Legal standing in relation to judicial power and cases involving constitutional questions

 "Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. In Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,22 this Court recognized that:

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Petitioner Members of Congress claim that the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President is tantamount to an exercise of Congress' emergency powers, thus impairing the lawmakers' legislative powers. Petitioners also maintain that the declaration is a subterfuge to avoid congressional scrutiny into the President's exercise of martial law powers.

Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members, have no legal standing or locus standi to bring suit. "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged…. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."23

Petitioners Sanlakas and PM assert that:

2. As a basic principle of the organizations and as an important plank in their programs, petitioners are committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights, interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens.

3. Members of the petitioner organizations resort to mass actions and mobilizations in the exercise of their Constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and their freedom of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the same.24 [Emphasis in the original.]

Petitioner party-list organizations claim no better right than the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, whose standing this Court rejected in Lacson v. Perez:

… petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal rights has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.

At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that it[']s right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a "state of rebellion" and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution.

However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5 [1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.25

Even assuming that petitioners are "people's organizations," this status would not vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the presidential issuances, as this Court made clear in Kilosbayan v. Morato:26

The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means," that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, §§15-16)

These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decisionmaking in the courts from decisionmaking in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.27

That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does not necessarily endow them with standing. A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.28 No such illegal disbursement is alleged.

On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.29 Again, no such injury is alleged in this case.

Even granting these petitioners have standing on the ground that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, the petitions must fail."

EN BANC 

G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004

SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP. RENATO MAGTUBO petitioners,

vs

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, DIR. GEN. HERMOGENES EBDANE, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 159103           February 3, 2004

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS namely, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R. SANDOVAL and RODOLFO D. MAPILE, petitioners,

vs

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON DATUMANONG, HON. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ANGELO REYES, and HON. SECRETARY JOSE LINA, JR., respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 159185           February 3, 2004

REP. ROLEX T. SUPLICO, REP. CARLOS M. PADILLA, REP. CELSO L. LOBREGAT, REP. HUSSIN U. AMIN, REP. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, REP. EMMYLOU J. TALINO-SANTOS, and REP. GEORGILU R. YUMUL-HERMIDA, petitioners,

vs

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO; and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 159196,  February 3, 2004

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. as a Member of the Senate, petitioner,

vs

SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES; SECRETARY JOSE LINA, et al., respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/feb2004/gr_159085_2004.html

Moot cases but capable of repetition yet evading review

 "Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.16 In addition, the Solicitor General questions the standing of the petitioners to bring suit.17

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation No. 435, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of "actual controversies."18 Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet evading review."19 The case at bar is one such case.

Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1. On that occasion, "'an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons' assaulted and attempted to break into Malacañang."20 Petitions were filed before this Court assailing the validity of the President's declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases21 precluded this Court from addressing the constitutionality of the declaration.

To prevent similar questions from reemerging, we seize this opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in the exercise of the President's calling out power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding."

EN BANC 

G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004

SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP. RENATO MAGTUBO petitioners,

vs

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, DIR. GEN. HERMOGENES EBDANE, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 159103           February 3, 2004

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS namely, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R. SANDOVAL and RODOLFO D. MAPILE, petitioners,

vs

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON DATUMANONG, HON. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ANGELO REYES, and HON. SECRETARY JOSE LINA, JR., respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 159185           February 3, 2004

REP. ROLEX T. SUPLICO, REP. CARLOS M. PADILLA, REP. CELSO L. LOBREGAT, REP. HUSSIN U. AMIN, REP. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, REP. EMMYLOU J. TALINO-SANTOS, and REP. GEORGILU R. YUMUL-HERMIDA, petitioners,

vs

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO; and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 159196,  February 3, 2004

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. as a Member of the Senate, petitioner,

vs

SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES; SECRETARY JOSE LINA, et al., respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/feb2004/gr_159085_2004.html

