As partial research aids on the history and politics of corruption, violence and oppression in the exotic and rich Philippine island of Mindanao, I wish to reproduce below, verbatim, three self-explanatory reading materials, for research purposes, to wit:
(a) “Government Urged to Disarm Political Warlords” by Perseus Echeminada, published in The Philippine Star on November 29, 2009;
(b) “Why ‘Rido’ Persists in Maguindanao” by Ryan Rosauro published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on November 28, 2009; and
(c) The editorial entitled “Political Entrepreneurs” of the Philippine Daily Inquirer on November 28, 2009.
But before doing that, perhaps it is good to remind ourselves once again of the relevant provisions of the 1987 Philippine Constitution insofar as warlordism, republicanism, sovereignty of the people, and the civilian nature of the military and the police are concerned. Thus:
SEC. 26, Article II (Sate Policies), 1987 Constitution.
The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and “prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law”.
Article II (State Policies), 1987 Constitution
SEC. 1.
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
SEC. 3.
Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
SEC. 4.
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.
SEC. 5.
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
SEC. 26.
The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
SEC. 24, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions), 12987 Constitution - Private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled. All paramilitary forces including Civilian Home Defense Forces not consistent with the citizen armed force established in this Constitution, shall be dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force.
Article XVI (General Provisions), 1987 Constitution
on the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police.
SEC. 4
The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and serve, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State.
SEC. 5, Id.
(1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.
(2) The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty.
(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics.
No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote.
(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.
(5) Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of their service.
(6) The officers and men of the regular force of the armed forces shall be recruited proportionately from all provinces and cities as far as practicable.
(7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces shall not exceed three years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty.
SEC. 6.
The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
Sec. 18, Article XVII (Executive), 1987 Constitution
SEC. 18.
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or the legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Below are the news items I referred to above dealing with wardlordism, and “rido” (the Muslim concept of clan violence in Manindanao), and political entrepreneurism (elected politicians making a big business or livelihood out of the game of politics).
Headlines
Government urged to disarm political warlords
By Perseus Echeminada
(The Philippine Star)
Updated November 29, 2009 12:00 AM
MANILA, Philippines - A former senator has called on the government to disarm all political warlords in the country including the Ampatuan clan, which is reportedly still in possession of high-powered guns despite a crackdown against all firearms in Maguindanao.
Former senator Francisco Tatad also said the weapons confiscated recently by the police and the military were vintage guns and not the ones used by private armies.
The crackdown came after a massacre of more than 50 people in Ampatuan town on Nov. 23 by a group reportedly led by a member of the Ampatuan clan, Datu Unsay Mayor Andal Ampatuan Jr. He is now under the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation after his arrest on Thursday.
The victims included the wife of Buluan town Vice Mayor Esmael Mangudadatu, his sisters, journalists and lawyers. They were on their way to Shariff Aguak to file his certificate of candidacy for governor when waylaid by some 100 heavily armed men.
Tatad, who is an honorary Muslim Sultan, said some of his Muslim friends who know the Ampatuans have expressed skepticism over the turnover of the weapons as shown in photos and on TV.
“The Ampatuans have more sophisticated and powerful weapons,” he said, quoting his Muslim friends.
Tatad also called on investigators to check reports that the mass graves for the victims had been prepared at least two days before the carnage.
Sen. Pia Cayetano said authorities have to be more aggressive in their effort to disarm private armies.
“Our police and armed forces would have to do better than showcasing 300 rusting garand rifles that were supposedly confiscated from members of the Ampatuans’ private militia,” she said.
“Seriously now, I don’t think anyone would believe that the Ampatuans had been able to lord it over Maguindanao with a private army that uses relic rifles from World War II,” said Cayetano, chair of the Senate Committee on Social Justice.
“That’s a big joke! Where are the high-powered firearms used by the perpetrators last Monday?”
Cayetano blamed the public’s skepticism over the progress of the investigation on the Arroyo administration’s closeness with the Ampatuans.
It was widely believed that the Ampatuans helped the Arroyo administration manipulate the results of the 2004 elections in Maguindanao to ensure the victory of Mrs. Arroyo by at least one million votes over popular actor Fernando Poe Jr.
“It was the Arroyo administration which spawned the monster in Maguindanao. In order to slay it, it would have to take great political will from the government and the people’s continued vigilance,” she said.
Sen. Francis Escudero, for his part, said the massacre showed the insincerity of authorities in enforcing gun permit laws.
“If you are not a soldier or personnel in uniform, you have no business carrying a gun,” he said.
