2025 Supreme Court decision on PhilHealth funds, Associate Justice Ramon Paul Hernando, in his separate concurring and dissenting opinion, argued forcefully that unprogrammed appropriations are unconstitutional and even “repugnant” because they:
1. Do not constitute an appropriation for a specific expenditure;
2. Create discretionary lump sums outside the constitutional appropriations framework; and
3. Enable avoidance of legislative specificity and oversight mandated by the Constitution.
Justice Hernando’s view is grounded in the principle that the Constitution does not contemplate inclusion of open-ended standby funds in the General Appropriations Act (GAA), echoing earlier jurisprudence (e.g., Demetria vs. Alba) limiting executive reallocation that undermines legislative authority.
While this is a separate opinion and not the controlling judgment, it represents a robust constitutional critique of unprogrammed funds grounded in fiscal constitutionalism and separation of powers.
C. Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Fiscal Accountability
The Philippine Constitution explicitly vests the power of the purse in the Legislature, subject to the President’s recommendations. Unprogrammed funds—by providing large, unspecified allocations usable upon contingent triggers—devolve discretion to Executive agencies (through the DBM or the President) that should constitutionally reside with Congress.
This mirrors the rationale in Belgica vs. Ochoa (the PDAF case), where the Supreme Court struck down congressional pork-barrel insertions because they violated separation of powers and legislative appropriations authority. Although unprogrammed funds differ in structure, the underlying constitutional concern—unauthorized delegation of appropriation power and vagueness in legislative direction of funds—remains analogous.
D. Practical Constitutional Consequences
The practice of embedding large unprogrammed appropriations facilitates:
Circumvention of revenue certainty: Funds are appropriated without identifiable revenue streams, arguably violating fiscal discipline obligations.
Opaque budgetary authority: Reduces transparency and complicates legislative oversight through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOCPE).
Political patronage risk: Enables discretionary spending that critics equate with pork despite judicial prohibition of pork barrel mechanisms.
While proponents argue that unprogrammed funds do not “increase” the nominal budget figure because they are contingent, the constitutional prohibition focuses on the authority to authorize beyond the President’s recommended ceiling, not merely on budget cash flows.
III. Comparative Perspective: Developed Democracies
In mature democracies, budget appropriations are tightly constrained by constitutional or statutory frameworks designed to preserve legislative control and transparency:
In the United States, annual appropriation bills must be specific, and Congress cannot delegate its appropriation authority to the Executive without clear legislative guidelines; lump-sum contingencies are tightly circumscribed.
In Westminster systems (e.g., the UK, Australia, Canada), while appropriation bills originate in the lower house, the legislature retains authority to debate, amend, and authorize appropriations; no constitutional practice exists for embedding contingent lump sums outside of explicit budget statutes.
OECD budget norms emphasize clear appropriation lines and legislative oversight to ensure accountability and minimize discretionary executive reallocations outside the approved budget.
The consistent theme in these systems is that legislatures must expressly authorize contingent spending through transparent mechanisms—not via open-ended standby funds embedded in general appropriation acts.
IV. Conclusion
From a constitutional standpoint grounded in the text of the 1987 Constitution, separation of powers, and emerging Philippine jurisprudence:
Unprogrammed funds—by virtue of their indeterminate nature, potential to increase appropriations beyond the President’s recommendations, and delegation of discretionary authority—are constitutionally infirm.
This conclusion is reinforced by respected judicial commentary (e.g., Justice Hernando’s opinion), comparative constitutional principles in developed democracies, and foundational fiscal constitutional doctrine.
Thus, continued use of unprogrammed funds in the national budget merits rigorous judicial scrutiny and, on firm constitutional grounds, should be invalidated or reformed through clear, programmatic appropriations enacted in compliance with constitutional mandates.
V. Sources and Citations
News Articles and Reporting
Philstar: Bicam restores unprogrammed funds to P243 billion – https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2025/12/21/2495866/bicam-restores-unprogrammed-funds-p243-billion
Philstar: Old habits die hard: Restored P243.4B unprogrammed funds draw backlash – https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2025/12/18/2495215/old-habits-die-hard-restored-p2434b-unprogrammed-funds-draw-backlash
Constitutional Text and Analysis
1987 Constitution, Article VI, Sections 25(1) and 25(5) – Philippine Constitution, budget provisions
Judicial Commentary
Justice Ramon Paul Hernando separate opinion on unprogrammed appropriations – https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2025/12/15/2494367/legislate-unprogrammed-appropriations-sc-justice
Comparative Budget Practices
OECD Journal on Budgeting (budget norms and legislative control) – https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2005/07/oecd-journal-on-budgeting-volume-4-issue-3_g1gh404a/budget-v4-3-en.pdf
Appropriation bill practices in developed democracies – https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appropriation_bill
Related Jurisprudence
PDAF case and separation of powers in appropriations – https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pork_barrel_scam
(Assisted by ChatGPT, December 21, 2025)
