"x x x.
Well-settled is the rule that an injunction cannot be issued to transfer possession or control of a property to another when the legal title is in dispute between the parties and the legal title has not been clearly established.2 In this case, respondent judge evidently disregarded this established doctrine applied in numerous cases when it granted the preliminary injunction in favor of Pagels whose legal title is disputed. When the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.3 Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence.4
Respondent judge should have been more cautious in issuing writs of preliminary injunctions because as consistently held these writs are strong arms of equity which must be issued with great deliberation.”5 In Fortune Life Insurance Co., Inc. v. Luczon,6 the Court held the judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he failed to conduct a hearing prior to issuance of an injunction in violation of the Rules of Court. It was further emphasized in Zuño v. Cabredo,7where it was held that the act of respondent in issuing the TRO to enjoin the Bureau of Customs and its officials from detaining the subject shipment amounted to gross ignorance of the law.
A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence.8 In the present case, the following compounded circumstances manifest bad faith on the part of respondent judge: (1) in his Comment with Counter-Charge, respondent judge states that he decided after the parties submitted their position papers, but his Order dated 11 August 2009 indicates that respondent spouses did not file their position paper and the hearing of the Affirmative Defense was still set on 18 August 2009; (2) respondent judge’s Order patently shows facts not entitling Pagels to the preliminary injunction but respondent judge still issued it; and (3) respondent judge did not require petitioner Pagels to put up a bond without sufficient justification or showing of exemption.