National Press Club president Benny Antiporda told the weekly Kapihan sa Sulo news forum that among the firearms seized from the Ampatuans were 200 Bush Master and 200 more assorted modern weapons recently bought in the Middle East. The Bush Master weapons were reportedly given as gifts to the Ampatuans by a prominent political personality in Manila.
OK of House bill pushed
For the Philippine National Police (PNP), Senate approval of a House-sponsored gun control bill would pave the way for a stronger drive against illegal firearms.
“The endorsement by House Speaker Prospero Nograles of the proposed legislation is an encouraging development in our desire to establish effective firearms control in the country,” PNP chief Director General Jesus Verzosa said.
“It is high time that law enforcement should be given stronger legal foundation to enable us to act decisively with the full might of the law behind us against persons in possession of loose firearms, especially those used in criminal activity,” Versoza said.
The House of Representatives earlier approved on third reading House Bill 6776 seeking stiffer penalties for illegal possession of firearms.
The measure also seeks to make illegal possession of three or more firearms a non-bailable offense punishable by life imprisonment.
Suspend permits to carry
Former Defense chief and administration party standard-bearer Gilbert Teodoro Jr. said ensuring order in troubled areas particularly during the elections may require the suspension of all permits to carry firearms outside of residence (PTCFOR).
“The PNP should seriously consider an early total gun ban by immediately suspending the privilege to bear firearms covered by PTCFORs, particularly in areas identified by the Commission on Elections as election hot spots,” Teodoro said.
He said a January gun ban may be too late since election-related violence has already erupted.
He said authorities should adopt a zero-tolerance policy on private armies in next year’s elections.
The Comelec-imposed gun ban is from Jan. 9, 2010 until June 10, 2010.
“By ensuring that all authorized firearms are placed under lock-and-key, the PNP can concentrate on its task of arresting illegal gun owners and private armed groups out to disrupt the coming elections,” the Lakas standard bearer added.
In the 2007 elections, three regions that logged the highest number of incidents involving firearms were the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, the Cordillera Administrative Region and Western Mindanao.
“Shortcuts in how the law regarding the possession and ownership of firearms is implemented are partly to blame for violent crimes. These rules were not placed to be conveniently ignored for a price,” he said.
“The privilege to bear firearms covered by PTCFORs can be validly revoked by the state to protect its citizens.” Teodoro stressed.
“Only when criminal elements see that the police mean business in cracking down on unregistered firearms will the gun ban be an effective deterrent against election-related violence,” he added.
“A review of the entire system to ensure that those in need of protection do not abuse the privilege will help prevent a repetition of the Maguindanao massacre where at least 57 people were mercilessly killed, including 30 local newsmen,” Teodoro stressed.
“In impoverished areas, we must work so that the unemployed are armed with practicable skills and tools and not let them be exploited by recruitment to private militias. Lastly we must work to ensure that those who commit crimes be held accountable for their acts,” he pointed out.
Disarmed bodyguards
Meanwhile in Davao City, members of the Army-led Task Force Davao seized yesterday a number of high-powered firearms from the bodyguards of ARMM Gov. Zaldy Ampatuan and 22 other members of his family at the vicinity of the Davao International Airport where they took a Philippine Airlines flight to Manila to visit his detained brother.
Task Force Davao chief Col. Oscar Lactao said taken from Ampatuan’s bodyguards and companions were a Bushmaster rifle, an M653 rifle and four .45 caliber pistols.
Lactao told The STAR that the seizure of the firearms was part of the city’s rule against the carrying of firearms.
“There was no resistance on the part of the Ampatuans when their firearms were taken from them,” Lactao said.
It was learned that barely two hours after the Ampatuans left, Mangudadatu and five other companions reportedly took the next PAL flight.
Army troops escorted Mangudadatu on Friday night when he went from Tacurong City to Davao City. Task Force Davao troops brought him directly to his residence at the
Insular Village.
“It is hard if the two factions would meet at the airport with those firearms,” Lactao said. “What is important is we have prevailed upon them that high-powered firearms are not allowed in the city,” he said.
Lactao said the firearms seized from the Ampatuans would be subjected to ballistic tests. No firearms were seized from Mangudadatu’s group.
Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte has imposed contingency measures to prevent the Maguindanao violence from spilling over to the city. The children of the two clans are studying in the city.
“We are not taking sides here. What we want to impose is the law and we hope everybody would follow,” Duterte said.
Sulu potential flashpoint
In Zamboanga City, Lt. Gen. Ben Dolorfino, chief of Western Mindanao Command, said they are closely monitoring developments in Sulu, the province reportedly next to Maguindanao with the biggest number of armed groups.
