The acquittal of accused-appellant is in order. Jurisprudence dictates that the correct course of action depends on whether the prosecution has presented evidence to establish the guilt of the accused

"The acquittal of accused-appellant is in order. Jurisprudence dictates that the correct course of action depends on whether the prosecution has presented evidence to establish the guilt of the accused


The State insists that the case must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings so that the trial court may comply with the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 116.


For his part, accused-appellant insists that he should be acquitted because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. In support thereof, he cited Janjalani80 which ruled that "[c]onvictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment."


Unfortunately, accused-appellant's quote is misleading. While it is true that convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are indeed set aside if the plea is the sole basis of the judgment, it does not automatically result in the acquittal of the accused. Rather, the case is remanded to the lower court for compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules.


The issue of the effects of an improvident plea of guilty on a conviction is not novel.


The applicable course of action prior to the 1985 Rules is clear. As stated above, the conviction of the accused simply depends on whether the plea of guilty to a capital offense was improvident or not. An indubitable admission of guilt automatically results to a conviction. Otherwise, a conviction on the basis of an improvident plea of guilt, on appeal, would be set aside and the case would be remanded for presentation of evidence. An exception to this is when, despite the existence of an improvident plea, a conviction will not be disturbed when the prosecution presented sufficient evidence during trial to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The existing rules, however, shifted the focus from the nature of the plea to whether evidence was presented during the trial to prove the guilt of the accused.


People v. Derilo81 explained this shift, thus:


Over the years and through numerous cases, this Court has adopted an exception to the erstwhile rule enunciating that there is no need to prove the presence of aggravating circumstances alleged in an information or complaint when the accused pleads guilty to the charge. Our rulings regarding this principle were expressed more or less in this wise:


Having pleaded guilty to the information, these aggravating circumstances were deemed fully established, for the plea of guilty to the information covers both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime.


We are not, however, concerned here merely with the doctrine itself but more specifically with the consequences thereof. Thus, in People vs. Rapirap, it was formerly explained that the subject doctrine has the following effects:


A plea of guilty does not merely join the issues of the complaint or information, but amounts to an admission of guilt and of the material facts alleged in the complaint or information and in this sense takes the place of the trial itself. Such plea removes the necessity of presenting further evidence and for all intents and purposes the case is deemed tried on its merits and submitted for decision. It leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty prescribed by law.


Then, in People vs. Lambino, we prevented the accused in criminal actions from contradicting the outcome of his admission, with our holding that by the plea of guilty, the accused admits all the facts alleged in the information and, by that plea, he is precluded from showing that he has not committed them.


People vs. Yamson, et al. thereafter expanded the application of the doctrine to both capital and non-capital cases:


A plea of guilty is an admission of all the material facts alleged in the complaint or information. A plea of guilty when formally entered in arraignment is sufficient to sustain a conviction for any offense charged in the information, without the necessity of requiring additional evidence, since by so pleading, the defendant himself has supplied the necessary proof. It matters not even if the offense is capital for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances.


Finally, People vs. Apduhan, Jr. cited by some of the cases relied upon by the lower court, declared that —


While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it at the same time constitutes an admission of all material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstance therein recited, x x x The prosecution does not need to prove the three aggravating circumstances (all alleged in the second amended information) since the accused, by his plea of guilty, has supplied the requisite proof.


With the foregoing presentation, the trial court must have believed that it had acted correctly in presuming the existence of evident premeditation based on appellant's plea of guilty without any proof being presented to establish such aggravating circumstance. However, the developmental growth of our procedural rules did not stop there. With the advent of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, a new rule, specifically mandating the course that trial courts should follow in capital cases where the accused pleads guilty, was introduced into our remedial law with this provision:


SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.


We expounded on this in People vs. Camay with this explanation:


Under the new formulation, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense has been entered by the accused: 1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; 2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and 3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.


The amended rule is a capsulization of the provisions of the old rule and pertinent jurisprudence. We had several occasions to issue the caveat that even if the trial court is satisfied that the plea of guilty was entered with full knowledge of its meaning and consequences, the Court must still require the introduction of evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt and degree of culpability of the defendant. This is the proper norm to be followed not only to satisfy the trial judge but also to aid the Court in determining whether or not the accused really and truly comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea.


The presentation of evidence is required in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that there might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalty.


To emphasize its importance this Court held in People vs. Dayot that the rule in Section 3, Rule 116 is mandatory, and issued the warning that any judge who fails to observe its command commits a grave abuse of discretion.


This Court has come a long way in adopting a mandatory rule with regard to the presentation of evidence in capital cases where the accused pleads guilty to the criminal charge. From granting trial courts in the


earlier Rules of Court sufficient discretion in requiring evidence whenever guilt is admitted by the accused, the Court has now made it mandatory on the part of the lower courts to compel the presentation of evidence and make sure that the accused fully comprehends the nature and consequences of his plea of guilty.82 (citations omitted)


Thus, the plea of guilty of an accused cannot stand in place of the evidence that must be presented and is called for by Sec. 3 of Rule 116. Trial courts should no longer assume that a plea of guilty includes an admission of the attending circumstances alleged in the information as they are now required to demand that the prosecution prove the exact liability of the accused. The requirements of Sec. 3 would become idle and fruitless if we were to allow conclusions of criminal liability and aggravating circumstances on the dubious strength of a presumptive rule.83


As it stands, the conviction of the accused shall be based principally on the evidence presented by the prosecution. The improvident plea of guilty by the accused becomes secondary.


Accordingly, convictions involving improvident pleas are affirmed if the same are supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the conviction is set aside and the case remanded for re-trial when the conviction is predicated solely on the basis of the improvident plea of guilt, meaning that the prosecution was unable to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus:


As in the case of an improvident plea of guilty, an invalid waiver of the right to present evidence and be heard per se does not work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case and enforce an automatic remand thereof to the trial court. In People v. Molina, to warrant the remand of the case it must also be proved that as a result of such irregularity there was inadequate representation of facts by either the prosecution or the defense during the trial —


In People v. Abapo we found that undue reliance upon an invalid plea of guilty prevented the prosecution from fully presenting its evidence, and thus remanded the criminal case for further proceedings. Similarly in People v. Durango where an improvident plea of guilty was followed by an abbreviated proceeding with practically no role at all being played by the defense, we ruled that this procedure was "just too meager to accept as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life" and so threw back the criminal case to the trial court for appropriate action. Verily the relevant matter that justifies the remand of the criminal case to the trial court is the procedural unfairness or complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings a quo as occasioned by xxx the "attendant circumstances."


Conversely, where facts are adequately represented in the criminal case and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that the guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld where the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record. Verily, in such a case, it would be a useless ritual to return the case to the trial court for further proceedings.84 (emphases supplied)


Accordingly, this Court has sustained convictions85 involving impro­vident pleas of guilt because, in any case, the sentence of conviction is supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt independent of the accused's plea of guilty.


However, where the conviction is predicated solely on the basis of an improvident plea of guilty, this Court has consistently chosen to set aside said conviction and, instead, remand the case to the lower court for further proceedings. This was the ruling in an unbroken line of jurisprudence.86 "Further proceedings" usually entails re-arraignment and reception of evidence from both the prosecution and the defense in compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 116.


In People v. Dalacat,87 this Court, in deciding to remand the case, stated the following:


Given the unchanging state of the three-tiered requisites in Section 3, Rule 116, there is, indeed, no justification for the trial court's failure to observe them.


Thus, we purge the decision under review of its errors and remand the case to the trial court for further re-arraignment, a more incisive searching inquiry and the reception of evidence for the prosecution and the defense, if the latter so desires, in accordance with the foregoing guideposts.88 (citation omitted)


Parenthetically, it is a mistake to assume that an invalid arraignment automatically results to a remand of the case. In People v. Ong (Ong),89 the Court decided the case on its merits despite a determination of an invalid arraignment.


