Only holders of valid titles can invoke the principle of indefeasibility of Torrens titles.
Our Ruling
Petitioners contend that the CA erred in holding that it was their burden to prove the invalidity of SMC’s title and that they failed to discharge such burden. They maintain that the mere existence of a prior title in Oliveros’ name suffices to create the presumption that SMC’s title, being the later title, is void.[80] With that presumption, it was incumbent upon SMC to prove the validity of its alleged title.
Petitioners are oversimplifying the rule. The principle that the earlier title prevails over a subsequent one applies when there are two apparently valid titles over a single property. The existence of the earlier valid title renders the subsequent title void because a single property cannot be registered twice. As stated in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court of Appeals,[81] which petitioners themselves cite, “a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in existence.” Clearly, a mere allegation of an earlier title will not suffice.
It is elementary that parties have the burden of proving their respective allegations.[82] Since petitioners allege that they have a title which was issued earlier than SMC’s title, it was their burden to prove the alleged existence and priority of their title. The trial and appellate courts’ shared conclusion that petitioners’ TCT No. T-17186does not exist in the official records is a finding of fact that is binding on this Court. Petitioners have not offered a reason or pointed to evidence that would justify overturning this finding. Neither did they assert that this factual finding is unsubstantiated by the records. Without a title, petitioners cannot assert priority or presumptive conclusiveness.[83]
In contrast to petitioners, SMC adequately proved its title to Lot 1131. SMC proved that its and its predecessors’ titles to Lot 1131 all exist in the official records, and petitioners failed to present any convincing evidence to cast doubt on such titles. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that SMC’s title enjoys presumptive conclusiveness and indefeasibility under the Torrens system.[84]
Petitioners’ argument that the ruling of the trial and appellate courts allowed a collateral attack on his title is clearly unmeritorious and easily disposed of.
In the first place, the prohibition against collateral attack does not apply to spurious or non-existent titles, since such titles do not enjoy indefeasibility. “Well-settled is the rule that the indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. In view of these circumstances, it was as if no title was ever issued in this case to the petitioner and therefore this is hardly the occasion to talk of collateral attack against a title.”[85]
Moreover, the attack on Oliveros’ title was not a collateral attack. “An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or to enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, it is indirect or collateral when, in an action or proceeding to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.”[86]
Here, SMC/Ramitex assailed the validity of Oliveros’ title as part of its counterclaim in an action to declare SMC/Ramitex’s title a nullity. A counterclaim is essentially a complaint filed by the defendant against the plaintiff and stands on the same footing as an independent action.[87] Thus, Ramitex’s counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on Oliveros’ title.
