Unity in judicial reform
By RENATO C. CORONA, Supreme Court Chief Justice
June 12, 2010, 8:06pm
Officers of the Philippine Constitution Association, fellow scholars of the law, distinguished guests, ladies, and gentlemen, a pleasant evening to you all. Before anything else, my sincerest gratitude to your Chairman of the Board, Minister Conrado F. Estrella, and President, Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, for inviting me to be your guest of honor and speaker tonight, as our nation celebrates its 112th Independence Day.
One month ago, our country had its first-ever automated elections. Come June 30, we will have an entirely new administration. Perhaps, for the first time in our history, the heads of the three branches of government are or will be newly installed. This is significant because the situation presents great opportunities to heal the painful wounds our country is suffering from and thereby usher in a new golden age of unity and economic strides. As our 22nd Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno so eloquently expressed it during the Justice Sector Coordinating Council Special Session.
True, these institutions are independent and have their own functions, but it ought to be clear and cannot be denied that the justice sector must work in an environment where there is interconnectivity. For reforms in one institution entail consequences for others. Hence, the success of reforms in one institution may be diluted by the lack of reforms in another justice sector agency. In effect, an injustice perpetuated in one justice sector agency threatens the entire administration of justice in our country.
The proposition is that if we want to have successful reforms in our justice system, we must act as one, move forward together, be guided by the singular goal of giving justice to our people all in accord with the command of our Constitution.
As the new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, allow me to speak on behalf of the judicial branch. Regrettably, the judiciary has often been denigrated as the most benign and least powerful branch of government. The celebrated Montesquieu wrote that “of the three powers above mentioned, the judiciary is next to nothing.” The perception that it is merely reactive and not proactive, remedial and not protective, admittedly finds its roots in traditional orthodoxy. Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist, No. 78, wrote:
The judiciary has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.
It proves incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; that it can never attack with success either of the two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks.
This view, however, no longer seems accurate in the light of our fundamental law which has infused vigor, muscle and intensity into the Court’s role in the nation’s political life. Indeed, in our jurisdiction, the days of Montesquieu and Hamilton, and the traditional role of the judiciary, may have long been dead and gone. Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution established a powerful judiciary by expanding its judicial power to inquire into political questions. Section 1 has substantially reformulated the political question doctrine which had, for many years, limited the power of judicial review, as clearly defined by Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel “with deft strokes and in bold lines” in the seminal case of Angara v. Electoral Commission.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The late Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, an eminent member of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, authored the expanded jurisdiction and explained its rationale:
This is actually a product of our experience during martial law the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the Solicitor General set up the defense of political question and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question.x The Committee on Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution to the question involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government, or any of its officials, has acted without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature x x x x (this) means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
And pursuant to this expanded power, the Supreme Court nullified the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain or MOA-AD, ruling that the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the consultation process as mandated by law. The Court struck down the agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), holding that the government negotiation panel’s failure to consult the local government units or communities constituted a departure from its mandate under Executive Order No. 3. The Court held that the “furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted (ran) contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.”
In Kabataan Party-List v. Comelec, the Court nullified Comelec Resolution No. 8585, insofar as it encroached on the period provided by the system of continuing voters’ registration, and extended the October 31, 2009 deadline to January 9, 2010 as prescribed by the system of continuing registration. More recent is the case Guingona Jr. v. Comelec, where the Court ordered the Comelec to disclose the complete details of its preparations for the automated elections. The Court held that the Comelec “(could) not shirk from its constitutional duty to disclose fully to the public complete details of all information relating to its preparation for the May 10, 2010 elections without violating the Constitution and relevant laws. No less than the Constitution mandated it to enforce and administer the election laws.”
In Aldaba v. Commission on Elections, the Court nullified Republic Act No. 9591, the law creating a congressional district for Malolos City, Bulacan and held that laws creating legislative districts, as well as justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on the constitutionality of the said Republic Act, such as compliance with the population requirement under Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, are within the ambit of judicial power of review. “To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA 9591 is to contend that this Court has no power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government, a duty mandated under Article VIII of the Constitution.”
Similarly, in Navarro v. Ermita, the Court declared as unconstitutional RA 9355, the law creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, and nullified the proclamation of the election of the officials thereof. The Court noted that the Province of Dinagat Islands, containing an approximate land area of 802.12 square kilometers, fell short of the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. The Province likewise failed to comply with the population requirement of not less than 250,000 inhabitants, the census conducted by the NSO showing that the Dinagat Islands’ population was only 106,951. The Court added that, while it respected the doctrine of separation of powers, it “(could) not renege on its duty to determine whether the other branches of the government had kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution, and determine(d) whether illegality attached to the creation of the province in question.”
Most certainly, the Supreme Court is ordained to be the final interpreter of the meaning and intent of the Constitution. “We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the Court says it is,” then New York Governor, and later Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Charles Evans Hughes once said. “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” wrote Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison. Thus, we continue to interpret the Constitution, especially the “invisible” Constitution, as referred to by Harvard Professor and renowned legal scholar Laurence H. Tribe.