Commission on Human Rights

 "Fortunately, after the historic February 1986 peaceful revolution which saw the ouster of the Marcos dictatorship and the restoration of freedom and democracy in our beloved land, President Corazon C. Aquino immediately moved to restore fundamental democratic structures and processes. One such step, among many, was the creation on March 18, 1986 of the Presidential Committee On Human Rights (PCHR) 21 with Diokno himself as chairman to affirm "the new governments commitment to "uphold and respect the people's civil liberties and human rights,'" and "the United Nations General Assembly's Resolution of 14 December 1984, encouraging all member states to take steps for the establishment or, where they already exist, the strengthening of national institutions for protection of human rights," 22 and was primarily charged with the investigation, among others, of "complaints it may receive, cases known to it or to its members, and such cases as the President may, from time to time assign to it, of unexplained or forced disappearances (extra-judicial killings, salvaging, massacres, torture, hamletting, food blockades) and other violations of human rights, past or present, committed by officers or agents of the national government or persons acting in their place or stead or under their orders, express or implied."

More, the 1987 Constitution which was overwhelmingly ratified on February 2,1987 expressly mandated the creation of the Commission on Human Rights as an independent office 23 in place of a mere Presidential Committee. The Constitution vested the Commission on Human Rights with broader powers than its predecessor committee, such as to investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; to exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; to establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; to recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, on their families; to monitor the government's compliance with international treaty, obligations on human rights and grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority. On May 5, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 163 declaring the effectivity of the creation of the Commission On Human Rights as provided for in the 1987 Constitution. This case (as well as all other cases, past and present) may therefore be properly referred to said Commission for a full and thorough investigation and determination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the disappearance of Eduardo Dizon and Isabel Ramos and of the related grave charges of petitioners against the respondents and the other officers above-named.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to refer this case to the Commission on Human Rights for investigation and appropriate action as may be warranted by its findings, and to furnish the Court with a report of the outcome of its investigation and action taken thereon. This Resolution is immediately executory."

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-59118, March 3, 1988

JUAN DIZON AND SOLEDAD RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.

BRIG. GEN. VICENTE EDUARDO AND COL. TEDDY CARIAN, respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/mar1988/gr_l_59118_1988.html

Prescription: threat, intimidation vs. fraud.

 "On whether the complaint for reconveyance should be dismissed

We agree with the RTC’s and the CA’s rulings that petitioner’s argument on the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action is unavailing. When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde.33 The test, therefore, is whether, assuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be true, a valid judgment could be rendered in accordance with the prayer stated therein. Where the allegations are sufficient but the veracity of the facts is assailed, the motion to dismiss should be denied.34

In their complaint for reconveyance, respondents alleged that the transfer of the three parcels of land from TCAIC to ICCI was facilitated through threat, duress and intimidation employed by certain individuals. On its face, the complaint clearly states a cause of action and raises issues of fact that can be properly settled only after a full-blown trial. On this ground, petitioner’s motion to dismiss must, perforce, be denied.

We do not, however, subscribe to the RTC’s ruling that the action has already prescribed.

It is true that an action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations, which requires that the action shall be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.35 The RTC, however, seemed to have overlooked the fact that the basis of respondents’ complaint for reconveyance is not fraud but threat, duress and intimidation, allegedly employed by Marcos’ cronies upon the relatives of the Montanos while the latter were on self-exile.36 In fact, fraud was neither specifically alleged nor remotely implied in the complaint.

Article 1391 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1391. An action for annulment shall be brought within four years.

This period shall begin: In case of intimidation, violence or undue influence, from the time the defect of the consent ceases.

In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same.

And when the action refers to contracts entered into by minors or other incapacitated persons, from the time the guardianship ceases.

In the circumstances prevailing in this case, the threat or intimidation upon respondents is deemed to have ceased only upon the ouster of then President Marcos from power on February 21, 1986. The four-year prescriptive period must, therefore, be reckoned from the said date. Thus, when respondents filed their complaint for reconveyance on September 15, 1989, the period provided for by law had not yet prescribed. Therefore, petitioner’s motion to dismiss should be denied."

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 166383,  October 16, 2009

ASSOCIATED BANK, Petitioner,

vs. SPOUSES JUSTINIANO S. MONTANO, SR., AND LIGAYA MONTANO and TRES CRUCES AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_166383_2009.html

Affirmative defenses

"On the propriety of the motion to dismiss

Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. – If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.