Jurisprudence has developed in such a way that cases are remanded back to the trial court for re-arraignment and re-trial when undue prejudice was brought about by the improvident plea of guilty. The Court explains this course of action in People v. Abapo,90 viz:


We are not unmindful of the rulings of this Court to the effect that the manner by which the plea of guilt was made, whether improvidently or not, loses its legal significance where the conviction is based on the evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged. However, after a careful examination of the records of this case, we find that the improvident plea of guilt of the accused-appellant has affected the manner by which the prosecution conducted its presentation of the evidence. The presentation of the prosecution's case was lacking in assiduity and was not characterized with the meticulous attention to details that is necessarily expected in a prosecution for a capital offense. The state prosecutor in his examination of the victim was evidently concerned only with proving the respective dates of the commission of the repeated rapes, and did not attempt to elicit details about the commission of each rape that would satisfy the requirements for establishing proof beyond reasonable doubt that the offenses charged have in fact been committed by the accused. It is clear to our mind that the prosecution did not discharge its obligation as seriously as it would have had there been no plea of guilt on the part of the accused, x x x[.]91 (citation omitted)


The Court repeated the rule in People v. Molina (Molina)92 when it held that:


It is also urged in the Brief for the Appellant that an improvident plea of guilty per se results in the remand of the criminal case(s) to the trial court for the re-arraignment of accused-appellant and for further proceedings. We hold that this argument does not accurately reflect the standing principle. Our jurisdiction does not subscribe to a per se rule that once a plea of guilty is deemed improvidently made that the accused-appellant is at once entitled to a remand. To warrant a remand of the criminal case, it must also be proved that as a result of such irregularity there was inadequate representation of facts by either the prosecution or the defense during the trial. In People v. Abapo, we found that undue reliance upon an invalid plea of guilty prevented the prosecution from fully presenting its evidence, and thus remanded the criminal case for further proceedings. Similarly in People v. Durango where an improvident plea of guilty was followed by an abbreviated proceeding with practically no role at all being played by the defense, we ruled that this procedure was "just too meager to accept as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life" and so threw back the criminal case to the trial court for appropriate action. Verily the relevant matter that justifies the remand of the criminal case to the trial court is the procedural unfairness or complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings a quo as occasioned by the improvident plea of guilty, or what People v. Tizon, encapsulizes as the "attendant circumstances."93 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)


Here, the Court cannot sustain the conviction as there is nothing in the records that would show the guilt of accused-appellant. Neither is it just to remand the case. This is not a situation where the prosecution was wholly deprived of the opportunity to perform its duties under the 2000 Revised Rules to warrant a remand. In this case, the prosecution was already given reasonable opportunity to prove its case against accused-appellant. Regrettably, the State squandered its chances to the detriment of accused-appellant. If anything, the State, given its vast resources and awesome powers, cannot be allowed to vex an accused with criminal prosecution more than once. The State should, first and foremost, exercise fairness.


The records also do not disclose that the improvident plea of guilty jeopardized the presentation of evidence by the prosecution, to the prejudice of either the prosecution or accused-appellant.


Therefore, in instances where an improvident plea of guilt has been entered and the prosecution was given reasonable opportunity to present evidence to establish the guilt of the accused but failed to do so, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, if only to give rise to the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and the presumption of innocence.


Since the prosecution was given four (4) separate hearing dates to present evidence against accused-appellant and, despite these chances, the prosecution was unable to prove his guilt, the Court acquits accused- appellant for failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder."



PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html

There is no transcript of stenographic notes which would reveal what actually took place, what words were spoken, what warnings were given, if a translation was made and the manner by which it was made, and whether or not the guidelines for a searching inquiry were duly observed.

"Applying the foregoing principles in this case, it is evident that the trial court failed miserably to comply with the duties imposed by the 2000 Revised Rules. As regards the first duty.... The Court scanned the records of the case to see compliance with the said duty. The search, however, was in vain. The records are barren of any proceeding where the trial court gauged the mindset of the accused when he pleaded guilty.

There is no transcript of stenographic notes which would reveal what actually took place, what words were spoken, what warnings were given, if a translation was made and the manner by which it was made, and whether or not the guidelines for a searching inquiry were duly observed.

The RTC merely stated in its August 20, 2009 Order77 that "[a]ll the contents of the Information as well as the particular crime charged was personally read to accused-appellant in a Cebuano-Visayan dialect."78 The RTC further stated that the court and his counsel explained to accused-appellant the consequences of his plea of guilt and that he will be sentenced and imprisoned. Despite this, accused-appellant maintained his plea of guilty.

Simply, there is no proof whatsoever that the herein judge conducted the searching inquiry required. No other conclusion can be made other than that the RTC failed to discharge its duties. Accused-appellant's plea of guilt is improvident.

What compounded the RTC's strenuous oversight is the fact that the trial court penalized accused-appellant of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to present evidence of his guilt. This is in direct contravention of the mandate of the second duty stated in Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules.

In this regard, the Court agrees with the CA that accused-appellant's guilt for the crime of murder was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is beyond cavil that the prosecution did not present any witness, despite being given four (4) separate hearing dates to do so. Thus, the RTC's conviction of accused-appellant relied solely on his improvident plea of guilty.

Lastly, as regard the third requisite, the October 5, 2011 Order of the RTC stated that "[a]ccused[-appellant,] despite the non-reception of prosecution's evidence,] opted not to present any evidence in [sic] his behalf."79 It would appear that accused-appellant waived his right to present evidence under Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules. However, the same Order and the records of the case are bereft of any showing that the trial court complied with the guidelines promulgated by the Court in People v. Bodoso. Such cavalier attitude of the trial court to the Rules of Court and existing jurisprudence leaves much to be desired.

The RTC's noncompliance with the Rules of Court is beyond dispute. Both the OSG and accused-appellant agree on this point. The divergence, however, is centered on the effect of such noncompliance. Accused-appellant contends that he should be acquitted while the OSG agrees with the CA's order to remand the case for reception of evidence to prove accused-appellant's guilt."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html

The accused must be given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence

"The accused must be given a reasonable

opportunity to present evidence

The third duty imposed on the trial court by the 2000 Revised Rules is to allow the accused to present exculpatory or mitigating evidence on his behalf in order to properly calibrate the correct imposable penalty. This duty, however, does not mean that the trial court can compel the accused to present evidence. Of course, the court cannot force the accused to present evidence when there is none. The accused is free to waive his right to present evidence if he so desires.

Consistent with the policy of the law, the Court has issued guidelines regarding the waiver of the accused of his right to present evidence under this rule, thus:

Henceforth, to protect the constitutional right to due process of every accused in a capital offense and to avoid any confusion about the proper steps to be taken when a trial court comes face to face with an accused or his counsel who wants to waive his client's right to present evidence and be heard, it shall be the unequivocal duty of the trial court to observe, as a prerequisite to the validity of such waiver, a procedure akin to a "searching inquiry" as specified in People v. Aranzado when an accused pleads guilty, particularly —

1.  The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the accused with their respective counsel on the desire or manifestation of the accused to waive the right to present evidence and be heard.

2. The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the prosecution and especially the accused with their respective counsel in the hearing which must be recorded. Their presence must be duly entered in the minutes of the proceedings.

3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court to —

a.   ask the defense counsel a series of question to determine whether he had conferred with and completely explained to the accused that he had the right to present evidence and be heard as well as its meaning and consequences, together with the significance and outcome of the waiver of such right. If the lawyer for the accused has not done so, the trial court shall give the latter enough time to fulfill this professional obligation.

b.  inquire from the defense counsel with conformity of the accused whether he wants to present evidence or submit a memorandum elucidating on the contradictions and insufficiency of the prosecution evidence, if any, or in default theory, file a demurrer to evidence with prior leave of court, if he so believes that the prosecution evidence is so weak that it need not even be rebutted. If there is a desire to do so, the trial court shall give the defense enough time to this purpose.

c.  elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed waiver.

d.  all questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter, hence, the record must state the language used for this purpose as well as reflect the corresponding translation thereof in English.

In passing, trial courts may also abide by the foregoing procedure even when the waiver of the right to be present and be heard is made in criminal cases involving non-capital offenses. After all, in whatever action or forum the accused is situated, the waiver that he makes if it is to be binding and effective must still be exhibited in the case records to have been validly undertaken, that is, it was done voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. As a matter of good court practice, the trial court would have to rely upon the most convenient, if not primary, evidence of the validity of the waiver which would amount to the same thing as showing its adherence to the step-by-step process outlined above.

