I have written in my past blogs about the internal politics in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Even so-called “brothers” in the Sigma Rho Fraternity of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines which has monopolized the political reins of the IBP since the 1970s have their own internal political squabbles and bloody power plays, showing the depth of the political disease of “factionalism” inside the IBP.
The controversial consolidated cases of ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs. ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, etc., En Banc and Per Curiam, A.C. No. 6697, Bar Matter No. 1227, and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, July 25, 2006 is a very good example of the divisive political factionalism (and survival of the fittest) inside the IBP.
The only difference was that in the above consolidated cases, there was a new intervening variable, i.e., R.A. No. 9227, the law which increased the special allowances of judges and justices.
Atty. De Vera in principle felt that it was unconstitutional.
The law led to the drastic increase in the court fees charged by the courts under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) likewise increased it own administrative fees imposed on all criminal complaints filed with the local DOJ offices. (To seek criminal justice, one must pay filing fees!).
These abrupt increases led to huge sufferings on the part of Filipino litigants. Up to the now, it is a big issue even among trial lawyers.
(At any rate, to mitigate the sufferings of litigants, Rule 3 and Rule 141 of the Rules of Court contain provisions which exempt indigent litigants from the huge and painful legal fees imposed by the Court).
Going back to R.A. 9227, at first, the IBP Board agreed with Atty. De Vera. The board filed a petition in the Supreme Court contesting its constitutionality.
Later, for some unknown and mysterious reasons (which Atty. De Vera felt should have been explained to the IBP general membership), the board withdrew the petition.
Atty. De Vera, who was a co-petitioner in the petition, did not withdraw as a petitioner.
During a national convention of lawyers in Baguio City in 2006, many lawyers questioned the withdrawal made by the IBP Board. The board alleged that Atty. De Vera was the mastermind behind the heated questions raised by the general membership on the plenary floor.
A few weeks later, the board removed him as a Regional Governor and as the incumbent Executive Vice President. Under the “automatic assumption rule”, he was supposed to be the next national president of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
The Supreme Court suspended him for two years from the Roll of Attorneys based on another ground, i.e., alleged dishonesty committed in another jurisdiction (California) a few years back.
Having been suspended, he was disqualified to continue as an IBP officer. He thus lost the presidency for the term 2005-2007.
Meanwhile, I think the 5-year period stipulated in R.A. 9227 within which the increased special allowances of judges and justice should be paid (from increased court fees), has already expired. The issue was mooted, if I am not mistaken.
As far as I can recall, I have not come across any decision of the Court resolving the merits of the De Ver petition questioning the constitutionality of the said special law.
It appears that on January 25, 2005, the Court had terminated the case. It appears further that in a Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc in re: G.R. No. 165108, April 19, 2005, entitled Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al., the Court denied the “Manifestation and Motion to Give Due Course to the Petition and to Resolve It on Its Merits by Ruling on the Constitutionality of R.A. 9227 and Its Implementing Guidelines, dated 21 March 2005” filed by counsel for petitioners Leonard S. De Vera, Carlos L. Valdez, Jr., Dante G. llaya and Immanuel I. Sodusta, considering that in the resolution of 25 January 2005, this case was already considered closed and terminated.
It appears furthermore that in an earlier Resolution dated March 1, 2005, it resolved that considering that in the resolution of 25 January 2005, the withdrawal of the petition was granted and this case was considered closed and terminated, the Court simply noted without action the (a) Opposition to the Withdrawal of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer to Rule on the Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227 and Its Implementing Issuances), dated 8 February 2005 filed by petitioners Leonard S. De Vera, Carlos L. Valdez, Jr., Dante G. Ilaya and Immanuel I. Sodusta, all Members of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, assisted by their counsel; and (b) Manifestation dated 8 February 2005 filed by petitioner Immanuel I. Sodusta in relation to the aforesaid Opposition, stating that he was not withdrawing his standing as individual petitioner.
Any way, the judges and justices were truly glad and happy their special allowances were not touched and revoked.
Meanwhile, Atty. De Vera suffered in silence while serving his two-year suspension period.
(At present, he is busy with his anti-corruption and anti-violence advocacy in cooperation with leading law and justice non-governmental organizations in Metro Manila). He has not involved himself in IBP activities since then.
I may be wrong, but up to now, I truly feel that the IBP Board and the Supreme Court did not treat Atty. De Vera with fairness and that some kind of high-level politics and prejudice had tainted the actions of the IBP Board and the Supreme Court.
At any rate, let me digest the salient parts of the abovecited consolidated cases for legal research purposes of the visitors of this blog.
In A.C. No. 6697, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds: (a) respondent’s alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and (b) respondent’s alleged violation of the so-called “rotation rule” enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department – San Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the country’s most noble profession.
Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called “rotation rule” provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised that the respondent’s transfer was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.
Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata.
In Bar Matter No. 1227, Atty. de Vera requested the Court to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President.
In A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, in a letter, dated May 19, 2005, furnished the Court with the IBP’s Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general.
The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular meeting of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed as “Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. – Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108.” The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.
The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L. Valdez.
On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at the CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP Board’s Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227.
On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP.