The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be without prejudice to the prosecution in the same or separate action of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer.

The rule is based on practicality. Both the parties and the court can conveniently save time and expenses necessarily involved in a case preparation and in a trial at large, when the issues involved in a particular case can otherwise be disposed of in a preliminary hearing.31

Since the rule provides that the "preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed," such hearing shall therefore be conducted in the manner provided in Section 2, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,32 which reads:

SEC. 2. Hearing of motion. – At the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their arguments on the question of law and their evidence on the questions of fact involved except those not available at that time. Should the case go to trial, the evidence presented during the hearing shall automatically be part of the evidence of the party presenting the same.

It is, therefore, inconsequential that petitioner had already filed an answer to the complaint prior to its filing of a motion to dismiss. The option of whether to set the case for preliminary hearing after the filing of an answer which raises affirmative defenses, or to file a motion to dismiss raising any of the grounds set forth in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules are procedural options which are not mutually exclusive of each other.

Moreover, as petitioner correctly pointed out, respondents failed to oppose the motion to dismiss despite having been given the opportunity to do so by the RTC. Therefore, any right to contest the same was already waived by them."

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 166383,  October 16, 2009

ASSOCIATED BANK, Petitioner,

vs. SPOUSES JUSTINIANO S. MONTANO, SR., AND LIGAYA MONTANO and TRES CRUCES AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_166383_2009.html

Cause of action ; elements of.

"7. ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS OF A CAUSE OF ACTION. — A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. Its essential elements are, namely:(1) the existence of a legal right in the plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty on the part of the defendant, and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of plaintiff’s right with consequential injury or damage to the plaintiff for which he may maintain an action for the recovery of damages or other appropriate relief."

Source - 

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. JUDGE AMIR PUNDOGAR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, 12th Judicial Region, Branch III, FERNANDO JACINTO, JACINTO STEEL, INC., and ILIGAN INTEGRATED STEEL MILLS, INC., Respondents.

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com. 

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Existence of cause of action

 " 8. ID.; ID.;ID.; A FINDING THAT A COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION DOES NOT IMPLY THAT THE COMPLAINANT IS ASSURED OF A RULING IN HIS FAVOR.— However, a finding that a complaint states a cause of actin does not imply that the complainant is assured of a ruling in his favor. While a motion to dismiss based on failure of the complainant to state a cause of action necessarily carries with it the adminission, for purposes of the motion, of the truth of all material facts pleaded in the complaint, what is submitted for determination therein is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. Corrolarily, the denial of a motion to dismiss does not necessarily resolve the issues raised in the complaint in favor of the complainant inasmuch as, after the trial, the defendant might prove to have a better right to the subject matter in litigation."

Source - 

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. JUDGE AMIR PUNDOGAR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, 12th Judicial Region, Branch III, FERNANDO JACINTO, JACINTO STEEL, INC., and ILIGAN INTEGRATED STEEL MILLS, INC., Respondents.

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com. 

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Right to file action

 " 9. ID.; ID.;ID.; PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVING THE LEGAL RIGHT TO FILE THE INSTANT CASE, COURT FINDS THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION. — There is no allegation in the complaint that would show that a demand on the board of directors of IISMI was in fact made. But even if the Jacintos and JSI omitted to make the same, they can still file the instant case as a derivative suit. They have alleged that "at this time, IISMI is without a duly or legally constituted board of directors and no election of officers has been held." It would be futile for them to make a demand on the board of directors whose very constitution is being questioned. Private respondents, having the legal right to file the instant case, we find that the complaint states a legal cause of action." 

Source - 

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. JUDGE AMIR PUNDOGAR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, 12th Judicial Region, Branch III, FERNANDO JACINTO, JACINTO STEEL, INC., and ILIGAN INTEGRATED STEEL MILLS, INC., Respondents.

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com. 

