"x x x.
The Court’s policy of non-interference with the Office of the Ombudsman except in a clear case of grave abuse of discretion
The Constitution and R.A. No. 6770[15] endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and employees.[16] Specifically, the determination of whether probable cause exists[17] is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. Whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not is basically its call.[18]
As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers,[19] and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Office of the Ombudsman which, “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.”[20] While the Ombudsman’s findings as to whether probable cause exists are generally not reviewable by this Court,[21] where there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the Ombudsman’s act cannot escape judicial scrutiny under the Court’s own constitutional power and duty “to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”[22]
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner - which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law – in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention. The petitioner failed to show the existence of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
Evidentiary basis of probable cause
The petitioner argues that in finding probable cause for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, the Ombudsman should have used the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard as threshold.
We strongly disagree.
In line with the constitutionally-guaranteed independence of the Office of the Ombudsman[23] and coupled with the inherent limitations in a certiorari proceeding in reviewing the Ombudsman’s discretion,[24] we have consistently held that so long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsman’s ruling, his decision should stand.[25] In a criminal proceeding before the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman merely determines whether probable cause exists, i.e., whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guiltythereof.[26] Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.[27] As the term itself implies, probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not absolute or even moral certainty;[28] it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.[29] On this score, Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao )[30] is instructive
[A] finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. [italics, underscoring and emphasis ours.]
A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.[31]
In the present case, the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 against the petitioner is supported by substantial evidence. First, the petitioner himself recommended the non-renewal of the complainants’ contractual employment;[32] and second, the petitioner is the head of the Task Force where the complainants were previously employed. As the Ombudsman does, we find these facts sufficient to engender a reasonable belief that the petitioner’s act satisfies one of the elements[33] of the law allegedly violated, and whose existence the petitioner strongly disputes. In turn, these facts rule out any arbitrariness in the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause. Whether the evidence before the Ombudsman will be sufficient to procure a conviction is a different matter that must await the trial of the criminal case.
