Harpoon Marine Services, Inc. and Jose Lido T. Rosit, | G.R. No. 167751 | |
Petitioners, | ||
Present: | ||
CORONA | ||
VELASCO | ||
- versus - | DE CASTRO, | |
DEL CASTILLO | ||
PEREZ, JJ. | ||
Fernan H. Francisco, | Promulgated: | |
Respondent. | March 2, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Satisfactory evidence of a valid or just cause of dismissal is indispensably required in order to protect a laborer’s right to security of tenure. In the case before us, the employer presented none despite the burden to prove clearly its cause.
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Our Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
Respondent was illegally dismissed for failure of petitioners to prove the existence of a just cause for his dismissal.
Petitioners reiterate that respondent was a habitual absentee as indubitably shown by his time card for the period covering June 1-15, 2001,[27] payroll[28] for the same period as well as the memoranda[29] enumerating his absences subsequent to
June 15, 2001.
Respondent belies these claims and explained that his absence for three days as reflected in the time card was due to petitioner Rosit’s prohibition for them to report for work owing to the latter’s hospitalization. He claims that he was illegally terminated on June 15, 2001 and was subsequently prevented from entering company premises. In defense, petitioners deny terminating respondent on June 15, 2001, maintaining that petitioner Rosit merely reminded him of his numerous absences. However, in defiance of the company’s order, respondent continued to absent himself, went on AWOL and abandoned his work.
We find no merit in petitioners’ contention that respondent incurred unexplained and habitual absences and tardiness. A scrutiny of the time card and payroll discloses that respondent incurred only three days of absence and no record of tardiness. As aptly held by the NLRC, the time card and payroll presented by petitioners do not show gross and habitual absenteeism and tardiness especially since respondent’s explanation of his three-day absence was not denied by petitioners at the first instance before the Labor Arbiter. No other evidence was presented to show the alleged absences and tardiness. On the other hand, Solares, a co-worker of respondent has stated under oath that, as their supervisor, respondent was diligent in reporting for work until June 20, 2001 when they heard the news concerning respondent’s termination from his job.
Likewise, we are not persuaded with petitioners’ claim that respondent incurred additional absences, went on AWOL and abandoned his work. It is worthy to note at this point that petitioners never denied having offered respondent his separation pay. In fact, in their letter-reply dated September 28, 2001,[30] petitioners intimated that respondent may pick up the amount of P27,584.37 any time he wants, which amount represents his separation and 13th month pays. Oddly, petitioners deemed it fit to give respondent his separation pay despite their assertion that there is just cause for his dismissal on the ground of habitual absences. This inconsistent stand of petitioners bolsters the fact that they wanted to terminate respondent, thus giving more credence to respondent’s protestation that he was barred and prevented from reporting for work.
Jurisprudence provides for two essential requirements for abandonment of work to exist. The “failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason” and “clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship x x x manifested by some overt acts” should both concur.[31] Further, the employee’s deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume his employment without any intention of returning should be established and proven by the employer.[32]
Petitioners failed to prove that it was respondent who voluntarily refused to report back for work by his defiance and refusal to accept the memoranda and the notices of absences sent to him. The CA correctly ruled that petitioners failed to present evidence that they sent these notices to respondent’s last known address for the purpose of warning him that his continued failure to report would be construed as abandonment of work. The affidavit of petitioner Harpoon’s liaison officer that the memoranda/notices were duly sent to respondent is insufficient and self-serving. Despite being stamped as received, the memoranda do not bear any signature of respondent to indicate that he actually received the same. There was no proof on how these notices were given to respondent. Neither was there any other cogent evidence that these were properly received by respondent.
The fact that respondent never prayed for reinstatement and has sought employment in another company which is a competitor of petitioner Harpoon cannot be construed as his overt acts of abandoning employment. Neither can the delay of four months be taken as an indication that the respondent’s filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is a mere afterthought. Records show that respondent first attempted to get his separation pay and alleged commissions from the company. It was only after his requests went unheeded that he resorted to judicial recourse.
In fine, both the NLRC and the CA did not commit manifest error in finding that there was illegal dismissal. The award of backwages and separation pay in favor of respondent is therefore proper.
Respondent is not entitled to the payment of commissions since the check vouchers and purported list of vessels show vagueness as to sufficiently prove the claim.
The Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA unanimously held that respondent is entitled to his accrued commissions in the amount of P10,000.00 for every vessel repaired/constructed by the company or the total amount of P70,000.00 for the seven vessels repaired/constructed under his supervision.