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Motion to dismiss

 "10. ID.; ID.; ID.; A MOTION TO DISMISS MAY BE BASED ON ONLYONE OF THE GROUNDS ENUMERATED IN SEC. 1, RULE 16 OF THE RULES OF COURT. — Moreover, a motion to dismiss may be based on only one of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. That the petitioners were able to prove the presence of three of the four grounds they raised, viz., res judicata, lack of jurisdiction and prescription, more than warrants the reversal of the Order below denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss."

Source - 

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. JUDGE AMIR PUNDOGAR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, 12th Judicial Region, Branch III, FERNANDO JACINTO, JACINTO STEEL, INC., and ILIGAN INTEGRATED STEEL MILLS, INC., Respondents.

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com. 

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Martial law years do not interrupt prescriptive period

 "6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT RULES THAT UNDER THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THE MARTIAL LAW YEARS DID NOT HAVE THE EFFECT OF INTERRUPTING THE RUNNING OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.— The allegations regarding their absence, the cancellation of their passports, the seizure of their resources and the incarceration of other IISMI officials had all been raised earlier in the Republic case. Not having been convinced then, neither is this Court convinced now. Raising them for the second time to compel a relitigation will not suffice to make this reverse itself. Thus, we rule that, under the factual circumstances of this case, the martial law years did not have the effect of interrupting the running of the prescriptive period."

Source - 

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. JUDGE AMIR PUNDOGAR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, 12th Judicial Region, Branch III, FERNANDO JACINTO, JACINTO STEEL, INC., and ILIGAN INTEGRATED STEEL MILLS, INC., Respondents.

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com. 

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Prescription; martial law is not force majeure

 "5. ID.;ID.; PRESCRIPTION; THE SO-CALLED "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" DO NOT CONVINCE THIS COURT THAT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, MARTIAL LAW SHOULD BE TREATED AS FORCE MAJEURE THAT SUSPENDS THE RUNNING OF PRESCRIPTION.— If this Court does, then it would be relieving private respondents of their bounden duty to show that during martial law they were so circumstanced that it was impossible for them to commence, continue or even resist an action. And yet a fullblown hearing is not even necessary as the so-called "special circumstances" do not convince this Court that, in this particular case, martial law should be treated as force majeure that suspends the running of presciption. Likewise, petitioners have consistently pointed out that during the hearing of the motion to dismiss, private respondents failed to adduce any proof regarding their allegations on the tolling of the prescriptive period. Private respondents have not, in any of their pleadings, rebutted this."

Source - 

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. JUDGE AMIR PUNDOGAR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, 12th Judicial Region, Branch III, FERNANDO JACINTO, JACINTO STEEL, INC., and ILIGAN INTEGRATED STEEL MILLS, INC., Respondents.

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com. 

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Identity of causes of action

 "4. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.; THE TEST OF IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION LIES NOT IN THE FORM OF THE ACTION BUT ON WHETHER THE SAME EVIDENCE WOULD SUPPORT AND ESTABLISH THE FORMER AND THE PRESENT CAUSES OF ACTION.— As regards identity of causes of action, this requisite is similarly present although the same may not be quite apparent. In Civil Case No. 1701, the caption clearly indicates that the action is one for injunction while in Civil Case No. 111-1549, the caption does not state the title of the action as required by Sec. 1, Rule 7 if the Rules of Court. This omission notwithstanding, the test of identity of causes of action lies, not in form of the action, but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of action."

Source - 

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. JUDGE AMIR PUNDOGAR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, 12th Judicial Region, Branch III, FERNANDO JACINTO, JACINTO STEEL, INC., and ILIGAN INTEGRATED STEEL MILLS, INC., Respondents.

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com. 

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Res judicata; substantial identity of parties

 "3. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.; FOR RES JUDICATA TO APPLY, ABSOLUTE IDENTITY OF PARTIES IS NOT REQUIRED BECAUSE SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY IS SUFFICIENT. — For res judicata to apply, absolute identity of parties is not required because substantial identity is sufficient. Inclusion of additional parties will not affect the application of the principle of res judicata. In both cases, the subject matter involved is the Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc."

Source - 

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. JUDGE AMIR PUNDOGAR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, 12th Judicial Region, Branch III, FERNANDO JACINTO, JACINTO STEEL, INC., and ILIGAN INTEGRATED STEEL MILLS, INC., Respondents.