On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President.
On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter where he strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due process.
On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera. In their Reply, the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member.
On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position paper coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.
On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special meeting of the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de Vera’s removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared as IBP EVP.
On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago. On 20 June 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board. Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.
On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazar’s election. IBP National President Cadiz also requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazar’s election be approved and that he be allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is approved by this Court. Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of Atty. Salazar.
Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the Convention’s Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP Board.
Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this Court’s Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks.
Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.
After hearing the parties, the Court resolved, in AC No. 6697, that under Section 19, Article II of the IBP By-Laws, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice. It is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in registering one's preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time. The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. Under this section, a lawyer who wishes to move to another chapter must do so not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco, Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November 1996, the Court declared that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the Court’s administrative powers.
In subsequent decisions of the Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William Layague (Administrative Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that while double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a second time for an act which he had already answered for.
Likewise, in the case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), the Court held that applied the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment. Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. It provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again. This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law.”
In the instant case, the Court held that contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, “In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election” and promulgated on 11 December 2003 did not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata.
According to the Court, in order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.
It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first administrative case, complainants’ cause of action was Atty. de Vera’s alleged violation or circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Vera’s alleged violation of lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de Vera’s suspension or disbarment.
The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties’ rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can file with the IBP President a written protest against the candidate. The Court’s statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law for three years.
What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.
Atty. de Vera was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.
The Court held that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction may result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines if the acts giving rise to his suspension are the same grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court’s action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. The judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the unethical acts of a lawyer. (Sec. 48, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
The Court stated that under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The said rule also provides that the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated; that the judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.
In the case of Atty. De Vera, an administrative case was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal account. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for three years. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California.
Atty. de Vera insisted that the foregoing facts did not prove that he misappropriated his client’s funds as the latter’s father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he “expected de Vera might use the money for a few days.”
The Court held that the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client’s funds is highly unethical, citing Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION; that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client; that a lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
In the instant case, the Court held that it was “admitted” (in the judicial pleadings filed) by Atty. de Vera that he had “used” his client’s money for personal use and that such an constituted more than substantial evidence of malpractice. The Court added that Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence “which he himself supplied”.
The Court rejected the claim of Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds intended for the latter’s son and that he had restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in the State Bar of California, on the ground that they were self-serving statements and that it could not find anywhere in the records any proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his client.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified that he “expected de Vera might use the money for a few days.” As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis “expected de Vera might use the money for a few days” was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client’s funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his client’s funds, which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.
Complainant further insisted that Atty. de Vera’s transfer of membership from the Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan Del Sur IBP Chapter was a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant stressed that Atty. de Vera was not a resident of Agusan Del Sur nor did he hold office therein.
As to the rotation or chapter-shopping-related issue raised by the complainant in Adm. Case No. 6052, the Court held that Atty. de Vera’s act of transferring to another IBP Chapter was not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same was allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three months immediately preceding any chapter election.
As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera’s right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that he was guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule – will produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyer’s Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.
In Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC, the Court addressed the issue of whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty. de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005; and whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and could consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
Under Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, should the Board of Governors determine after proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, it may, by resolution of the Majority of its remaining members, declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term.
In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied “very basic rights of due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases” like the right to answer formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support his own motion.
The Court agreed with the IBP Board when it argued that since its members were present during the plenary session of the controversial national convention of lawyers in Baguio City, and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera’s actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was present at the Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.
The Court stated that due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with “judicial process” for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing is not essential to due process of law.
It added that the right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. Nor is an actual hearing always essential especially under the factual milieu of this case where the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court – all witnessed Atty. de Vera’s actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.
The Court added that it was undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it was patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.
For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Vera’s expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera). The Court cited Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws which provides that any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase “remaining members” refers to the members exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members are interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion while two voted against it which still added up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.
The Court held that Atty. de Vera’s removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary. It stated that the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, was diluted if the conflicts were brought outside its governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors, did not and could not speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBP’s prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.
The Court stated that the IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latter’s actuations during the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board was not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it could not effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the administration of justice.
The Court held that when a member of a governing body could not accept the voice of the majority, he should resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his heart’s content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well. Under Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Vera’s removal from the Board of Governors automatically disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP (who is the automatic president in the following term).
Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the Integration Rule, and Section 11 (Vacancies), Section 44 (Removal of members), Section 47 (National officers), Section 48 (other officers), and Section 49 (Terms of Office) of the By-Laws.
The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that “[t]he EVP shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term.” The phrase “for the next succeeding term” necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet to resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.
Accordingly, the Court held that the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.
The Court did not give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws. According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis.
Clarifying the meaning of the rotation rule, the Court held that In Bar Matter 491 it held that it was “the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine Regional Governors”. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is “merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency”. Thus, the “rotation rule” pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the “automatic succession rule” pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency was but a consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Vera’s removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 – in this case, Governor Salazar – who would have served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.
In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase “as much as practicable” to clearly indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances.
It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have.
In fine, the Court ruled as follows:
1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts;
2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion;
3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and
4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.
