Sunday, March 6, 2011

3rd-party claims during executions of decisions in labor cases

G.R. No. 184007

Note:


Courts have no power to enjoin labor proceedings or writs. The Labor Code and its Implementing Rules so provide. The said Rules contain provisions on remedies of third-party claimants during the execution of decisions in labor cases. The process is internal to the structures of the National Labor Relations Commission. Courts cannot enjoin the labor arbiters.



PAQUITO V. ANDO,
Petitioner,
 
- versus -

ANDRESITO Y. CAMPO, ET AL.,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 184007

Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 16, 2011
x---------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
 
x x x.


Initially, we must state that the CA did not, in fact, err in upholding the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction to restrain the implementation of the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter.
The Court has long recognized that regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide questions which arise from and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards rendered in labor cases by appropriate officers and tribunals of the Department of Labor and Employment. To hold otherwise is to sanction splitting of jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.[22]
Thus, it is, first and foremost, the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment that governs any question on the execution of a judgment of that body. Petitioner need not look further than that. The Rules of Court apply only by analogy or in a suppletory character.[23]
Consider the provision in Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on third-party claims:

SEC. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.—If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff or levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the purpose.
 

On the other hand, the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment deals specifically with third-party claims in cases brought before that body. It defines a third-party claim as one where a person, not a party to the case, asserts title to or right to the possession of the property levied upon.[24] It also sets out the procedure for the filing of a third-party claim, to wit:


SECTION 2. Proceedings. — If property levied upon be claimed by any person other than the losing party or his agent, such person shall make an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title and shall file the same with the sheriff and copies thereof served upon the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing the writ and upon the prevailing party. Upon receipt of the third party claim, all proceedings with respect to the execution of the property subject of the third party claim shall automatically be suspended and the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing the writ shall conduct a hearing with due notice to all parties concerned and resolve the validity of the claim within ten (10) working days from receipt thereof and his decision is appealable to the Commission within ten (10) working days from notice, and the Commission shall resolve the appeal within same period.
 

There is no doubt in our mind that petitioner’s complaint is a third- party claim within the cognizance of the NLRC. Petitioner may indeed be considered a “third party” in relation to the property subject of the execution vis-à-vis the Labor Arbiter’s decision. There is no question that the property belongs to petitioner and his wife, and not to the corporation. It can be said that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, not to petitioner alone. Thus, the property belongs to a third party, i.e., the conjugal partnership. At the very least, the Court can consider that petitioner’s wife is a third party within contemplation of the law.
The Court’s pronouncements in Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Hon. Cabato[25] are instructive:


Ostensibly the complaint before the trial court was for the recovery of possession and injunction, but in essence it was an action challenging the legality or propriety of the levy vis-a-vis the alias writ of execution, including the acts performed by the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Sheriff implementing the writ. The complaint was in effect a motion to quash the writ of execution of a decision rendered on a case properly within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, to wit: Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice. Considering the factual setting, it is then logical to conclude that the subject matter of the third party claim is but an incident of the labor case, a matter beyond the jurisdiction of regional trial courts.
x x x x
x x x. Whatever irregularities attended the issuance an execution of the alias writ of execution should be referred to the same administrative tribunal which rendered the decision. This is because any court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.
The broad powers granted to the Labor Arbiter and to the National Labor Relations Commission by Articles 217, 218 and 224 of the Labor Code can only be interpreted as vesting in them jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in connection with or relating to labor disputes, as the controversy under consideration, to the exclusion of the regular courts.[26]


There is no denying that the present controversy arose from the complaint for illegal dismissal. The subject matter of petitioner’s complaint is the execution of the NLRC decision. Execution is an essential part of the proceedings before the NLRC. Jurisdiction, once acquired, continues until the case is finally terminated,[27] and there can be no end to the controversy without the full and proper implementation of the commission’s directives.
Further underscoring the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint is Article 254 of the Labor Code, to wit:


ART. 254. INJUNCTION PROHIBITED. – No temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity, except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of this Code.
 

That said, however, we resolve to put an end to the controversy right now, considering the length of time that has passed since the levy on the property was made.
Petitioner claims that the property sought to be levied does not belong to PACSI, the judgment debtor, but to him and his wife. Since he was sued in a representative capacity, and not in his personal capacity, the property could not be made to answer for the judgment obligation of the corporation.
The TCT[28] of the property bears out that, indeed, it belongs to petitioner and his wife. Thus, even if we consider petitioner as an agent of the corporation – and, therefore, not a stranger to the case – such that the provision on third-party claims will not apply to him, the property was registered not only in the name of petitioner but also of his wife. She stands to lose the property subject of execution without ever being a party to the case. This will be tantamount to deprivation of property without due process.
Moreover, the power of the NLRC, or the courts, to execute its judgment extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone.[29] A sheriff, therefore, has no authority to attach the property of any person except that of the judgment debtor.[30] Likewise, there is no showing that the sheriff ever tried to execute on the properties of the corporation.
In sum, while petitioner availed himself of the wrong remedy to vindicate his rights, nonetheless, justice demands that this Court look beyond his procedural missteps and grant the petition.


x x x.