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com. 

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Loss of confidence in the Solicitor General

 

"11. ID.; ID.; PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE; THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS NOT ABSOLUTELY REQUIRED TO REPRESENT A GOVERNMENT AGENCY NEITHER IS THE LATTER ABSOLUTELY COMPELLED TO AVAIL OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL’S SERVICES. — Government agencies, including government corporations, must look to the Solicitor General to the Solicitor General, in the first instance, to represent them in legal proceedings. However, in much the same way that the Solicitor General is not absolutely required to represent a government agency, neither is the latter absolutely compelled to avail of the Solicitor General’s services. A justifiable departure from the general rule is when the agency has lost confidence in the Solicitor General, as demonstrated by its past actuations exemplified in the instant case where the DBP would rather rely on its "in house" resources for legal services. In this case, therefore, we grant DBP’s prayer to terminate the services of the OSG.

Source - 

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. JUDGE AMIR PUNDOGAR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, 12th Judicial Region, Branch III, FERNANDO JACINTO, JACINTO STEEL, INC., and ILIGAN INTEGRATED STEEL MILLS, INC., Respondents.

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com. 

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Res judicata

 "2. ID.;ACTION; RES JUDICATA; ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING RES JUDICATA AS A GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF A COMPLAINT. — Res judicata is indeed present. Imbedded in Philippine jurisprudence are the elements constituting res judicata as a ground for the dismissal of a complaint: a) the former judgment must be final; b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; c) it must be a judgment on the merits and d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action."

Source - 

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. JUDGE AMIR PUNDOGAR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, 12th Judicial Region, Branch III, FERNANDO JACINTO, JACINTO STEEL, INC., and ILIGAN INTEGRATED STEEL MILLS, INC., Respondents.

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com. 

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Denial of motion to dismiss

 "1. REMEDIAL LAW; CERTIORARI; PETITIONERS ARE RIGHTFULLY ENTITLED TO THE RECOURSE AVAILED OF AS IT IS PART OF THE SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OF THE COURT TO CORRECT THE ERROR COMMITTED. — Private respondents correctly cited the general rule in elevating cases to this Court. The rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as when the court, in denying the motion to dismiss acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. In such an instance, certiorari becomes available in order to relieve the defendant of the trouble of undergoing the ordeal and expense of a useless trial. As will be seen in the subsequent discussion, petitioners are rightfully entitled to the recourse availed of as it is part of the supervisory authority of the Court to correct the error committed."

Source - 

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. JUDGE AMIR PUNDOGAR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, 12th Judicial Region, Branch III, FERNANDO JACINTO, JACINTO STEEL, INC., and ILIGAN INTEGRATED STEEL MILLS, INC., Respondents.

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com. 

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Moot and academic

 "The problem in this case is that the President aborted the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao in just eight days. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become moot and academic. 

Of course, the Court has in exceptional cases passed upon issues that ordinarily would have been regarded as moot. But the present cases do not present sufficient basis for the exercise of the power of judicial review. The proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in this case, unlike similar Presidential acts in the late 60s and early 70s, appear more like saber-rattling than an actual deployment and arbitrary use of political power.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions on the ground that the same have become moot and academic."

Source - 

G. R. No. 190293               March 20, 2012

PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES, Petitioners,

vs.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as Commander-in-Chief and President of the Republic of the Philippines, EDUARDO ERMITA, Executive Secretary, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), or any of their units, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES acting under their direction and control, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 190294

DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Petitioner,

vs.

EDUARDO R. ERMITA in his capacity as Executive Secretary, NORBERTO GONZALES in his capacity as Secretary of National Defense, RONALDO PUNO in his capacity as Secretary of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 190301

NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLES' LAWYERS (NUPL) SECRETARY GENERAL NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE SATUR C. OCAMPO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE LIZA L. MAZA, ATTY. JULIUS GARCIA MATIBAG, ATTY. EPHRAIM B. CORTEZ, ATTY. JOBERT ILARDE PAHILGA, ATTY. VOLTAIRE B. AFRICA, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN) SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR. and ANTHONY IAN CRUZ, Petitioners,

vs.

