There is an unwritten rule among pragmatic trial lawyers: “Do not antagonize your trial judge. Adjust to his idiosyncrasies and peculiarities, no matter how odd and irritating they may be. Save your case from retaliation and absolute defeat.”
I admit that as a trial lawyer, whose personal principle is to be patient and calm under all circumstances inside the court room, no matter how trying and difficult they made be, I, too, am guilty of such a “safe attitude” once in a while. For I believe that there is no point in needlessly arguing with the ego-inflated judge who is trying your case and in the process incurring his ire when you can equally and more effectively achieve your professional objective of prosecuting or defending your client’s cause without unnecessary, futile and costly “court room bloodshed”, so to speak.
At any rate, I am proud of the bravery of the Baguio lawyers, led by their chapter president, Atty. Cesar G. Oracion, because they had united to declare, by their courageous and professional deeds, that they were proud and unique exceptions to the abovementioned unwritten rule of pragmatic trial lawyers.
In the case of THE OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE IBP BAGUIO-BENGUET CHAPTER, CESAR G. ORACION, PRESIDENT vs. FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch III, Baguio City, En Banc, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1691. January 16, 2004, the Philippine Supreme Court suspended the respondent Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Baguio City, for a period of one (1) year effective immediately, with a stern warning that a repetition of the acts subject matter of the said administrative case shall be dealt with more severely, for gross ignorance of the law, gross violation of constitutional rights of the accused, arrogance, violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, oppression and graft and corruption.
Parenthetically, I wonder what had happened to the subsequent professional dealings and relationships of the guilty judge and the complaining trial lawyers whose new cases, by unfortunate luck, were raffled to the sala of the guilty judge for adjudication (after the expiration of his suspension period). I am quite sure the guilty judge had a very hard time controlling his humiliated heart and mind from committing acts of vengeance and retaliation against the complaining lawyers. Judges are human beings, too, with their own weaknesses and frailties.
At any rate, let me quote the doctrinal portions of the aforecited decision for legal research purposes of the visitors of this blog. Thus:
X x x.
On Gross Ignorance of the Law
The respondent judge’s ignorance of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is palpable. In People vs. Dumez, et al. (Criminal Cases Nos. 15776-R up to 15779-R), the respondent judge sentenced the accused who were found guilty of theft to suffer imprisonment “from seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years and eight (8) months as maximum of prision mayor for each case.” The penalty imposed by the respondent judge was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law which prescribes that the minimum of the imposable penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalty for theft is prision mayor, the minimum of the penalty imposable on the accused should have been within the range of prision correccional, the penalty next lower to prision mayor.
A perusal of the other decisions rendered by the respondent judge shows that his erroneous application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in imposing the penalties was committed in not just one or two instances. Rather, as correctly raised by the complainants, the respondent judge had repeatedly misapplied the Indeterminate Sentence Law in at least seventeen (17) other cases x x x,
X x x,
The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the imposition of penalties in crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code is a basic precept. The respondent judge’s repeated misapplication thereof in quite a number of criminal cases he had rendered constitutes gross ignorance of the law. As this Court has consistently ruled, “a judge is presumed to know the law and when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.” Indeed, judges are duty bound to have more than a cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that “a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.” It bears stressing that –
. . . Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law.
The respondent judge has utterly failed to live up to the standard of competence required of him. His erroneous application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law committed not just once or twice but in at least seventeen (17) instances is a compelling evidence of his gross ignorance of the law.
On Gross Violation of
the Constitutional Rights
of the Accused
In People vs. Ceferino Baniqued (Criminal Case No. 13949-R) for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the prosecution filed a motion for preventive suspension and the accused filed his opposition thereto. In his Order of August 18, 1998, the respondent judge submitted the said motion for resolution. However, it took the respondent judge more than one (1) year to resolve the same. As correctly found by the Investigating Justice, the delay in resolving this motion constituted violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial.
In Surla vs. Dimla (Civil Case No. 3322-R), the respondent judge resolved an unopposed motion for reconsideration after almost four (4) months. Again, this contravened the mandate of the Constitution that "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of cases.”
Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provide:
Rule 1.02. – A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
Rule 3.05. – A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 enjoins that:
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from dates of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so . . .
Further, SC Administrative Circular No. 1-88 reads:
6.1. All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts . . .
Conformably with the foregoing mandate, this Court has pronounced –
The office of a judge exists for one solemn end – to promote the ends of justice by administering it speedily and impartially. The judge as the person presiding over that court is the visible representation of the law and justice. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.
The unreasonable delay of the respondent judge in resolving the motions submitted for his resolution clearly constituted a violation of the parties’ constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases.
