An employment contract, like any other contract, is perfected at the moment (1) the parties come to agree upon its terms; and (2) concur in the essential elements thereof: (a) consent of the contracting parties, (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract, and (c) cause of the obligation.[20] The object of the contract was the rendition of service by respondent on board the vessel for which service he would be paid the salary agreed upon.
Hence, in this case, the employment contract was perfected on January 15, 2000 when it was signed by the parties, respondent and petitioners, who entered into the contract in behalf of their principal, Ranger Marine S.A., thereby signifying their consent to the terms and conditions of employment embodied in the contract, and the contract was approved by the POEA on January 17, 2000. However, the employment contract did not commence, since petitioners did not allow respondent to leave on January 17, 2000 to embark the vessel M/V AUK in Germany on the ground that he was not yet declared fit to work on the day of departure, although his Medical Certificate dated January 17, 2000 proved that respondent was fit to work.
In Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc.,[21] the Court held that the employment contract did not commence when the petitioner therein, a hired seaman, was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire; thus, no employer-employee relationship was created between the parties.
Nevertheless, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party.[22] If the reverse happened, that is, the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.[23]
The Court agrees with the NLRC that a recruitment agency, like petitioner BMC, must ensure that an applicant for employment abroad is technically equipped and physically fit because a labor contract affects public interest. Nevertheless, in this case, petitioners failed to prove with substantial evidence that they had a valid ground to prevent respondent from leaving on the scheduled date of his deployment. While the POEA Standard Contract must be recognized and respected, neither the manning agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from being deployed without a valid reason.[24]
Petitioners’ act of preventing respondent from leaving and complying with his contract of employment constitutes breach of contract for which petitioner BMC is liable for actual damages to respondent for the loss of one-year salary as provided in the contract.[25] The monthly salary stipulated in the contract is US$670, inclusive of allowance.
The Court upholds the award of moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00, as the Court of Appeals correctly found petitioners’ act was tainted with bad faith,[26]considering that respondent’s Medical Certificate stated that he was fit to work on the day of his scheduled departure, yet he was not allowed to leave allegedly for medical reasons.
Further, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that petitioner BMC is liable to respondent for exemplary damages,[27] which are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in view of petitioner’s act of preventing respondent from being deployed on the ground that he was not yet declared fit to work on the date of his departure, despite evidence to the contrary. Such act, if tolerated, would prejudice the employment opportunities of our seafarers who are qualified to be deployed, but prevented to do so by a manning agency for unjustified reasons. Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.[28] In this case, petitioner should be held liable to respondent for exemplary damages in the amount ofP50,000.00,[29] following the recent case of Claudio S. Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management, et al.,[30] instead of P10,000.00
The Court also holds that respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees in the concept of damages and expenses of litigation.[31] Attorney's fees are recoverable when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest.[32] Petitioners’ failure to deploy respondent based on an unjustified ground forced respondent to file this case, warranting the award of attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the recoverable amount.[33]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67571, dated October 25, 2004, is AFFIRMED with modification. Petitioner Bright Maritime Corporation is hereby ORDERED to pay respondent Ricardo B. Fantonial actual damages in the amount of the peso equivalent of US$8,040.00, representing his salary for one year under the contract; moral damages in the amount Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00); exemplary damages that is increased from Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), and attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the recoverable amount.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