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL VICTOR S. IBRADO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL JESUS A. VERZOSA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY AGNES VST DEVANADERA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES EASTERN MINDANAO COMMAND CHIEF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RAYMUNDO B. FERRER, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 190302

JOSEPH NELSON Q. LOYOLA, Petitioner,

vs.

HER EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL VICTOR IBRADO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), DIRECTOR GENERAL JESUS VERZOSA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 190307

JOVITO R. SALONGA, RAUL C. PANGALANGAN, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, EMILIO CAPULONG, FLORIN T. HILBAY, ROMEL R. BAGARES, DEXTER DONNE B. DIZON, ALLAN JONES F. LARDIZABAL and GILBERT T. ANDRES, suing as taxpayers and as CONCERNED Filipino citizens, Petitioners,

vs.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in his (sic) capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines, HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, GENERAL VICTOR IBRADO, in his capacity as Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff, DIRECTOR JESUS VERZOSA, in his capacity as Chief of the Philippine National Police, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 190356

BAILENG S. MANTAWIL, DENGCO SABAN, Engr. OCTOBER CHIO, AKBAYAN PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES WALDEN F. BELLO and ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, THEODORE O. TE and IBARRA M. GUTIERREZ III, Petitioners,

vs.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, and THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 190380

CHRISTIAN MONSOD and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Respondent.

Bigamy in relation to void marriages - batasfilipinas.com

 "... The SC ruled in this wise: “After a careful consideration, this Court is constrained to abandon our earlier rulings that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first, and/or second marriages cannot be raised as a defense by the accused in a criminal prosecution for bigamy. We hold that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab initio prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy case. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or second marriages presented by the accused in the prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time within which they are secured.”

Being inexistent under the eyes of the law, the nullity of a void marriage can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the spouses. A void marriage is ipso facto void without need of any judicial declaration of nullity; the only recognized exception under existing law is Article 40 of the Family Code where a marriage void ab initio is deemed valid for purposes of remarriage, hence necessitating a judicial declaration of nullity before one can contract a subsequent marriage.

Clearly, when the first marriage is void ab initio, one of the essential elements of bigamy is absent, i.e. a prior valid marriage. There can be no crime when the very act which was penalized by the law, i.e. contracting another marriage during the subsistence of a prior legal or valid marriage, is not present. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to begin with. Thus, an accused in a bigamy case should be allowed to raise the defense of a prior void ab initio marriage through competent evidence other than the judicial decree of nullity.

Apropos, with the retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage, there is nothing to annul nor dissolve as the judicial declaration of nullity merely confirms the inexistence of such marriage. Thus, the second element of bigamy, i.e. that the former marriage has not been legally dissolved or annulled, is wanting in case of void ab initio prior marriage.

What Article 349 of the RPC contemplates is contracting a subsequent marriage when a voidable or valid first marriage is still subsisting. As expounded by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Article 349 of the RPC was patterned after the Codigo Penal, which was enacted when the law governing marriages was the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, which provides that marriages may be dissolved either through annulment or divorce. The term “former marriage”, therefore, in the second element of bigamy refers to voidable or valid marriages which may be dissolved by annulment or divorce, respectively. Hence, Article 349 should be construed to pertain only to valid and voidable marriages.

In effect, when the accused contracts a second marriage without having the first marriage dissolved or annulled, the crime of bigamy is consummated as the valid or voidable first marriage still subsists without a decree of annulment by a competent court, In contrast, when the first marriage is void ab initio, the accused cannot be held liable for bigamy as the judicial declaration of its nullity is not tantamount to annulment nor dissolution but merely a declaration of a status or condition that no such marriage exists.

In the same manner, when the accused contracts a second or subsequent marriage that is void ab initio, other than it being bigamous, he/she cannot be held liable for bigamy as the effect of a void marriage signifies that the accused has not entered into a second or subsequent marriage, being inexistent from the beginning. Thus, the element, “that he or she contracts a second or subsequent marriage” is lacking. A subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage merely confirms its inexistence and shall not render the accused liable for bigamy for entering such void marriage while the first marriage still subsists. Consequently, the accused in bigamy may validly raise a void ab initio second or subsequent marriage even without a judicial declaration of nullity.