Dolorfino also said his command supports the complete disbanding of private armed groups in the province.
“Next to Maguindanao, Sulu is the province to watch out for,” Dolorfino warned. “There are so many armed groups.”
He said the province is haven to so-called lost command rebels and the Abu Sayyaf group. Political leaders in the province have their own private armies.
Dolorfino said the Sulu provincial government has organized a 2,500-man Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) under police supervision. A powerful clan has also recruited around 1,500 civilian volunteers. – With Roel Pareño, Edith Regalado, Jaime Laude, Mike Frialde
See:
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=527831&publicationSubCategoryId=63
Inquirer Mindanao
Why ‘rido’ persists in Maguindanao
By Ryan Rosauro
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 23:10:00 11/28/2009
FOR its sheer brutality, the Maguindanao massacre on Monday is viewed as unprecedented in the history of political violence in the country.
But clan feuding, or more popularly known as “rido,” which is blamed for the mass killings, is a common occurrence in the social landscape of Maguindanao, where members of the Ampatuan clan virtually reign as political overlords.
A study on the incidence of rido in the province done in 2005 by Abhoud Syed Lingga of the Institute for Bangsamoro Studies found that all 28 towns, plus Cotabato City, were rocked by clan feuds.
The study is part of the book “Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao,” published by The Asia Foundation in 2007.
Lingga documented 218 rido cases from 1970 to 2004, though he estimates a higher number because many of these were usually not reported to authorities. Of the total number of cases, 116 had been resolved.
The study, along with others with the same theme, was presented in Manila two years ago. Lingga had said that while clan conflict also grips other parts of the country, the phenomenon was more pronounced in Moro communities.
Challenge
This was among the reasons international development agencies in Mindanao are looking keenly at the intricacies of rido as a useful guide to peace-building initiatives in the communities.
Rido has remained a challenge. The secessionist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines were dragged into it, spoiling the environment of the peace process.
Among the Maguindanaoan people, rido or “ukag” is directly related to the concept of “kanaman,” which pertains to a deep sense of personal dignity and honor, and self-respect. It is known as the “maratabat” among the Maranao and Iranun peoples.
According to Professor Jamail Kamlian of the Mindanao State University, when this honor is violated, an aggrieved person avenges the psychological hurt to the extent of carrying out a killing—which, in turn, can invite retribution.
Rido anatomy
Lingga’s study found that a damaged kanaman could be restored with a measure of justice that would assuage the hurt. If this is not obtained, the conflict can escalate into a rido.
But Lingga qualified that a rido could be launched only if one has the ability to do so; if not, the motive to retaliate becomes dormant “until he is capable or the situation is suitable for him to regain his self-respect and the respect of the community.”
A feud can start from fairly minor matters, but the ones that have turned bloody and long drawn-out usually arise from disputes over elective seats and land.
Throughout the 35-year period covered by the Lingga study, political rivalry tops the major triggers of rido in Maguindanao, accounting for almost 20 percent of cases.
This is followed by dispute over land.
The most discernible cost of rido is lives lost, and properties and crops damaged. In the Lingga study, the 218 clan feuds had resulted in 811 people dead and 369 others wounded.
To avoid being the target of vengeful attacks, 581 families moved their residences leading to economic displacement.
In the longer term, unresolved clan conflicts infuse social discord; the enmity can last for generations that polarize residents in a community.
Math of conflict
Heads of families or clan leaders are expected to lead efforts in obtaining justice. And clan members are expected to support the effort to defend their collective honor.
According to Lingga, “the close family ties among Maguindanawons … partly explain this sense of collective responsibility and accountability.”
The support of other families not related by blood can also be enlisted, even as relatives may also declare noninvolvement.
But apart from being potential warriors, kin on both sides can actually play a role in resolving the conflict. Lingga’s research found that pressure from family and community leaders are able to prevent the carrying out of retribution and retaliation that effectively cuts the cycle of vengeance.
Settlement
Sustaining rido is economically exacting. So is striking a settlement which usually involves payment of blood money.
But beyond the financial cost, repairing relationships is the most crucial element in sustainable resolution of the conflict. This is supposedly facilitated by a justice system sensitive to the sociocultural underpinnings of the community.
Lingga points to the traditional way of the “kadsarakan,” whereby the values of humility and forgiveness is best practiced. Here, the offender goes to the house of the offended party, accompanied by relatives and community leaders, and submit to the latter’s discretion as a show of remorse. This is also accompanied by efforts to arrange indemnity.