The Court, however, is inclined to rule otherwise. Examination of the check vouchers presented by respondent reveals that an amount of P30,000.00 and P10,000.00 alleged as commissions were paid to respondent on June 9, 2000 and September 28, 2000, respectively. Although the veracity and genuineness of these documents were not effectively disputed by petitioners, nothing in them provides that commissions were paid to respondent on account of a repair or construction of a vessel. It cannot also be deduced from said documents for what or for how many vessels the amounts stated therein are for. In other words, the check vouchers contain very scant details and can hardly be considered as sufficient and substantial evidence to conclude that respondent is entitled to a commission of P10,000.00 for every vessel repaired or constructed by the company. At most, these vouchers only showed that respondent was paid on two occasions but were silent as to the specific purpose of payment. The list of vessels supposedly repaired/constructed by the company neither validates respondent’s monetary claim as it merely contains an enumeration of 17 names of vessels and nothing more. No particulars, notation or any clear indication can be found on the list that the repair or complete construction of seven of the seventeen boats listed therein was supervised or managed by respondent. Worse, the list is written only on a piece of paper and not on petitioners’ official stationery and is unverified and unsigned. Verily, its patent vagueness makes it unworthy of any credence to be used as basis for awarding respondent compensations as alleged commissions. Aside from these documents, no other competent evidence was presented by respondent to determine the value of what is properly due him, much less his entitlement to a commission. Respondent’s claim cannot be based on allegations and unsubstantiated assertions without any competent document to support it. Certainly, the award of commissions in favor of respondent in the amount of P70,000.00 should not be allowed as the claim is founded on mere inferences, speculations and presumptions.
Rosit could not be held solidarily liable with Harpoon for lack of substantial evidence of bad faith and malice on his part in terminating respondent.
Although we find no error on the part of the NLRC and the CA in declaring the dismissal of respondent illegal, we, however, are not in accord with the ruling that petitioner Rosit should be held solidarily liable with petitioner Harpoon for the payment of respondent’s backwages and separation pay.
As held in the case of MAM Realty Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[33] “obligations incurred by [corporate officers], acting as such corporate agents, are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent.”[34] As such, they should not be generally held jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation. The Court, however, cited circumstances when solidary liabilities may be imposed, as exceptions:
1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the officers of a corporation –
(a) vote for or assent to [patently] unlawful acts of the corporation;
(b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the corporate affairs;
(c) are guilty of conflict of interest to the prejudice of the corporation, its stockholders or members, and other persons.
2. When the director or officer has consented to the issuance of watered stock or who, having knowledge thereof, did not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto.
3. When a director, trustee or officer has contractually agreed or stipulated to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation.
4. When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of law, personally liable for his corporate action.[35]
The general rule is grounded on the theory that a corporation has a legal personality separate and distinct from the persons comprising it.[36] To warrant the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction, the officer’s bad faith or wrongdoing “must be established clearly and convincingly” as “[b]ad faith is never presumed.”[37]
In the case at bench, the CA’s basis for petitioner Rosit’s liability was that he acted in bad faith when he approached respondent and told him that the company could no longer afford his salary and that he will be paid instead his separation pay and accrued commissions. This finding, however, could not substantially justify the holding of any personal liability against petitioner Rosit. The records are bereft of any other satisfactory evidence that petitioner Rosit acted in bad faith with gross or inexcusable negligence, or that he acted outside the scope of his authority as company president. Indeed, petitioner Rosit informed respondent that the company wishes to terminate his services since it could no longer afford his salary. Moreover, the promise of separation pay, according to petitioners, was out of goodwill and magnanimity. At the most, petitioner Rosit’s actuations only show the illegality of the manner of effecting respondent’s termination from service due to absence of just or valid cause and non-observance of procedural due process but do not point to any malice or bad faith on his part. Besides, good faith is still presumed. In addition, liability only attaches if the officer has assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation.
Thus, it was error for the CA to hold petitioner Rosit solidarily liable with petitioner Harpoon for illegally dismissing respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 26, 2005 and Resolution dated April 12, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79630 finding respondent Fernan H. Francisco to have been illegally dismissed and awarding him backwages and separation pay are AFFIRMED. The award of commissions in his favor is, however, DELETED. Petitioner Jose Lido T. Rosit is ABSOLVED from the liability adjudged against co-petitioner Harpoon Marine Services, Incorporated.
SO ORDERED.
Notes:
[31] Henlin Panay Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 180718, October 23, 2009, 604 SCRA 362, 369.
[32] Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., 459 Phil. 506, 515 (2003).
[33] 314 Phil. 838 (1995).
[34] Id. at 844.
[35] Id. at 844-845.
[36] Petron Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commissions, G.R. No. 154532, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 596, 613.
[37] Carag v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 147590, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 28, 49.