Clearly, the rationale behind the foregoing requirements is that courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence in irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times thrown caution to the wind and given up defending themselves out of ignorance or desperation. Moreover, the necessity of taking further evidence would aid this Court in determining on appellate review the proprietary or impropriety of the waiver.76 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)"

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html

The plea of guilt made by the accused does not relieve the prosecution of the duty to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt

"The plea of guilt made by the accused

does not relieve the prosecution of the

duty to prove the guilt of the accused

beyond reasonable doubt

On account of the amendment of the 1964 Rules of the Court, the second duty of the trial court, to require the prosecution to present evidence of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, has become mandatory. Hence, it is imperative that the trial court requires the presentation of evidence from the prosecution to enable itself to determine the precise participation and the degree of culpability of the accused in the perpetration of the capital offense charged.74

The reason behind this requirement is that the plea of guilt alone can never be sufficient to produce guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It must be remembered that a plea of guilty is only a supporting evidence or secondary basis for a finding of culpability, the main proof being the evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Once an accused charged with a capital offense enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial shall be conducted just the same as if no such plea was entered. The court cannot, and should not, relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability by the requisite quantum of evidence. The reason for such rule is to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which may justify or require either a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties.75

Thus, as it stands, the conviction of the accused no longer depends solely on his plea of guilty but rather on the strength of the prosecution's evidence."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html

The essence of the requirement of the conduct of a searching inquiry is the ascertainment of the accused's voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea

"The essence of the requirement of the
conduct of a searching inquiry is the
ascertainment of the accused's
voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea

The searching inquiry requirement means more than informing cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term but also, the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the certainty that he will serve time at the national penitentiary or a penal colony.65 The searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea.66

Not infrequently indeed, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of lenient treatment, or upon bad advice, or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions.''67

A searching inquiry likewise compels the judge to content himself reasonably that the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state of duress — and that his guilty plea has not therefore been given improvidently — either by actual threats of physical harm from malevolent quarters or simply because of his, the judge's, intimidating robes.68

Further, a searching inquiry must not only comply with the requirements of Sec. 1, par. (a), of Rule 116 but must also expound on the events that actually took place during the arraignment, the words spoken and the warnings given, with special attention to the age of the accused, his educational attainment and socio-economic status as well as the manner of his arrest and detention, the provision of counsel in his behalf during the custodial and preliminary investigations, and the opportunity of his defense counsel to confer with him. These matters are relevant since they serve as trustworthy indices of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. Lastly, the trial court must explain the essential elements of the crime he was charged with and its respective penalties and civil liabilities, and also direct a series of questions to defense counsel to determine whether he has conferred with the accused and has completely explained to him the meaning of a plea of guilty. This formula is mandatory and absent any showing that it was followed, a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been undertaken.69

Simply, the requirement ensures that the plea of guilty was voluntarily made and that the accused comprehends the severe consequences of his plea. This means asking a myriad of questions which would solicit any indication of coercion, misunderstanding, error, or fraud that may have influenced the decision of the accused to plead guilty to a capital offense.

Thus, in every case where the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, especially when he is ignorant with little or no education, the proper and prudent course to follow is to take such evidence as are available and necessary in support of the material allegations of the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance, and consequences of his plea.70 In particular, trial courts are mandated to conduct the searching inquiry, thus:

Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a "searching inquiry," we have held that the following guidelines should be observed:

1. Ascertain from the accused himself

a. how he was brought into the custody of the law;

b. whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and

c. under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.

2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.

3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.

5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.

6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.

7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.71

Corollary to this duty, a plea of guilty to a capital offense without the benefit of a searching inquiry or an ineffectual inquiry, as required by Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules, results to an improvident plea of guilty. It has even been held that the failure of the court to inquire into whether the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and to fully explain to him the elements of the crime constitutes a violation of the accused's fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.72

This requirement is a reminder that judges must be cautioned against the demands of sheer speed in disposing of cases for their mission, after all, and as has been time and again put, is to see that justice is done.73"


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html

The evolution of the duty of trial courts in instances where the accused pleaded guilty to a capital offense

"The evolution of the duty of trial
courts in instances where the accused
pleaded guilty to a capital offense

Accused-appellant was charged with murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, making said crime a capital offense.37

It must be noted that murder remains a capital offense despite the proscription against the imposition of death as a punishment.38 In People v. Albert,39 the Court ruled that "in case death was found to be the imposable penalty, the same would only have to be reduced to reclusion perpetua in view of the prohibition against the imposition of the capital punishment, but the nature of the offense of murder as a capital crime, and for that matter, of all crimes properly characterized as capital offenses under the Revised Penal Code, was never tempered to that of a non-capital offense."40

Thus, when accused-appellant pleaded guilty during his arraignment, he pleaded to a capital offense. Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules is relevant, viz.:


SECTION 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and [shall] require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.


Interestingly, the rule encapsulated in Sec. 3, Rule 116 was not the rule prior to the advent of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The evolution of the rule reveals a dichotomy which the Court now addresses. The development of the rule, as well as jurisprudence, dictates a just resolution of the case.


Even prior to the adoption of the 1940 Rules of Court, jurisprudence has had to grapple with instances where an accused pleaded guilty to a capital offense. In such instances, the Court maintained a policy of restraint in rendering judgment on the sole basis of such plea.


As early as 1903, in U.S. v. Patala,41 the Court cautioned against the acceptance of pleas of guilty and opined that the trial judge should freely exercise his discretion in allowing pleas of guilty to be withdrawn if the accused does not fully realize the probable effects of his admission:


The pleas of "guilty" and "not guilty" as accepted in American law were unknown to the Spanish law. Under the Spanish law there was what was called "judicial confession," whereby the accused admitted the commission of the act alleged in the complaint, but by so doing the defendant did not attempt to characterize the act as criminal, as is the case with a defendant who pleads "guilty" under American law. It also appears that there are no words in the Tagalog or Visayan dialects which can express exactly the idea conveyed by the English word "guilty." In a case of homicide, for instance, when the question is put to the defendant in either of these two dialects as to whether he is guilty or not guilty, he is asked whether he killed the deceased or not. If he answers that he did kill the deceased, he merely admits that he committed the material act which caused the death of the deceased. He does not, however, understand it to be an admission on his part that he has no defense and must be punished. The case at bar serves to illustrate this fact. Under these circumstances, we are of opinion that the trial judge should freely exercise his discretion in allowing the plea of "guilty" to be withdrawn; indeed, he must, on his own motion, order that it be withdrawn if, in his opinion, the accused does not fully realize the probable effect of his admission.42


Again, in the 1917 case of U.S. v. Jamad (Jamad),43 this Court noted that "[notwithstanding the plea of 'guilty,' several witnesses were examined, under the well-settled practice in this jurisdiction which contemplates the taking of additional evidence in cases wherein pleas of 'guilty' are entered to complaints or information charging grave crimes, and more especially crimes for which the prescribed penalty is death."44 Hence, the following guidelines were adopted:


We may say then, in response to the request for a ruling on this subject by the Attorney-General:


(1) The essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime or crimes charged in the complaint or information.


(2) Such a plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself supplied the necessary proof.


(3) There is nothing in the law in this jurisdiction which forbids the introduction of evidence as to the guilt of the accused, and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime, after the entry of a plea of "guilty."


(4) Having in mind the danger of the entry of improvident pleas of "guilty" in criminal cases, the prudent and advisable course, especially in cases wherein grave crimes are charged, is to take additional evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime.


(5) The better practice would indicate that, when practicable, such additional evidence should be sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction independently of the plea of guilty, or at least to leave no room for reasonable doubt in the mind of either the trial or the appellate court as to the possibility of a misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the precise nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty.


(6) Notwithstanding what has been said, it lies in the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge whether he will take evidence or not in any case wherein he is satisfied that a plea of "guilty" has been entered by the accused, with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his act.


(7) But in the event that no evidence is taken, this court, if called upon to review the proceedings had in the court below, may reverse and send back for a new trial, if, on the whole record, a reasonable doubt arises as to whether the accused did in fact enter the plea of "guilty" with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of the act.45


From the foregoing, it is evident that this jurisdiction places a premium on ensuring that an accused pleading guilty to a grave crime understands his plea and the possible consequences thereof. Further, this Court expressly recognized the wisdom in receiving evidence in such cases despite the fact that Sec. 3146 of General Order No. 5847 contemplated the reception of evidence only in cases where a plea of not guilty has been entered.


The Jamad guidelines became the standard for trial courts when confronted with similar circumstances. It must be noted, however, that the reception of evidence in cases where the accused pleads guilty remained discretionary on the part of the trial court. In fact, convictions solely on the basis of a plea of guilty were upheld by this Court.