“For a serious crime, the offender dons white and brings along a kris which he offers to the offended party upon arrival at the latter’s home. This is meant for the offended party to carry out an execution,” Lingga wrote.
He added that “even in grave cases, Maguindanawon tradition expects the offended party to forgive the offender who humbles himself.”
But Lingga notes, the existence of competing systems of justice in Maguindanao makes it difficult to address rido as this gives the parties opportunity to shop for different venues where to obtain the most satisfactory result.
At the time Lingga wrote the research report, venues for dispute resolution includes that with traditional leaders and the MILF courts, alongside those sanctioned by the Philippine state.
Weak governance
The Lingga study also asserts that rido “is a consequence of the absence of justice brought about by the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the justice system …”
Weak governance in the region aggravates this problem. For one, parties in a rido have easy access to guns that underpin their bloody campaigns against each other.
For another, the social environment is ripe for those well-connected with or part of established political authorities to carry out violence almost with impunity. It’s as if the violation of one’s honor constitutes a challenge to formal authority. Or a challenge to formal authority violates one’s honor.
In communities such as Maguindanao, where political office is almost like a personal possession, it is not surprising why rivalry in the elections could trigger vendettas.
see:
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/regions/view/20091128-239042/Why-rido-persists-in-Maguindanao
Editorial
Political entrepreneurs
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 23:17:00 11/28/2009
MANILA, Philippines—This is what Francisco Lara Jr., writing for MindaNews, calls political families—like the Ampatuans. He says that causes of violence and conflict in Muslim Mindanao are going through some changes. There is a new breed of warlords, he says, “whose powers depend upon their control of a vast, illegal and shadow economy and an ever-growing slice of internal revenue allotments,” and their insatiable hunger for wealth induces “a violent addiction to political office.”
Lara differentiates the old power dynamics governing warlords in Muslim Mindanao and their patrons in the national government from the psychopathic behavior of the new kind. As the national government surrendered revenue and authority to the new warlords in order to engage them on the government’s side in fighting rebel groups—in the process anointing specific warlord clans—elections in their area became winner-take-all contests and were held with ever-mounting ferocity. As the state abdicated its powers and responsibilities, the warlords discovered that beyond patronage via tax pesos, enormous fortunes could be made by engaging in Mafia-style activities.
As Lara puts it, “political authority may enable control over the formal economy, but the bigger prize is the power to monopolize or to extort money from those engaged in the lucrative business of illegal drugs, gambling, kidnap-for-ransom, gun-running, and smuggling, among others.” The “others” include piracy (software, CDs and DVDs) and smuggling of pearls and gems from overseas.
Imagine the utter impotence national agencies like the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) feel in places like Maguindanao; or how the internal revenue or customs bureaus are reduced into nominal agencies in such fiefdoms.
This explains the warlords’ spectacular and damning lack of interest in imposing true law and order, or in anything beyond the undeveloped economy that exists in places like Maguindanao, one of the poorest parts of the country by any measure. The real money is to be made only in so far as political office ensures the means to allow or disallow illegal activities—depending solely on whether officialdom gets a piece of the action or not.
It is actually in the interest of such “leaders” to keep their electorate poor, hungry, ignorant and unhealthy. As Lara bluntly puts it, “People actually expect local leaders to pocket government resources, and are willing to look the other way so long as their clans dominate and they are given a small slice during elections. Legitimacy is all about providing protection to your fellow clan members by trumping the firepower of your competitors, leaving people alone, and forgetting about taxes.”
The only limit to such predatory official behavior is not the national government—which created such a monstrous situation in the first place—but the Moros themselves: specifically, the Moro civil society and organized sectors in the population, such as women’s groups, assisted by the media, to show that Moro aspirations are different from those of their so-called elected officials.
This is why the Ampatuan Massacre was so horrific, not just in the manner it was conducted but also, in the targets picked for slaughter. When Moro women, “who usually played a strategic role in negotiating an end to rido became its principal victims,” Lara says, it was a signal that there is no room for any dissent or change whatsoever in the Maguindanao envisioned by the killers. And the lesson was meant to sink down the line for all others targeted on that horrific day of Nov. 23: the media, as the megaphone for the powerless and the weak; and even the Mangudadatus who dared think the province can be anything but a one-clan dictatorship.
And all because Manila, believing that warlords could serve as useful auxiliaries to the PNP and AFP, has learned to its delight the real value-added of dynasties like the Ampatuans: they can help administrations exercise a veto power on the results of national elections.
See:
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/editorial/view/20091128-239043/Political-entrepreneurs
