Friday, February 3, 2012

Probable cause not established; estafa

Republic of the Philippines

"x x x.


Ruling


The appeal has no merit.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government,27 or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch,28 represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.29 That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.30 For instance, in Balanganan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City,31the Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice exceeded his jurisdiction when he required “hard facts and solid evidence” in order to hold the defendant liable for criminal prosecution when such requirement should have been left to the court after the conduct of a trial.


In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is not part of a trial.32 At a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice only determines whether the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.33 Probable cause refers to facts and circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof.34 There is no definitive standard by which probable cause is determined except to consider the attendant conditions; the existence of probable cause depends upon the finding of the public prosecutor conducting the examination, who is called upon not to disregard the facts presented, and to ensure that his finding should not run counter to the clear dictates of reason.35


Tobias was charged with estafa through falsification of public document the elements of which are: (a) the accused uses a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or employs other similar deceits; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.36 It is required that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive that induced the complainant to part with the thing.37


METROBANK urges the application of the presumption of authorship against Tobias based on his having offered the duplicate copy of the spurious title to secure the loan; and posits that there is no requirement that the presumption shall apply only when there is absence of a valid explanation from the person found to have possessed, used and benefited from the forged document.


We cannot sustain METROBANK’s urging.


Firstly, a presumption affects the burden of proof that is normally lodged in the State.38 The effect is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case that shall prevail in the absence of proof to the contrary.39 As such, a presumption of law is material during the actual trial of the criminal case where in the establishment thereof the party against whom the inference is made should adduce evidence to rebut the presumption and demolish the prima facie case.40 This is not so in a preliminary investigation, where the investigating prosecutor only determines the existence of aprima facie case that warrants the prosecution of a criminal case in court.41


Secondly, the presumption of authorship, being disputable, may be accepted and acted upon where no evidence upholds the contention for which it stands.42 It is not correct to say, consequently, that the investigating prosecutor will try to determine the existence of the presumption during preliminary investigation, and then to disregard the evidence offered by the respondent. The fact that the finding of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is an executive function does not excuse the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice from discharging the duty to weigh the evidence submitted by the parties. Towards that end, the investigating prosecutor, and, ultimately, the Secretary of Justice have ample discretion to determine the existence of probable cause,43 a discretion that must be used to file only a criminal charge that the evidence and inferences can properly warrant.


The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger applies only in the absence of a satisfactory explanation.44 Accordingly, we cannot hold that the Secretary of Justice erred in dismissing the information in the face of the controverting explanation by Tobias showing how he came to possess the spurious document. Much less can we consider the dismissal as done with abuse of discretion, least of all grave. We concur with the erudite exposition of the CA on the matter, to wit:


It would seem that under the above proposition of the petitioner, the moment a person has in his possession a falsified document and has made use of it, probable cause or prima facie is already established and that no amount of satisfactory explanation will prevent the filing of the case in court by the investigating officer, for any such good explanation or defense can only be threshed out in the trial on the merit. We are not to be persuaded. To give meaning to such argumentation will surely defeat the very purpose for which preliminary investigation is required in this jurisdiction.


A preliminary investigation is designed to secure the respondent involved against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed, and (b) whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof (De Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 480 SCRA 71 [2006]). It is a means of discovering the person or persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime (Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 478 SCRA 387, 410 [2005]). Prescindingly, under Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the respondent must be informed of the accusation against him and shall have the right to examine the evidence against him and submit his counter-affidavit to disprove criminal liability. By far, respondent in a criminal preliminary investigation is legally entitled to explain his side of the accusation.


We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same the presumption or inference is that such person is the forger (Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]), citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet, the Supreme Court declared that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used it is presumed to be the forger (citing People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation could render ineffective the presumption which, after all, is merely a disputable one.45

We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank dealing in real property, had the duty to observe due diligence to ascertain the existence and condition of the realty as well as the validity and integrity of the documents bearing on the realty.46 Its duty included the responsibility of dispatching its competent and experience representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and condition, and of investigating who was its real owner.47 Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did not diligently perform a thorough check on Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the realty he had offered as collateral. As such, it had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to exercise greater care and prudence than others in their dealings because their business is impressed with public interest.48 Their failure to do so constitutes negligence on its part.49 "