In U.S. v. Burlado,48 this Court affirmed therein accused's conviction for the crime of qualified theft on the strength of his plea of guilty. The Court explained that "[a] plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant himself having supplied the necessary proof by his plea of guilty. (United States v. Dineros, 18 Phil. 566 (1911); United States v. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305 (1917).) The defendant having admitted his guilt of the facts charged in the complaint, the only question left for decision is the penalty"49


The 1940 Rules of Court, the earliest progenitor of the 2000 Revised Rules, extended the same level of protection. Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the 1940 Rules of Court reads:


SECTION 5. Plea of Guilty — Determination of Punishment. — Where the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or information, if the court accepts the plea and has discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it may hear witnesses to determine what punishment shall be imposed.50


The 1964 version of the Rules of Court reproduced this section verbatim.51 Thus, when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court may hear witnesses for purposes of determining the punishment to be imposed; the guilt of the accused was a forgone conclusion. The rule seemed to institutionalize Jamad as shown by the discretionary nature of the hearing.


Accordingly, in People v. Ng Pek,52 this Court stated that "[t]he record shows that when the case was called for the arraignment of the accused on November 3, 1947, the accused waived his right to be assisted by counsel and then and there entered the plea of guilty. That plea necessarily foreclosed the right of the accused to defend himself and left the court with no other alternative than to impose the penalty prescribed by law."53


In the same breath, the Court, in People v. Santa Rosa,54 upheld the conviction of therein accused for illegal possession of a firearm due to his plea of guilty. It stated that "[t]he general rule is that 'a plea of guilty when formally entered on arraignment is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant himself having supplied the necessary proof by his plea of guilty."55


Finally, in People v. Acosta,56 which involved the imposition of the supreme penalty of death for the crime of robbery with homicide, this Court upheld the conviction and penalty imposed and stated that:


"x x x the essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the information; that when formally entered, such a plea is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself supplied the necessary proof; and that while it may be prudent and advisable in some cases, especially where grave crimes are charged, to take additional evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime nevertheless it lies in the sound discretion of the court whether to take evidence or not in any case where it is satisfied that the plea of guilty has been entered by the accused with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his act. (citations omitted)"57


Clearly, to this point, the reception of evidence when an accused pleads guilty depended on the sound discretion of the trial court.


However, the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules) introduced a paradigm shift to the formerly discretionary role of trial courts when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The 1985 version of the rule,58 as amended, reads:


SECTION 3. Plea of Guilty to Capital Offense; Reception of Evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. (5a, R-118)


The 2000 Revised Rules retained the salient points of the 1985 amendment. Hence, at present, the three (3)-fold duty of the trial court in instances where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense is as follows: (1) conduct a searching inquiry, (2) require the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt and precise degree of culpability, and (3) allow the accused to present evidence on his behalf.


The present rules formalized the requirement of the conduct of a searching inquiry as to the accused's voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. Further, it made mandatory the reception of evidence in cases where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. Most importantly, the present rules require that the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. Evidently, starting with the 1985 Rules, the accused may no longer be convicted for a capital offense on the sole basis of his plea of guilty.


The Court acknowledged the paradigm shift in People v. Lagarto,59 thus:


Section 5, Rule 118 of the old Rules of Court provides that "Where the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or information, if the trial court accepts the plea and has discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it may hear witnesses to determine what punishments shall be imposed." The trial court in a criminal case may sentence a defendant who pleads guilty to the offense charged in the information, without the necessity of taking testimony. (US v. Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541). Yet, it is advisable for the trial court to call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the defendant. (People vs. Comendador, supra) The present Revised Rules of Court, however, decrees that where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, it is now mandatory for the court to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and his precise degree of culpability, with the accused being likewise entitled to present evidence to prove, inter alia, mitigating circumstances (See People vs. Camay, 152 SCRA 401; Section 3, Rule 116 of Rules of Court).60 (emphasis supplied)


It is equally important to note that the 1985 Rules retained the directive that the reception of evidence in cases where the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense is discretionary on the part of the trial court.


This is encapsulated in Sec. 4, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules.61 The 2000 Revised Rules adopted Sec. 4, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules verbatim.


Considering the mandatory nature of Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules, this Court, in People v. Gambao (Gambao),62 restated the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense as follows:


(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,


(2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and


(3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.63


Gambao also explained the rationale for these duties, thus:


Courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence of his plea. Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.64 (emphasis supplied). "


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html

In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.

"Accused-appellant availed of the
wrong remedy

Procedurally, it must be noted that accused-appellant availed of the wrong remedy in questioning the May 8, 2018 CA Decision before this Court.

He filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, which provides:

SECTION 13. Certification or Appeal of Cases to Supreme Court. —

x x x x

(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.

Here, the CA Decision annulled and set aside the RTC conviction and ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Notably, the assailed CA Decision did not affirm the conviction or the penalty imposed by the RTC. Thus, Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 is not applicable to the case at bench.

Instead, accused-appellant should have filed an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to assail the CA Decision pursuant to Sec. 3(e), Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules, which expressly provides that "[e]xcept as provided in the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45."

Accordingly, the remedy available to accused-appellant to question the CA Decision is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. It is an oft-repeated rule that appeals of criminal cases shall be brought to the Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court except when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, in which case the appeal shall be made by a mere notice of appeal before the CA.36 Evidently, accused-appellant availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a notice of appeal to question the May 8, 2018 CA Decision.

Nonetheless, this Court, in the interest of substantial justice, shall treat the instant ordinary appeal as an appeal by certiorari so as to resolve the substantive issues with finality."


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html

Right reason and justice

"For there is but one essential justice which cements society, and ONE LAW which establishes this JUSTICE. This law is RIGHT REASON, which is the TRUE RULE of all commandments and prohibitions. Whoever neglects this law, whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust and wicked."

— Marcus Tullius CICERO 

"In addition, the Court remains mindful of the fact that the State possesses vast powers and has immense resources at its disposal. Indeed, as the Court held in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, the individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-a-vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government and his only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES under the BILL OF RIGHTS which shield him in times of need."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html

Children, regardless of their parents’ marital status, can now inherit from their grandparents and other direct ascendants by right of representation.

"SC Revisits ‘Iron Curtain Rule’ in Succession Law, Upholds Best Interest of the Child
March 31, 2022

Children, regardless of their parents’ marital status, can now inherit from their grandparents and other direct ascendants by right of representation.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the Court En Banc reinterpreted Article 992 of the Civil Code, which prohibits nonmarital children from inheriting from their siblings who are marital children, as well as “relatives of [their] father or mother[.]” The Decision used the terms “marital” and “nonmarital” to replace the terms “legitimate” and “illegitimate” when referring to the children, as the latter terms are pejorative terms when used to describe children based on their parents’ marital status.

This case involves a woman who claims to be the nonmarital child of a man who died before she was born. After her alleged paternal grandfather died, she asserted her right to represent her deceased father—a marital child—in inheriting from her grandfather’s estate.

However, in previous cases, the Court had interpreted Article 992 as barring nonmarital children from inheriting from their grandparents and other direct ascendants, as they are covered by the term “relatives.” The Supreme Court had called this prohibition the “iron curtain rule,” inferred from a perceived hostility between the marital and nonmarital sides of a family.

Now, the Court reexamined the iron curtain rule, finding that Article 992 “should be construed to account for other circumstances of birth and family dynamics. Peace within families cannot be encouraged by callously depriving some of its members of their inheritance. Such deprivation may even be the cause of antagonism and alienation that could have been otherwise avoided.”

The Court also recognized that nonmarital children primarily suffer the consequences imposed by laws, despite the status being beyond their power to change. Some children may be nonmarital because their parents choose not to marry; in 2016, the Philippine Statistics Authority reported that, from 2007 to 2016, there was 14.4% decline in registered marriages in the country. Other children may be nonmarital because one or both of their parents are below marriageable age. In 2017 alone, 196,478 children were born to mothers 19 years old and under, and 52,342 children were sired by fathers 19 years old and under. There are also children who are nonmarital when their mother was a survivor of sexual assault who did not marry the perpetrator; or when one parent dies before they can marry the other parent.

Departing from regressive conjectures about family life in favor of the best interests of the child, the Court abandoned the presumption that “nonmarital children are products of illicit relationships or that they are automatically placed in a hostile environment perpetrated by the marital family.”