Thus, in Penera v. Comelec, the Court clarified that, under the law, the word “candidate” is defined as “any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy,” and that “any person who files a certificate of candidacy within the period for filing shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.” In Quinto v. Comelec, the Court upheld the constitutionality of three provisions in the election laws that deemed appointive officials to be automatically resigned upon filing their certificates of candidacy, holding that they did not violate the equal protection clause. In February of this year, the Court held that the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was not exempt from payment of legal fees imposed under the Rules of Court. The Court ruled that the Constitution and jurisprudence did not mean to include legal fees in the exemption from “fees, charges or duties of all kinds” because the payment of legal fees was a vital component of the rules promulgated by the Court, and it (could) not be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress.
But as Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson, in Brown v. Allen said of the Court, “We are not final because we are infallible, we are infallible only because we are final.”
Paragraph (5), Section 5, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution also authorizes the Supreme Court to “[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.”
Accordingly, with its rule-making power, the Court underscored and fortified our people’s individual, civil and political rights by the promulgation of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Indeed, one cannot deny the potency of this Rule when, mere days after its promulgation, several persons detained by the military on suspicion that they were communist rebels, regained their liberty. This was closely followed by the promulgation of the groundbreaking Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, which obliges state officials to permit families of victims of enforced disappearances access to official documents by invoking the formerly nebulous “right to truth.”
Just a month and a half ago, we completed the circle of human rights by focusing on our people’s rights to a healthy environment, intergenerational equity and sustainability. The newly-launched Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, at the crux of which are the Writ of Kalikasan and the Writ of Continuing Mandamus, are a sound testament to this.
We likewise persevered to increase the poor’s access to effective and efficient justice by promulgating the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service for Practicing Lawyers, which requires all practicing lawyers to render a minimum number of hours every year of free legal aid to indigents as a pre-condition to their continued good standing. Corollarily, the Court likewise approved the Rule on the Exemption from the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) and the Legal Aid Offices of the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Furthermore, cognizant of the adage “[j]ustice delayed is justice denied,” the Court has gone to great lengths to decongest court dockets and expedite the resolution of cases. In 2008, for example, the Court promulgated the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases to accelerate the resolution of civil cases involving the poor and the oppressed. In 2009, it promulgated the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution to encourage and promote the use of ADR, specifically arbitration and mediation, as a means to de-clog the dockets of the courts.
The Court has also literally brought people to justice, and justice to the people, when it launched the Enhanced Justice on Wheels (EJOW) project. By April 2010, these mobile courtrooms have released 3,545 inmates, either because they were acquitted or they had served the maximum penalty for the crimes they were accused of. 5,606 cases have also been successfully mediated. 2,270 individuals have benefited from free legal aid, and 9,056 inmates have received medical and dental attention. Pursuant to my commitment to Chief Justice Puno to continue the EJOW, we launched the EJOW Project in Marikina last week. Before noon, 75 inmates had been released, 130 given medical and dental aid, 50 extended legal assistance, while 4 out of 4 cases considered were successfully mediated.
Indeed, the judiciary as empowered by the 1987 Constitution is certainly far from being benign. Indeed, it has become a misconception to say that it is the least powerful of all the branches of government because the judiciary can make a distinct and significant difference for the good, and in ways that directly impact on our people’s lives.
We hope to complete the construction of both the Manila and the Angeles Halls of Justice, both of which are designed as models courts. We are going to fully computerize all our courts from Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to Balut Island, Davao del Sur. Hopefully, these improvements in infrastructure and equipment will aid in creating a more efficient working environment for our court personnel. These reforms shall also be complemented by developments within the judicial system. Among the programs we intend to pay close attention to are the decentralization of functions of the Office of the Court Administrator and the strengthening of the integrity values in the Judiciary. The objective is to bring our courts closer to the people and make the judiciary more responsive and relevant to the needs of the court users.
In this light, and with all candor, I acknowledge that I have stepped into gigantic shoes. Former Chief Justice Puno, truly an intellectual aristocrat, has instituted far-reaching and significant judicial reforms whose consequences, without doubt, will resonate well into the future. However, as I pledged when I entered upon the duties of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, I will serve with utmost fidelity to this call of public duty to serve God and country.
We shall not have a dormant judiciary in my watch. To be sure, a strong, competent, incorruptible and independent judiciary is the protector of our rights and liberties, and without doubt, the last bulwark of democracy. I shall thus continue the reforms we have begun, aim to improve the judiciary even further in every aspect possible, and strengthen the great institution of the Supreme Court. Certainly, much still remains to be done as the quest for fairness, justice and right is a never-ending pursuit. Mindful of the spectrum of public opinion, as well as the fact that I have more than eight years to serve our people, I say with all humility: let history be the inerrant judge of the Corona Court.
Thank you and a happy Independence Day to all of you. Mabuhay ang Pilipinas!
see:
http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/261770/unity-judicial-reform
