The case of SYLVIA SANTOS vs. JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA- CHUA, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2312-RTJ), February 13, 2009, involved a trial judge in the premier financial city of the Philippines, i.e., Makati City.
The complainant Sylvia Santos, an aunt of the respondent trial judge, accused the respondent Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 144, Makati City, of serious misconduct and dishonesty.
After trial, the Philippine Supreme Court found the judge GUILTY of gross misconduct and SUSPENDED her from office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits, with the warning that the commission of the same or a similar act in the future shall merit a more severe penalty.
As was usual among administrative cases against judges and lawyers, this case involved money and influence peddling.
Let me digest the case for legal-ethics research purposes.
Complainant, an aunt of respondent's husband, alleges: In the first week of September 2002, she asked respondent's help, who was then the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 63 of Makati City, regarding the cases of complainant's friend, Emerita Muñoz, pending before the Supreme Court. Respondent, a former employee of the Court, said that she could help as she had connections with some Justices of the Court; she just needed P100, 000.00 which she would give to an employee of the Court for the speedy resolution of said cases. In the first week of October 2002, complainant gave respondent P100, 000.00 in the privacy of the latter's chamber. When complainant followed up the cases in February 2003, respondent told her that there was a problem, as the other party was offering P10 million to the Justices. Complainant asked respondent to return the P100, 000.00; however respondent could no longer be contacted.
In her Comment dated August 19, 2005, respondent denied the charges against her. She averred that when she became a judge, complainant asked a lot of favors from her, and knowing that she worked as a Court Attorney of the Supreme Court, complainant asked her to talk to a certain Mario Tolosa of the Third Division, to whom complainant had given P50, 000.00 for a favorable resolution of the Munoz cases. Respondent declined; thereafter complainant started spreading malicious imputations against her. On April 23, 2005, complainant begged respondent to talk to anyone in the Third Division to recover the money she gave Tolosa. Respondent again refused; complainant then repeatedly tried to talk to her until April 25, 2005 when complainant threatened to file a case against respondent with the Supreme Court. Complainant sent two demand letters addressed to respondent's court asking for the return of the P100, 000.00 complainant allegedly gave her. Complainant also told respondent's husband, outside respondent's house, that she was corrupt, as she asked for money in order to settle cases in court. Respondent filed cases of Grave Oral Defamation, Intriguing Against Honor and Unjust Vexation against complainant, while complainant filed an estafa case against her.
The investigating Court of Appeals associate justice who was tasked by the Supreme Court to hear the evidence of the parties conduct found that: complainant was able to present substantial evidence in support of her complaint against respondent; while respondent denied that she asked for and received from complainant P100,000.00 for the facilitation of a favorable decision on Muñoz's cases, respondent, however, admitted meeting complainant in her office in September 2002, claiming only a different reason for such meeting; that is, complainant was there to console her for the protests against respondent at the time; respondent claims to have incurred complainant's ire for declining complainant's request for favors in June 2004; however, it was respondent who asserted that the complainant asked her to talk to Mario Tolosa of the Supreme Court; complainant asserted that she had not heard of Tolosa before; however it was respondent's comment and her husband's affidavit which stated that complainant informed them on April 23, 2005 that Tolosa had gone on absence without leave; it was respondent, as a former employee of the Supreme Court who stood to know who Tolosa was; there was also a strong reason to believe that respondent knew and associated with Muñoz prior to the parties' falling out, since the affidavit of Robert Chua (Robert), respondent's husband, stated that Muñoz was introduced to them by complainant in September 2003, and that they went to Tagaytay with her in 2004; Robert claimed, however, that the topic of case-fixing never cropped up; although respondent filed a complaint for grave oral defamation, intriguing against honor and unjust vexation on June 20, 2005 before complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, it cannot be denied, however, that respondent at the time had already been served complainant's demand letters dated April 28, 2005 and May 27, 2005; respondent's failure, both as a judge and as a lawyer, to reply to complainant's first demand letter, was unusual; considering complainant's advanced age and illnesses, respondent's claim -- that complainant's motive for filing the administrative case was respondent’s refusal to give in to complainant's request to intercede in the cases of the latter’s friend -- was too paltry an explanation for complainant's willingness to expend the time, money, effort and aggravation entailed by the administrative case as well as the criminal case filed by and against her; complainant's compliance with the Court's Resolution, which directed her to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for filing an unfounded complaint against respondent, stated that the allegations in her complaint were true and based on personal knowledge, and it was only because of respondent and their family's pleas, as well as for humane reasons, that she gave up her complaint against respondent.
In deciding the complaint, the Supreme Court held that It was settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish malfeasance was not proof beyond reasonable doubt, but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In this case, the investigating justice found that substantial evidence existed to support the allegations against respondent.
Try as she might to show the implausibility of complainant's claims, respondent could not deny that she and complainant met at her office sometime in September 2002; that she and her husband knew Muñoz and associated with her on several occasions, and that it was respondent, being a former employee of the Supreme Court, who stood to know who Tolosa was. But most telling of all the circumstances pointing to respondent's guilt is the unwavering stance of complainant that respondent did solicit and receive P100, 000.00 from her in order to facilitate a favorable ruling in Muñoz's cases.
As a rule, the findings of investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are generally given by this Court great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. In the case at bar, as the observations and findings of the investigating justice were well supported by the records, the Court found no reason to depart from such rule.
As defined, misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while “gross,” has been defined as “out of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused.
Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140, a judge found guilty of gross misconduct may be punished with any of the following sanctions: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
This was respondent's first administrative offense. In view of such circumstance and the sanctions provided under Rule 140, the Court found suspension from office without salary and other benefits for six months to be proper in this case.
Parenthetically, the Court emphasized as a final word that the office of a judge was sacred and imbued with public interest. The need to maintain the public’s confidence in the judiciary could not be made to depend solely on the whims and caprices of complainants. Thus, withdrawal of a complaint or desistance from a complaint would not deprive the Court of its power under the Constitution to ferret out the truth and discipline its members accordingly.