The Court ruled that grandparents and other direct ascendants are outside the scope of “relatives” under Article 992. “Both marital and nonmarital children, whether born from a marital or nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their parents and other ascendants.” Thus, a nonmarital child’s right of representation should be governed by Article 982 of the Civil Code, which does not differentiate based on the birth status of grandchildren and other direct descendants.

The two amici curiae appointed by the Court, Dean Cynthia Del Castillo and Professor Elizabeth Aguiling-Pangalangan, also contributed insights on the Civil Code, Family Code, and jurisprudential treatment of nonmarital children.

However, because of factual issues with the nonmarital child’s claim of filiation, the Court remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court and ordered it to receive further evidence, including DNA evidence. It emphasized that DNA testing is a valid method of determining filiation in all cases where this is an issue.

A copy of the decision will be uploaded by the SC Public Information Office to the website once it is available.

(G.R. Nos. 208912 and 209018, Aquino v. Aquino, December 7, 2021)."


Read:

https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/25819/

SC Issues Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts - March 2, 2022

Rules on Expedited Procedures in First Level Courts (A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC)

"x x x. 

The Supreme Court, during its En Banc deliberation on Tuesday, March 1, 2022, approved the procedural rules EXPEDITING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS filed before the FIRST LEVEL COURTS.

This EFFECTIVELY AMENDED the 1991 Revised Rule on SUMMARY PROCEDURE and 2016 Revised Rules on SMALL CLAIMS CASES.

Entitled Rules on Expedited Procedures in First Level Courts (A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC), the same will take effect after its required publication in two newspapers of general circulation.

The new Rules recalibrates, reconciles, and harmonizes the coverage of the Revised Rule on SUMMARY PROCEDURE and SMALL CLAIMS CASES following the enactment of REPUBLIC ACT (RA) No. 11576, which EXPANDED the JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT cognizable by the FIRST LEVEL COURTS to ₱2,000,000.00 for CIVIL ACTIONS MONETARY CLAIMS.

The Rules provide for a more efficient and expedited procedure GOVERNING BOTH SUMMARY PROCEDURE AND SMALL CLAIMS CASES.

The provisions on PROHIBITED PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS and SERVICE pursuant to INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS under the 2019 AMENDMENTS to the 1997 Rules of CIVIL PROCEDURE have also been INCORPORATED , and VIDEOCONFERENCING HEARINGS have been AUTHORIZED AT ANY STAGE of the proceedings.

The salient features of the Rules include:

RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE

CIVIL CASES covered by the rule on SUMMARY PROCEDURE now consist of:

1) FORCIBLE ENTRY and UNLAWFUL DETAINED cases;

2) CIVIL ACTIONS and complaints for DAMAGES where the claims DO NOT EXCEED ₱2,000,000.00;

3) cases for ENFORCEMENT OF BARANGAY AMICABLE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND ARBITRATION AWARD where the money claim EXCEEDS ₱1,000,000.00;

4) cases SOLELY for the REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT OF ANY FIRST LEVEL COURT; and

5) the CIVIL ASPECT of violations of BATAS PAMBANSA BLG . 22 (BP 22), IF NO CRIMINAL ACTION HAS BEEN INSTITUTED.

Provisions on the evidentiary nature of PLEADINGS, FILING and SERVICE , and PRE-TRIAL from the 2019 AMENDMENTS have likewise been ADOPTED , UNLESS INCONSISTENT.

With respect to CRIMINAL CASES, violation of BP 22 is explicitly included, and the PENALTY THRESHOLD of all other criminal cases is increased to imprisonment NOT EXCEEDING ONE YEAR, or a FINE NOT EXCEEDING ₱50,000.00, or BOTH, and a FINE NOT EXCEEDING ₱150,000.00 for offenses involving DAMAGE TO PROPERTY THROUGH CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE.

ARRAIGNMENT and PRE-TRIAL shall be scheduled and conducted in accordance with the REVISED GUIDELINES FOR CONTINUOUS TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES.

The procedure of APPEAL has also been simplified.

Any JUDGMENT, FINAL ORDER, or FINAL RESOLUTION may be APPEALED to the appropriate REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC) exercising jurisdiction over the territory under RULE 40 for CIVIL CASES and RULE 122 for CRIMINAL CASES, of the Rules of Court.

The JUDGMENT OF THE RTC ON THE APPEAL shall be FINAL , EXECUTORY, and UNAPPEALABLE.

RULE ON SMALL CLAIMS

The Rules INCREASES the threshold amount of SMALL CLAIMS CASES to ₱1,000,000.00 and NO LONGER MAKES A DISTINCTION whether the claim is filed before the first level courts WITHIN OR OUTSIDE METRO MANILA .

The claim or demand may be for MONEY OWED under CONTRACTS of LEASE , LOAN and OTHER CREDIT ACCOMMODATIONS, SERVICES , and SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.

The RECOVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY is EXCLUDED , UNLESS made subject of a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT between the parties.

Nevertheless, the ENFORCEMENT of BARANGAY AMICABLE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND ARBITRATION AWARDS where the MONEY CLAIM DOES not EXCEED ₱1,000,000.00 is likewise COVERED.

The Rules ALLOWS the SERVICE OF SUMMONS BY THE PLAINTIFF if RETURNED UNSERVED by the SHERIFF or proper court officer, or if it shall be served OUTSIDE THE JUDICIAL REGION of the court where the case is pending.

If the case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO SERVE SUMMONS , the case may be RE-FILED WITHIN ONE YEAR from notice of dismissal, subject to the payment of a REDUCED FILING FEE OF ₱2,000.00.

NOTICES may now be served through MOBILE PHONE CALLS , SMS, or INSTANT MESSAGING SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS .

While VIDEOCONFERENCING HEARINGS should be conducted using the Supreme Court-prescribed platform, the court may ALLOW the use of ALTERNATIVE PLATFORMS or INSTANT MESSAGING APPLICATIONS WITH VIDEO CALL FEATURES , under certain CONDITIONS.

The 30-day period within which TO SET THE HEARING was EXTENDED TO 60 DAYS if ONE of the DEFENDANTS RESIDES or is HOLDING BUSINESS OUTSIDE the JUDICIAL REGION of the court.

There shall ONLY BE ONE HEARING DAY , with JUDGMENT RENDERED within 24 HOURS from its termination.

The SMALL CLAIMS FORMS have also been updated and improved for ease of use, with translations in FILIPINO.

The Rules maintained that the DECISION rendered by the first level courts in SMALL CLAIMS shall be FINAL , EXECUTORY and UNAPPEALABLE.

PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF NEW RULES

The Rules shall have a PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION.

Cases covered by these Rules which are currently pending with the first level and second level courts shall remain with and be decided by those same courts, in accordance with the applicable rules at the time of their filing.

The SC Public Information Office will immediately upload a copy of the Rules in the Supreme Court website upon official receipt of the same from the Office of the Clerk of Court En Banc. ###"

DOWNLOAD the new rules from the SC website -

https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/24982/

Homicide, penalty for.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GREGORIO HERMOSA and GABRIEL ABELINDE, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 131805, September 7, 2001.


"In the ABSENCE of any circumstance that would QUALIFY the killing to MURDER, the appellants should only be held liable for HOMICIDE. ARTICLE 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

"Article 249. HOMICIDE. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall KILL another WITHOUT the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of HOMICIDE and punished by RECLUSION TEMPORAL."

RECLUSION TEMPORAL has a range of 12 YEARS AND 1 DAY to 20 YEARS of imprisonment. Applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, there being NO MITIGATING OR AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, the MAXIMUM TERM of the penalty shall be imposed in the MEDIUM PERIOD 47 OF RECLUSIO TEMPORAL, ranging from 14 YEARS , 8 months and 1 day to 17 YEARS and 4 months. The MINIMUM TERM of the penalty shall be taken from the penalty NEXT LOWER IN DEGREE or PRISON MAYOR, in ANY of its PERIODS, ranging from six (6) years."

Abuse of superior strength.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GREGORIO HERMOSA and GABRIEL ABELINDE, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 131805, September 7, 2001.


"NOR can we agree that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength. This circumstance should be appreciated whenever there is a NOTORIOUS INEQUALITY OF FORCES between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of SUPERIORITY OF STRENGTH NOTORIOUSLY ADVANTAGEOUS FOR THE AGGRESSOR, SELECTED or TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF by him in the commission of the crime.45 MERE superiority in number is NOT ENOUGH to constitute superior strength. There must be CLEAR PROOF OF DELIBERATE INTENT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE of the same. The prosecution did not adduce evidence on these actual issues.46 It is UNCLEAR whether the appellants DELIBERATELY TOOK ADVANTAGE of their combined strength TO FACILITATE the commission of the crime. WHAT Macuibelle saw was just the ONSET of the attack."