On Arrogant, Oppressive
and Improper Conduct and
Violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct
As correctly enumerated by the Investigating Justice, the following incidents establish the respondent judge’s arrogant and oppressive conduct:
a. Arrogance
When he tried to limit the cross examination by Atty. Fernando Manapat Jr., who was representing the accused in People vs. Andrada, of the prosecution witness to ten (10) minutes with an advice of not repeating questions that were already asked during the direct examination;
b. Arrogance and Oppression
Atty. J[o]ris Karl B. Dacaw[i], a young lawyer, who became the beneficiary of respondent’s arrogance and oppressive conduct on 11 March 1999. On said date, Atty. Dacaw[i], as plaintiff’s lawyer, moved for the cancellation of the hearing of the case entitled “Alejo Cabre[r]os vs. Susie Edralin” alleging although his witness Alejo Cabre[r]os was present, said witness however was not feeling well. This simple manifestation caught the ire of respondent judge who instantaneously ordered Alejo Cabre[r]os to stand and told him not to pay his lawyer his attorneys fees because he did not do anything for that day;
c. Oppression and Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
1. Atty. Reynaldo U. Agranzamendez, while appearing as counsel de oficio for Liwayway Cruz in Criminal Case No. 7304-R, for estafa last 29 July 1999, was extremely embarrassed when he was ordered by respondent judge to stand in behalf of accused, who was then absent despite due notice, and face the Clerk of Court during the reading of the full text of the decision when said case was called for promulgation. Accordingly, Atty. Agranzamendez asked respondent judge to allow him to take his seat as there were several people inside the courtroom who, being unmindful of the rules might think that he was the accused. But his pleas, however, got respondent mad, for instead of allowing him to sit down, respondent instead banged his gavel and told Atty. Agranzamendez not to argue with the court and to stand straight as he leaned over avoid the glances of the Clerk of Court.
2. Evidence on hand also reveals respondent’s casual disregard of procedural rules, that is, when he promulgated a decision that has yet to be released as shown in the case of People vs. Malapit, et al., docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 15320-R, 15323-R, 15[327]-R and 15571-R and in People vs. Cas, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15306-R.
The behavior of the respondent judge towards Atty. Mandapat, i.e. berating the latter in his cross-examination for repeating the questions already asked during the direct examination, betrayed his impatience in the conduct of the hearing. A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of trial is a norm of behavior incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good judge.
The respondent’s statement to the client that Atty. Dacawi did not deserve to be paid as he did not do anything during the trial was uncalled for. Further, his act of requiring Atty. Agranzamendez to take the place of the accused during the reading of the decision at the promulgation thereof was improper. These actuations of the respondent judge cannot be countenanced as they clearly violated Rule 3.04 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
Rule 3.04. – A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
Apropos, this Court has held:
. . . A judge should be courteous both in his conduct and in his language especially to those appearing before him. He can hold counsels to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court, their clients, and the public without being petty, arbitrary, overbearing, or tyrannical. He should refrain from conduct that demeans his office and remember always that courtesy begets courtesy. Above all, he must conduct himself in such a manner that he gives no reason for reproach.
Clearly, the respondent judge has failed to observe courtesy and civility to the lawyers as well as to the litigants who appeared before him.
Finally, the Court frowns upon the highly irregular practice of the respondent judge of promulgating a decision, copies of which were not then ready for release to the parties. Consequently, Atty. Lagdao of the PAO, who represented the accused, filed the notices of appeal stating as follows:
In the Malapit case:
. . . hereby gives notice that she is appealing to the Supreme Court decision of the honorable Court promulgated on 18 September 1999, copies of which the honorable Court has yet to release despite the fact that the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal is about to expire. . .
In the Cas case:
. . . hereby gives notice that she is appealing to the court of appeals the decision of the honorable Court promulgated on 22 June 1999, a copy of which the Honorable Court has yet to release.. .
What is even more reprehensible were the respondent judge’s directives to Atty. Lagdao to delete the phrase “copies of which the Honorable Court has yet to release” from the notices of appeal otherwise he (the respondent judge) would not act thereon. This conduct of the respondent judge was utterly unbecoming a magistrate and violated the following canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
CANON 1 - A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
Rule 1.01. – A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES
Rule 2.01. - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
CANON 3 - A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE
Rule 3.01. - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
On Graft and Corruption
While the Investigating Justice absolved, for insufficiency of evidence, the respondent judge of the charge of graft and corruption in connection with the appointment of Mr. Gula as driver, nonetheless, she found the respondent judge guilty of impropriety. As found by the Investigating Justice, the respondent judge’s recommendation of Mr. Gula to be his driver “despite the latter’s lack of driver’s license and inability to drive not only casts doubt in his integrity but also his honesty as a judge.” Indeed, the personal behavior of the judge, not only while in the performance of his duties but also outside the court must be beyond reproach for he is the visible representation of the law and of justice.
The Court also notes that this is not the respondent’s first administrative case. In Gacayan vs. Pamintuan, the Court found him guilty of violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Ethics which amount to grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming an officer of the judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service. Despite the fact that the accused already filed a Demurer to Evidence, the respondent, without resolving the same and in blatant disregard for the rules of criminal procedure, still called witnesses who were not listed in the information as well as those who had already testified to appear before him, resulting in the re-opening of the case with respect to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. When the accused filed a motion for inhibition and a motion to suspend further proceedings, the respondent judge denied the same. He was also seen conferring with the witnesses for the prosecution, and later set the case for hearing without notice to the counsel of the accused. The respondent was meted a fine of P10,000 and sternly warned that a repetition of similar transgressions would be dealt with more severely.
Considering all the foregoing, we find that the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year is appropriate.
X x x,
