In the case of TORBEN B. OVERGAARD vs. ATTY. GODWIN R. VALDEZ, Per Curiam, En Banc, A.C. No. 7902, March 31, 2009, at bar was a Motion for Reconsideration, dated, October 21, 2008 filed by respondent Godwin R. Valdez, praying that the September 30, 2008 decision of this Court disbarring him from the practice of law be reconsidered by remanding the records of the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline. He further prays that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline be directed to receive his Answer, evidence and Position Paper and thereafter, that he be absolved of the charges against him and that his name be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
In the said case, the Philippine Supreme Court made the following doctrinal pronouncements, thus:
1. The complainant, Torben Overgaard (Overgaard) engaged the services of respondent Valdez as his legal counsel in two cases filed by him and two cases filed against him. Despite the receipt of the full amount of legal fees of P900,000.00 as stipulated in a Retainer Agreement, the respondent refused to perform any of his obligations under their contract for legal services, ignored the complainant’s request for a report of the status of the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected the complainant’s demands for the return of the money paid to him.
2. Complainant Overgaard filed a complaint for disbarment against Valdez before the IBP. During the investigation, respondent Valdez did not participate despite due notice. He was declared in default for failure to submit an answer and attend the mandatory conference. He did not submit a position paper or attend the hearing.
3. On September 30, 2008, this Court held that respondent Valdez committed multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive portion of this Decision states:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is ORDERED to immediately return to Torben B. Overgaard the amount of $16,854.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of actual payment, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from November 27, 2006, the date of extra-judicial demand. A twelve percent (12%) interest per annum, in lieu of six percent (6%), shall be imposed on such amount from the date of promulgation of this decision until the payment thereof. He is further ORDERED to immediately return all papers and documents received from the complainant.
4. On the first issue raised in the motion for reconsideration, the respondent argues that the IBP has no jurisdiction over him since proof of service of the initiatory pleading to the defendant is a jurisidictional requirement. He states in his Motion for Reconsideration that “he had no inkling whatsoever of the existence of the disbarment case filed by the complainant.” He asserts that, in September 2006, he “abruptly abandoned his office at Suite 402 Pacific Irvine Bldg., 2746 Zenaida St., at Makati City following persistent and serious threats to his physical safety and security x x x.” On the advice of his close friends and clients to “lie low” and “make himself ‘scarce,’” he stayed for a few days in his residence at Imus, Cavite then relocated to Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. He has been holding office and residing in Bukidnon since then, and he only found out about the decision from a colleague in Bukidnon who read the decision from the Court’s website.
5. We hold that respondent was given reasonable notice of the complaint for disbarment against him.
A copy of the Complaint as well as the Order to answer the Complaint was sent by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to the respondent’s Makati office address, and it was duly received by the respondent. The Registry Return Receipt shows that it was also received by one “RRJ,” whose signature appears on the space for the signature of the addressee’s agent. The respondent cannot claim lack of knowledge of the complaint for disbarment against him when the Complaint and the Order for him to submit an Answer were duly received by his agent at his Makati law office. Succeeding notices in connection with the disbarment proceedings were also sent to the respondent’s Makati law office. He cannot escape liability for his misdeeds by feigning ignorance of the disbarment case, since the notices in connection with the proceedings were sent to his office address made known to the public and properly received by his agent.
6. Respondent Valdez was given full opportunity, upon reasonable notice, to answer the charges against him and to present evidence on his behalf. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was correct in proceeding with the investigation ex parte, because it was due to the respondent’s own fault and negligence that he was not able to submit an answer to the Complaint and participate in the investigation. Rule 138, Section 30 provides that an attorney should be heard before he is removed or suspended; but if, upon reasonable notice, an attorney fails to appear and answer the accusations against him, the matter may be dealt with ex parte. Rule 138, Section 30 states:
SECTION 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. (Emphasis supplied.)
7. The respondent’s feeble excuse that he was no longer holding office at his Makati office address at the time the Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was sent to him is unacceptable. Ordinary prudence would have guarded against his alleged failure to receive the notices. All notices to the respondent were sent to his Makati office address, which was the address made known to the public and to the complainant. This is even the address printed on the letterhead of the Retainer Agreement between the complainant and the respondent. And although the respondent claims that he had to “make himself ‘scarce’” due to threats to his life and safety, this does not mean that he avoids the responsibility of taking account of his mail. The respondent owes it to himself and to his clients to adopt a system whereby he would be able to receive mail sent to his law office during his absence. Assuming that circumstances would justify the respondent’s abrupt abandonment of his Makati office, it absolutely does not give him the license to abandon his clients as well.