NIGHTTIME did not aggravate the crime.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GREGORIO HERMOSA and GABRIEL ABELINDE, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 131805, September 7, 2001.

"We also hold that the circumstance of NIGHTTIME did not aggravate the crime. There is NO PROOF that the appellants PURPOSELY SOUGHT nighttime TO FACILITATE the commission of the crime. The mere fact that the crime was committed at nighttime DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MAKE NOCTURNITY an aggravating circumstance.44

TREACHERY was not established.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GREGORIO HERMOSA and GABRIEL ABELINDE, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 131805, September 7, 2001.

"We also rule that TREACHERY was not established. The essence of treachery is that the attack is DELIBERATE and WITHOUT WARNING — done in a SWIFT and UNEXPECTED manner, affording the hapless and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.42 The prosecution did not prove the deliberateness of the attack. The evidence shows that Macuibelle peeped through the hole on the wall only after she heard the victim made an outcry. Appellant Hermosa was already at the main door and was then in the act of assaulting the victim. Macuibelle could not give the particulars on HOW the killing of the victim BEGAN and DEVELOPED . Absent any particulars on HOW the aggression COMMENCED or HOW the act which RESULTED in the victim's death unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated.43 We note, further, that the victim was AWARE of the danger on her life. She was HOLDING A BOLO when she was attacked. She was also ABLE TO SHOUT for help. In light of these circumstances, treachery cannot be appreciated."

DENIAL and ALIBI

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GREGORIO HERMOSA and GABRIEL ABELINDE, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 131805, September 7, 2001.


“The appellants' defense of DENIAL and ALIBI cannot prevail over their POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION . ALIBI is the weakest defense as it is easy to concoct. For alibi to prosper an accused must not only prove that he was ABSENT at the crime scene at the time of its commission, but also, that it was PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE for him to be so situated at said distance.35

In the case at bar, it was established that, at the time of the incident, appellant Abelinde was residing in San Pedro, a barangay ADJACENT to barangay Gahit (the locus criminis). The distance of his house from the victim's house was about three hundred (300) meters.36 Appellant Hermosa himself admitted that, from the said distance, it would only take him FIVE (5) MINUTES TO REACH the victim's place on foot.37 Thus, even assuming that the appellants went to Abelinde's house after the dance, it was NOT IMPOSSIBLE for them to go to the house of the victim and commit the crime.”

DOUBLE JEOPARDY - "In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINO ALEJANDRO Y PIMENTEL, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 223099, January 11, 2018.

"In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.20

The 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of the accused against double jeopardy, thus:

Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for double jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.21

Here, all the elements were present. There was a valid information for two counts of rape over which the RTC had jurisdiction and to which the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. After the trial, a judgment of acquittal was thereafter rendered and promulgated on July 25, 2011. What is peculiar in this case is that a judgment of acquittal was rendered based on the mistaken notion that the private complainant failed to testify; allegedly because of the mix-up of orders with a different case involving the same accused-appellant. This, however, does not change the fact that a judgment of acquittal had already been promulgated. Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation.22

The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. We find that these exceptions do not exist in this case.23 Here, there was no deprivation of due process or mistrial because the records show that the prosecution was actually able to present their case and their witnesses.

A mere manifestation also will not suffice in assailing a judgment of acquittal. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed. A judgment of acquittal may only be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated.24

In People v. Laguio, Jr.,25 this Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus:

x x x The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.26

In this case, the acquittal was not even questioned on the basis of grave abuse of discretion. It was only through a supposed mere manifestation of the prosecutor, a copy of which was not in the records, that the RTC was apprised of the supposed mistake it committed.

A similar instance had been ruled upon by this Court in Argel v. Judge Pascua,27 where the Judge was sanctioned for gross ignorance of the law for recalling a judgment of acquittal, thus:

As stated earlier, complainant was accused of murder in Crim. Case No. 2999-V of the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On 13 August 1993 judgment was promulgated acquitting him on the ground that there was no witness who positively identified him as the perpetrator of the crime. However after respondent's attention was called by the private complainant's counsel to the fact that there was such a witness and confirmed by respondent upon re-reading her notes, she issued an Order dated 16 August 1993 stating her intention to "revise" the previous judgment of acquittal, branded the same as "uncalled for" and "not final," and reset the case for another "rendering of the decision." The reason given was that the judgment of acquittal was rendered without all the facts and circumstances being brought to her attention.

Respondent Judge explained. that the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of eyewitness Tito Retreta was not attached to the records when she wrote her decision. Thus, in a Decision dated 19 August 1993, respondent Judge declared herein complainant Miguel Argel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder on the basis of the eyewitness account of Tito Retreta, sentenced complainant Argel to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P60,000.00 for actual damages.

Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration except to correct errors which are clerical in nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moro-moro or mock trial. A final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness.

In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.

Complainant herein was already acquitted of murder by respondent in a decision promulgated on 13 August 1993. Applying the aforestated rule, the decision became final and immutable on the same day. As a member of the bench who is always admonished to be conversant with the latest legal and judicial developments, more so of elementary rules, respondent should have known that she could no longer "revise" her decision of acquittal without violating not only an elementary rule of procedure but also the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (Emphasis Ours)28

Similarly, in this case, the RTC was reminded of the fact that private complainant AAA testified during the trial, only after it had already rendered and promulgated the judgment of acquittal. The RTC then realized that had AAA's testimony been taken into account, the case would have had a different outcome. Consequently, the RTC issued an Order recalling the judgment of acquittal for the purpose of rectifying its error, and thereafter, rendered a Decision convicting the accused-appellant for two counts of rape. This, however, cannot be countenanced for a contrary ruling would transgress the accused-appellant's constitutionally-enshrined right against double jeopardy."

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10368 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REPARATION AND RECOGNITION OF VICTIMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING THE MARCOS REGIME, DOCUMENTATION OF SAID VIOLATIONS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10368

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REPARATION AND RECOGNITION OF VICTIMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING THE MARCOS REGIME, DOCUMENTATION OF SAID VIOLATIONS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS

Section 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as the "Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013″. 

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. — Section 11 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines declares that the State values the dignity of every human, person and guarantees full respect for human rights. Pursuant to this declared policy, Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution prohibits the use of torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will and mandates the compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families.

By virtue of Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution adopting generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, the Philippines adheres to international human rights laws and conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment which imposes on each State party the obligation to enact domestic legislation to give effect to the rights recognized therein and to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms have been violated shall have an effective remedy, even if the violation is committed by persons acting in an official capacity. In fact, the right to a remedy is itself guaranteed under existing human rights treaties and/or customary international law, being peremptory in character (jus cogens) and as such has been recognized as non-derogable.

Consistent with the foregoing, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to recognize the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance and other gross human rights violations committed during the regime of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos covering the period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 and restore the victims’ honor and dignity. The State hereby acknowledges its moral and legal obligation to recognize and/or provide reparation to said victims and/or their families for the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they suffered under the Marcos regime.

Similarly, it is the obligation of the State to acknowledge the sufferings and damages inflicted upon persons whose properties or businesses were forcibly taken over, sequestered or used, or those whose professions were damaged and/or impaired, or those whose freedom of movement was restricted, and/or such other victims of the violations of the Bill of Rights.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. — The following terms as used in this Act shall mean:

(a) Detention refers to the act of taking a person into custody against his will by persons acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the State.

