JOEY P. MARQUEZ, Petitioner, - versus - THE SANDIGANBAYAN 5TH DIVISION and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents. | G.R. 187912-14 Present: CARPIO, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: January 31, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
x x x.
One of the most vital and precious rights accorded to an accused by the Constitution is due process, which includes a fair and impartial trial and a reasonable opportunity to present one’s defense. Under Section 14, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided that:
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (emphasis supplied)
In this connection, it is well settled that due process in criminal proceedings requires that (a) the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
While the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity, by necessary implication, it means that the accused should be allowed reasonable freedom to present his defense if the courts are to give form and substance to this guaranty. Should the trial court fail to accord an accused reasonable opportunity to submit evidence in his defense, the exercise by the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is warranted as this amounts to a denial of due process.
Thus, Marquez bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove the fact that his signatures were indeed forged. In order to be able to discharge his burden, he must be afforded reasonable opportunity to present evidence to support his allegation. This opportunity is the actual examination of the signatures he is questioning by no less than the country’s premier investigative force – the NBI. If he is denied such opportunity, his only evidence on this matter is negative testimonial evidence which is generally considered as weak. And, he cannot submit any other examination result because the signatures are on the original documents which are in the control of either the prosecution or the graft court.
At any rate, any finding of the NBI will not be binding on the graft court. It will still be subject to its scrutiny and evaluation in line with Section 22 of Rule 132. Nevertheless, Marquez should not be deprived of his right to present his own defense. How the prosecution, or even the court, perceives his defense to be is irrelevant. To them, his defense may seem feeble and his strategy frivolous, but he should be allowed to adduce evidence of his own choice. The court should not control how he will defend himself as long as the steps to be taken will not be in violation of the rules.
Apparently, he did not abandon his quest. In his Omnibus Motion dated April 1, 2008 filed with the SB-4th Division, Marquez did not only move for the inhibition of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, but also moved for the referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization to the NBI. Since the latter was not acted upon, he filed the subject Motion to Refer Prosecution’s Evidence for Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation reiterating his plea, this time with the SB-5th Division.
If this case has been delayed, it is because of the denial of the simple request of Marquez. If it was granted in the first instance, the trial of the case would have proceeded smoothly and would have been over by now. If the Court were to deny this petition and Marquez would be convicted for having failed to prove forgery, he could not be prevented from crying that he was prevented from presenting evidence in his defense.
The fact that Marquez did not raise this issue with the COA is immaterial and irrelevant. His failure or omission to do so may affect the appreciation and weight of his defense, but it should not bar him from insisting on it during his turn to adduce evidence.
In denying said motion, the SB-5th Division offered no valid explanation other than the fact that, being the trial court, it may validly determine forgery from its own independent examination of the documentary evidence. While it is true that the appreciation of whether the signatures of Marquez are genuine or not is subject to the discretion of the graft court, this discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Evidence cannot properly be weighed if not exhibited or produced before the court.[14] Only after evidence is offered and admitted that the court can appreciate and evaluate it. The prosecution had already offered its evidence on the matter. The court should not deny the same right to the defense.
The fact that the documentary exhibits were already formally offered and duly admitted by the anti-graft court cannot preclude an examination of the signatures thereon by the defense. With proper handling by court personnel, this can easily be accomplished by the NBI expert examiners.
In the conduct of its proceedings, a court is given discretion in maintaining the delicate balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial on the one hand, and the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals on the other. Indeed, both the State and the accused are entitled to due process. However, the exercise of such discretion must be exercised judiciously, bearing in mind the circumstances of each case, and the interests of substantial justice.
Thus, for having denied Marquez the opportunity to be heard and to produce evidence of his choice in his defense, the SB-5th Division committed grave abuse of discretion warranting intervention from the Court. The anti-graft court should allow him to refer the evidence of the prosecution to the Questioned Documents Section of the NBI for examination at the soonest time possible and for the latter to immediately conduct such examination and to submit the results to the court within a reasonable time.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 11, 2009 and May 20, 2009 Resolutions of the 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27903, 27904 and 27905 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to allow the petitioner Joey P. Marquez to refer the evidence of the prosecution to the Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation for examination as soon as possible and, after submission of the results to the court and proper proceedings, to act on the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Rollo, p. 5
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Napoleon E. Inoturan with Associate Justice Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada
and Associate Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, concurring; id. at 47-51.
[3] Id. at 52-55.
[4] Id. at 66-75.
[5] Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27903-27905. Other graft cases filed against the petitioner and other officials of the City of Parañaque were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27944, 27946, 27952-27954.
[6] Rollo, pp. 154-159.
[7] Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)
[8] Resolution, Sandiganbayan-5th Division, February 11, 2009, pp.1-2, rollo, pp. 47-48.
[9] Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. — The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (23a)
[10] Salma v. Hon. Miro, G.R. No. 168362, January 25, 2007, 512 SCRA 724.
[11] Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 550.
[12] Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. CA, G.R. No. 117609, 360 Phil. 753 (1998).
[13] Rollo, pp. 154-159.
[14] See Basco v. Rapatalo, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335, 336 Phil. 214 (1997), citing Ramos v. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362 (1923).