True, a marriage is presumed to be valid even if the same is void ab initio without a judicial declaration of its absolute nullity in view of Article 40 of the Family Code. However, the accused in a bigamy case should not be denied the right to interpose the defense of a void ab initio marriage, which effectively retroacts to the date of the celebration of the first marriage.

Miscellaneous

Article 40 of the Family Code does not categorically withhold from the accused the right to invoke the defense of a void ab initio marriage even without a judicial decree of absolute nullity in criminal prosecution for bigamy. To adopt a contrary stringent application would defy the principle that penal laws are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Granted, the State has the right to preserve and protect the sanctity of marriage; this should not, however, be done at the expense of the presumption of innocence of the accused. What is penalized under Article 349 of the RPC is the act of contracting a subsequent marriage while the prior marriage was valid and subsisting. This simply connotes that this provision penalizes contracting of a voidable or valid marriage and not a void ab initio marriage.

Nothing in Article 40 mentions the effect thereof on the criminal liability of the accused in bigamy cases. It would indeed be unfair to withhold from the accused in a bigamy case the right and the opportunity to raise the defense of nullity of a void ab initio marriage when the law does not explicitly say so. Thus, to borrow Justice Caguioa5 s opinion, even with the enactment of Article 40, a void ab initio marriage remains a valid defense in bigamy, and a prior and separate judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not indispensable to establish the same."

Source - 

https://batasfilipinas.com/case-digest-luisito-pulido-v-people-of-the-philippines-g-r-no-220149-july-27-2021/

Retired Chief Justices

A RETIRED CHIEF JUSTICE of the Philippines who wishes to maintain his PERSONAL DIGNITY and the INSTITUTIONAL DIGNITY of the JUDICIARY as an INDEPENDENT AND CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT should not be employed as a SALARIED BUREAUCRAT of the EXECUTIVE, regardless of the high rank and salary grade accruing to the position.

I REJECT the hypocrisy that the retired Chief Justice merely desires "to continue serving his country" as a civil servant and as a legal expert under the day-to-day supervision and control of the Executive. Let us face it, their real motives are the maintenance of POWER AND WEALTH as aristocrats in the government hierarchy. 

The honorable ways for a retired Chief Justice to serve his Nation, in general, and the Bench and the Bar, in particular, aside from enjoying the retirement phase of his remaining lifespan with his grandchildren, are by being a LEGAL SCHOLAR, LEGAL ACADEMICIAN,  LEGAL AND SOCIAL CRITIC, LEGAL AUTHOR, and LEGAL ELDER OF SOCIETY in general.

Retired Justices should be happy with their retirement status and should live modest lives within the amounts of the retirement benefits granted to them by government (the gross amounts of which are not really that "modest" compared to the amounts of the retirement benefits received by regular government officials and personnel).

They should preserve the NOBILITY of their positions, names and memories as RETIRED HIGHEST RANKING ADMINISTRATORS AND DISPENSERS OF JUSTICE by refusing regular active employment in the Executive Branch as SALARIED INFERIORS OF THE EXECUTIVE.

Quantum of evidence to convict. Circumstantial evidence.

 "It is axiomatic in criminal law that the quantum of evidence required for conviction of an accused is that which produces moral certainly in an unprejudiced mind that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. If the evidence is susceptible of two (2) interpretations, one inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and the other inconsistent with his guilt, the accused must be acquitted. 23

Accordingly, circumstantial evidence would only be sufficient if there is a concurrence of the following elements: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inference was derived are proven and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must be "an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion, which points to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person."24 The Constitution demands no less than "proof beyond reasonable doubt", consistent with the demands of justice and due process.

In sum, we rule that while accused-appellant's alibi may have been weak, the evidence presented by the prosecution was much weaker. A broken chain of circumstances cannot overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused which entitles him to an ACQUITTAL."

G.R. Nos. 110991-92 February 24, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

MELCHOR DELA IGLESIA, accused-appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/feb1995/gr_110991_92_1995.html