(b) Human rights violation refers to any act or omission committed during the period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 by persons acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the State, but shall not be limited to the following:

(1) Any search, arrest and/or detention without a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest issued by a civilian court of law, including any warrantless arrest or detention carried out pursuant to the declaration of Martial Law by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos as well as any arrest., detention or deprivation of liberty carried out during the covered period on the basis of an "Arrest, Search and Seizure Order (ASSO)", a "Presidential Commitment Order {PCO)" or a "Preventive Detention Action (PDA)" and such other similar executive issuances as defined by decrees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, or in any manner that the arrest, detention or deprivation, of liberty was effected;

(2) The infliction by a person acting in an official capacity and/or an agent of the State of physical injury, torture, killing, or violation of other human rights, of any person exercising civil or political rights, including but not limited to the freedom of speech, assembly or organization; and/or the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, even if such violation took place during or in the course of what the authorities at the time deemed an illegal assembly or demonstration: Provided, That torture in any form or under any circumstance shall be considered a human rights violation;

(3) Any enforced or involuntary disappearance caused upon a person who was arrested, detained or abducted against one’s will or otherwise deprived of one’s liberty, as defined in Republic Act No. 10350 1, otherwise known as the "Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act of 2012″;

(4) Any force or intimidation causing the involuntary exile of a person from the Philippines;

(5) Any act of force, intimidation or deceit causing unjust or illegal takeover of a business, confiscation of property, detention of owner/s and or their families, deprivation of livelihood of a person by agents of the State, including those caused by Ferdinand E. Marcos, his spouse Imelda R. Marcos, their immediate relatives by consanguinity or affinity, as well as those persons considered as among their close relatives, associates, cronies and subordinates under Executive Order No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986 by then President Corazon C. Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution;

(6) Any act or series of acts causing, committing and/or conducting the following:

(i) Kidnapping or otherwise exploiting children of persons suspected of committing acts against the Marcos regime;

(ii) Committing sexual offenses against human rights victims who are detained and/or in the course of conducting military and/or police operations; and

(iii) Other violations and/or abuses similar or analogous to the above, including those recognized by international law.

(c) Human Rights Violations Victim (HRVV) refers to a person whose human rights were violated by persons acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the State as defined herein. In order to qualify for reparation under this Act, the human rights violation must have been committed during the period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986: Provided, however, That victims of human rights violations that were committed one (1) month before September 21, 1972 and one (1) month after February 25, 1986 shall be entitled to reparation, under this Act if they can establish that the violation was committed:

(1) By agents of the State and/or persons acting in an official capacity as defined hereunder;

(2) For the purpose of preserving, maintaining, supporting or promoting the said regime; or

(3) To conceal abuses during the Marcos regime and/or the effects of Martial Law.

(d) Persons Acting in an Official Capacity and/or Agents of the State.—The following persons shall be deemed persons acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the State under this Act:

(1) Any member of the former Philippine Constabulary (PC), the former Integrated National Police (INP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 as well as any civilian agent attached thereto; and any member of a paramilitary group even if one is not organically part of the PC, the INP, the AFP or the CHDF so long as it is shown that the group was organized, funded, supplied with equipment, facilities and/or resources, and/or indoctrinated, controlled and/or supervised by any person acting in an official capacity and/or agent of the State as herein defined;

(2) Any member of the civil service, including persons who held elective or appointive public office at any time from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986;

(3) Persons referred to in Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1, creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), issued on February 28, 1986 and related laws by then President Corazon C. Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, including former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, spouse Imelda R. Marcos, their immediate relatives by consanguinity or affinity, as well as their close relatives, associates, cronies and subordinates; and

(4) Any person or group/s of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State during the Marcos regime.

(e) Torture refers to any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on any person under the custody of persons acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the State, as defined by law, jurisprudence, international conventions and Republic Act No. 9745, otherwise known as the "Anti-Torture Act of 2009″.

Section 4. Entitlement to Monetary Reparation. — Any HRVV qualified under this Act shall receive reparation from the State, free of tax, as herein prescribed: Provided, That for a deceased or involuntary disappeared HRVV, the legal heirs as provided for in the Civil Code of the Philippines, or such other person named by the executor or administrator of the deceased or involuntary disappeared HRVV’s estate in that order, shall be entitled to receive such reparation: Provided, further, That no special power of attorney shall be recognized in the actual disbursement of the award, and only the victim or the aforestated successor(s)-in-interest shall be entitled to personally receive said reparation form the Board, unless the victim involved is shown to be incapacitated to the satisfaction of the Board: Provided, furthermore, That the reparation received under this Act shall be without prejudice to the receipt of any other sum by the HRVV from any other person or entity in any case involving violations of human rights as defined in this Act.

Section 5. Nonmonetary Reparation. — The Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of Education (DepED), the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), and such other government agencies shall render the necessary services as nonmonetary reparation for HRVVs and/or their families, as may be determined by the Board pursuant to the provisions of this Act. The amount necessary for this purpose shall be sourced from the budget of the agency concerned in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).

Section 6. Amount of Reparation. — The amount of reparation under this Act shall be in proportion to the gravity of the human rights violation committed on the HRVV and in accordance with the number of points assigned to the individual under Section 19 hereof.

Section 7. Source of Reparation. — The amount of Ten billion pesos (P10,000,000,000.00) plus accrued interest which form part of the funds transferred to the government of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of the December 10, 1997 Order of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, adjudged by the Supreme Court of the Philippines as final and executory in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan on July 15, 2003 (G.R. No. 152154) as Marcos ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, shall be the principal source funds for the implementation of this Act.

CHAPTER II

THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS’ CLAIMS BOARD

Section 8. Creation and Composition of the Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board. — There is hereby created an independent and quasi-judicial body to be known as the Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board. It shall be composed of nine (9) members, who shall possess the following qualifications:

(a) Must be of known probity, competence and integrity;

(b) Must have a deep and thorough understanding and knowledge of human rights and involvement in efforts against human rights violations committed during the regime of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos;

(c) At least three (3) of them must be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years; and

(d) Must have a clear and adequate understanding and commitment to human rights protection, promotion and advocacy.

The Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board shall be attached to but shall not be under the Commission on Human Rights (CHR).

The Board shall organize itself within thirty (30) days from the completion of appointment of all nine (9) members and shall thereafter organize its Secretariat.

Section 9. Appointment to the Board. — The President shall appoint the Chairperson and the other eight (8) members of the Board: Provided, That human rights organizations such as, but not limited to, the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism (MABINI), the Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND) and the Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at Aresto (SELDA) may submit nominations to the President.

Section 10. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) Receive, evaluate, process and investigate applications for claims under this Act;

(b) Issue subpoena/s ad testificandum and subpoena/s duces tecum;

(c) Conduct independent administrative proceedings and resolve disputes over claims;

(d) Approve with finality all eligible claims under this Act;

(e) Deputize appropriate government agencies to assist it in order to effectively perform its functions;

(f) Promulgate such rules as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, including rules of procedure in the conduct of its proceedings, with the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines having suppletory application;

(g) Exercise administrative control and supervision over its Secretariat;

(h) The Board, at its discretion, may consult the human rights organizations mentioned in Section 9 herein; and

(i) Perform such other duties, functions and responsibilities as may be necessary to effectively attain the objectives of this Act.

Section 11. Resolution, of Claims. — The Board shall be composed of three (3) divisions which shall function simultaneously and independently of each other in the resolution of claims for reparation. Each division shall be composed of one (1) Chairperson, who shall be a member of the Philippine Bar and two (2) members to be appointed by the Board en banc.

Section 12. Emoluments. — The Chairperson and members of the Board shall have the rank, salary, emoluments and allowances equivalent to s Presiding Justice and Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, respectively.

Section 13. Secretariat of the Board. — The Board shall be assisted by a Secretariat which may come from the existing personnel of the CHR, without prejudice to the hiring of additional personnel as determined by the Board to accommodate the volume of required work. The following shall be the functions of the Secretariat:

(a) Receive, evaluate, process and investigate applications for claims under this Act;

(b) Recommend to the Board the approval of applications for claims;

(c) Assist the Board in technical functions; and

(d) Perform other duties that may be assigned by the Board.

The Chairperson of the Board shall appoint a Board Secretary who shall head the Secretariat for the duration of the existence of the Board. There shall be a Technical Staff Head assisted by five (5) Legal Officers and three (3) Paralegal Officers; and an Administrative Staff Head assisted by three (3) Administrative Support Staff.

When necessary, the Board may hire additional contractual employees or contract a service provider to provide services of counselors, psychologists, social workers and public education specialists, among others, to augment the services of the Secretariat: Provided, That the maximum contract amount per year shall not exceed more than fifteen percent (15%) of the total annual operating budget of the Board.

Section 14. Operating Budget of the Board.— The operating budget of the Board shall be funded from the Ten billion peso {P10,000,000,000.00) fund, with Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) as its initial operating budget: Provided, That it shall not exceed Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) a year

Section 15. Proper Disposition of Funds. — The Board shall ensure that funds appropriated or those which may become available as reparation for HRVVs are properly disbursed in accordance with the policies stated by Congress and relevant government rules, regulations and accounting procedures.

