In the recent case of JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY, on petition for writ of certiorari to the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, docketed as Case No. 08-10914 and decided on February 22, 2010 (see: http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/8-10914.html), the US Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, held, inter alia, that in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1, 4 (1992), the Court held that "the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the inmate does not suffer serious injury." In the instant case, the District Court dismissed a prisoner's excessive force claim based entirely on its determination that his injuries were "de minimis." Because the District Court's approach, affirmed on appeal, was at odds with Hudson's direction to decide excessive force claims “based on the nature of the force rather than the extent of the injury”, the petition for certiorari was granted, and the questioned judgment was reversed by the Court.
In March 2008, petitioner Jamey Wilkins, a North Carolina state prisoner, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §1983. Wilkins' pro se complaint alleged that, on June 13, 2007, he was "maliciously and sadistically" assaulted "[w]ithout any provocation" by a corrections officer, respondent Gaddy.1 App. to Pet. for Cert. C-4. According to the complaint, Gaddy, apparently angered by Wilkins' request for a grievance form, "snatched [Wilkins] off the ground and slammed him onto the concrete floor." Ibid. Gaddy "then proceeded to punch, kick, knee and choke [Wilkins] until another officer had to physically remove him from [Wilkins]." Ibid. Wilkins further alleged that, "[a]s a result of the excessive force used by [Gaddy], [he] sustained multiple physical injuries including a bruised heel, lower back pain, increased blood pressure, as well as migraine headaches and dizziness" and "psychological trauma and mental anguish including depression, panic attacks and nightmares of the assault." Ibid.
Like Wilkins, the prisoner in Hudson filed suit under §1983 alleging that corrections officers had used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Evidence indicated that the officers had punched Hudson in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach without justification, resulting in "minor bruises and swelling of his face, mouth, and lip" as well as loosened teeth and a cracked partial dental plate. 503 U. S., at 4. A Magistrate Judge entered judgment in Hudson's favor, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that an inmate must prove "a significant injury" in order to state an excessive force claim. Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F. 2d 1014, 1015 (1990) (per curiam). According to the Court of Appeals, Hudson's injuries, which had not required medical attention, were too "minor" to warrant relief. Ibid.
Reversing the Court of Appeals, the US Supreme Court rejected the notion that "significant injury" was a threshold requirement for stating an excessive force claim. The "core judicial inquiry," it was held, was not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." 503 U. S., at 7; see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312, 319-321 (1986). "When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm," the Court recognized, "contemporary standards of decency always were violated whether or not significant injury was evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury." Hudson, 503 U. S., at 9; see also id., at 13-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) ("The Court today appropriately puts to rest a seriously misguided view that pain inflicted by an excessive use of force is actionable under the Eighth Amendment only when coupled with 'significant injury,' e.g., injury that requires medical attention or leaves permanent marks").
This is not to say that the "absence of serious injury" is irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, the Court stated. Id., at 7. "[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest 'whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary' in a particular situation." Ibid. (quoting Whitley, 475 U. S., at 321). The extent of injury may also provide some indication of the amount of force applied. As stated in Hudson, not "every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action." 503 U. S., at 9. "The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual' punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind," the Court added. Ibid. An inmate who complains of a "push or shove" that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim. Ibid. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F. 2d 1028, 1033 (CA2 1973)).
Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury. Accordingly, the Court concluded in Hudson that the supposedly "minor" nature of the injuries "provide[d] no basis for dismissal of [Hudson's] §1983 claim" because "the blows directed at Hudson, which caused bruises, swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate, are not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes." 503 U. S., at 10.
The allegations made by Wilkins in the instant case were quite similar to the facts in Hudson. Wilkins alleged that he was punched, kicked, kneed, choked, and body slammed "maliciously and sadistically" and "[w]ithout any provocation." Dismissing Wilkins' action sua sponte, the District Court did not hold that this purported assault, which allegedly left Wilkins with a bruised heel, back pain, and other injuries requiring medical treatment, involved de minimis force. Instead, the court concluded that Wilkins had failed to state a claim because "he simply has not alleged that he suffered anything more than de minimus [sic] injury." No. 3:08-cv-00138 (WD NC, Apr. 16, 2008), at 2.
In fine, in holding that the District Court erred in dismissing Wilkins' complaint based on the supposedly de minimis nature of his injuries, the US Supreme Court expressed no view on the underlying merits of his excessive force claim. In order to prevail, Wilkins would ultimately have to prove not only that the assault actually occurred but also that it was carried out "maliciously and sadistically" rather than as part of "a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline." Ibid. Moreover, even if Wilkins succeeded, the relatively modest nature of his alleged injuries would no doubt limit the damages he may recover, the Court stated.
The petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis were granted. The questioned judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Court