8. In abruptly abandoning his law office without advising his client and without making sure that the cases he was handling for his client were properly attended to during his absence, and without making arrangements whereby he would receive important mail, the respondent is clearly guilty of gross negligence. A lawyer cannot simply disappear and abandon his clients and then rely on the convenient excuse that there were threats to his safety. Even assuming that there were serious threats to his person, this did not give him the permission to desert his client and leave the cases entrusted to his care hanging. He should have at least exercised reasonable and ordinary care and diligence by taking steps to ensure that the cases he was handling were attended to and that his client’s interest was safeguarded. If it was not possible for him to handle the cases entrusted to his care, he should have informed the complainant of his predicament and asked that he be allowed to withdraw from the case to enable the client to engage the services of another counsel who could properly represent him. Deplorably, the respondent just disappeared, deserted his client and forgot about the cases entrusted to his care, to the complainant’s damage and prejudice.
9. The respondent’s disbarment is not anchored on his failure to do anything in relation the cases entrusted to his care, but on his abandonment of his client. He will not be absolved from liability on the basis alone of these inconsequential acts which he claims to have accomplished because the glaring fact remains that he has failed to perform his essential obligations to his client, to the courts and to society. As the complainant’s lawyer, the respondent is expected to serve his client with competence and diligence. This includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care and giving the complainant sound legal advice, but also properly representing his client in court, attending scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the cases entrusted to his care with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for his client or the court to prod him to do so. He should not idly sit by and leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty.
10. The respondent’s acts and omissions were not just a case of inaction, but they amount to deceitful conduct and are contrary to good morals. After assuring the complainant that he would protect the latter’s interest and attend to the cases included in the Retainer Agreement, he abandoned his client. It was only after the complainant’s own inquiry that he discovered that the respondent never appeared in court to represent the complainant in the cases filed against him, so much so that he had no knowledge that warrants of arrest were already issued against him. The respondent also failed to enter his appearance in the civil case for Mandamus, Injunction and Damages that the complainant filed. After receiving the complete amount of legal fees, giving the complainant initial legal advice, and interviewing some witnesses, the respondent just disappeared and the complainant never heard from him despite his continued efforts to contact the respondent.
11. The complainant put his trust in the respondent with full faith that the latter would exert his best effort and ability in the prosecution and defense of his client’s cause. But instead of devotion to his client’s cause, the respondent grossly neglected his duties to his client. After all the representations he made to the complainant and after receipt of the full amount of the legal fees, he absconded from his responsibilities and betrayed his client’s trust. There is no excuse for this, and his gross negligence and appalling indifference is unforgiveable.
12. If the respondent had indeed returned the documents sometime in the middle of July 2006, he would have presented a receipt to prove such turnover of documents. And if the respondent had indeed rendered an accounting of the money that was paid to him, he would have attached a received copy of the accounting to his Motion for Reconsideration. But he failed to do both. There was no proof presented. We cannot rely on his bare allegation, especially when the complainant demanded the return of the documents months after they were allegedly returned.
13. It is a lawyer’s duty to properly account for the money he received from the client. If indeed the respondent told the client that he would pay P300,000.00 to two intelligence operatives, as he claims in his Motion for Reconsideration, he should have held this money in trust, and he was under an obligation to make an accounting. It was his duty to secure a receipt for the payment of this amount on behalf of his client. But he failed to present any receipt or certification from Collado that the payment was received. Since the respondent was not able either to present an accounting of the P900,000.00 paid to him upon the complainant’s demand, or to provide a sufficient and plausible explanation for where such amount was spent, he must immediately return the same.
14. We must emphasize that the right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise, and it may be extended or withheld by this Court in the exercise of its sound discretion. As guardian of the legal profession, this Court has ultimate disciplinary power over members of the Bar in order to ensure that the highest standards of competence and of honesty and fair dealing are maintained. We find that the respondent has fallen below such exacting standard and is unworthy of the privilege to practice law.