CHAPTER III

CLAIMANTS, REPARATION AND RECOGNITION

Section 16. Claimants. — Any person who is an HRVV may file a claim with the Board for reparation and/or recognition in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Section 17. Conclusive Presumption That One is an HRVV Under This Act. — The claimants in the class suit and direct action plaintiffs in the Human Rights Litigation Against the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos (MDL No. 840, CA No. 88-0390) in the US Federal District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii wherein a favorable judgment has been rendered, shall be extended the conclusive presumption that they are HRVVs: Provided, That the HRVVs recognized by the Bantayog Ng Mga Bayani Foundation shall also be accorded the same conclusive presumption: Provided, further, That nothing herein shall be construed to deprive the Board of its original jurisdiction and its inherent power to determine the extent of the human rights violations and the corresponding reparation and/or recognition that may be granted.

Section 18. Motu Proprio Recognition. — The Board may take judicial notice motu proprio of individual persons who suffered human rights violations as defined herein and grant such persons recognition as HRVVs and included in the Roll of Victims as provided for in Section 26 hereof.

Section 19. Determination of Award. — (a) The Board shall follow the point system in the determination of the award. The range shall be one (1) to ten (10) points, as follows:

(1) Victims who died or who disappeared and are still missing shall be given ten (10) points;

(2) Victims who were tortured and/or raped or sexually abused shall he given six (6) to nine (9) points:

(3) Victims who were detained shall be given three (3) to five (5) points; and

(4) Victims whose rights were violated under Section 3, paragraph (b), nos. (4), (5) and (6) under this Act shall be given one (1) to two (2) points.

The Board shall exercise its powers with due discretion in the determination of points for each victim, which shall be based on the type of violation committed against the HRVV, frequently and duration of the violation. In each category, HRVVs who had suffered more would receive more points. In instances where a victim is classified in more than one category, one shall be awarded the points in the higher category: Provided, That in cases where there are several eligible claims filed for reparation by or on behalf of a particular HRVV, the Board shall award only one (1) valid claim which corresponds to the category obtaining the highest number of points for each eligible claimant.

(b) The Board shall proceed to determine the award for each claimant classified under Sections 16, 17 and 18 of this Act.

(c) The Board shall then compute the final monetary value of one’s award that is equivalent to the numerical value of one point multiplied by the number of points that a claimant is entitled to, as previously determined by the Board.

(d) Within thirty (30) days after the Board has approved with finality each eligible claim pending before it and after due publication of such legitimate claim, the award of monetary compensation shall take effect: Provided., That any pending appeal filed by an aggrieved claimant or opposite before the Board en banc must resolved by it sixty (60) days before the Board becomes functus officio.

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL- PROVISIONS

Section 20. Transfer of Funds. — Pursuant to the judgment mentioned in Section 7 hereof, the amount of Ten billion pesos (P10,000,000,000.00) plus the accrued interest are hereby set aside and appropriated to fund the purposes of this Act.

Section 21. Documentation of Human — Rights Violations Committed by the Marcos Regime. — In the implementation of this Act and without prejudice to any other documentary or other evidence that may be required for the award of any reparation, any HRVV seeking reparation shall execute a detailed sworn statement narrating the circumstances of the pertinent human rights violation/s committed.

Section 22. Publication. — Consistent with Section 23 herein, the Board, after having been duly convened, shall set the period for the commencement and termination of applications by HRVVs and cause the publication of the same: Provided, That such period shall only become operative fifteen (15) days after its last publication, which shall be once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Section 23. Period for Filing of Claims; Waiver. — An HRVV shall file an application for reparation with the Board within six (6) months from the effectivity of the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of this Act: Provided, That failure to file an application within said period is deemed a waiver of the right to file the same: Provided, further, That for HRVVs who are deceased, incapacitated, or missing due to enforced disappearance, their legal heir/s or representatives, shall be entitled to file an application for reparation on their behalf.

Any opposition to the new application/s pursuant to Section 16 hereof shall only be entertained if such is filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of the last publication of the official list of eligible claimants as may be determined by the Board. The Board shall cause the publication of the official list of eligible claimants once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Section 24 Appeal. — Any aggrieved claimant or oppositor may file an appeal within ten (10) calendar days from the receipt of the Resolution of the Division, to the Board en banc, whose decision shall then become final and executory.

Section 25. Penalties; Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. — Any claimant who is found by the Board, after due hearing, to have filed a fraudulent claim, shall be referred to the appropriate office for prosecution. If convicted, he shall suffer the imprisonment of eight (8) to ten (10) years, shall be disqualified from public office and employment and shall be deprived of the right to vote and be voted for in any national or local election, even after the service of sentence unless granted absolute pardon.

Any member of the Board and its Secretariat, public officer, employee of an agency or any private individual mandated to implement this Act, who shall misuse, embezzle or misappropriate the funds for the reparation of HRVVs or who shall commit fraud in the processing of documents and claims of HRVVs, or shall conspire with any individual to commit the same, shall also be prosecuted,

Any member of the Board and its Secretariat, public officer, employee of an agency or any private individual mandated to implement this Act, who may have been found guilty of committing any or all of the prohibited acts stated in the preceding paragraph, or those acts punishable under the Revised Penal Code, shall be penalized under the pertinent provisions in the Code and relevant special penal laws.

Section 26. Roll of Victims. — Persons who are HRVVs, regardless of whether they opt to seek reparation or not, shall be given recognition by enshrining their names in a Roll of Human Rights Victims to be prepared by the Board.

A Memorial/Museum/Library shall be established in honor and in memory of the victims of human rights violations whose names shall be inscribed in the Roll. A compendium of their sacrifices shall be prepared and may be readily viewed and accessed in the internet. The Memorial/Museum/Library/Compendium shall have an appropriation of at least Five hundred million pesos (P500,000,000.00) from the accrued interest of the Ten billion peso (P10,000,000,000.00) fund.

The Roll may also be displayed in government agencies as maybe designated by the HRVV Memorial Commission as created hereunder.

Section 27. Human, Rights Violations Victims’ Memorial Commission.. — There is hereby created a Commission to be known as the Human Rights Violations Victims’ Memorial Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, primarily for the establishment, restoration, preservation and conservation of the Memorial/Museum/Library/Compendium in honor of the HRVVs during the Marcos regime.

The powers and functions of the Commission shall be assumed by the Board of Trustees which shall be composed of the following; Chairperson of the CHR as Chairperson; Chairperson of the National Historical Commission as Co-Chairperson; and Chairpersons of the CHED, the National Commission on Culture and the Arts (NCCA), the Secretary of the Department of Education and the Head of the University of the Philippines Diliman Main Library, as members.

The Board of Trustees shall have the authority to hire and appoint its officials and employees, receive donations and grants for and on its behalf, and generate revenues for the benefit of the Commission.

The Commission shall be attached to the CHR solely for budgetary and administrative purposes. The operating budget of the Commission shall be appropriated from the General Appropriations Act.

The Commission shall also coordinate and collaborate with the DepED and the CHED to ensure that the teaching of Martial Law atrocities, the lives and sacrifices of HRVVs in our history are included in the basic, secondary and tertiary education curricula.

CHAPTER V

FINAL PROVISIONS

Section 28. Guidelines for the Implementing Rules and Regulations (1RR). — In implementing this Act and in formulating the corresponding rules and regulations, and to ensure that all applications are properly screened for fraudulent claims, the Board must provide for:

(a) Transparency in the processing of the claims;

(b) A procedure that allows any concerned party to oppose an application or claim on the ground that it is fraudulent, fictitious or spurious and gives that party the opportunity to question the same and to present evidence in support thereof; and

(c) A procedure that is speedy and expeditious without sacrificing any of the parties’ fundamental rights.

Within fifteen (15) days from the date of its organization, the Board shall promulgate the necessary IRR and procedures for the effective implementation of this Act. The IRR shall be effective fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Section 29. Work Period; Sunset Clause. — The Board shall complete its work within two (2) years from the effectivity of the IRR promulgated by it. After such period, it shall become functus officio.

Section 30. Separability Clause. — If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such other sections or provisions not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect.

Section 31. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act, including Section 63(b) of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.1âwphi1

Section 32. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE
President of the Senate (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker of the House of Representatives


This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 5990 and Senate Bill No. 3334 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on January 28, 2013.



(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES
Secretary of Senate

(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP
Secretary General
House of Representatives


Approved: FEB 25 2013

(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
President of the Philippines