"x x x.
President’s authority to appoint OICs
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the President’s power to appoint pertains only to appointive positions and cannot extend to positions held by elective officials.
The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in nature.[25] Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power, thus:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
The 1935 Constitution contained a provision similar to the one quoted above. Section 10(3), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provides:
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [emphasis ours]
The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is the sentence construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the various appointments the President can make are enumerated in a single sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the various appointments the President is empowered to make and divides the enumeration in two sentences. The change in style is significant; in providing for this change, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction between the first group of presidential appointments and the second group of presidential appointments, as made evident in the following exchange:
MR. FOZ. Madame President x x x I propose to put a period (.) after “captain” and x x x delete “and all” and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.[26]
The first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
The second group of officials the President can appoint are “all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.”[27]The second sentence acts as the “catch-all provision” for the President’s appointment power, in recognition of the fact that the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature.[28] The wide latitude given to the President to appoint is further demonstrated by the recognition of the President’s power to appoint officials whose appointments are not even provided for by law. In other words, where there are offices which have to be filled, but the law does not provide the process for filling them, the Constitution recognizes the power of the President to fill the office by appointment.
Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the President’s appointment power should be strictly construed and must be clearly stated in order to be recognized.[29] Given that the President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the President’s appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.
The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the power to appoint OICs in elective positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the Constitution,[30] which merely grants the President the power of supervision over autonomous regions.
This is an overly restrictive interpretation of the President’s appointment power. There is no incompatibility between the President’s power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.
The power of supervision is defined as “the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law.”[31] This is distinguished from the power of control or “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.”[32]
The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the President’s appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners’ supposition. The provision states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners’ fears in this regard are more apparent than real.
